Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Karrie and Howard Gurwood filed a lawsuit against GCA Services Group, Inc. after Karrie slipped and fell on a freshly waxed floor at her workplace, resulting in serious injuries. The Gurwoods claimed negligence on the part of GCA and sought damages, including punitive damages. At trial, the court granted GCA's motion for a directed verdict on punitive damages, and the jury found both Karrie and GCA each fifty percent at fault. The jury awarded Karrie the exact amount of her past medical expenses but found in favor of GCA on Howard's loss of consortium claim.The Gurwoods appealed to the South Carolina Court of Appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in granting the directed verdict on punitive damages and raised five other issues. The Court of Appeals reversed the directed verdict on punitive damages, finding it dispositive of the appeal, and remanded for a new trial. GCA then petitioned for a writ of certiorari to the South Carolina Supreme Court.The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' reversal of the directed verdict on punitive damages but modified the remand instructions. The Supreme Court held that requiring a retrial on all issues would be contrary to law and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals to address the other five grounds raised by the Gurwoods. The Supreme Court clarified that if the Court of Appeals finds no error on the other grounds, the case should proceed to a new trial on punitive damages only, unless GCA requests a new trial on all issues under subsection 15-32-520(A) of the South Carolina Code. View "Gurwood v. GCA Services Group, Inc." on Justia Law

Kenneth and Jill Swing were involved in a divorce action that included contested issues such as the pre-nuptial agreement, equitable division of property, child custody, visitation, support, and fees. The family court issued a final order on June 8, 2021. Jill filed a motion to alter or amend this order on June 16, 2021, which the family court partially granted on August 27, 2021, issuing an amended final order. Kenneth then filed his own motion to alter or amend on September 10, 2021.The family court denied Kenneth's motion on July 14, 2022, deeming it untimely as it did not address the amended final order but rather the original June 8 order. Jill received notice of this denial on July 21, 2022, and served her notice of appeal on August 22, 2022. Kenneth moved to dismiss Jill's appeal, arguing it was untimely because his own motion did not toll the appeal period. The court of appeals agreed with Kenneth and dismissed Jill's appeal, concluding that Kenneth's motion was untimely and did not stay the time for filing an appeal.The South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that Kenneth's motion was timely as it was served within ten days of receiving notice of the amended final order. The Court clarified that a timely Rule 59(e) motion stays the time for appeal for all parties unless it falls into specific exceptions previously established in case law. The Court found that Kenneth's motion did not fit these exceptions and thus stayed the time for appeal. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' decision and remanded the case for consideration of Jill's appeal on its merits. View "Swing v. Swing" on Justia Law

Nicole Lampo was hired by Amedisys Holding, LLC as a physical therapist. A month after her hiring, Amedisys sent an email to all employees introducing an arbitration program. The email required employees to acknowledge the arbitration materials and provided an opt-out option within 30 days. Lampo acknowledged the email but did not opt out. She continued working for Amedisys until her termination in March 2018, after which she filed a lawsuit against Amedisys and her former supervisor for wrongful discharge, tortious interference, and defamation. Amedisys moved to compel arbitration based on the arbitration agreement.The Circuit Court of Georgetown County denied Amedisys's motion to compel arbitration, concluding that Lampo's failure to opt out did not constitute acceptance of the arbitration agreement. The Court of Appeals reversed this decision, finding that Lampo had accepted the arbitration agreement as a matter of law by not opting out and continuing to work.The Supreme Court of South Carolina reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeals' decision. The Supreme Court held that Lampo did not accept Amedisys's offer to form an arbitration agreement by merely failing to opt out and continuing to work. The court emphasized that silence and inaction do not constitute acceptance of an offer unless specific circumstances indicate a manifestation of assent, which were not present in this case. The court concluded that there was no evidence of Lampo's intent to be bound by the arbitration agreement, and thus, no valid arbitration agreement was formed. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Lampo v. Amedisys Holding, LLC" on Justia Law

Decedent and Burnsed were married in 1997, and in 1998, Decedent named Burnsed as the primary beneficiary of his life insurance policy. They divorced in 2002, and the divorce decree did not address the life insurance policy. Decedent maintained the policy until his death in 2017 without changing the beneficiary designation. Decedent's son and brother filed a lawsuit claiming the policy proceeds, arguing that South Carolina Probate Code section 62-2-507(c) revoked Burnsed's beneficiary status upon divorce.The Circuit Court denied Respondents' motion for summary judgment, holding that the statute did not apply retroactively and granted Burnsed's motion for summary judgment, finding the legislature did not intend for the statute to apply to divorces before its effective date. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that section 62-2-507(c) revoked Burnsed's designation because Decedent died after the statute's effective date, and Burnsed had no vested interest in the policy until Decedent's death.The South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision as modified. The Court held that section 62-2-507(c) applies to governing instruments executed before the statute's effective date if the decedent's death occurred after the effective date. The statute's presumption of revocation upon divorce applied to Decedent's life insurance policy, revoking Burnsed's status as the primary beneficiary. The Court concluded that the statute did not apply retroactively but prospectively from its effective date, effectuating Decedent's presumed intent. View "Estate of Meier v. Burnsed" on Justia Law

In 2004, Jason McSwain, a former teacher, pled guilty to two counts of criminal sexual conduct with a minor in the second degree and one count of contributing to the delinquency of a minor. After serving his prison sentence, he registered as a sex offender as required by South Carolina's Sex Offender Registry Act (SORA). Initially, SORA mandated lifetime registration for all sex offenders. In 2022, the General Assembly amended SORA to implement a three-tier system based on the severity of the offense, with tier II offenders, like McSwain, required to register for 25 years before seeking removal.McSwain applied for removal from the registry in 2022, but the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division (SLED) denied his application as premature. He then filed a motion in the circuit court, arguing that the tier system and mandatory wait times violated his right to substantive due process. The circuit court denied his motion, finding that the amendments to SORA were rationally related to the government's interest in public safety and law enforcement.The South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the case and upheld the circuit court's decision. The Court found that the tiered-registration system and corresponding mandatory-minimum time periods for registration were rationally related to SORA's legislative purposes of protecting the public and aiding law enforcement. The Court emphasized that the amendments brought SORA in line with federal law and the approach taken by a majority of states. Consequently, the Court held that McSwain failed to establish that SORA violated his right to substantive due process and affirmed the circuit court's decision. View "The State v. McSwain" on Justia Law

James Smith Jr. initiated a civil action against Rufus and Merle Rivers in magistrates court, claiming to be their landlord and seeking their eviction. The Rivers contended that Smith did not own the property where they resided. The magistrates court sided with Smith and ordered the Rivers' eviction. The Rivers appealed, and the circuit court upheld the eviction order. However, the court of appeals reversed the decision, citing a South Carolina Code provision that barred the magistrates court from handling the eviction due to the Rivers' challenge to Smith's property title.The magistrates court initially ruled in favor of Smith, determining that he was the lawful owner and that a landlord-tenant relationship existed. The Rivers filed motions for reconsideration, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction due to a pending circuit court case challenging Smith's ownership. The magistrates court denied these motions, and the Rivers appealed to the circuit court. The circuit court affirmed the magistrates court's decision, finding no evidence to dispute Smith's ownership and confirming the landlord-tenant relationship.The South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the court of appeals' decision. The Supreme Court held that the magistrates court had the authority to conduct the eviction proceeding because it had determined that a landlord-tenant relationship existed between Smith and the Rivers. The court emphasized that the existence of such a relationship precludes the tenant from challenging the landlord's title in an eviction proceeding. Consequently, the Supreme Court reinstated the magistrates court's eviction order. View "Rivers v. Smith" on Justia Law

Paula Russell, an assistant manager at Wal-Mart, injured her back in 2009 and reached maximum medical improvement in 2011, receiving a seven percent disability rating for her lumbar spine. She was awarded workers' compensation benefits based on this rating. However, her condition worsened, and in December 2011, she sought additional medical treatment and benefits due to a change in her condition. In 2013, a single commissioner found her condition had changed and awarded her continued medical treatment and temporary total disability benefits.The Appellate Panel of the Workers' Compensation Commission reversed this decision, concluding that Russell had not proven her condition had worsened. This led to a series of appeals and remands between the court of appeals, the single commissioner, and the Appellate Panel. In 2019, the South Carolina Supreme Court remanded the case to the Appellate Panel for immediate and final review. The Appellate Panel again found that Russell failed to prove a change of condition, and the court of appeals affirmed this decision.The South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the Appellate Panel's denial of Russell's change of condition claim was not supported by substantial evidence. The court found that the Appellate Panel had improperly weighed the MRI scans over the uncontradicted medical opinions of Russell's doctors, who testified that her condition had worsened. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals and remanded the case to the Workers' Compensation Commission with instructions to award Russell benefits. View "Russell v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc." on Justia Law

Rashawn Vertez Carter was involved in a violent home invasion and robbery in Aiken, South Carolina, on May 9, 2015. After the crime, law enforcement officers used Carter's real-time cell-site location information from his cell-service provider, T-Mobile, to track him down without obtaining a search warrant. Carter was subsequently arrested and made incriminating statements during interviews with the police.At trial, Carter moved to suppress the evidence obtained from his real-time cell-site location information, arguing that it was obtained in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights and the South Carolina Constitution. The trial court denied the motion, ruling that the information gathered did not constitute a search under either constitution. The jury convicted Carter of burglary, armed robbery, kidnapping, and illegal possession of a weapon, but acquitted him of the alleged sexual assault. Carter appealed to the South Carolina Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement applied and that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule also justified the officers' actions.The South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed Carter's convictions. The court did not address whether a search occurred or if the exigent circumstances exception applied. Instead, it focused on the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule, concluding that the officers acted in good faith reliance on the federal Stored Communications Act, which allowed the disclosure of customer records in emergencies. The court held that the good-faith exception precluded the suppression of evidence obtained through Carter's real-time cell-site location information, as the officers reasonably believed their actions were lawful under the statute. View "State v. Carter" on Justia Law

In the early morning of March 7, 2015, Robert Xavier Geter and James Lewis engaged in a fight at Culler's Bar in Columbia, South Carolina. The altercation moved outside, where Geter stabbed Lewis, who later died from his injuries. During the incident, Geter also stabbed Clarence Stone, causing permanent blindness in one eye. Geter claimed self-defense, stating he was attacked by multiple people and only used his knife to defend himself.The State indicted Geter for murder and attempted murder, arguing that Geter intended to kill Lewis and that this intent transferred to Stone when he was stabbed. The trial court instructed the jury on the doctrine of transferred intent, and Geter was convicted of both charges. Geter appealed, arguing that transferred intent should not apply to attempted murder and that certain testimony constituted improper bolstering.The South Carolina Court of Appeals reversed Geter's attempted murder conviction, holding that the State needed to prove Geter specifically intended to kill Stone, which was not the State's theory. The court also found that some testimony constituted improper bolstering but deemed it harmless, affirming the murder conviction. Judge Geathers dissented on the transferred intent issue.The South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the doctrine of transferred intent does not apply to attempted murder. The court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision to reverse Geter's attempted murder conviction and upheld the murder conviction, agreeing that the error in admitting the bolstering testimony was harmless. View "State v. Geter" on Justia Law

In 2001, Frances Mack-Marion refinanced her property, taking out a new mortgage. In 2020, U.S. Bank National Association, the successor-in-interest to the mortgage, initiated foreclosure proceedings against her. Mack-Marion counterclaimed, seeking a declaratory judgment that U.S. Bank was barred from foreclosure because the mortgage closed without attorney supervision, referencing the Matrix Financial Services Corporation v. Frazer decision. The Master-in-Equity dismissed her claim, ruling it lacked subject matter jurisdiction and that the mortgage was recorded before the effective date of Matrix.The Master-in-Equity interpreted Hambrick v. GMAC Mortgage Corporation to mean only the South Carolina Supreme Court could determine unauthorized practice of law claims. Additionally, the Master found Mack-Marion's claim insufficient as the mortgage predated Matrix. Mack-Marion appealed, and the South Carolina Supreme Court granted her motion to certify the appeal.The South Carolina Supreme Court overruled Hambrick to the extent it held that circuit courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction over unauthorized practice of law claims. The Court clarified that circuit courts do have jurisdiction over such claims and reaffirmed that Matrix applies prospectively. The Court held that the Master had subject matter jurisdiction but correctly dismissed Mack-Marion's claim under Rule 12(b)(6), SCRCP, because her mortgage was recorded before the effective date of Matrix. The Court affirmed the Master's dismissal as modified, maintaining that U.S. Bank could pursue foreclosure. View "U.S. Bank National Association v. Mack" on Justia Law