Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant Stephen Lipscomb, manager of SEL Properties, appealed a jury verdict against him for tortious interference with a contract entered into by SEL with Respondents Dutch Fork Development Group, II, LLC and Dutch Fork Realty, LLC. Appellant contended that he, as the manager of the limited liability company, could not be held individually liable in tort for a contract that was breached by SEL. Alternatively, Appellant challenged the jury's award of $3,000,000 in actual damages to Respondents on the grounds: (1) the trial judge erred in charging the jury that lost customers and lost goodwill were elements of damages as there was no evidence of such damages; and (2) the award was improper and should have been reduced as the actual damages for the tort claim were "coextensive" with or subsumed in the jury's award of actual damages to Respondents for the breach of contract claim against SEL. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Appellant was entitled to a directed verdict as to the claim of tortious interference with a contract. Accordingly, the Court reversed the jury's award of damages. View "Dutch Fork Development v. SEL Properties" on Justia Law

Petitioner Neeltec Enterprises, Inc., d/b/a/ Fireworks Supermarket, appealed an order requiring it to substitute two corporations as defendants in its SCUPTA suit in lieu of the individual Willard Long against whom it had brought suit. Petitioner operated a fireworks store near I-95. Defendant Long was alleged to have operated a competing fireworks store "Fireworks Superstore" near I-95. Petitioner alleged that Long first changed his store's name to closely resemble Petitioner's. Petitioner then redecorated the outside of his building facing I-95 traffic with an advertising display. Long allegedly retaliated by moving a 45- foot long, 9-foot tall storage container onto his property, effectively blocking travelers' views of Petitioner's wall advertisement. Petitioner alleged that, by his actions, Long had violated the SCUTPA. Long answered, and subsequently filed a "Motion for Summary Judgment or, in the Alternative, for Substitution of Parties." Long asserted he never owned the Fireworks Superstore, but that it had been owned by Hobo Joes, Inc., when the suit was commenced and was now owned by Foxy's Fireworks Superstore, Inc., both South Carolina corporations.  He sought either summary judgment because Petitioner had sued the wrong party or an order that Long be dropped as a party and that Hobo Joe's and Foxy's Fireworks be added as defendants. The special referee granted Long's motion in part, finding he was not "the proper defendant. Petitioner appealed and the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the order requiring Petitioner to discontinue its SCUPTA suit against Long affected its substantial right to name its defendant, making it immediately appealable. The decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing the appeal was reversed, and the matter was remanded for consideration of the merits of Petitioner's appeal. View "Neeltec Enterprises v. Long" on Justia Law

Respondent Atlantic Coast Builders and Contractors, LLC brought an action against its landlord, Petitioner Laura Lewis, for negligent misrepresentation, unjust enrichment, and breach of contract.  Atlantic also sought a return of the security deposit it paid pursuant to its lease with Lewis.  The master-in-equity entered judgment in favor of Atlantic, and the court of appeals affirmed. The landlord appealed, arguing the appellate court erred in its return of the security deposit and in calculating its damages award. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the court of appeals erred in concluding the issue regarding the security deposit was preserved for review. Because the deposit issue was not preserved, the landlord was entitled to retain the deposit. Consequently, Atlantic's damages were reduced by $3500. The Court affirmed the appellate court as to the entry of judgment against the landlord for negligent misrepresentation and unjust enrichment. View "Atlantic Coast Builders and Contractors v. Lewis" on Justia Law

This case presented a "novel" question of whether a member of a limited liability company could be held personally liable for torts committed while acting in furtherance of the company's business. Carl R. Aten, Jr., and his wife are the only members of R. Design Construction Co., LLC. In this particular case, R. Design selected a lot in Beaufort, South Carolina, on which it planned to build a four-unit condominium project. When Aten could not secure the necessary financing, he approached Dennis Green about entering into a contract for R. Design to construct the building. Green ultimately formed 16 Jade Street, LLC for this purpose, and R. Design entered into an agreement with Jade Street for the construction of the condominium. One of the subcontractors selected by R. Design was Catterson & Sons Construction. Michael Catterson is the sole shareholder of Catterson & Sons, and he is a specialty subcontractor with a special license for framing in addition to holding his general contractor's license. As the general contractor, it was Aten's job to supervise the project. A couple months into construction, problems arose concerning the AAC block construction and the framing. Following a progress payment dispute, Catterson & Sons left the job site and did not return. In the ensuing months, Aten's relationship with Green deteriorated as Aten tarried in fixing the defects, and the construction eventually ground to a halt. R. Design subsequently left the project, never replacing Catterson & Sons nor adequately addressing the defects. The day after R. Design left the project, Kern-Coleman conducted another inspection of the property. This time, it identified thirty-four defects in addition to the original four, which had not yet been remedied, for a total of thirty-eight. Anchor Construction was retained as the new general contractor, and its own inspection revealed sixty defects in the original construction. After Anchor began working on the project, more defects surfaced. Jade Street subsequently sued R. Design, Aten, Catterson & Sons, and Catterson for negligence and breach of implied warranties. As to Aten personally, the circuit court concluded that despite the fact he was a member of an LLC, he was personally liable because he held a residential home builder's license. In particular, the court concluded the statutes pertaining to the license create civil liability for the licensee. The court imposed no liability against Catterson himself. The court ultimately awarded Jade Street damages for its claims. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the General Assembly did not intend the LLC act to shield a member from liability for his own torts. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the circuit court's holding that Aten was personally liable for his negligence, and that Catterson was not personally liable for the acts of Catterson & Sons. View "16 Jade Street v. R. Design Construction" on Justia Law

This case returned to the South Carolina Supreme Court from the United States Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of "AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion." The underlying action originally came to the Court on appeal of the trial court's denial of Appellant Century BMW's motion to compel arbitration. The Court affirmed the trial court's denial of the motion to compel. Following that decision, Appellant filed a petition for rehearing, contending the Supreme Court's opinion was inconsistent with the federal Supreme Court's decision in "Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. Animalfeeds International Corp." which found that the federal Arbitration Act preempted South Carolina law. The South Carolina Court emphasized that its opinion was based on state law grounds, and admonished Appellant for "attempting to reframe the issues and miscast [the Court's] holding as disingenuous to the opinion and a holding [it] never made." Thereafter, Appellant petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. The South Carolina Court's opinion was vacated by the federal Supreme Court and remanded for consideration in light of its decision in "AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion." Respondents Heather Herron and several others "individually and for the benefit of all car buyers who paid 'administrative fees'" argued that the matter of preemption was not preserved in the South Carolina proceedings. The South Carolina Court agreed and therefore adhered to its initial opinion. View "Herron v. Century BMW" on Justia Law

Appellant Willard Farr owned seven gaming machines seized from a Union business. The magistrate issued an order to destroy the machines, and Appellant timely sought a post-seizure hearing in an attempt to block their destruction. Following the hearing, the magistrate affirmed the order, and Appellant appealed to the circuit court. Appellant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence presented before the magistrate concerning the State's witness and her inability to identify which of the offending machines she played. Finding that Appellant misunderstood the burden of proof at the post-seizure hearing (which rested solely on the owner to show why the machines should not have been forfeited and destroyed), the Supreme Court affirmed the magistrate's and circuit court's decisions. View "Union County Sheriff's Office v. Henderson" on Justia Law

In the summer of 1999, Petitioner Gerald Bass was a guest at the Super 8 Motel (Super 8) in Orangeburg while he and several co-workers performed refrigeration work at a local grocery store.  Gopal, Incorporated (Respondent), a franchisee of Super 8, owned and operated the motel. At approximately 10 PM on one evening, Petitioner and his roommate were turning in for the evening when they received a knock at their door. Both men got out of bed, and without looking first to see who was at the door, the roommate opened the door. They saw a man standing a couple of feet from the door. The man then asked Petitioner for his money. When Petitioner refused, the man shot Petitioner in the leg with a small caliber handgun and fled on foot. In September 2002, Petitioner filed a complaint alleging negligence against both Respondent and Super 8. Respondent and Super 8 each filed motions for summary judgment, which were granted.  The court of appeals affirmed, and Petitioner appealed. At issue on appeal was "foreseeability": whether a business owner has a duty to protect its invitees from criminal acts of third parties. Upon review, the Supreme Court adopted a balancing approach to determine "foreseeability," but found that it was unreasonable for Respondent to have foreseen what happened to Petitioner: "[e]ven with all reasonable inferences from the evidence cast in favor of Petitioner, we find Petitioner did not provide the circuit court any evidence that Respondent's security measures were unreasonable given the risk of criminal activity on the property. " The Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Respondent. View "Bass v. Gopal" on Justia Law

Respondent Atlantic Coast Builders & Contractors, LLC brought an action against Petitioner Laura Lewis for negligent misrepresentation, unjust enrichment, and breach of contract.  In 2003, Petitioner, acting through a leasing agent, entered into a commercial lease whereby Respondent would lease from Petitioner property located in Beaufort County.  Although Petitioner represented in the lease that the property could lawfully be used for a building and construction office, the property was zoned "rural," meaning virtually all commercial uses were prohibited. Respondent occupied the property and made numerous alterations to it. A few months later, a Beaufort County zoning official served Respondent with notice and warning of two violations for Respondent's failure to obtain a certificate of zoning compliance before occupying the premises and its failure to obtain a sign permit before erecting a sign.  Respondent vacated the property, relocated its business, and ceased making rental payments. Respondent then instituted this action. Petitioner denied the allegations and made a counterclaim for breach of contract.  The master in equity entered judgment in favor of Respondent. The Court of Appeals affirmed, finding the master properly granted judgment in favor of Respondent. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Petitioner did not appeal all grounds on which the master's judgment was based.  Namely, she did not challenge the determination that Respondent was entitled to recover based on unjust enrichment.  Accordingly, the Court affirmed the master-in-equity's and appellate court's decisions in favor of Respondent. View "Atlantic Coast Builders & Contractors v. Lewis" on Justia Law

In 2004, Sherry Ray formed CFRE, a single-member limited liability company with herself as the sole member. CFRE conducts no business and was formed solely for estate planning and asset protection purposes. To that end, Ray declined to have CFRE taxed as a corporation and, in 2006, deeded the title in her home to it. Because there was a conveyance by deed of the property, the Greenville County Assessor automatically commenced a reassessment of the property for the 2007 tax year. Accordingly, the property was subjected to the default property tax ratio of six percent until CFRE could prove entitlement to the lower ratio under section 12-43-220. When CFRE sought the four percent ratio, the Assessor denied it eligibility. CFRE, LLC appealed the decision of the Administrative Law Court (ALC) that held that real estate owned by the company was not entitled to the residential tax ratio. Furthermore, CFRE argued the ALC erred in not sanctioning the Assessor for failing to respond to discovery requests from CFRE. While the Supreme Court held the ALC did not abuse its discretion in not sanctioning the Assessor, the Court reversed the ALC's conclusion regarding CFRE's entitlement to the legal residence tax ratio and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "CFRE v. Greenville County Assesor" on Justia Law

Appellant Stivers Automotive of Lexington, Inc. (Stivers) and Respondent South Carolina Federal Credit Union (SCFCU) were parties to a Dealer Agreement (Agreement), under which SCFCU agreed to purchase sales contracts between Stivers and purchasers of its vehicles. Among other provisions in the Agreement, Stivers warranted certain representations made in connection to its sales contracts assigned to SCFCU. Hiram Riley (Riley) sought to purchase a vehicle from Stivers but was unable to qualify for financing. Stivers' salesman, Tom Roper (Roper), indicated that Riley could get the car if he found a co-signer. Riley contacted his sister, Mildred Higgins (Higgins), who agreed to co-sign for the car. Roper then visited Higgins at her home to sign the appropriate paperwork. After Roper thoroughly explained the documents, Higgins indicated she understood and signed the paperwork. As it turned out, the paperwork was drafted so that Higgins was the sole purchaser of the car, not a co-signer. Ultimately, SCFCU approved the loan to Higgins for the purchase price. Riley picked up the vehicle, with the understanding that he was to make the payments. Riley eventually stopped making payments on the car, stopped driving it, and told SCFCU where it could recover the car. SCFCU hired an agent to repossess the vehicle. SCFCU filed a complaint against Higgins, given that her name was on the loan. Higgins denied the allegations in the complaint, stating that she was incompetent at the time of the execution of the contract. Subsequently, SCFCU amended its complaint, alleging Stivers breached the Agreement. The trial court granted SCFCU's motion for a directed verdict against Stivers, finding Higgins lacked capacity to contract and Stivers breached the Agreement in that regard. The court also held that Stivers breached all contract warranties. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the trial court erred by directing a verdict against Stivers on the issue of capacity. Additionally, the Court held that the trial court erred in granting a directed verdict to SCFCU as to the other warranties contained in the contract, as well as the amount of damages due SCFCU. View "South Carolina Federal Credit Union v. Higgins" on Justia Law