Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

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Meredith Logan Whitehurst was cited for violating the Town of Sullivan's Island's Disorderly Conduct Ordinance after loudly berating her Uber driver with profanity and racial and xenophobic epithets at nearly 2:00 a.m. The driver, an Egyptian-born immigrant, testified that Whitehurst's loud phone conversation disturbed his driving, and when he asked her to be quiet, she began mocking and cursing him. After stopping the car and asking Whitehurst and her friend to exit, Whitehurst continued to yell offensive remarks at the driver. The police were called, and Whitehurst was cited for public disorderly conduct.Whitehurst was tried by a jury in the Town's Municipal Court, which found her guilty and fined her $1,040. She moved for a new trial, which was denied, and then appealed to the circuit court, which affirmed the conviction. Whitehurst then appealed to the South Carolina Supreme Court, arguing that the Ordinance violated her First Amendment rights, was unconstitutionally vague, and that the trial court erred in various procedural rulings, including denying her motion to suppress the Uber video.The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision. The Court held that the Ordinance was content-neutral and served the Town's significant interest in controlling noise levels, thus not infringing on Whitehurst's First Amendment rights. The Court also found that the Ordinance was not unconstitutionally vague, as it provided fair notice of the prohibited conduct and included a scienter requirement. Additionally, the Court deemed Whitehurst's arguments regarding the multiple subsections of the Ordinance and the motion to suppress the Uber video as conclusory and abandoned due to lack of supporting authority. View "Whitehurst v. Town of Sullivan's Island" on Justia Law

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Charles Dent was accused of sexually abusing his granddaughter, J.M., when she was eight or nine years old. The alleged abuse occurred during periods when Dent visited his daughter’s family in South Carolina. The victim disclosed various acts of abuse, including being forced to perform fellatio, digital penetration, cunnilingus, and being shown obscene material. The State indicted Dent on two counts of disseminating obscene material to a minor and two counts of criminal sexual conduct with a minor (CSCM) in the first degree, specifically alleging fellatio as the sexual battery in both CSCM indictments.At trial in the Circuit Court for Beaufort County, the State presented evidence through forensic interviews and the victim’s testimony. The victim described only one instance of fellatio, which she located at House 1, not House 2. Dent moved for a directed verdict on the CSCM charge related to House 2, arguing there was no evidence of fellatio at that location. The trial court denied the motion and, over Dent’s objection, instructed the jury on the full statutory definition of sexual battery, including acts not charged in the indictment. The jury convicted Dent of the CSCM charge for House 2 and both dissemination charges, but acquitted him of the CSCM charge for House 1. The South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions after remand.The Supreme Court of South Carolina held that the trial court erred by denying Dent’s motion for a directed verdict on the CSCM charge for House 2, as there was no evidence of fellatio at that location, and by instructing the jury on unindicted acts of sexual battery. The Court reversed Dent’s CSCM conviction but affirmed his convictions for dissemination of obscene material to a minor. The Court also rejected Dent’s procedural challenge regarding the composition of the appellate panel. View "State v. Dent" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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Mitchell Rivers was convicted of Homicide by Child Abuse (HCA) following the death of his four-month-old adoptive child, who died from asphyxiation. During the trial, the State introduced evidence of the child's prior injuries, which were unrelated to the cause of death. Rivers' trial attorney objected to this evidence pretrial but failed to renew the objection during the trial, leaving the issue unpreserved for appeal. Rivers subsequently filed for post-conviction relief (PCR), claiming ineffective assistance of counsel.The PCR court denied relief, finding that Rivers was not prejudiced by his attorney's failure to renew the objection. However, the court of appeals reversed this decision, holding that Rivers was prejudiced by his attorney's errors, as there was no nexus between the collateral injury evidence and the circumstances surrounding the child's death.The Supreme Court of South Carolina reviewed the case and reversed the court of appeals' decision. The Supreme Court found that even if the collateral injury evidence had been excluded, there was no reasonable probability that the jury's verdict would have been different. The court noted that Rivers' actions, including his failure to seek medical assistance after the child resumed wheezing and his inability to perform CPR, demonstrated a conscious disregard for the risk of the child's death, thus establishing extreme indifference beyond a reasonable doubt. Consequently, Rivers failed to satisfy the prejudice prong of the Strickland test for ineffective assistance of counsel. The decision of the court of appeals was reversed. View "Rivers v. State" on Justia Law

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Melvin G. Welch died in 2023 from mesothelioma caused by asbestos exposure. His widow, Donna B. Welch, sued Atlas Turner, Inc. and other defendants, alleging their products caused his death. Atlas Turner, a Canadian company, produced and sold asbestos insulation, which was shipped to South Carolina. Welch was likely exposed to these products while working in Greenwood, South Carolina. The case was brought in Richland County and assigned to Judge Jean H. Toal, who oversees the South Carolina asbestos docket.Atlas Turner moved to dismiss the claims for lack of personal jurisdiction, but the trial court denied the motion and ordered Atlas Turner to participate in discovery. Atlas Turner ignored deposition notices and refused to comply with discovery orders, claiming it had no knowledgeable witnesses and that the Québec Business Concerns Records Act (QBCRA) prohibited it from disclosing information. The trial court held Atlas Turner in contempt, struck its answer, and placed it in default. The court also appointed a Receiver over Atlas Turner's Insurance Assets.The South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's sanctions and the appointment of the Receiver over Atlas Turner's Insurance Assets. The court found that Atlas Turner's refusal to comply with discovery was willful and that the QBCRA did not excuse its non-compliance. The court also held that the trial court had the authority to appoint a Receiver before judgment due to Atlas Turner's conduct, which indicated an intent to evade responsibility. However, the Supreme Court reversed the portion of the Receivership order that granted the Receiver authority beyond investigating and collecting Atlas Turner's Insurance Assets. View "Welch v. Atlas Turner, Inc." on Justia Law

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Planned Parenthood South Atlantic and other appellants challenged the constitutionality of the 2023 South Carolina Fetal Heartbeat and Protection from Abortion Act. The Act prohibits most abortions once a fetal heartbeat is detected, which the appellants argued occurs only after approximately nine weeks of pregnancy. The State contended that a fetal heartbeat is detectable at approximately six weeks of pregnancy.The federal district court initially enjoined the 2021 version of the Act, but the injunction was lifted following the Supreme Court's decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization. The South Carolina Supreme Court later declared the 2021 Act unconstitutional under the state constitution. In response, the General Assembly revised the Act in 2023, maintaining the same definition of "fetal heartbeat." The circuit court ruled in favor of the State, and Planned Parenthood appealed.The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's decision, holding that the term "fetal heartbeat" refers to the detection of cardiac activity, which can be identified by medical professionals using diagnostic technology such as a transvaginal ultrasound. The Court determined that this cardiac activity typically occurs at approximately six weeks of pregnancy. The Court's interpretation was based on legislative history, medical evidence, and statutory construction principles, concluding that the General Assembly intended to ban most abortions at this early stage of pregnancy. View "Planned Parenthood v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

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In 2005, Island Pointe, LLC contracted Complete Building Corporation (CBC) to construct a condominium project, Palmetto Pointe at Peas Island. CBC subcontracted Tri-County Roofing (TCR) for roofing and related work. In 2014-2015, Palmetto discovered construction defects and sued CBC, TCR, and others for negligence and breach of warranty. Palmetto received $6,800,000 in settlements, including $1,000,000 from CBC's insurer for a covenant-not-to-execute and $1,975,000 from four other defendants.The trial began in May 2019, and the jury found CBC and TCR liable for $6,500,000 in actual damages and $500,000 each in punitive damages. The trial court apportioned 5% liability to two other defendants, making CBC and TCR jointly and severally liable for the remaining 90% of actual damages. TCR sought setoff for the $1,000,000 payment and the settlements from the four other defendants. The trial court denied TCR's motion for setoff, except for partial amounts conceded by Palmetto.The South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the case. It reversed the court of appeals' decision, holding that TCR is entitled to set off the full $1,000,000 paid by CBC's insurer. The court affirmed the lower court's decision regarding the settlements from Novus, Atlantic, H and A, and Cohen's, agreeing that the trial court reasonably allocated the settlement amounts. The case was remanded to the trial court for the calculation of the judgment against TCR. View "Palmetto Pointe v. Tri-County Roofing" on Justia Law

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Rory M. Isaac and Kimberly J. Isaac, buyers in a residential real estate transaction, sued the sellers' real estate agent, Laura Kopchynski, for failing to disclose high moisture levels in the crawl space and mischaracterizing a wood infestation report as "good." The Isaacs claimed fraud, fraud in the inducement, negligent misrepresentation, civil conspiracy, and violation of the South Carolina Residential Property Condition Disclosure Act.The Circuit Court granted summary judgment to Kopchynski on all claims. The Isaacs appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed the summary judgment on the negligent misrepresentation and Disclosure Act claims, while affirming the summary judgment on the fraud and civil conspiracy claims. Kopchynski then petitioned for certiorari.The South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the case. It found that the Isaacs' agent did not rely on Kopchynski's statement about the June CL-100 report being "good" and that the Isaacs had a duty to inspect the property themselves. Therefore, the Isaacs could not establish justifiable reliance, a necessary element for negligent misrepresentation. The Court also held that the South Carolina Residential Property Condition Disclosure Act does not create a private cause of action against real estate licensees, only against property owners.The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and reinstated the Circuit Court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Kopchynski on both the negligent misrepresentation and Disclosure Act claims. View "Isaac v. Kopchynski" on Justia Law

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Intellectual Capitol, Inc., JMI Sports, and JMIS College, LLC (Appellants) obtained contracts through the state procurement process with the South Carolina Workers' Compensation Commission (WCC) and Clemson University (Respondents). Disputes arose under these contracts, leading Respondents to file Requests for Resolution of Contract Controversy with the Chief Procurement Officer (CPO) for the State of South Carolina. Appellants then filed separate declaratory judgment actions in circuit court, challenging the constitutionality of section 11-35-4230 of the South Carolina Code, which grants the CPO exclusive jurisdiction over state contract disputes.The circuit court granted Respondents' motions to dismiss the declaratory judgment actions, ruling that section 11-35-4230 placed exclusive jurisdiction over the State's contract disputes with the CPO. The court also dismissed Appellants' constitutional claims as premature due to their failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Appellants appealed this decision.The South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the circuit court's dismissal of the declaratory judgment actions, but modified the reasoning. The Supreme Court held that the contracts between Appellants and Respondents contained a clear choice-of-forum provision, which unambiguously gave the CPO exclusive authority to resolve disputes. By agreeing to this provision, Appellants waived their right to have their disputes decided by a court of the unified judicial system. Consequently, there was no justiciable controversy, rendering the constitutional challenge to section 11-35-4230 a purely academic exercise. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's dismissal of the declaratory judgment actions, as there were no legal rights at issue. View "Intellectual Capital, Inc. v. Chief Procurement Officer" on Justia Law

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James and Lori Marlowe own a home on Highway 378 in Florence County, South Carolina. In 2015, the South Carolina Department of Transportation (SCDOT) began construction to widen and realign a portion of Highway 378 adjacent to the Marlowes' home. During the construction, the home flooded twice, once in October 2015 and again in October 2016, during major storm events. The Marlowes filed a lawsuit against SCDOT, alleging inverse condemnation, conversion, due process violations, and negligence.The Circuit Court granted summary judgment in favor of SCDOT on all claims. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Circuit Court's decision on the negligence claim but reversed on the inverse condemnation claim. The Court of Appeals also held that the Stormwater Management and Sediment Reduction Act did not immunize SCDOT from liability. SCDOT petitioned for a writ of certiorari on the inverse condemnation and Stormwater Act issues, which the South Carolina Supreme Court granted.The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision that the Stormwater Act did not immunize SCDOT from liability. However, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision on the inverse condemnation claim, finding that there was insufficient evidence on the causation issue to allow the claim to proceed. The court held that the evidence, including expert testimony, did not rise above speculation regarding whether the construction of the new roadway caused the flooding of the Marlowes' home. Consequently, the Supreme Court reinstated the grant of summary judgment in favor of SCDOT on the inverse condemnation claim. View "Marlowe v. SC DOT" on Justia Law

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Karrie and Howard Gurwood filed a lawsuit against GCA Services Group, Inc. after Karrie slipped and fell on a freshly waxed floor at her workplace, resulting in serious injuries. The Gurwoods claimed negligence on the part of GCA and sought damages, including punitive damages. At trial, the court granted GCA's motion for a directed verdict on punitive damages, and the jury found both Karrie and GCA each fifty percent at fault. The jury awarded Karrie the exact amount of her past medical expenses but found in favor of GCA on Howard's loss of consortium claim.The Gurwoods appealed to the South Carolina Court of Appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in granting the directed verdict on punitive damages and raised five other issues. The Court of Appeals reversed the directed verdict on punitive damages, finding it dispositive of the appeal, and remanded for a new trial. GCA then petitioned for a writ of certiorari to the South Carolina Supreme Court.The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' reversal of the directed verdict on punitive damages but modified the remand instructions. The Supreme Court held that requiring a retrial on all issues would be contrary to law and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals to address the other five grounds raised by the Gurwoods. The Supreme Court clarified that if the Court of Appeals finds no error on the other grounds, the case should proceed to a new trial on punitive damages only, unless GCA requests a new trial on all issues under subsection 15-32-520(A) of the South Carolina Code. View "Gurwood v. GCA Services Group, Inc." on Justia Law