Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

John A. Tibbs and his wife brought suit against numerous defendants, including an English company known as Cape Intermediate Holdings Limited (CIHL), alleging that exposure to asbestos caused Mr. Tibbs’ lung cancer. The litigation involved confusion regarding the proper “Cape” entity, but the parties ultimately agreed that CIHL, as the successor to Cape Asbestos Company, was the correct defendant. The trial court had previously appointed a receiver for Cape in a related asbestos case (Park), after which the receiver accepted service and asserted third-party claims in the Tibbs case against several foreign entities, alleging unjust enrichment and related theories.The Richland County Circuit Court denied the third-party defendants’ motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and to dissolve the receivership. These defendants appealed, and the South Carolina Supreme Court later remanded the case to ensure the receivership complied with guidelines set forth in Welch v. Advance Auto Parts, Inc. On remand, the trial court issued a Confirmation Order clarifying that CIHL was the real party in interest, affirming the appointment of a pre-judgment receiver based on findings of moral fraud and potential insolvency, and adjusting the scope of the receiver’s authority.The Supreme Court of South Carolina reviewed the Confirmation Order. It held that the trial court had jurisdiction and that the appointment of a pre-judgment receiver was justified due to CIHL’s conduct intended to defeat or hinder claimants, but not on the ground of insolvency. The Court modified the Confirmation Order, limiting the receiver’s authority to collecting insurance assets and pursuing related claims responsive to the Tibbs plaintiffs. The Court affirmed as modified and reversed the finding regarding insolvency, clarifying that foreign court decisions did not control personal jurisdiction determinations in South Carolina and that the lack of a bond did not void the receivership order. View "Tibbs v. 3M Company" on Justia Law

The case involves Bayan Aleksey, who was convicted and sentenced to death for the murder of a South Carolina state trooper during a traffic stop in 1997. After his conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal, Aleksey filed a post-conviction relief application alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, which was denied. Following the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Atkins v. Virginia, establishing that intellectually disabled persons cannot be executed, Aleksey filed a second post-conviction relief application asserting intellectual disability as a bar to execution.The Orangeburg County post-conviction relief (PCR) court held a hearing to determine Aleksey’s intellectual disability. Aleksey submitted five affidavits, including the Hammock affidavit, as evidence of deficits in adaptive functioning. The PCR court excluded the Hammock affidavit because the affiant was unavailable for cross-examination, leaving only non-expert evidence on adaptive functioning. After reviewing IQ scores, expert testimony, and school records, the PCR court found Aleksey failed to prove intellectual disability by a preponderance of the evidence, as his developmental-period IQ scores were above the threshold, his adaptive deficits stemmed from ADHD and emotional disturbance rather than intellectual disability, and no intellectual disability diagnosis manifested during his developmental years.The Supreme Court of South Carolina reviewed whether the PCR court erred in its findings and evidentiary rulings. The Court affirmed the PCR court’s decision, holding that the finding Aleksey is not intellectually disabled was supported by the evidence and not against its preponderance. The Court also found no abuse of discretion in the exclusion of the Hammock affidavit, emphasizing the necessity of cross-examination for contested issues. The PCR court’s denial of relief was therefore affirmed. View "Aleksey v. State" on Justia Law

Two groups of plaintiffs challenged the road maintenance fees imposed by Orangeburg and Georgetown Counties, arguing these fees constituted invalid taxes under South Carolina law as interpreted in a prior decision. Both counties had long-standing ordinances requiring an annual fee from vehicle owners for road and bridge maintenance, which were increased over time. After this Court’s decision in Burns v. Greenville County Council found similar fees invalid unless they provided a benefit distinct from that received by the general public, the plaintiffs filed suit seeking declaratory and monetary relief.The Orangeburg County action was reviewed by Judge Edgar W. Dickson, who dismissed all monetary claims but allowed the request for declaratory relief to proceed. The Georgetown County action was reviewed by Judge William H. Seals, Jr., who denied a motion to strike but did not address the motion to dismiss. After the legislature amended the relevant statute via Act No. 236 of 2022—explicitly allowing retroactive application to fees imposed after 1996—the cases were assigned to Judge Roger M. Young, Sr. He found section 2(E) of the Act unconstitutional under the Separation of Powers Clause, granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs in Butts, and denied summary judgment for the defendants in Brown, certifying the constitutional question for appeal.The Supreme Court of South Carolina reviewed the consolidated appeals. The Court held that the General Assembly has the constitutional authority to retroactively amend statutes following judicial interpretation, so long as final judgments are not disturbed and express constitutional limitations are not violated. The Court overruled prior precedent that categorically barred such retroactive legislation under the Separation of Powers Clause. Accordingly, the trial court’s orders were reversed and the cases remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Butts v. Mace" on Justia Law

The case involved Andy Hyman, who had previously been convicted of sexual offenses against minors. After serving his sentence, the State of South Carolina sought to civilly commit him as a sexually violent predator (SVP). As required by statute, the South Carolina Office of Mental Health (OMH) conducted a pre-commitment evaluation and diagnosed Hyman with pedophilic disorder, but determined he did not meet the legal criteria for SVP status because he was not likely to reoffend. Dissatisfied, the State obtained a second evaluation from the Medical University of South Carolina (MUSC), which included a penile plethysmography (PPG) test and resulted in an opposing opinion—MUSC concluded Hyman was an SVP.At trial in Florence County, Hyman moved to exclude the PPG evidence, arguing it was scientifically unreliable due to lack of standardization and high error rates. The trial court denied his motion, finding the PPG reliable and admissible. The jury found Hyman to be an SVP, leading to his commitment. Hyman appealed, and the South Carolina Court of Appeals reversed, concluding the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the PPG evidence, since it failed to meet the reliability standards required for scientific evidence.The Supreme Court of South Carolina reviewed the case on a writ of certiorari. It affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision, holding that PPG results are generally inadmissible in judicial proceedings in South Carolina until the underlying science is more thoroughly developed and standardized. The court found that the lack of standardization in PPG administration and interpretation rendered the test inherently unreliable under the applicable evidentiary standard. The court further concluded that admitting the PPG evidence was prejudicial and not harmless error, and remanded the case for a new commitment proceeding. View "In the Matter of the Care and Treatment of Hyman" on Justia Law

The case involved a former attorney who was tried and convicted in 2023 for the murders of his wife and son, as well as for possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime. The trial was widely publicized and lasted six weeks. After his conviction and sentencing to life in prison, the defendant filed a motion for a new trial, alleging that the Colleton County Clerk of Court had improperly influenced the jury by making comments that disparaged his credibility and suggested he was guilty, as well as by pressuring the jury to reach a guilty verdict. Affidavits and testimony from several jurors and court staff supported claims that the clerk made these comments, motivated in part by a desire for notoriety and book sales.A post-trial court, presided over by a different judge due to the original judge’s recusal, held a hearing to examine the alleged improper communications. The post-trial court found that the clerk had made improper comments to the jury, but concluded these did not affect any juror’s verdict and denied the motion for a new trial. The defendant appealed, and the South Carolina Supreme Court certified the appeal and consolidated it with the direct appeal of the convictions.The Supreme Court of South Carolina reversed the post-trial court’s denial of a new trial. The court held that the clerk’s comments constituted improper external influence on the jury, triggering a presumption of prejudice under the Remmer v. United States standard. The court found that the State failed to rebut this presumption, and further held that the post-trial court erred by questioning jurors about the effect of the comments in a manner prohibited by evidentiary rules. The Supreme Court ordered a new trial and provided guidance for the admissibility of evidence related to the defendant’s financial crimes on remand. View "The State v. Murdaugh" on Justia Law

Samir Kevin Shank was charged after an incident in which, while trying to evade police in a stolen vehicle, he reversed the car down a narrow street. During the attempt to escape, the car’s open passenger-side door collided with an officer’s open driver-side door, knocking the officer to the ground. The officer suffered a scraped knee, but no serious injuries. Shank was arrested after a further pursuit and indicted for, among other charges, Assault and Battery of a High and Aggravated Nature (ABHAN).During his trial in the Greenville County Circuit Court, Shank requested a jury instruction on Third-Degree Assault and Battery, arguing that the evidence—particularly the minor injury and lack of intent to harm—supported conviction for the lesser offense rather than ABHAN. The trial court denied this request, agreeing with the State that the manner in which the vehicle was used was likely to produce death or great bodily injury, as required for ABHAN. Shank was convicted as charged. On appeal, the South Carolina Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense and that this error was not harmless.The Supreme Court of South Carolina reviewed the case and reversed the court of appeals. It held that the trial court did not err in refusing to give the requested lesser-included offense instruction because the evidence did not support a rational inference that Shank was guilty only of Third-Degree Assault and Battery. The Court found that Shank’s use of the vehicle constituted a means likely to produce death or great bodily injury, thus satisfying all elements of ABHAN and making an instruction on the lesser offense inapplicable. View "The State v. Shank" on Justia Law

After being injured in a car accident while riding in a vehicle insured by Progressive, the respondent received medical treatment from several providers. The total amount billed for her treatment was $27,786.17. However, as a Medicaid recipient, her providers agreed to accept $1,323.60—paid by Medicaid—as full satisfaction for her medical expenses. The respondent demanded payment of the full $10,000 policy limit under the "Medpay" provision of her Progressive auto insurance policy, but Progressive paid only the $1,323.60 Medicaid had paid, arguing that this was the only amount the respondent actually "incurred."The Circuit Court for Chester County denied Progressive’s motion to dismiss the breach of contract claim and, after a bench trial, found for the respondent. The court determined the term "incurred" was ambiguous and should be interpreted in favor of the insured, entitling the respondent to the full amount charged for her medical care. The South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the full amount billed constituted expenses "incurred," even though the providers accepted less due to Medicaid.The Supreme Court of South Carolina granted certiorari and reversed. It held that the term "expenses incurred" in the policy is unambiguous and means the amount for which the insured is legally obligated to pay. The Court determined the respondent incurred only the amount Medicaid paid, as she had no obligation to pay the providers more. Accordingly, Progressive was required to pay only $1,323.60, and not the higher amounts billed or the policy limit. The Court remanded for entry of judgment in favor of Progressive. View "Jones v. Progressive Northern Insurance Company" on Justia Law

Amazon Services, LLC operated the online marketplace Amazon.com, which allowed third-party merchants to sell products to South Carolina residents. In 2016, although Amazon Services collected and remitted sales tax for products it and its affiliates sold, it did not do so for sales made by third-party merchants. After an audit, the South Carolina Department of Revenue assessed Amazon Services for $12,490,502.15 in unpaid sales taxes, penalties, and interest, claiming that Amazon Services was legally required to collect and remit sales taxes on third-party merchant sales due to the company's significant involvement in those transactions.Amazon Services contested the assessment before the South Carolina Administrative Law Court, which upheld the Department of Revenue’s determination, finding Amazon Services was “engaged in the business of selling” under the South Carolina Sales and Use Tax Act and thus responsible for remitting the tax. Amazon Services appealed, and the South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the Administrative Law Court’s ruling, agreeing with the interpretation that Amazon Services’ role in third-party sales triggered the statutory obligation to collect and remit sales tax.The Supreme Court of South Carolina granted certiorari and affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court held that, under the plain language of subsection 12-36-910(A) of the South Carolina Sales and Use Tax Act, Amazon Services was “engaged in the business of selling” due to its comprehensive control and involvement in third-party transactions and was therefore required to remit sales tax on those sales. The Court also held that this application did not violate due process, as the relevant statutory provisions were in effect prior to the challenged assessment, and clarified that its holding was not based on interpreting tax statutes broadly but on ordinary statutory interpretation principles. View "Amazon Services v. SCDOR" on Justia Law

After a high school basketball game, a confrontation occurred between two groups of rival fans, leading to the stabbing death of Da'Von Capers. The defendant, Kierin Marcellus Dennis, was indicted for murder. Dennis claimed he acted in self-defense and sought immunity from prosecution under the Protection of Persons and Property Act. At the pre-trial immunity hearing, witnesses gave conflicting accounts about whether the victim or others had unlawfully and forcefully entered Dennis’s vehicle before the stabbing. The circuit court found that Dennis failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was entitled to immunity and denied his request, allowing the prosecution to proceed.Dennis was tried for murder, but the jury could not reach a unanimous verdict, resulting in a mistrial. When the State sought to retry him, Dennis requested a second immunity hearing, arguing that the mistrial entitled him to a new hearing or, alternatively, to introduce new evidence discovered since the first hearing. The circuit court allowed him to present new evidence but ultimately denied a second immunity hearing and again denied immunity. Dennis was convicted at the second trial. He appealed, arguing he was entitled to another immunity hearing after the mistrial. The South Carolina Court of Appeals agreed and reversed his conviction, holding that the mistrial required a new immunity hearing.The Supreme Court of South Carolina reviewed the case and held that a mistrial does not entitle a defendant to a second immunity hearing under the Act. The court reasoned that an immunity hearing is an independent proceeding and its result remains binding after a mistrial. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the original denial of immunity. The decision of the court of appeals was reversed and the case remanded for consideration of the remaining appellate issues. View "The State v. Dennis" on Justia Law

The dispute centers around an attempted annexation by the City of North Charleston of a one-acre parcel located near Highway 61 and the Ashley River. This parcel, purchased by North Charleston in 2017, is situated on the southwest side of Highway 61 and separated from both the highway and North Charleston’s existing city limits by a narrow strip of land owned by the National Trust for Historic Preservation. That narrow strip has been part of the City of Charleston since its annexation in 2005. The annexation ordinance at issue included 62 square feet of the National Trust’s strip—land within Charleston’s city limits—in its property description.The National Trust and the City of Charleston challenged the validity of North Charleston’s annexation ordinance, arguing that the parcel was not “adjacent” to North Charleston’s existing city limits as required by section 5-3-100 of the South Carolina Code. The Circuit Court for Charleston County dismissed the lawsuit, holding that neither the National Trust nor Charleston had standing to contest the annexation, but also found in the alternative that, if standing existed, the annexation was invalid because the parcel was not adjacent to North Charleston’s city limits. On appeal, the South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal for lack of standing and declined to reach the merits of the annexation’s validity.The Supreme Court of South Carolina granted review and held that both the National Trust and the City of Charleston had standing to challenge the annexation. The Court further affirmed the circuit court’s alternative ruling that North Charleston’s annexation was invalid because the parcel was not “adjacent” to its city limits, as required under state law. Thus, the decision of the court of appeals was reversed in part and affirmed in part. View "National Trust for Historic Preservation v. City of North Charleston" on Justia Law