Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Rory M. Isaac and Kimberly J. Isaac, buyers in a residential real estate transaction, sued the sellers' real estate agent, Laura Kopchynski, for failing to disclose high moisture levels in the crawl space and mischaracterizing a wood infestation report as "good." The Isaacs claimed fraud, fraud in the inducement, negligent misrepresentation, civil conspiracy, and violation of the South Carolina Residential Property Condition Disclosure Act.The Circuit Court granted summary judgment to Kopchynski on all claims. The Isaacs appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed the summary judgment on the negligent misrepresentation and Disclosure Act claims, while affirming the summary judgment on the fraud and civil conspiracy claims. Kopchynski then petitioned for certiorari.The South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the case. It found that the Isaacs' agent did not rely on Kopchynski's statement about the June CL-100 report being "good" and that the Isaacs had a duty to inspect the property themselves. Therefore, the Isaacs could not establish justifiable reliance, a necessary element for negligent misrepresentation. The Court also held that the South Carolina Residential Property Condition Disclosure Act does not create a private cause of action against real estate licensees, only against property owners.The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and reinstated the Circuit Court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Kopchynski on both the negligent misrepresentation and Disclosure Act claims. View "Isaac v. Kopchynski" on Justia Law

Intellectual Capitol, Inc., JMI Sports, and JMIS College, LLC (Appellants) obtained contracts through the state procurement process with the South Carolina Workers' Compensation Commission (WCC) and Clemson University (Respondents). Disputes arose under these contracts, leading Respondents to file Requests for Resolution of Contract Controversy with the Chief Procurement Officer (CPO) for the State of South Carolina. Appellants then filed separate declaratory judgment actions in circuit court, challenging the constitutionality of section 11-35-4230 of the South Carolina Code, which grants the CPO exclusive jurisdiction over state contract disputes.The circuit court granted Respondents' motions to dismiss the declaratory judgment actions, ruling that section 11-35-4230 placed exclusive jurisdiction over the State's contract disputes with the CPO. The court also dismissed Appellants' constitutional claims as premature due to their failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Appellants appealed this decision.The South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the circuit court's dismissal of the declaratory judgment actions, but modified the reasoning. The Supreme Court held that the contracts between Appellants and Respondents contained a clear choice-of-forum provision, which unambiguously gave the CPO exclusive authority to resolve disputes. By agreeing to this provision, Appellants waived their right to have their disputes decided by a court of the unified judicial system. Consequently, there was no justiciable controversy, rendering the constitutional challenge to section 11-35-4230 a purely academic exercise. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's dismissal of the declaratory judgment actions, as there were no legal rights at issue. View "Intellectual Capital, Inc. v. Chief Procurement Officer" on Justia Law

James and Lori Marlowe own a home on Highway 378 in Florence County, South Carolina. In 2015, the South Carolina Department of Transportation (SCDOT) began construction to widen and realign a portion of Highway 378 adjacent to the Marlowes' home. During the construction, the home flooded twice, once in October 2015 and again in October 2016, during major storm events. The Marlowes filed a lawsuit against SCDOT, alleging inverse condemnation, conversion, due process violations, and negligence.The Circuit Court granted summary judgment in favor of SCDOT on all claims. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Circuit Court's decision on the negligence claim but reversed on the inverse condemnation claim. The Court of Appeals also held that the Stormwater Management and Sediment Reduction Act did not immunize SCDOT from liability. SCDOT petitioned for a writ of certiorari on the inverse condemnation and Stormwater Act issues, which the South Carolina Supreme Court granted.The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision that the Stormwater Act did not immunize SCDOT from liability. However, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision on the inverse condemnation claim, finding that there was insufficient evidence on the causation issue to allow the claim to proceed. The court held that the evidence, including expert testimony, did not rise above speculation regarding whether the construction of the new roadway caused the flooding of the Marlowes' home. Consequently, the Supreme Court reinstated the grant of summary judgment in favor of SCDOT on the inverse condemnation claim. View "Marlowe v. SC DOT" on Justia Law

Karrie and Howard Gurwood filed a lawsuit against GCA Services Group, Inc. after Karrie slipped and fell on a freshly waxed floor at her workplace, resulting in serious injuries. The Gurwoods claimed negligence on the part of GCA and sought damages, including punitive damages. At trial, the court granted GCA's motion for a directed verdict on punitive damages, and the jury found both Karrie and GCA each fifty percent at fault. The jury awarded Karrie the exact amount of her past medical expenses but found in favor of GCA on Howard's loss of consortium claim.The Gurwoods appealed to the South Carolina Court of Appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in granting the directed verdict on punitive damages and raised five other issues. The Court of Appeals reversed the directed verdict on punitive damages, finding it dispositive of the appeal, and remanded for a new trial. GCA then petitioned for a writ of certiorari to the South Carolina Supreme Court.The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' reversal of the directed verdict on punitive damages but modified the remand instructions. The Supreme Court held that requiring a retrial on all issues would be contrary to law and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals to address the other five grounds raised by the Gurwoods. The Supreme Court clarified that if the Court of Appeals finds no error on the other grounds, the case should proceed to a new trial on punitive damages only, unless GCA requests a new trial on all issues under subsection 15-32-520(A) of the South Carolina Code. View "Gurwood v. GCA Services Group, Inc." on Justia Law

Kenneth and Jill Swing were involved in a divorce action that included contested issues such as the pre-nuptial agreement, equitable division of property, child custody, visitation, support, and fees. The family court issued a final order on June 8, 2021. Jill filed a motion to alter or amend this order on June 16, 2021, which the family court partially granted on August 27, 2021, issuing an amended final order. Kenneth then filed his own motion to alter or amend on September 10, 2021.The family court denied Kenneth's motion on July 14, 2022, deeming it untimely as it did not address the amended final order but rather the original June 8 order. Jill received notice of this denial on July 21, 2022, and served her notice of appeal on August 22, 2022. Kenneth moved to dismiss Jill's appeal, arguing it was untimely because his own motion did not toll the appeal period. The court of appeals agreed with Kenneth and dismissed Jill's appeal, concluding that Kenneth's motion was untimely and did not stay the time for filing an appeal.The South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that Kenneth's motion was timely as it was served within ten days of receiving notice of the amended final order. The Court clarified that a timely Rule 59(e) motion stays the time for appeal for all parties unless it falls into specific exceptions previously established in case law. The Court found that Kenneth's motion did not fit these exceptions and thus stayed the time for appeal. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' decision and remanded the case for consideration of Jill's appeal on its merits. View "Swing v. Swing" on Justia Law

Nicole Lampo was hired by Amedisys Holding, LLC as a physical therapist. A month after her hiring, Amedisys sent an email to all employees introducing an arbitration program. The email required employees to acknowledge the arbitration materials and provided an opt-out option within 30 days. Lampo acknowledged the email but did not opt out. She continued working for Amedisys until her termination in March 2018, after which she filed a lawsuit against Amedisys and her former supervisor for wrongful discharge, tortious interference, and defamation. Amedisys moved to compel arbitration based on the arbitration agreement.The Circuit Court of Georgetown County denied Amedisys's motion to compel arbitration, concluding that Lampo's failure to opt out did not constitute acceptance of the arbitration agreement. The Court of Appeals reversed this decision, finding that Lampo had accepted the arbitration agreement as a matter of law by not opting out and continuing to work.The Supreme Court of South Carolina reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeals' decision. The Supreme Court held that Lampo did not accept Amedisys's offer to form an arbitration agreement by merely failing to opt out and continuing to work. The court emphasized that silence and inaction do not constitute acceptance of an offer unless specific circumstances indicate a manifestation of assent, which were not present in this case. The court concluded that there was no evidence of Lampo's intent to be bound by the arbitration agreement, and thus, no valid arbitration agreement was formed. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Lampo v. Amedisys Holding, LLC" on Justia Law

Decedent and Burnsed were married in 1997, and in 1998, Decedent named Burnsed as the primary beneficiary of his life insurance policy. They divorced in 2002, and the divorce decree did not address the life insurance policy. Decedent maintained the policy until his death in 2017 without changing the beneficiary designation. Decedent's son and brother filed a lawsuit claiming the policy proceeds, arguing that South Carolina Probate Code section 62-2-507(c) revoked Burnsed's beneficiary status upon divorce.The Circuit Court denied Respondents' motion for summary judgment, holding that the statute did not apply retroactively and granted Burnsed's motion for summary judgment, finding the legislature did not intend for the statute to apply to divorces before its effective date. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that section 62-2-507(c) revoked Burnsed's designation because Decedent died after the statute's effective date, and Burnsed had no vested interest in the policy until Decedent's death.The South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision as modified. The Court held that section 62-2-507(c) applies to governing instruments executed before the statute's effective date if the decedent's death occurred after the effective date. The statute's presumption of revocation upon divorce applied to Decedent's life insurance policy, revoking Burnsed's status as the primary beneficiary. The Court concluded that the statute did not apply retroactively but prospectively from its effective date, effectuating Decedent's presumed intent. View "Estate of Meier v. Burnsed" on Justia Law

In 2004, Jason McSwain, a former teacher, pled guilty to two counts of criminal sexual conduct with a minor in the second degree and one count of contributing to the delinquency of a minor. After serving his prison sentence, he registered as a sex offender as required by South Carolina's Sex Offender Registry Act (SORA). Initially, SORA mandated lifetime registration for all sex offenders. In 2022, the General Assembly amended SORA to implement a three-tier system based on the severity of the offense, with tier II offenders, like McSwain, required to register for 25 years before seeking removal.McSwain applied for removal from the registry in 2022, but the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division (SLED) denied his application as premature. He then filed a motion in the circuit court, arguing that the tier system and mandatory wait times violated his right to substantive due process. The circuit court denied his motion, finding that the amendments to SORA were rationally related to the government's interest in public safety and law enforcement.The South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the case and upheld the circuit court's decision. The Court found that the tiered-registration system and corresponding mandatory-minimum time periods for registration were rationally related to SORA's legislative purposes of protecting the public and aiding law enforcement. The Court emphasized that the amendments brought SORA in line with federal law and the approach taken by a majority of states. Consequently, the Court held that McSwain failed to establish that SORA violated his right to substantive due process and affirmed the circuit court's decision. View "The State v. McSwain" on Justia Law

James Smith Jr. initiated a civil action against Rufus and Merle Rivers in magistrates court, claiming to be their landlord and seeking their eviction. The Rivers contended that Smith did not own the property where they resided. The magistrates court sided with Smith and ordered the Rivers' eviction. The Rivers appealed, and the circuit court upheld the eviction order. However, the court of appeals reversed the decision, citing a South Carolina Code provision that barred the magistrates court from handling the eviction due to the Rivers' challenge to Smith's property title.The magistrates court initially ruled in favor of Smith, determining that he was the lawful owner and that a landlord-tenant relationship existed. The Rivers filed motions for reconsideration, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction due to a pending circuit court case challenging Smith's ownership. The magistrates court denied these motions, and the Rivers appealed to the circuit court. The circuit court affirmed the magistrates court's decision, finding no evidence to dispute Smith's ownership and confirming the landlord-tenant relationship.The South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the court of appeals' decision. The Supreme Court held that the magistrates court had the authority to conduct the eviction proceeding because it had determined that a landlord-tenant relationship existed between Smith and the Rivers. The court emphasized that the existence of such a relationship precludes the tenant from challenging the landlord's title in an eviction proceeding. Consequently, the Supreme Court reinstated the magistrates court's eviction order. View "Rivers v. Smith" on Justia Law

Paula Russell, an assistant manager at Wal-Mart, injured her back in 2009 and reached maximum medical improvement in 2011, receiving a seven percent disability rating for her lumbar spine. She was awarded workers' compensation benefits based on this rating. However, her condition worsened, and in December 2011, she sought additional medical treatment and benefits due to a change in her condition. In 2013, a single commissioner found her condition had changed and awarded her continued medical treatment and temporary total disability benefits.The Appellate Panel of the Workers' Compensation Commission reversed this decision, concluding that Russell had not proven her condition had worsened. This led to a series of appeals and remands between the court of appeals, the single commissioner, and the Appellate Panel. In 2019, the South Carolina Supreme Court remanded the case to the Appellate Panel for immediate and final review. The Appellate Panel again found that Russell failed to prove a change of condition, and the court of appeals affirmed this decision.The South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the Appellate Panel's denial of Russell's change of condition claim was not supported by substantial evidence. The court found that the Appellate Panel had improperly weighed the MRI scans over the uncontradicted medical opinions of Russell's doctors, who testified that her condition had worsened. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals and remanded the case to the Workers' Compensation Commission with instructions to award Russell benefits. View "Russell v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc." on Justia Law