Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Samir Kevin Shank was charged after an incident in which, while trying to evade police in a stolen vehicle, he reversed the car down a narrow street. During the attempt to escape, the car’s open passenger-side door collided with an officer’s open driver-side door, knocking the officer to the ground. The officer suffered a scraped knee, but no serious injuries. Shank was arrested after a further pursuit and indicted for, among other charges, Assault and Battery of a High and Aggravated Nature (ABHAN).During his trial in the Greenville County Circuit Court, Shank requested a jury instruction on Third-Degree Assault and Battery, arguing that the evidence—particularly the minor injury and lack of intent to harm—supported conviction for the lesser offense rather than ABHAN. The trial court denied this request, agreeing with the State that the manner in which the vehicle was used was likely to produce death or great bodily injury, as required for ABHAN. Shank was convicted as charged. On appeal, the South Carolina Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense and that this error was not harmless.The Supreme Court of South Carolina reviewed the case and reversed the court of appeals. It held that the trial court did not err in refusing to give the requested lesser-included offense instruction because the evidence did not support a rational inference that Shank was guilty only of Third-Degree Assault and Battery. The Court found that Shank’s use of the vehicle constituted a means likely to produce death or great bodily injury, thus satisfying all elements of ABHAN and making an instruction on the lesser offense inapplicable. View "The State v. Shank" on Justia Law

After being injured in a car accident while riding in a vehicle insured by Progressive, the respondent received medical treatment from several providers. The total amount billed for her treatment was $27,786.17. However, as a Medicaid recipient, her providers agreed to accept $1,323.60—paid by Medicaid—as full satisfaction for her medical expenses. The respondent demanded payment of the full $10,000 policy limit under the "Medpay" provision of her Progressive auto insurance policy, but Progressive paid only the $1,323.60 Medicaid had paid, arguing that this was the only amount the respondent actually "incurred."The Circuit Court for Chester County denied Progressive’s motion to dismiss the breach of contract claim and, after a bench trial, found for the respondent. The court determined the term "incurred" was ambiguous and should be interpreted in favor of the insured, entitling the respondent to the full amount charged for her medical care. The South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the full amount billed constituted expenses "incurred," even though the providers accepted less due to Medicaid.The Supreme Court of South Carolina granted certiorari and reversed. It held that the term "expenses incurred" in the policy is unambiguous and means the amount for which the insured is legally obligated to pay. The Court determined the respondent incurred only the amount Medicaid paid, as she had no obligation to pay the providers more. Accordingly, Progressive was required to pay only $1,323.60, and not the higher amounts billed or the policy limit. The Court remanded for entry of judgment in favor of Progressive. View "Jones v. Progressive Northern Insurance Company" on Justia Law

Amazon Services, LLC operated the online marketplace Amazon.com, which allowed third-party merchants to sell products to South Carolina residents. In 2016, although Amazon Services collected and remitted sales tax for products it and its affiliates sold, it did not do so for sales made by third-party merchants. After an audit, the South Carolina Department of Revenue assessed Amazon Services for $12,490,502.15 in unpaid sales taxes, penalties, and interest, claiming that Amazon Services was legally required to collect and remit sales taxes on third-party merchant sales due to the company's significant involvement in those transactions.Amazon Services contested the assessment before the South Carolina Administrative Law Court, which upheld the Department of Revenue’s determination, finding Amazon Services was “engaged in the business of selling” under the South Carolina Sales and Use Tax Act and thus responsible for remitting the tax. Amazon Services appealed, and the South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the Administrative Law Court’s ruling, agreeing with the interpretation that Amazon Services’ role in third-party sales triggered the statutory obligation to collect and remit sales tax.The Supreme Court of South Carolina granted certiorari and affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court held that, under the plain language of subsection 12-36-910(A) of the South Carolina Sales and Use Tax Act, Amazon Services was “engaged in the business of selling” due to its comprehensive control and involvement in third-party transactions and was therefore required to remit sales tax on those sales. The Court also held that this application did not violate due process, as the relevant statutory provisions were in effect prior to the challenged assessment, and clarified that its holding was not based on interpreting tax statutes broadly but on ordinary statutory interpretation principles. View "Amazon Services v. SCDOR" on Justia Law

After a high school basketball game, a confrontation occurred between two groups of rival fans, leading to the stabbing death of Da'Von Capers. The defendant, Kierin Marcellus Dennis, was indicted for murder. Dennis claimed he acted in self-defense and sought immunity from prosecution under the Protection of Persons and Property Act. At the pre-trial immunity hearing, witnesses gave conflicting accounts about whether the victim or others had unlawfully and forcefully entered Dennis’s vehicle before the stabbing. The circuit court found that Dennis failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was entitled to immunity and denied his request, allowing the prosecution to proceed.Dennis was tried for murder, but the jury could not reach a unanimous verdict, resulting in a mistrial. When the State sought to retry him, Dennis requested a second immunity hearing, arguing that the mistrial entitled him to a new hearing or, alternatively, to introduce new evidence discovered since the first hearing. The circuit court allowed him to present new evidence but ultimately denied a second immunity hearing and again denied immunity. Dennis was convicted at the second trial. He appealed, arguing he was entitled to another immunity hearing after the mistrial. The South Carolina Court of Appeals agreed and reversed his conviction, holding that the mistrial required a new immunity hearing.The Supreme Court of South Carolina reviewed the case and held that a mistrial does not entitle a defendant to a second immunity hearing under the Act. The court reasoned that an immunity hearing is an independent proceeding and its result remains binding after a mistrial. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the original denial of immunity. The decision of the court of appeals was reversed and the case remanded for consideration of the remaining appellate issues. View "The State v. Dennis" on Justia Law

The dispute centers around an attempted annexation by the City of North Charleston of a one-acre parcel located near Highway 61 and the Ashley River. This parcel, purchased by North Charleston in 2017, is situated on the southwest side of Highway 61 and separated from both the highway and North Charleston’s existing city limits by a narrow strip of land owned by the National Trust for Historic Preservation. That narrow strip has been part of the City of Charleston since its annexation in 2005. The annexation ordinance at issue included 62 square feet of the National Trust’s strip—land within Charleston’s city limits—in its property description.The National Trust and the City of Charleston challenged the validity of North Charleston’s annexation ordinance, arguing that the parcel was not “adjacent” to North Charleston’s existing city limits as required by section 5-3-100 of the South Carolina Code. The Circuit Court for Charleston County dismissed the lawsuit, holding that neither the National Trust nor Charleston had standing to contest the annexation, but also found in the alternative that, if standing existed, the annexation was invalid because the parcel was not adjacent to North Charleston’s city limits. On appeal, the South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal for lack of standing and declined to reach the merits of the annexation’s validity.The Supreme Court of South Carolina granted review and held that both the National Trust and the City of Charleston had standing to challenge the annexation. The Court further affirmed the circuit court’s alternative ruling that North Charleston’s annexation was invalid because the parcel was not “adjacent” to its city limits, as required under state law. Thus, the decision of the court of appeals was reversed in part and affirmed in part. View "National Trust for Historic Preservation v. City of North Charleston" on Justia Law

480 King Street, LLC hired Glick/Boehm & Associates, Inc. (GBA), an architectural firm, to design and administer construction of a stair tower. 480 King alleged that GBA negligently designed elements of the project, including the elevator, electrical, HVAC, windows, and stairs, and also failed to properly administer construction, resulting in code violations and additional costs. As the statute of limitations was approaching, 480 King filed its complaint without the expert affidavit required by the South Carolina Frivolous Civil Proceedings Sanctions Act, later submitting an affidavit from Louis Hackney, a professional engineer, attesting to deviations from the standard of care in both design and contract administration.The Circuit Court of Charleston County, after allowing time for the affidavit, ultimately dismissed all claims against GBA, finding Hackney was not qualified to opine on the standard of care for architects. On appeal, the South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of negligent design claims but reversed as to claims for negligent construction administration, finding Hackney qualified under statutory standards for expert witnesses. The appellate court also reversed dismissal of breach of contract and warranty claims, remanding them for further proceedings.The Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed in part and reversed in part. It held that the expert witness affidavit requirement under section 15-36-100 does not mandate the affiant be from the same profession as the defendant, provided the statutory qualifications are met. Hackney’s affidavit was sufficient for the negligent construction administration claim, but not for negligent architectural design, as he declined to opine on the latter. Claims for negligent supervision were subsumed under construction administration. The breach of contract claim may proceed only as to construction administration, while breach of warranty and negligent design claims were properly dismissed. The disposition was affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "Blanchard v. 480 King Street, LLC" on Justia Law

A telehealth company developed software that enables individuals to determine their refractive eye error using a computer or smartphone without an in-person visit to an optometrist or ophthalmologist. This technology, approved by the FDA and available in many states, was offered in South Carolina until the enactment of the Eye Care Consumer Protection Law in 2016. The law prohibits eye doctors from prescribing spectacles or contact lenses based solely on information from automated equipment, including kiosks or online applications, and requires a valid prescription from a provider following an in-person examination.After the law was enacted, the company ceased providing its service in South Carolina, as local eye doctors were no longer willing to issue prescriptions based solely on remote test results. The company challenged the constitutionality of the law, arguing it violated equal protection and due process guarantees under the South Carolina Constitution. The Circuit Court for Richland County initially granted summary judgment for the defendants, finding the law’s purpose was to protect public health and that its provisions were reasonably related to maintaining the standard of care for medical professionals.Upon direct appeal, the Supreme Court of South Carolina reviewed the case. The Court applied the rational basis test and held that the legislature’s decision to require in-person examinations before prescribing corrective lenses was rationally related to the legitimate government interest of protecting public health. The Court found the classification created by the Act was reasonable and did not violate equal protection, as it treated similarly situated eye doctors alike and addressed unique risks in eye care. The Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment, upholding the constitutionality of the law. View "Opternative v. South Carolina Optometric Physicians Association" on Justia Law

The dispute arose from a commercial transaction in which an entity obtained a loan to purchase property, granting the lender a freely assignable and perpetual option to purchase a significant co-tenancy interest in the property. When the borrower later sought to refinance, the lender exercised the option and assigned it to another party. The borrower objected to the option’s exercise, negotiations failed over reimbursement of legal fees, and the refinancing collapsed. Litigation ensued, with the new holder of the option seeking specific performance, while the borrower claimed the option was void under South Carolina’s statutory and common law rules against perpetuities.The Circuit Court for Richland County granted partial summary judgment in favor of the borrower, holding that although the South Carolina Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities (SCUSRAP) generally superseded the common law rule against perpetuities (CLRAP), the SCUSRAP did not apply to nonvested property interests arising from nondonative transfers, such as the option in question. The Circuit Court reasoned that the common law rule continued to apply to such interests, rendering the option void. The South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed this judgment.The Supreme Court of South Carolina reviewed the statutory construction issue de novo. It held that the SCUSRAP completely abolished the common law rule against perpetuities in South Carolina. The court found that nonvested property interests arising from nondonative transfers, which are excluded from the statutory rule, are not subject to any rule against perpetuities, statutory or otherwise. Therefore, the option was not void under either the SCUSRAP or the CLRAP. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case to the circuit court for consideration of the borrower’s waiver defense, which had not been previously addressed. View "Spring Valley Interests, LLC v. The Best for Last, LLC" on Justia Law

Kenneth H. Eastwood was convicted of murder after the body of Cara Hodges was found strangled in a wooded area. Eastwood was the last person seen with the victim and, after being interviewed by police, he confessed to the crime both to his employer and later to law enforcement. During the investigation, Eastwood took a polygraph test and was told by police that he had failed. He subsequently confessed to the murder, describing details of the crime and disposal of evidence. At trial, Eastwood did not testify but presented a false confession expert who opined that his confession was consistent with an internalized false confession, citing factors such as alcohol use, sleep deprivation, and being confronted by police with allegedly objective evidence of guilt.The case was tried in the Circuit Court for Orangeburg County. Eastwood sought to introduce evidence through his expert that police told him he failed the polygraph, arguing it was relevant to his false confession defense. The trial court excluded this evidence, relying on Rule 702 and Rule 403 of the South Carolina Rules of Evidence, finding that polygraph evidence was unreliable and that its admission would confuse the jury and potentially prejudice Eastwood by bolstering the confession’s truthfulness.On appeal, the Supreme Court of South Carolina reviewed whether exclusion of the polygraph evidence was error. The court held that the trial court erred in excluding the evidence under Rule 702, as Eastwood was not offering scientific proof of the polygraph’s reliability but rather the fact that police told him he failed. The Supreme Court found the evidence relevant to the defense and not substantially outweighed by confusion or prejudice under Rule 403. However, the court concluded that the error did not affect the jury’s verdict, as the expert was able to present the core theory of false confessions. The conviction was therefore affirmed. View "The State v. Eastwood" on Justia Law

The case concerns the authority of the South Carolina Attorney General to enter into and execute a contingent fee agreement with private law firms in connection with litigation against the United States Department of Energy (DOE). The Attorney General retained two law firms to represent the State in disputes over the DOE’s obligations regarding plutonium storage and removal at the Savannah River Site. After extensive litigation and negotiation, the State and the DOE reached a settlement in which the DOE agreed to pay South Carolina $600 million. The Attorney General subsequently paid $75 million in attorney’s fees to the law firms, pursuant to the contingent fee agreement.Previously, the Richland County Circuit Court dismissed a challenge to the fee payment, finding that the plaintiffs lacked standing. However, the Supreme Court of South Carolina later determined that the plaintiffs had public importance standing and remanded the case for consideration of the merits. On remand, the circuit court granted summary judgment to the Attorney General and the law firms, holding that the Attorney General had the authority to enter into the fee agreements. The circuit court did not address all of the plaintiffs’ claims, but the Supreme Court found the record sufficient to resolve the remaining legal questions.The Supreme Court of South Carolina held that the Attorney General’s payment of attorney’s fees directly to the law firms, without first depositing the gross settlement into the State’s general fund or a legislatively created Litigation Recovery Account, was permissible under South Carolina Code subsection 1-7-150(B). The Court found that the settlement agreement and related documents “awarded” attorney’s fees as part of the settlement, and that the Attorney General’s contractual obligation to pay the fees constituted a “disposition required by law.” The Court also held that judicial review of the reasonableness of the fee would violate the separation of powers, as no statute authorized such review in this context. The judgment was affirmed in result. View "SC Public Interest Foundation v. Wilson" on Justia Law