Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The case concerns the authority of the South Carolina Attorney General to enter into and execute a contingent fee agreement with private law firms in connection with litigation against the United States Department of Energy (DOE). The Attorney General retained two law firms to represent the State in disputes over the DOE’s obligations regarding plutonium storage and removal at the Savannah River Site. After extensive litigation and negotiation, the State and the DOE reached a settlement in which the DOE agreed to pay South Carolina $600 million. The Attorney General subsequently paid $75 million in attorney’s fees to the law firms, pursuant to the contingent fee agreement.Previously, the Richland County Circuit Court dismissed a challenge to the fee payment, finding that the plaintiffs lacked standing. However, the Supreme Court of South Carolina later determined that the plaintiffs had public importance standing and remanded the case for consideration of the merits. On remand, the circuit court granted summary judgment to the Attorney General and the law firms, holding that the Attorney General had the authority to enter into the fee agreements. The circuit court did not address all of the plaintiffs’ claims, but the Supreme Court found the record sufficient to resolve the remaining legal questions.The Supreme Court of South Carolina held that the Attorney General’s payment of attorney’s fees directly to the law firms, without first depositing the gross settlement into the State’s general fund or a legislatively created Litigation Recovery Account, was permissible under South Carolina Code subsection 1-7-150(B). The Court found that the settlement agreement and related documents “awarded” attorney’s fees as part of the settlement, and that the Attorney General’s contractual obligation to pay the fees constituted a “disposition required by law.” The Court also held that judicial review of the reasonableness of the fee would violate the separation of powers, as no statute authorized such review in this context. The judgment was affirmed in result. View "SC Public Interest Foundation v. Wilson" on Justia Law

Mark and Jane Thompson, residents of Aiken County and the City of Aiken, paid road maintenance fees levied by both the county and city for several years. After the City of Aiken rescinded its fee in 2021 and agreed to reimburse fees paid after that date, the Thompsons filed suit against various city and county officials and entities. They sought a declaratory judgment that the ordinances imposing the fees were invalid, reimbursement of unlawfully collected fees, damages under section 8-21-30 of the South Carolina Code, and relief for alleged violations of their constitutional rights.The case was first heard in the Circuit Court for Aiken County. The Thompsons voluntarily dismissed some claims and parties before and during the hearing. The trial court ultimately dismissed the remaining claims, finding that the South Carolina Revenue Procedures Act (RPA) deprived it of subject matter jurisdiction, that section 12-60-80(C) barred class actions against political subdivisions, that section 8-21-30 did not apply to the road maintenance fees or the actions of the county treasurer, and that sovereign immunity barred the unjust enrichment claim. The constitutional claim was dismissed by stipulation. The Thompsons appealed, and the Supreme Court of South Carolina certified the appeal before the Court of Appeals could rule.The Supreme Court of South Carolina held that the road maintenance fees at issue were not “taxes” under the RPA, so the RPA did not deprive the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction over the individual or class claims. The catchall provision of section 12-60-80(C) does not bar class actions against political subdivisions unless the claim concerns value-based property taxes. The court affirmed the dismissal of the unjust enrichment, section 8-21-30, and constitutional claims, but reversed the dismissal of the declaratory judgment claim and remanded for further proceedings on that claim, both individually and as a class. View "Thompson v. Killian" on Justia Law

The case concerns a man who was convicted of murdering his estranged wife by shooting her in the back seat of a car outside a police station, in the presence of children. He was arrested the day before the murder for domestic violence, released on bond, and the next day followed his wife and her friend to the police station, where the shooting occurred. The prosecution presented evidence of prior domestic abuse and a previous conviction for a violent offense. The defense focused on the defendant’s troubled upbringing, mental health issues, and cognitive deficits. The jury found him guilty and recommended a death sentence, which the trial court imposed.After his conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal, the defendant filed for post-conviction relief (PCR) in the Circuit Court for Spartanburg County, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, particularly regarding the investigation and presentation of mitigating evidence during the penalty phase. The PCR court initially denied relief in an order that was identical to the State’s proposed order. The Supreme Court of South Carolina vacated that order and remanded for a new order with specific findings. On remand, the PCR court again denied relief, issuing an amended order after reviewing the parties’ proposed orders and making some corrections. The defendant’s requests for a new hearing or for the judge’s recusal were denied.The Supreme Court of South Carolina reviewed whether the PCR court erred by adopting the State’s proposed order and whether trial counsel was ineffective in preparing and presenting mitigation. The court held that the PCR court did not violate the defendant’s rights by adopting the State’s proposed order after adequate review, and that any deficiencies in trial counsel’s mitigation investigation or presentation did not prejudice the defendant. The court found no reasonable probability that additional mitigation evidence would have changed the jury’s recommendation. The decision of the PCR court was affirmed in result. View "Lindsey v. The State" on Justia Law

Gulfstream Café, Inc. owns a restaurant within the Marlin Quay Planned Development (PD) in Georgetown County, South Carolina. The PD includes a shared parking lot, with Gulfstream holding a nonexclusive easement for sixty-two spaces and owning seventeen additional spaces. In 2016, Palmetto Industrial Development, LLC purchased the marina and parking lot, demolished the existing structures, and sought approval from the Georgetown County Council to build a new restaurant. After several iterations and legal challenges, the Council approved a final plan (Ordinance 2018-40) for the new restaurant, which increased evening parking demand and allegedly harmed Gulfstream’s business.Previously, Gulfstream challenged the approval process and the impact on its easement rights in the Circuit Court for Georgetown County. The court held a bench trial and ruled in favor of the County, the County Council, and Councilmember Steve Goggans on all claims, including substantive and procedural due process, takings, inverse condemnation, and alleged impropriety in the approval process. Gulfstream appealed the decision.The Supreme Court of South Carolina reviewed the case, applying a limited scope of review for factual findings and de novo review for legal and constitutional issues. The Court held that Gulfstream’s easement was nonexclusive and had not been deprived by the ordinance, that the County’s actions had a rational basis, and that the ordinance did not constitute a per se or regulatory taking under the Penn Central test. The Court also found no procedural due process violation, as Gulfstream received notice and an opportunity to be heard, and determined that Councilmember Goggans’ prior involvement did not invalidate the ordinance. The Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed the circuit court’s judgment in all respects. View "The Gulfstream Café v. Georgetown County" on Justia Law

Following the 2020 census, South Carolina was required to redraw its congressional districts to ensure population equality among the seven districts. The most significant changes involved Districts 1 and 6, with District 1 being overpopulated and District 6 underpopulated. The redistricting process, led by Senator Chip Campsen, resulted in a plan that increased the Republican advantage in District 1 by unifying certain counties and shifting precincts with high Democratic vote shares into District 6. The plan was enacted in 2022 and used in subsequent elections.Previously, the United States Supreme Court reviewed the plan in Alexander v. South Carolina State Conference of the NAACP, 602 U.S. 1 (2024), focusing on claims of racial gerrymandering. The Supreme Court found that the legislature’s primary intent was partisan advantage, not racial discrimination, and held that claims of partisan gerrymandering are nonjusticiable under the U.S. Constitution. After the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their remaining federal claims, the League of Women Voters of South Carolina filed a petition in the Supreme Court of South Carolina, arguing that the plan constituted an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander under several provisions of the South Carolina Constitution.The Supreme Court of South Carolina, exercising its original jurisdiction, held that claims of partisan gerrymandering present a nonjusticiable political question under the state constitution. The court found that South Carolina’s constitution and statutes do not contain provisions that prohibit or limit partisan gerrymandering, nor do they provide judicially manageable standards for adjudicating such claims. The court concluded that the authority to draw congressional districts is textually committed to the legislature and denied the League’s request for relief, dismissing the claims with prejudice. View "League of Women Voters of South Carolina v. Alexander" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who was arrested and indicted for the murder of an individual named Donald Blake, with the allegation being that the murder was committed by blunt force trauma. At trial, the court instructed the jury on both murder and, over the defendant’s objection, the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter. After more than five hours of deliberation, the jury returned a verdict of not guilty on murder and guilty on voluntary manslaughter. During jury polling, the eleventh juror indicated that the guilty verdict for manslaughter was not her true verdict, explaining she had been pressured by other jurors and maintained a not guilty stance. The trial judge, without instructing the jury to continue deliberations and over the objections of both parties, questioned the dissenting juror individually and then declared a mistrial.Following the mistrial, the State sought to retry the defendant for murder. The defendant moved for habeas corpus and for entry of a verdict of acquittal, arguing that jeopardy had attached to the murder charge because the jury had returned a final not guilty verdict. The Circuit Court denied relief, holding that jeopardy had not attached and that the State could retry the defendant for murder. The defendant’s appeal to the South Carolina Court of Appeals was dismissed as not immediately appealable, and his petitions for supersedeas and habeas corpus were denied. The Supreme Court of South Carolina then issued a common law writ of certiorari to review whether the State could retry the defendant for murder, and later requested briefing on the voluntary manslaughter charge as well.The Supreme Court of South Carolina held that jeopardy attached to both the murder and voluntary manslaughter charges. The Court found the not guilty verdict on murder was final and that the trial court’s sua sponte declaration of a mistrial, without manifest necessity and without instructing the jury to continue deliberations, barred retrial on both charges under double jeopardy principles. The Court reversed the lower court’s ruling, holding the State may not retry the defendant for either offense. View "The State v. Erb" on Justia Law

Law enforcement arrested the defendant after discovering large quantities of methamphetamine and fentanyl in his vehicle. He was indicted for trafficking in methamphetamine and trafficking in illegal drugs under South Carolina law. The defendant entered a deferred plea agreement, agreeing to cooperate as a confidential informant in exchange for deferred sentencing. However, after being re-arrested on new drug charges, he ultimately pled guilty to both trafficking charges. Two years later, he moved to vacate his guilty plea to trafficking in illegal drugs, arguing that the statute under which he was charged did not criminalize trafficking in fentanyl, a synthetic opioid, and thus he had pled guilty to a nonexistent offense.The Circuit Court for Greenville County denied the motion to vacate, reasoning that the defendant had received a benefit by pleading to trafficking rather than a more serious charge and that his conduct was clearly criminal. The court did not specifically address whether fentanyl fell within the statutory language but imposed concurrent sentences for both trafficking convictions. The defendant appealed, contending that the indictment failed to state an offense and that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to accept his plea.The Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed the conviction and sentence. The court held that even if the statute did not encompass fentanyl, any defect in the indictment was non-jurisdictional and was waived by the defendant’s guilty plea. The court clarified that subject matter jurisdiction is not implicated by defects in an indictment charging a recognized crime, and that a guilty plea waives all non-jurisdictional challenges. Therefore, the defendant could not challenge his conviction on the grounds asserted after pleading guilty. View "The State v. Sweet" on Justia Law

Following a motor vehicle accident in which a tractor-trailer driven by Mervin Johnson rear-ended Kacey and Charinrath Green’s Tesla multiple times on I-26, the Greens filed suit against Johnson. The accident resulted in relatively minor property damage and medical expenses totaling approximately $12,826. The Greens testified to ongoing pain and suffering, some loss of income, and property depreciation. Johnson did not respond to the complaint, resulting in a default judgment. At a damages hearing, the master-in-equity awarded the Greens $1.76 million in actual and punitive damages, based largely on their testimony and a video of the accident.After the default judgment, Johnson moved to set aside the entry of default and the damages award, citing health issues and arguing the damages were grossly disproportionate to the actual harm. The master denied relief from default but later reduced the damages to $250,000 ($190,000 actual, $60,000 punitive), finding the original award excessive in light of the evidence. The master omitted a $10,000 property damage award previously included. The Greens moved for reconsideration, which was denied. On appeal, the South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of relief from default but vacated the reduced award, reinstating the original $1.76 million.The Supreme Court of South Carolina reviewed the case and held that a party in default may satisfy the “meritorious defense” requirement by showing a defense as to the amount of damages or proximate cause, not just fault. The Court affirmed the denial of relief from default, reversed the reinstatement of the $1.76 million award, and reinstated the master’s reduced award with two modifications: the master must allocate the damages between the Greens and add $10,000 for property damage to Mr. Green’s share. The case was remanded for these adjustments. View "Green v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Two drivers, McGee and Hudgins, were involved in a road-rage incident that ended with McGee crashing into Green’s vehicle, causing her injuries. Green and her husband sued both drivers. Before filing suit, Green received $100,000 from McGee’s insurer in exchange for a covenant not to execute judgment against McGee. Green’s underinsured motorist (UIM) carrier, Progressive, defended the suit in McGee’s name. The jury found McGee 60% at fault and Hudgins 40% at fault, and determined both acted recklessly, willfully, and wantonly. The jury awarded Green $88,546.78 in actual damages and $35,000 in punitive damages against each defendant.The Circuit Court for Spartanburg County combined the actual and punitive damages for a total of $158,546.78, subtracted the $100,000 payment from McGee’s insurer, and allocated the remaining $58,546.78 between McGee and Hudgins based on their respective percentages of fault. On appeal, the South Carolina Court of Appeals altered the setoff calculation, allocating the $100,000 payment first to McGee’s share, then applying any remainder to Hudgins’ share, resulting in a net judgment of $58,546.78 against Hudgins and $0 against McGee.The Supreme Court of South Carolina reviewed the setoff calculation. It held that, because the jury found both defendants acted recklessly, willfully, and wantonly, joint and several liability applied to the actual damages, making the percentage allocation of fault irrelevant. The court further held that the $100,000 payment could only be set off against the actual damages, not the punitive damages, as punitive damages are not for the “same injury.” The court reversed the Court of Appeals, holding Green is entitled to a net judgment of $23,546.78 against McGee and $35,000 against Hudgins, and remanded for entry of judgment in those amounts. View "Green v. McGee" on Justia Law

A certified registered nurse anesthetist, who had already retired and was receiving retirement benefits, resumed work at a medical center. He and other similarly situated salaried healthcare workers received additional pay for working undesirable shifts, such as weekends, holidays, late hours, on-call, and for hours worked beyond their scheduled shifts. This extra compensation, referred to as the "Wages in Controversy," was subject to mandatory deductions for the South Carolina Retirement System (SCRS). The plaintiff challenged these deductions, arguing that the extra pay should not be considered "earnable compensation" under the SCRS Act and thus should not be subject to retirement contributions.The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, recognizing that the resolution of the plaintiff’s claims depended on the interpretation of state law, certified a question to the Supreme Court of South Carolina. The question was whether the Wages in Controversy constituted "earnable compensation" under South Carolina law, making them subject to mandatory employer deductions for SCRS contributions.The Supreme Court of South Carolina held that the Wages in Controversy are "earnable compensation" as defined by the SCRS Act. The court reasoned that these payments, although labeled differently by the employer, were all compensation for hours actually worked and not irregular, one-time, or bonus payments excluded by statute. The court concluded that such pay is subject to mandatory employer deductions under the relevant statutory provisions. The certified question was answered accordingly. View "Luce v. Lexington County Health Services District, Inc." on Justia Law