Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Devin Jamel Johnson was convicted of murdering Akeem Smalls. The incident stemmed from a dispute over a debt Smalls owed Johnson for stolen marijuana. On the night of the murder, surveillance footage showed Johnson and an unidentified man, referred to as "Creep," arriving at the scene. Johnson initially denied involvement but later admitted to driving the car seen in the footage. Evidence included Johnson's fingerprints on a bullet cartridge found at the scene and cell phone records indicating his presence near the crime scene.The case was tried three times. In the first trial, Johnson was convicted after the trial court gave an accomplice liability instruction following a jury question. The South Carolina Court of Appeals reversed this conviction, citing fundamental unfairness due to the trial court's change in instructions. A second trial ended in a mistrial. In the third trial, Johnson was again convicted, but the Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, ruling that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on accomplice liability, as there was no evidence that Johnson acted in concert with another person.The South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the case and disagreed with the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court held that the evidence supported the trial court's decision to instruct the jury on accomplice liability. The court found that Johnson's actions and communications indicated a mutual plan to murder Smalls, and the presence of "Creep" at the scene supported the inference that they acted together. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and reinstated Johnson's murder conviction. View "The State v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Adam Rowell was convicted by a jury of two felony driving under the influence charges. After the trial, Rowell discovered that Juror 164 had failed to disclose during voir dire that he had been recently arrested for several charges, including possession with intent to distribute marijuana. Rowell included this information in his motion for a new trial. Although the State consented to a second hearing to examine Juror 164, the circuit court denied the motion without holding the hearing.The Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court's decision, stating that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by not conducting an evidentiary hearing with Juror 164. The appellate court agreed with the circuit court's finding that Juror 164's failure to disclose his arrest was unintentional and that no further inquiry was necessary.The Supreme Court of South Carolina reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeals' decision. The Supreme Court held that the distinction between intentional and unintentional concealment of information during voir dire should be abandoned. Instead, the focus should be on whether the concealed information suggests bias and whether it would have been material to the use of a peremptory strike or a challenge for cause. The court emphasized the importance of a hearing to determine if the juror's nondisclosure indicated potential bias.The Supreme Court vacated the lower court's decision and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing to examine Juror 164. The circuit court is instructed to determine if the concealed information suggests bias and if it would have been material to Rowell's use of peremptory strikes or a challenge for cause. The standard for materiality is whether a reasonable party would have exercised a strike had the information been disclosed. View "The State v. Rowell" on Justia Law

In the mid-1990s, Bradford Jeffcoat and Sandra Perkins began a long-term relationship and lived together in a house Jeffcoat purchased in Charleston, South Carolina. In 2000, Jeffcoat deeded the property to himself and Perkins as joint tenants with the right of survivorship. Perkins developed dementia in 2009, and in 2015, her daughter Vanessa Williams took her to Alabama without Jeffcoat's knowledge. Williams was later appointed as Perkins' guardian and conservator by an Alabama probate court and deeded Perkins' interest in the property to herself. Perkins died in November 2015.Williams filed a petition in Charleston County court to partition the property by sale. Jeffcoat counterclaimed, alleging fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and slander of title, and argued that the conveyance was invalid. The Charleston County Master-in-Equity granted summary judgment to Williams, finding that a joint tenant could unilaterally sever the joint tenancy under South Carolina law. The court of appeals affirmed the decision.The South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that there were genuine issues of material fact regarding Jeffcoat's unclean hands defense, which precluded summary judgment. The court also held that the Alabama probate court had subject matter jurisdiction over the guardianship and conservatorship proceedings. However, the court determined that South Carolina Code section 27-7-40, which allows unilateral severance of joint tenancies, did not apply retroactively to the joint tenancy created before the statute's enactment. Under common law, the joint tenancy could be severed by unilateral conveyance.The Supreme Court reversed the summary judgment in part, affirmed the decision as modified in part, and remanded the case to the Master-in-Equity to resolve the unclean hands defense and determine whether it would defeat Williams' demand for partition. View "Williams v. Jeffcoat" on Justia Law

The case involves a challenge to the constitutionality of the 2023 Act No. 8 (S. 39), known as the Education Scholarship Trust Fund (ESTF) Act, which establishes a fund to provide scholarships for qualifying educational expenses, including private school tuition. Petitioners argue that the Act violates South Carolina's constitutional prohibition against using public funds for the direct benefit of private educational institutions.The lower courts did not review this case; it was accepted directly by the South Carolina Supreme Court in its original jurisdiction. Petitioners sought an injunction and declaratory judgment, claiming the Act violated several provisions of the South Carolina Constitution, including Article XI, Sections 2, 3, and 4, and Article X, Sections 5 and 11.The South Carolina Supreme Court held that portions of the Act violate the state constitution's prohibition against using public funds for the direct benefit of private educational institutions. The court found that the ESTF funds are public funds and that using these funds for private school tuition constitutes a direct benefit to private educational institutions, which is unconstitutional under Article XI, Section 4. The court severed and declared unconstitutional the provisions of the Act that allowed payments from ESTF scholarships for tuition and fees at private educational institutions. The court enjoined the Department of Education from disbursing ESTF scholarships for these purposes. The court's decision was guided by the principle that legislative policy must conform to constitutional mandates, and it emphasized the importance of adhering to the plain meaning of constitutional text. View "Candace Eidson v. South Carolina Dept. of Education" on Justia Law

Alvetta Massenberg inherited a 2.54-acre tract of undeveloped land in Clarendon County, South Carolina. After failing to pay property taxes for 2016, the Clarendon County Treasurer issued a tax execution to collect the delinquent taxes. The tax collector followed the statutory procedure by sending notices via regular and certified mail, but the certified mail was returned undelivered. Subsequently, a private contractor posted a "Notice of Levy" on a tree facing a one-lane dirt road on the property. The property was later sold at a public auction to Blacktop Ventures, LLC, which paid the outstanding taxes.The master-in-equity court refused to set aside the tax sale, concluding that the notice met the legal requirements for posting. The court did not specifically analyze whether the notice was posted in a "conspicuous" place. Massenberg appealed, and the South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the master's decision. Massenberg then petitioned for a writ of certiorari, which was granted.The South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the case and focused on whether the notice was posted in a "conspicuous" place as required by subsection 12-51-40(c) of the South Carolina Code. The Court found that the tax collector failed to exercise judgment in ensuring the notice was posted conspicuously. The notice was posted on a tree facing a less-traveled dirt road, making it difficult to see. The Court determined that the notice should have been posted on the side of the property facing a more frequently traveled paved road. Consequently, the Court held that the tax collector did not comply with the statutory requirement, rendering the tax sale invalid.The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals, setting aside the tax sale. View "Massenberg v. Clarendon County Treasurer" on Justia Law

Beverly Dale Jolly worked as an inspector at nuclear plants from 1980 to 1984, where he was exposed to asbestos-containing products manufactured by Fisher Controls International, LLC and Crosby Valve, LLC. In 2016, Dale was diagnosed with mesothelioma. He and his wife Brenda sued multiple defendants, settling with all except Fisher and Crosby for $2,270,000. The jury awarded Dale $200,000 and Brenda $100,000. The Jollys filed a motion for a new trial nisi additur, claiming the verdicts were inadequate. The trial court granted the motion, increasing Dale's award to $1,580,000 and Brenda's to $290,000, while allowing Fisher and Crosby the option to reject the additur for a new trial.The South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. Fisher and Crosby appealed, questioning the trial court's grant of the new trial nisi additur and the partial denial of their motion for setoff. The Supreme Court of South Carolina reviewed the case, focusing on whether the trial court applied the correct standard and procedure for a new trial nisi additur and whether it properly allocated the pretrial settlement proceeds for setoff purposes.The Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed the trial court's decisions. It held that the trial court acted within its discretion in granting the new trial nisi additur, finding the jury's verdicts inadequate but not grossly so. The court also upheld the trial court's allocation of the pretrial settlement proceeds, agreeing that the allocation was reasonable and that the setoff was correctly applied only to the same injury claims. The case was remanded for Fisher and Crosby to either accept the additur or opt for a new trial. View "Jolly v. Fisher Controls International, LLC and Crosby Valve, LLC" on Justia Law

Gregg Pickrell was convicted of murdering Robert Lamont Demary. Pickrell and Demary were romantically involved but did not live together. Pickrell claimed that Demary routinely abused her and that she shot him in self-defense as he lunged toward her in her bedroom. The entry wound was in Demary's back, which Pickrell did not dispute.The Circuit Court of Kershaw County admitted testimony from SLED Agent Dawn Claycomb and Kershaw County Sheriff's Investigator Rick Bailey. Pickrell objected to both testimonies. The court of appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that any error in admitting Agent Claycomb's testimony was harmless and that Pickrell's objection to Investigator Bailey's testimony was not preserved for appellate review. The court also found Bailey's testimony admissible under Rule 701 of the South Carolina Rules of Evidence.The Supreme Court of South Carolina reviewed the case on certiorari. The court agreed with the court of appeals that the error in admitting Agent Claycomb's testimony was harmless because the location of the shooting was not in dispute. However, the court disagreed with the court of appeals regarding Investigator Bailey's testimony, finding that Pickrell's objection was sufficient to preserve the issue for appeal. The court held that Bailey's testimony did not meet the foundational requirements of Rule 701 and should have been excluded. Despite this, the court found the error harmless because Bailey's testimony was cumulative to that of Investigator Miles Taylor, who provided similar testimony without objection.The Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed the court of appeals' decision as modified, maintaining Pickrell's conviction. View "State v. Pickrell" on Justia Law

The petitioner was convicted of first-degree criminal sexual conduct with a minor. The trial court refused the State's request to instruct the jury that the testimony of an alleged victim of criminal sexual conduct need not be corroborated, as per section 16-3-657 of the South Carolina Code. However, the court allowed the State to cite and quote the statute during its closing argument, over the petitioner's objection. The victim testified that the petitioner sexually abused her from the age of four or five until she was nine, with no corroborating evidence presented.The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the issue of whether the State could argue section 16-3-657 was unpreserved for appellate review. The petitioner then sought post-conviction relief, arguing that his trial counsel failed to perfect his direct appeal. The post-conviction relief court granted a belated appeal, but the Court of Appeals again found the issues unpreserved and affirmed the conviction, also noting that the petitioner conceded the State could argue the statute during its closing argument.The Supreme Court of South Carolina reviewed the case and found that the petitioner's objections to the State arguing section 16-3-657 were preserved for appellate review. The court held that it is improper for a party to argue the statute to the jury, as it could unduly influence the jury to believe the victim's testimony without corroboration. The court noted that the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury on the statute, combined with the State's argument and assurance that the trial court would correct any misstatement of the law, compounded the error. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and remanded the case for a new trial. View "Cone v. State" on Justia Law

Two children, E.G. and J.J., through their guardian ad litem, John D. Elliott, filed a lawsuit against the South Carolina Department of Social Services (DSS) and others, alleging that the children were sexually molested by P.M., the adopted son of Annie Montgomery, while in Montgomery's foster care. The plaintiffs claimed that DSS and Montgomery were negligent in placing and accepting the children into the foster home, knowing or having reason to know of P.M.'s history of sexually abusive behavior. They sought discovery of DSS's adoption files to support their claims.The circuit court issued a protective order for certain DSS foster care files but did not rule on the adoption files. The plaintiffs then filed a motion in family court to unseal the adoption files, which was denied. The family court ruled that the plaintiffs had no legal interest in the records and had not shown good cause under section 63-9-780(C) of the South Carolina Code. The court of appeals affirmed this decision.The South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the confidentiality provision in section 63-9-780(C) does not insulate DSS adoption files from civil discovery if they meet the criteria under the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. The court determined that if the files are discoverable under Rule 26(b), then good cause exists for their inspection. The court reversed the court of appeals' decision, emphasizing that protective orders can be used to maintain confidentiality while allowing necessary discovery. View "E.G. v. SCDSS" on Justia Law

Respondent Olandio R. Workman was convicted by a jury of domestic violence of a high and aggravated nature (DVHAN), kidnapping, and possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime. The trial court sentenced him to concurrent prison terms of twelve, fifteen, and five years, respectively. The case arose from an incident in August 2016, where Workman confined and beat his wife, Loretta Workman, for over forty-eight hours. The abuse included physical violence, threats with firearms, and preventing her from leaving the house or contacting anyone for help.The Court of Appeals reviewed the case and reversed Workman's DVHAN conviction, remanding for a new trial. The appellate court found that the trial court's jury instruction on the lesser-included offense of first-degree domestic violence (DV1) was erroneous. Specifically, the instruction failed to include the definition of "moderate bodily injury" and did not explain second-degree domestic violence (DV2), which is relevant to establishing DV1. The appellate court held that this omission was not harmless and warranted a new trial.The Supreme Court of South Carolina reviewed the case and agreed that the trial court's jury instruction was incomplete and erroneous. However, the Supreme Court held that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The court found that the evidence overwhelmingly supported Workman's conviction for DVHAN, as his actions demonstrated extreme indifference to human life and would reasonably cause fear of imminent great bodily injury or death. Consequently, the Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's finding of error but reversed its decision on harmless error, reinstating Workman's DVHAN conviction. View "The State v. Workman" on Justia Law