Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Jeane Whitfield filed a medical malpractice lawsuit against Dr. Dennis Schimpf and Sweetgrass Plastic Surgery, LLC, alleging negligence in performing breast augmentation-mastopexy surgery and in post-operative care. Whitfield experienced complications post-surgery, including severe pain and wound issues, leading her to seek further medical attention and additional surgeries. She claimed Schimpf's negligence caused her injuries and inadequate post-operative care exacerbated her condition.The jury in the Circuit Court of Charleston County found in favor of Schimpf and Sweetgrass, determining that Whitfield did not prove the defendants deviated from the standard of care. Whitfield appealed, and the South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. Whitfield then petitioned for a writ of certiorari to the South Carolina Supreme Court, challenging two evidentiary rulings: the exclusion of evidence to show bias of Sweetgrass' office manager, Vicky Tolbert, and the admission of testimony from Schimpf's expert witnesses based on their Rule 35 examinations of Whitfield.The South Carolina Supreme Court found the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the admission of the expert testimony but erred in affirming the exclusion of evidence of Tolbert's bias. The Supreme Court held that evidence of Tolbert's sexual relationship with Schimpf, her salary, and the free cosmetic procedures she received was relevant to show potential bias and should have been admitted. The Court determined that excluding this evidence was prejudicial to Whitfield's case, as it impacted the jury's ability to assess Tolbert's credibility. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and remanded the case for a new trial. View "Whitfield v. Schimpf" on Justia Law

Therese Hood was involved in a three-car accident and subsequently filed multiple lawsuits. Hood's underinsured motorist (UIM) carrier, United Services Automobile Association (USAA), provided her with counsel in a lawsuit filed by the Kucks, who were also involved in the accident. Hood also sued Johnson, the driver who initially hit her, and USAA defended Johnson under Hood's UIM policy. During mediation, USAA offered $200,000, but Hood did not accept it, and the case went to trial, where Hood won. Hood then filed a third lawsuit against USAA, alleging bad faith, negligence, and other claims, arguing that USAA took disparate positions on her headlight use and did not offer its full settlement authority during mediation.The Circuit Court granted summary judgment for USAA on several claims and directed a verdict on others, leaving only the bad faith and negligence claims for the jury. The jury found in favor of USAA on the bad faith claim but in favor of Hood on the negligence claim, awarding her damages. The trial court granted USAA's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) on the negligence claim, stating that a first-party insured could only bring a bad faith claim, not a negligence claim. The Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, holding that a first-party insured has no separate cause of action in negligence under the duty of good faith and fair dealing.The South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision. The court held that South Carolina law does not recognize a separate negligence claim between an insured and insurer, only a bad faith claim. The court also found that USAA did not act in bad faith during mediation or by taking a position on Hood's headlight use in the UIM action. The court concluded that USAA's actions were within its rights and that Hood's claims were without merit. View "Hood v. USAA" on Justia Law

In March 2017, a five-year-old child, A.G., reported to her father that she had been sexually abused by her mother's boyfriend, Brandon Clark. A forensic interview was conducted, and Clark was subsequently charged with first-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC) with a minor. During the trial, Clark sought to cross-examine the forensic interviewer about the techniques used during the interview, arguing that they may have influenced A.G.'s responses. The trial court prohibited this line of questioning, and Clark was convicted and sentenced to twenty-five years in prison.Clark appealed to the South Carolina Court of Appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in limiting his cross-examination. The court of appeals affirmed the conviction, interpreting previous case law to mean that any testimony regarding interview techniques was prohibited to avoid improper bolstering of the child victim's credibility. The court also held that challenges to the forensic interviewer's techniques should be vetted in front of the judge, not the jury.The South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the court of appeals' decision. The Supreme Court held that the lower courts misinterpreted the case law, which only prohibited the State from eliciting such testimony on direct examination, not the defense on cross-examination. The Supreme Court emphasized that denying Clark the opportunity to cross-examine the forensic interviewer violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him. The case was remanded for a new trial, allowing Clark to challenge the forensic interview techniques used in A.G.'s interview. View "The State v. Clark" on Justia Law

Amanda Leigh Huskins and Jay R. Huskins purchased a house from Mungo Homes, LLC, and signed a contract that included an arbitration clause. This clause required any demand for arbitration to be made within ninety days, effectively shortening the statute of limitations for any claims. The Huskins later filed a lawsuit against Mungo Homes, alleging various claims related to the sale. Mungo Homes moved to dismiss the complaint and compel arbitration based on the contract. The Huskins argued that the arbitration clause was unconscionable and unenforceable.The Circuit Court of Richland County granted Mungo Homes' motion to compel arbitration. The Huskins appealed, and the Court of Appeals found the clause limiting the statute of limitations to be unconscionable and unenforceable. However, the Court of Appeals severed this clause from the rest of the arbitration agreement and affirmed the order compelling arbitration.The Supreme Court of South Carolina reviewed the case and reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court held that the clause shortening the statute of limitations was void and illegal as a matter of public policy, and therefore unenforceable. The court determined that the absence of a severability clause, the presence of a merger clause, and the fact that the contract was an adhesion contract indicated that the parties did not intend for the arbitration agreement to stand if any part of it fell. Consequently, the entire arbitration agreement was deemed unenforceable. The case was remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings, with the remainder of the contract unaffected by this ruling. View "Huskins v. Mungo Homes, LLC" on Justia Law

In this custody modification case, the parents, who divorced in 2012, initially agreed to joint custody of their two children. The father, Joseph Grungo, and the mother, Wendy Grungo-Smith, lived in close proximity in Fort Mill, South Carolina, but the mother subsequently moved multiple times, often living up to an hour and a half away. This led to deviations from the original custody schedule, with the mother having the children most of the time.In 2019, the mother filed for primary custody, citing the father's failure to utilize his full custody time. The father counterclaimed, citing several changes in circumstances, including the mother's unstable living situation, her second husband's criminal conviction involving one of the children, and the negative environment created by her third husband. The family court trial in 2020 included testimony from both parents and a guardian ad litem, who reported on the children's stressful experiences at the mother's home and their preference for the father's home.The family court awarded primary custody to the father, finding a substantial change in circumstances and determining that the children's best interests would be served by this change. The mother appealed, and the South Carolina Court of Appeals reversed the family court's decision, reinstating the joint custody arrangement. The appellate court found that the family court erred in relying on the guardian's testimony and recommendation, asserting that such reliance was only appropriate in "extraordinary circumstances."The South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the appellate court's decision. The Supreme Court held that the family court's procedure in eliciting the guardian's testimony and recommendation complied with the applicable statute, which does not impose an "extraordinary circumstances" standard. The Supreme Court found that the evidence supported the family court's decision, reinstating the family court's order awarding primary custody to the father. View "Grungo-Smith v. Grungo" on Justia Law

Devin Jamel Johnson was convicted of murdering Akeem Smalls. The incident stemmed from a dispute over a debt Smalls owed Johnson for stolen marijuana. On the night of the murder, surveillance footage showed Johnson and an unidentified man, referred to as "Creep," arriving at the scene. Johnson initially denied involvement but later admitted to driving the car seen in the footage. Evidence included Johnson's fingerprints on a bullet cartridge found at the scene and cell phone records indicating his presence near the crime scene.The case was tried three times. In the first trial, Johnson was convicted after the trial court gave an accomplice liability instruction following a jury question. The South Carolina Court of Appeals reversed this conviction, citing fundamental unfairness due to the trial court's change in instructions. A second trial ended in a mistrial. In the third trial, Johnson was again convicted, but the Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, ruling that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on accomplice liability, as there was no evidence that Johnson acted in concert with another person.The South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the case and disagreed with the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court held that the evidence supported the trial court's decision to instruct the jury on accomplice liability. The court found that Johnson's actions and communications indicated a mutual plan to murder Smalls, and the presence of "Creep" at the scene supported the inference that they acted together. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and reinstated Johnson's murder conviction. View "The State v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Adam Rowell was convicted by a jury of two felony driving under the influence charges. After the trial, Rowell discovered that Juror 164 had failed to disclose during voir dire that he had been recently arrested for several charges, including possession with intent to distribute marijuana. Rowell included this information in his motion for a new trial. Although the State consented to a second hearing to examine Juror 164, the circuit court denied the motion without holding the hearing.The Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court's decision, stating that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by not conducting an evidentiary hearing with Juror 164. The appellate court agreed with the circuit court's finding that Juror 164's failure to disclose his arrest was unintentional and that no further inquiry was necessary.The Supreme Court of South Carolina reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeals' decision. The Supreme Court held that the distinction between intentional and unintentional concealment of information during voir dire should be abandoned. Instead, the focus should be on whether the concealed information suggests bias and whether it would have been material to the use of a peremptory strike or a challenge for cause. The court emphasized the importance of a hearing to determine if the juror's nondisclosure indicated potential bias.The Supreme Court vacated the lower court's decision and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing to examine Juror 164. The circuit court is instructed to determine if the concealed information suggests bias and if it would have been material to Rowell's use of peremptory strikes or a challenge for cause. The standard for materiality is whether a reasonable party would have exercised a strike had the information been disclosed. View "The State v. Rowell" on Justia Law

In the mid-1990s, Bradford Jeffcoat and Sandra Perkins began a long-term relationship and lived together in a house Jeffcoat purchased in Charleston, South Carolina. In 2000, Jeffcoat deeded the property to himself and Perkins as joint tenants with the right of survivorship. Perkins developed dementia in 2009, and in 2015, her daughter Vanessa Williams took her to Alabama without Jeffcoat's knowledge. Williams was later appointed as Perkins' guardian and conservator by an Alabama probate court and deeded Perkins' interest in the property to herself. Perkins died in November 2015.Williams filed a petition in Charleston County court to partition the property by sale. Jeffcoat counterclaimed, alleging fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and slander of title, and argued that the conveyance was invalid. The Charleston County Master-in-Equity granted summary judgment to Williams, finding that a joint tenant could unilaterally sever the joint tenancy under South Carolina law. The court of appeals affirmed the decision.The South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that there were genuine issues of material fact regarding Jeffcoat's unclean hands defense, which precluded summary judgment. The court also held that the Alabama probate court had subject matter jurisdiction over the guardianship and conservatorship proceedings. However, the court determined that South Carolina Code section 27-7-40, which allows unilateral severance of joint tenancies, did not apply retroactively to the joint tenancy created before the statute's enactment. Under common law, the joint tenancy could be severed by unilateral conveyance.The Supreme Court reversed the summary judgment in part, affirmed the decision as modified in part, and remanded the case to the Master-in-Equity to resolve the unclean hands defense and determine whether it would defeat Williams' demand for partition. View "Williams v. Jeffcoat" on Justia Law

The case involves a challenge to the constitutionality of the 2023 Act No. 8 (S. 39), known as the Education Scholarship Trust Fund (ESTF) Act, which establishes a fund to provide scholarships for qualifying educational expenses, including private school tuition. Petitioners argue that the Act violates South Carolina's constitutional prohibition against using public funds for the direct benefit of private educational institutions.The lower courts did not review this case; it was accepted directly by the South Carolina Supreme Court in its original jurisdiction. Petitioners sought an injunction and declaratory judgment, claiming the Act violated several provisions of the South Carolina Constitution, including Article XI, Sections 2, 3, and 4, and Article X, Sections 5 and 11.The South Carolina Supreme Court held that portions of the Act violate the state constitution's prohibition against using public funds for the direct benefit of private educational institutions. The court found that the ESTF funds are public funds and that using these funds for private school tuition constitutes a direct benefit to private educational institutions, which is unconstitutional under Article XI, Section 4. The court severed and declared unconstitutional the provisions of the Act that allowed payments from ESTF scholarships for tuition and fees at private educational institutions. The court enjoined the Department of Education from disbursing ESTF scholarships for these purposes. The court's decision was guided by the principle that legislative policy must conform to constitutional mandates, and it emphasized the importance of adhering to the plain meaning of constitutional text. View "Candace Eidson v. South Carolina Dept. of Education" on Justia Law

Alvetta Massenberg inherited a 2.54-acre tract of undeveloped land in Clarendon County, South Carolina. After failing to pay property taxes for 2016, the Clarendon County Treasurer issued a tax execution to collect the delinquent taxes. The tax collector followed the statutory procedure by sending notices via regular and certified mail, but the certified mail was returned undelivered. Subsequently, a private contractor posted a "Notice of Levy" on a tree facing a one-lane dirt road on the property. The property was later sold at a public auction to Blacktop Ventures, LLC, which paid the outstanding taxes.The master-in-equity court refused to set aside the tax sale, concluding that the notice met the legal requirements for posting. The court did not specifically analyze whether the notice was posted in a "conspicuous" place. Massenberg appealed, and the South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the master's decision. Massenberg then petitioned for a writ of certiorari, which was granted.The South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the case and focused on whether the notice was posted in a "conspicuous" place as required by subsection 12-51-40(c) of the South Carolina Code. The Court found that the tax collector failed to exercise judgment in ensuring the notice was posted conspicuously. The notice was posted on a tree facing a less-traveled dirt road, making it difficult to see. The Court determined that the notice should have been posted on the side of the property facing a more frequently traveled paved road. Consequently, the Court held that the tax collector did not comply with the statutory requirement, rendering the tax sale invalid.The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals, setting aside the tax sale. View "Massenberg v. Clarendon County Treasurer" on Justia Law