Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The case involves a defendant who was convicted of murder and armed robbery based largely on circumstantial evidence. The prosecution’s evidence included instant messages allegedly used to lure the victim, text messages about the defendant’s plan, cell phone location data placing him with the victim at key times, firearm evidence linking the defendant’s gun to the crime, and the defendant’s use of the victim’s credit card after the murder. The trial court instructed the jury using a reasonable doubt charge and a circumstantial evidence instruction recommended in an earlier South Carolina Supreme Court case.After his conviction, the South Carolina Court of Appeals dismissed the defendant’s direct appeal under the procedures outlined in Anders v. California. Subsequently, the defendant filed a post-conviction relief (PCR) application, arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective for not requesting a specific circumstantial evidence jury instruction identified in State v. Logan. At the evidentiary hearing, trial counsel admitted he had not known of Logan at the time of trial. The PCR court found counsel’s performance was not deficient and, even if it was, there was no prejudice.The Supreme Court of South Carolina reviewed the PCR court’s denial of relief. In its opinion, the court clarified South Carolina law regarding jury charges on circumstantial evidence, overruling in part its prior decision in Logan. The court held that trial courts must not require the jury to find that circumstantial evidence “point conclusively to guilt” or that “all circumstances be consistent,” as Logan had suggested. Instead, a constitutionally sound reasonable doubt charge, along with an explanation of circumstantial and direct evidence (as recommended in State v. Grippon), suffices. Consequently, the court held that counsel was not ineffective for not requesting the Logan charge and affirmed the PCR court’s decision. View "Heatley v. State" on Justia Law

Several inmates who were in the custody of either the South Carolina Department of Corrections or the South Carolina Department of Juvenile Justice filed a lawsuit alleging that prison officials were negligent in failing to implement proper policies, procedures, and staffing, resulting in their being sexually assaulted. The plaintiffs sought to represent a class of all inmates who were victims of nonconsensual sexual battery while in custody from 2012 to the present. They argued that common issues of law and fact predominated, justifying class treatment.The Circuit Court for Dorchester County certified two plaintiff classes—one for each department—based on alleged failures in protection and policy, finding that the requirements for class certification under Rule 23(a) of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure were met. The departments appealed the certification order, but the South Carolina Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal, holding that class certification orders are not immediately appealable.The Supreme Court of South Carolina granted a common-law writ of certiorari to review the circuit court’s class certification. The Supreme Court held that the proposed classes failed to meet the requirements of Rule 23(a), particularly the commonality requirement, because the factual and legal issues, including whether an individual was assaulted, whether negligence occurred, proximate causation, and damages, would require individualized determinations for each claimant. The Court clarified that interlocutory class certification orders are never immediately appealable to the court of appeals and reiterated that class certification requires a qualitative predominance of common issues. The Supreme Court reversed the class certification and remanded the case for discovery and trial solely on the individual claims of the named plaintiffs. View "Henson v. SCDC" on Justia Law

Two South Carolina corporations, owned and operated by Stephen P. Mantell, assist individuals with probate matters by serving as personal representatives, conservators, guardians, and attorneys in fact under powers of attorney. They occasionally acted as trustees of trusts but have since discontinued such services. Complaints were filed with the South Carolina Board of Financial Institutions alleging these corporations were conducting a “trust business” without Board authorization, as required by S.C. Code Ann. § 34-21-10.The Board sought a declaratory judgment and an injunction to stop the companies from operating as trustees or in other fiduciary roles without approval. The Master-in-Equity for Georgetown County granted a declaratory judgment that the corporations could not act as trustees without Board authorization and permanently enjoined them from doing so. However, the court declined to extend the injunction to their roles as guardian, conservator, or attorney in fact, finding these did not constitute a “trust business” under the statute.The South Carolina Court of Appeals reversed, holding that “trust business” under § 34-21-10 included all fiduciary services, not just acting as trustee, and thus required Board approval for the corporations’ roles as guardian, conservator, personal representative, and attorney in fact. Upon review, the South Carolina Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision. The Supreme Court held that the statutory term “trust business” does not encompass serving as a guardian, conservator, personal representative, or attorney in fact. The Court found that these activities are not defined as “trust business” under South Carolina law and are adequately regulated by the Probate Code and probate courts. The main holding is that the corporations’ non-trustee fiduciary roles do not require Board authorization under § 34-21-10. View "SC Board of Financial Instituions v. CDM Corp, Inc." on Justia Law

An employee of a Charleston convenience store fatally shot a customer after a heated confrontation that escalated from a dispute over a cell phone charger. The employee, Suhib Yousef, was previously a victim of armed robbery and displayed signs of trauma. During the incident, after the customer, David Wilson, engaged in aggressive behavior and attempted to disarm Yousef, Yousef shot Wilson, who died from his injuries. Yousef’s uncle, Mahmoud Yousef, owned the store and had hired and armed Suhib after his earlier trauma.Criminal charges for murder were brought against Yousef, but the Circuit Court (Judge R. Markley Dennis) granted him immunity under the South Carolina Protection of Persons and Property Act, finding that Yousef acted lawfully in self-defense and was justified in using deadly force. The State did not appeal this ruling. Wilson’s estate then brought civil claims against the store and its owner for negligence, wrongful death, negligent supervision, and negligent entrustment. The Circuit Court (Judge George M. McFaddin, Jr.) dismissed these claims, ruling that the immunity finding in the criminal case precluded civil liability for Yousef and, by extension, for the store and its owner. The court also found no actionable damages since Yousef’s actions were deemed reasonable.On appeal, the Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed the dismissal, holding that when an employee is granted statutory immunity for justified use of deadly force, that immunity extends to the employer for claims based on vicarious liability and also bars negligent supervision and negligent entrustment claims, as there was no underlying wrongful act. The court concluded this extension of immunity aligns with legislative intent and public policy. View "Moore v. Green's Grocery" on Justia Law

John A. Tibbs and his wife brought suit against numerous defendants, including an English company known as Cape Intermediate Holdings Limited (CIHL), alleging that exposure to asbestos caused Mr. Tibbs’ lung cancer. The litigation involved confusion regarding the proper “Cape” entity, but the parties ultimately agreed that CIHL, as the successor to Cape Asbestos Company, was the correct defendant. The trial court had previously appointed a receiver for Cape in a related asbestos case (Park), after which the receiver accepted service and asserted third-party claims in the Tibbs case against several foreign entities, alleging unjust enrichment and related theories.The Richland County Circuit Court denied the third-party defendants’ motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and to dissolve the receivership. These defendants appealed, and the South Carolina Supreme Court later remanded the case to ensure the receivership complied with guidelines set forth in Welch v. Advance Auto Parts, Inc. On remand, the trial court issued a Confirmation Order clarifying that CIHL was the real party in interest, affirming the appointment of a pre-judgment receiver based on findings of moral fraud and potential insolvency, and adjusting the scope of the receiver’s authority.The Supreme Court of South Carolina reviewed the Confirmation Order. It held that the trial court had jurisdiction and that the appointment of a pre-judgment receiver was justified due to CIHL’s conduct intended to defeat or hinder claimants, but not on the ground of insolvency. The Court modified the Confirmation Order, limiting the receiver’s authority to collecting insurance assets and pursuing related claims responsive to the Tibbs plaintiffs. The Court affirmed as modified and reversed the finding regarding insolvency, clarifying that foreign court decisions did not control personal jurisdiction determinations in South Carolina and that the lack of a bond did not void the receivership order. View "Tibbs v. 3M Company" on Justia Law

The case involves Bayan Aleksey, who was convicted and sentenced to death for the murder of a South Carolina state trooper during a traffic stop in 1997. After his conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal, Aleksey filed a post-conviction relief application alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, which was denied. Following the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Atkins v. Virginia, establishing that intellectually disabled persons cannot be executed, Aleksey filed a second post-conviction relief application asserting intellectual disability as a bar to execution.The Orangeburg County post-conviction relief (PCR) court held a hearing to determine Aleksey’s intellectual disability. Aleksey submitted five affidavits, including the Hammock affidavit, as evidence of deficits in adaptive functioning. The PCR court excluded the Hammock affidavit because the affiant was unavailable for cross-examination, leaving only non-expert evidence on adaptive functioning. After reviewing IQ scores, expert testimony, and school records, the PCR court found Aleksey failed to prove intellectual disability by a preponderance of the evidence, as his developmental-period IQ scores were above the threshold, his adaptive deficits stemmed from ADHD and emotional disturbance rather than intellectual disability, and no intellectual disability diagnosis manifested during his developmental years.The Supreme Court of South Carolina reviewed whether the PCR court erred in its findings and evidentiary rulings. The Court affirmed the PCR court’s decision, holding that the finding Aleksey is not intellectually disabled was supported by the evidence and not against its preponderance. The Court also found no abuse of discretion in the exclusion of the Hammock affidavit, emphasizing the necessity of cross-examination for contested issues. The PCR court’s denial of relief was therefore affirmed. View "Aleksey v. State" on Justia Law

Two groups of plaintiffs challenged the road maintenance fees imposed by Orangeburg and Georgetown Counties, arguing these fees constituted invalid taxes under South Carolina law as interpreted in a prior decision. Both counties had long-standing ordinances requiring an annual fee from vehicle owners for road and bridge maintenance, which were increased over time. After this Court’s decision in Burns v. Greenville County Council found similar fees invalid unless they provided a benefit distinct from that received by the general public, the plaintiffs filed suit seeking declaratory and monetary relief.The Orangeburg County action was reviewed by Judge Edgar W. Dickson, who dismissed all monetary claims but allowed the request for declaratory relief to proceed. The Georgetown County action was reviewed by Judge William H. Seals, Jr., who denied a motion to strike but did not address the motion to dismiss. After the legislature amended the relevant statute via Act No. 236 of 2022—explicitly allowing retroactive application to fees imposed after 1996—the cases were assigned to Judge Roger M. Young, Sr. He found section 2(E) of the Act unconstitutional under the Separation of Powers Clause, granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs in Butts, and denied summary judgment for the defendants in Brown, certifying the constitutional question for appeal.The Supreme Court of South Carolina reviewed the consolidated appeals. The Court held that the General Assembly has the constitutional authority to retroactively amend statutes following judicial interpretation, so long as final judgments are not disturbed and express constitutional limitations are not violated. The Court overruled prior precedent that categorically barred such retroactive legislation under the Separation of Powers Clause. Accordingly, the trial court’s orders were reversed and the cases remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Butts v. Mace" on Justia Law

The case involved Andy Hyman, who had previously been convicted of sexual offenses against minors. After serving his sentence, the State of South Carolina sought to civilly commit him as a sexually violent predator (SVP). As required by statute, the South Carolina Office of Mental Health (OMH) conducted a pre-commitment evaluation and diagnosed Hyman with pedophilic disorder, but determined he did not meet the legal criteria for SVP status because he was not likely to reoffend. Dissatisfied, the State obtained a second evaluation from the Medical University of South Carolina (MUSC), which included a penile plethysmography (PPG) test and resulted in an opposing opinion—MUSC concluded Hyman was an SVP.At trial in Florence County, Hyman moved to exclude the PPG evidence, arguing it was scientifically unreliable due to lack of standardization and high error rates. The trial court denied his motion, finding the PPG reliable and admissible. The jury found Hyman to be an SVP, leading to his commitment. Hyman appealed, and the South Carolina Court of Appeals reversed, concluding the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the PPG evidence, since it failed to meet the reliability standards required for scientific evidence.The Supreme Court of South Carolina reviewed the case on a writ of certiorari. It affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision, holding that PPG results are generally inadmissible in judicial proceedings in South Carolina until the underlying science is more thoroughly developed and standardized. The court found that the lack of standardization in PPG administration and interpretation rendered the test inherently unreliable under the applicable evidentiary standard. The court further concluded that admitting the PPG evidence was prejudicial and not harmless error, and remanded the case for a new commitment proceeding. View "In the Matter of the Care and Treatment of Hyman" on Justia Law

The case involved a former attorney who was tried and convicted in 2023 for the murders of his wife and son, as well as for possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime. The trial was widely publicized and lasted six weeks. After his conviction and sentencing to life in prison, the defendant filed a motion for a new trial, alleging that the Colleton County Clerk of Court had improperly influenced the jury by making comments that disparaged his credibility and suggested he was guilty, as well as by pressuring the jury to reach a guilty verdict. Affidavits and testimony from several jurors and court staff supported claims that the clerk made these comments, motivated in part by a desire for notoriety and book sales.A post-trial court, presided over by a different judge due to the original judge’s recusal, held a hearing to examine the alleged improper communications. The post-trial court found that the clerk had made improper comments to the jury, but concluded these did not affect any juror’s verdict and denied the motion for a new trial. The defendant appealed, and the South Carolina Supreme Court certified the appeal and consolidated it with the direct appeal of the convictions.The Supreme Court of South Carolina reversed the post-trial court’s denial of a new trial. The court held that the clerk’s comments constituted improper external influence on the jury, triggering a presumption of prejudice under the Remmer v. United States standard. The court found that the State failed to rebut this presumption, and further held that the post-trial court erred by questioning jurors about the effect of the comments in a manner prohibited by evidentiary rules. The Supreme Court ordered a new trial and provided guidance for the admissibility of evidence related to the defendant’s financial crimes on remand. View "The State v. Murdaugh" on Justia Law

Samir Kevin Shank was charged after an incident in which, while trying to evade police in a stolen vehicle, he reversed the car down a narrow street. During the attempt to escape, the car’s open passenger-side door collided with an officer’s open driver-side door, knocking the officer to the ground. The officer suffered a scraped knee, but no serious injuries. Shank was arrested after a further pursuit and indicted for, among other charges, Assault and Battery of a High and Aggravated Nature (ABHAN).During his trial in the Greenville County Circuit Court, Shank requested a jury instruction on Third-Degree Assault and Battery, arguing that the evidence—particularly the minor injury and lack of intent to harm—supported conviction for the lesser offense rather than ABHAN. The trial court denied this request, agreeing with the State that the manner in which the vehicle was used was likely to produce death or great bodily injury, as required for ABHAN. Shank was convicted as charged. On appeal, the South Carolina Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense and that this error was not harmless.The Supreme Court of South Carolina reviewed the case and reversed the court of appeals. It held that the trial court did not err in refusing to give the requested lesser-included offense instruction because the evidence did not support a rational inference that Shank was guilty only of Third-Degree Assault and Battery. The Court found that Shank’s use of the vehicle constituted a means likely to produce death or great bodily injury, thus satisfying all elements of ABHAN and making an instruction on the lesser offense inapplicable. View "The State v. Shank" on Justia Law