Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a high school basketball game, a confrontation occurred between two groups of rival fans, leading to the stabbing death of Da'Von Capers. The defendant, Kierin Marcellus Dennis, was indicted for murder. Dennis claimed he acted in self-defense and sought immunity from prosecution under the Protection of Persons and Property Act. At the pre-trial immunity hearing, witnesses gave conflicting accounts about whether the victim or others had unlawfully and forcefully entered Dennis’s vehicle before the stabbing. The circuit court found that Dennis failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was entitled to immunity and denied his request, allowing the prosecution to proceed.Dennis was tried for murder, but the jury could not reach a unanimous verdict, resulting in a mistrial. When the State sought to retry him, Dennis requested a second immunity hearing, arguing that the mistrial entitled him to a new hearing or, alternatively, to introduce new evidence discovered since the first hearing. The circuit court allowed him to present new evidence but ultimately denied a second immunity hearing and again denied immunity. Dennis was convicted at the second trial. He appealed, arguing he was entitled to another immunity hearing after the mistrial. The South Carolina Court of Appeals agreed and reversed his conviction, holding that the mistrial required a new immunity hearing.The Supreme Court of South Carolina reviewed the case and held that a mistrial does not entitle a defendant to a second immunity hearing under the Act. The court reasoned that an immunity hearing is an independent proceeding and its result remains binding after a mistrial. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the original denial of immunity. The decision of the court of appeals was reversed and the case remanded for consideration of the remaining appellate issues. View "The State v. Dennis" on Justia Law

The dispute centers around an attempted annexation by the City of North Charleston of a one-acre parcel located near Highway 61 and the Ashley River. This parcel, purchased by North Charleston in 2017, is situated on the southwest side of Highway 61 and separated from both the highway and North Charleston’s existing city limits by a narrow strip of land owned by the National Trust for Historic Preservation. That narrow strip has been part of the City of Charleston since its annexation in 2005. The annexation ordinance at issue included 62 square feet of the National Trust’s strip—land within Charleston’s city limits—in its property description.The National Trust and the City of Charleston challenged the validity of North Charleston’s annexation ordinance, arguing that the parcel was not “adjacent” to North Charleston’s existing city limits as required by section 5-3-100 of the South Carolina Code. The Circuit Court for Charleston County dismissed the lawsuit, holding that neither the National Trust nor Charleston had standing to contest the annexation, but also found in the alternative that, if standing existed, the annexation was invalid because the parcel was not adjacent to North Charleston’s city limits. On appeal, the South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal for lack of standing and declined to reach the merits of the annexation’s validity.The Supreme Court of South Carolina granted review and held that both the National Trust and the City of Charleston had standing to challenge the annexation. The Court further affirmed the circuit court’s alternative ruling that North Charleston’s annexation was invalid because the parcel was not “adjacent” to its city limits, as required under state law. Thus, the decision of the court of appeals was reversed in part and affirmed in part. View "National Trust for Historic Preservation v. City of North Charleston" on Justia Law

480 King Street, LLC hired Glick/Boehm & Associates, Inc. (GBA), an architectural firm, to design and administer construction of a stair tower. 480 King alleged that GBA negligently designed elements of the project, including the elevator, electrical, HVAC, windows, and stairs, and also failed to properly administer construction, resulting in code violations and additional costs. As the statute of limitations was approaching, 480 King filed its complaint without the expert affidavit required by the South Carolina Frivolous Civil Proceedings Sanctions Act, later submitting an affidavit from Louis Hackney, a professional engineer, attesting to deviations from the standard of care in both design and contract administration.The Circuit Court of Charleston County, after allowing time for the affidavit, ultimately dismissed all claims against GBA, finding Hackney was not qualified to opine on the standard of care for architects. On appeal, the South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of negligent design claims but reversed as to claims for negligent construction administration, finding Hackney qualified under statutory standards for expert witnesses. The appellate court also reversed dismissal of breach of contract and warranty claims, remanding them for further proceedings.The Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed in part and reversed in part. It held that the expert witness affidavit requirement under section 15-36-100 does not mandate the affiant be from the same profession as the defendant, provided the statutory qualifications are met. Hackney’s affidavit was sufficient for the negligent construction administration claim, but not for negligent architectural design, as he declined to opine on the latter. Claims for negligent supervision were subsumed under construction administration. The breach of contract claim may proceed only as to construction administration, while breach of warranty and negligent design claims were properly dismissed. The disposition was affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "Blanchard v. 480 King Street, LLC" on Justia Law

A telehealth company developed software that enables individuals to determine their refractive eye error using a computer or smartphone without an in-person visit to an optometrist or ophthalmologist. This technology, approved by the FDA and available in many states, was offered in South Carolina until the enactment of the Eye Care Consumer Protection Law in 2016. The law prohibits eye doctors from prescribing spectacles or contact lenses based solely on information from automated equipment, including kiosks or online applications, and requires a valid prescription from a provider following an in-person examination.After the law was enacted, the company ceased providing its service in South Carolina, as local eye doctors were no longer willing to issue prescriptions based solely on remote test results. The company challenged the constitutionality of the law, arguing it violated equal protection and due process guarantees under the South Carolina Constitution. The Circuit Court for Richland County initially granted summary judgment for the defendants, finding the law’s purpose was to protect public health and that its provisions were reasonably related to maintaining the standard of care for medical professionals.Upon direct appeal, the Supreme Court of South Carolina reviewed the case. The Court applied the rational basis test and held that the legislature’s decision to require in-person examinations before prescribing corrective lenses was rationally related to the legitimate government interest of protecting public health. The Court found the classification created by the Act was reasonable and did not violate equal protection, as it treated similarly situated eye doctors alike and addressed unique risks in eye care. The Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment, upholding the constitutionality of the law. View "Opternative v. South Carolina Optometric Physicians Association" on Justia Law

The dispute arose from a commercial transaction in which an entity obtained a loan to purchase property, granting the lender a freely assignable and perpetual option to purchase a significant co-tenancy interest in the property. When the borrower later sought to refinance, the lender exercised the option and assigned it to another party. The borrower objected to the option’s exercise, negotiations failed over reimbursement of legal fees, and the refinancing collapsed. Litigation ensued, with the new holder of the option seeking specific performance, while the borrower claimed the option was void under South Carolina’s statutory and common law rules against perpetuities.The Circuit Court for Richland County granted partial summary judgment in favor of the borrower, holding that although the South Carolina Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities (SCUSRAP) generally superseded the common law rule against perpetuities (CLRAP), the SCUSRAP did not apply to nonvested property interests arising from nondonative transfers, such as the option in question. The Circuit Court reasoned that the common law rule continued to apply to such interests, rendering the option void. The South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed this judgment.The Supreme Court of South Carolina reviewed the statutory construction issue de novo. It held that the SCUSRAP completely abolished the common law rule against perpetuities in South Carolina. The court found that nonvested property interests arising from nondonative transfers, which are excluded from the statutory rule, are not subject to any rule against perpetuities, statutory or otherwise. Therefore, the option was not void under either the SCUSRAP or the CLRAP. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case to the circuit court for consideration of the borrower’s waiver defense, which had not been previously addressed. View "Spring Valley Interests, LLC v. The Best for Last, LLC" on Justia Law

Kenneth H. Eastwood was convicted of murder after the body of Cara Hodges was found strangled in a wooded area. Eastwood was the last person seen with the victim and, after being interviewed by police, he confessed to the crime both to his employer and later to law enforcement. During the investigation, Eastwood took a polygraph test and was told by police that he had failed. He subsequently confessed to the murder, describing details of the crime and disposal of evidence. At trial, Eastwood did not testify but presented a false confession expert who opined that his confession was consistent with an internalized false confession, citing factors such as alcohol use, sleep deprivation, and being confronted by police with allegedly objective evidence of guilt.The case was tried in the Circuit Court for Orangeburg County. Eastwood sought to introduce evidence through his expert that police told him he failed the polygraph, arguing it was relevant to his false confession defense. The trial court excluded this evidence, relying on Rule 702 and Rule 403 of the South Carolina Rules of Evidence, finding that polygraph evidence was unreliable and that its admission would confuse the jury and potentially prejudice Eastwood by bolstering the confession’s truthfulness.On appeal, the Supreme Court of South Carolina reviewed whether exclusion of the polygraph evidence was error. The court held that the trial court erred in excluding the evidence under Rule 702, as Eastwood was not offering scientific proof of the polygraph’s reliability but rather the fact that police told him he failed. The Supreme Court found the evidence relevant to the defense and not substantially outweighed by confusion or prejudice under Rule 403. However, the court concluded that the error did not affect the jury’s verdict, as the expert was able to present the core theory of false confessions. The conviction was therefore affirmed. View "The State v. Eastwood" on Justia Law

The case concerns the authority of the South Carolina Attorney General to enter into and execute a contingent fee agreement with private law firms in connection with litigation against the United States Department of Energy (DOE). The Attorney General retained two law firms to represent the State in disputes over the DOE’s obligations regarding plutonium storage and removal at the Savannah River Site. After extensive litigation and negotiation, the State and the DOE reached a settlement in which the DOE agreed to pay South Carolina $600 million. The Attorney General subsequently paid $75 million in attorney’s fees to the law firms, pursuant to the contingent fee agreement.Previously, the Richland County Circuit Court dismissed a challenge to the fee payment, finding that the plaintiffs lacked standing. However, the Supreme Court of South Carolina later determined that the plaintiffs had public importance standing and remanded the case for consideration of the merits. On remand, the circuit court granted summary judgment to the Attorney General and the law firms, holding that the Attorney General had the authority to enter into the fee agreements. The circuit court did not address all of the plaintiffs’ claims, but the Supreme Court found the record sufficient to resolve the remaining legal questions.The Supreme Court of South Carolina held that the Attorney General’s payment of attorney’s fees directly to the law firms, without first depositing the gross settlement into the State’s general fund or a legislatively created Litigation Recovery Account, was permissible under South Carolina Code subsection 1-7-150(B). The Court found that the settlement agreement and related documents “awarded” attorney’s fees as part of the settlement, and that the Attorney General’s contractual obligation to pay the fees constituted a “disposition required by law.” The Court also held that judicial review of the reasonableness of the fee would violate the separation of powers, as no statute authorized such review in this context. The judgment was affirmed in result. View "SC Public Interest Foundation v. Wilson" on Justia Law

Mark and Jane Thompson, residents of Aiken County and the City of Aiken, paid road maintenance fees levied by both the county and city for several years. After the City of Aiken rescinded its fee in 2021 and agreed to reimburse fees paid after that date, the Thompsons filed suit against various city and county officials and entities. They sought a declaratory judgment that the ordinances imposing the fees were invalid, reimbursement of unlawfully collected fees, damages under section 8-21-30 of the South Carolina Code, and relief for alleged violations of their constitutional rights.The case was first heard in the Circuit Court for Aiken County. The Thompsons voluntarily dismissed some claims and parties before and during the hearing. The trial court ultimately dismissed the remaining claims, finding that the South Carolina Revenue Procedures Act (RPA) deprived it of subject matter jurisdiction, that section 12-60-80(C) barred class actions against political subdivisions, that section 8-21-30 did not apply to the road maintenance fees or the actions of the county treasurer, and that sovereign immunity barred the unjust enrichment claim. The constitutional claim was dismissed by stipulation. The Thompsons appealed, and the Supreme Court of South Carolina certified the appeal before the Court of Appeals could rule.The Supreme Court of South Carolina held that the road maintenance fees at issue were not “taxes” under the RPA, so the RPA did not deprive the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction over the individual or class claims. The catchall provision of section 12-60-80(C) does not bar class actions against political subdivisions unless the claim concerns value-based property taxes. The court affirmed the dismissal of the unjust enrichment, section 8-21-30, and constitutional claims, but reversed the dismissal of the declaratory judgment claim and remanded for further proceedings on that claim, both individually and as a class. View "Thompson v. Killian" on Justia Law

The case concerns a man who was convicted of murdering his estranged wife by shooting her in the back seat of a car outside a police station, in the presence of children. He was arrested the day before the murder for domestic violence, released on bond, and the next day followed his wife and her friend to the police station, where the shooting occurred. The prosecution presented evidence of prior domestic abuse and a previous conviction for a violent offense. The defense focused on the defendant’s troubled upbringing, mental health issues, and cognitive deficits. The jury found him guilty and recommended a death sentence, which the trial court imposed.After his conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal, the defendant filed for post-conviction relief (PCR) in the Circuit Court for Spartanburg County, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, particularly regarding the investigation and presentation of mitigating evidence during the penalty phase. The PCR court initially denied relief in an order that was identical to the State’s proposed order. The Supreme Court of South Carolina vacated that order and remanded for a new order with specific findings. On remand, the PCR court again denied relief, issuing an amended order after reviewing the parties’ proposed orders and making some corrections. The defendant’s requests for a new hearing or for the judge’s recusal were denied.The Supreme Court of South Carolina reviewed whether the PCR court erred by adopting the State’s proposed order and whether trial counsel was ineffective in preparing and presenting mitigation. The court held that the PCR court did not violate the defendant’s rights by adopting the State’s proposed order after adequate review, and that any deficiencies in trial counsel’s mitigation investigation or presentation did not prejudice the defendant. The court found no reasonable probability that additional mitigation evidence would have changed the jury’s recommendation. The decision of the PCR court was affirmed in result. View "Lindsey v. The State" on Justia Law

Gulfstream Café, Inc. owns a restaurant within the Marlin Quay Planned Development (PD) in Georgetown County, South Carolina. The PD includes a shared parking lot, with Gulfstream holding a nonexclusive easement for sixty-two spaces and owning seventeen additional spaces. In 2016, Palmetto Industrial Development, LLC purchased the marina and parking lot, demolished the existing structures, and sought approval from the Georgetown County Council to build a new restaurant. After several iterations and legal challenges, the Council approved a final plan (Ordinance 2018-40) for the new restaurant, which increased evening parking demand and allegedly harmed Gulfstream’s business.Previously, Gulfstream challenged the approval process and the impact on its easement rights in the Circuit Court for Georgetown County. The court held a bench trial and ruled in favor of the County, the County Council, and Councilmember Steve Goggans on all claims, including substantive and procedural due process, takings, inverse condemnation, and alleged impropriety in the approval process. Gulfstream appealed the decision.The Supreme Court of South Carolina reviewed the case, applying a limited scope of review for factual findings and de novo review for legal and constitutional issues. The Court held that Gulfstream’s easement was nonexclusive and had not been deprived by the ordinance, that the County’s actions had a rational basis, and that the ordinance did not constitute a per se or regulatory taking under the Penn Central test. The Court also found no procedural due process violation, as Gulfstream received notice and an opportunity to be heard, and determined that Councilmember Goggans’ prior involvement did not invalidate the ordinance. The Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed the circuit court’s judgment in all respects. View "The Gulfstream Café v. Georgetown County" on Justia Law