Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Hystron Fibers, Inc. hired Daniel Construction Company in 1965 to build a polyester fiber plant in Spartanburg, South Carolina. When the plant began operating in 1967, Hystron retained Daniel to provide all maintenance and repair workers at the plant. Hystron soon became Hoechst Fibers, Inc. Pursuant to a series of written contracts, Hoechst paid Daniel an annual fee and reimbursed Daniel for certain costs. The contracts required Daniel to purchase workers' compensation insurance for the workers and required Hoechst to reimburse Daniel for the workers' compensation insurance premiums. Dennis Seay was employed by Daniel. Seay worked various maintenance and repair positions at the Hoechst plant from 1971 until 1980. The manufacture of polyester fibers required the piping of very hot liquid polyester through asbestos-insulated pipes. He eventually developed lung problems, which were later diagnosed as mesothelioma, a cancer caused by inhaling asbestos fibers. Seay and his wife filed this lawsuit against CNA Holdings (Hoechst's corporate successor) claiming Hoechst acted negligently in using asbestos and in failing to warn of its dangers. After Seay died from mesothelioma, his daughter, Angie Keene, took over the lawsuit as personal representative of his estate. Throughout the litigation, CNA Holdings argued Seay was a statutory employee and the Workers' Compensation Law provided the exclusive remedy for his claims. The circuit court disagreed and denied CNA Holdings' motion for summary judgment. A jury awarded Seay's estate $14 million in actual damages and $2 million in punitive damages. The trial court denied CNA Holdings' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, again finding Seay was not a statutory employee. The South Carolina Supreme Court found the circuit court and the court of appeals correctly determined the injured worker in this case was not the statutory employee of the defendant. View "Keene v, CNA Holdings, LLC" on Justia Law

After sustaining injuries in a vehicle driven by her son, Kevin Simms, Petitioner Belinda Pickens sought UM coverage through her policy with Respondent United Services Automobile Association (USAA). At the time of the accident, Pickens's policy covered five vehicles, including the 1997 Chevrolet involved in the accident. The policy included liability, personal injury protection (PIP), UM, and underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage. Pickens also executed a named driver exclusion. Pickens's declarations page also contained a provision that stated, "***COVERAGES EXCLUDED WHEN ANY VEHICLE OPERATED BY KEVIN SIMMS***." USAA denied Pickens's claim and initiated a declaratory judgment action asserting she was not entitled to UM coverage because Simms, the excluded driver, was operating the vehicle at the time of the accident. Pickens sued USAA and lost. The issue this case presented for the South Carolina Supreme Court's review centered on whether Section 38-77-340 of the South Carolina Code (2015) permitted a named driver exclusion that precluded uninsured motorist (UM) coverage to a passenger injured in an accident involving an unknown driver. The Court held that it did. "As the circuit court noted, no liability coverage would have been afforded to a third party had Simms been at fault, and thus, it would violate public policy to allow Pickens to recover UM when she was the person who executed the exclusion yet knowingly allowed Simms to drive her vehicle." View "United Services Automobile Association v. Pickens" on Justia Law

Lucille Ray sued the City of Rock Hill, South Carolina (the City) for inverse condemnation, claiming her property was taken as a result of stormwater flowing through pipes under City streets and into a terra cotta pipe that ran underneath and behind her property. The circuit court granted summary judgment to the City, and the court of appeals reversed, holding a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the City engaged in an affirmative, positive, aggressive act sufficient to support Ray's claim. The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals (as modified), and remanded the case back to the circuit court for a determination on the merits as to whether the City's reconnection of its three stormwater pipes to the catch basin and the resumed flow of water through the Pipe constituted an affirmative, positive, aggressive act causing damage to the Property over and above any damage that had occurred before the three pipes were severed and reconnected. "Given the posture of this case and the above discussion, Ray cannot recover for any damage to the Property caused by the flow of water though the Pipe before the City reconnected its three pipes to the catch basin in November 2012." View "Ray v. City of Rock Hill" on Justia Law

In this appeal, several Summerville residents and public interest groups (Petitioners) asked the South Carolina Supreme Court to invalidate approval granted by the Town of Summerville Board of Architectural Review (the Board) for construction of a proposed development project (the Project). Petitioners contended the Board violated the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and various Summerville ordinances. At some point during Petitioners' appeal of the Board's decision, Applegate & Co. (the Developer) decided not to go forward with the Project. Since there remained no actual controversy for the Supreme Court to decide, it vacated the court of appeals' decision and dismissed Petitioners' appeal as moot. View "Croft v. Town of Summerville" on Justia Law

A Town of Cottageville police officer shot and killed the former town Mayor Bert Reeves. A federal jury awarded Reeves' estate $97,500,000 in damages. The South Carolina Municipal Insurance and Risk Financing Fund, which insured the town, paid $10,000,000 to settle the federal lawsuit and two other lawsuits. The Settlement Agreement provided for two questions to be submitted to the state courts: (1) whether the amount of indemnity coverage available under the policy was more than $1,000,000; and (2) whether the South Carolina Tort Claims Act applied to a bad faith action against the Fund. The South Carolina Supreme Court answered the first question "yes"; it declined to answer the second. View "Reeves v. South Carolina Municipal Insurance" on Justia Law

Petitioner Leisel Paradis’ civil conspiracy claim was dismissed by the circuit court for failing to plead special damages, and the dismissal was upheld by the court of appeals. The South Carolina Supreme Court granted a petition for a writ of certiorari to consider the narrow question whether South Carolina's requirement of pleading special damages should be abolished. The Court concluded that it should: “South Carolina is the only state with this unique requirement as an element, and we find it resulted from a misinterpretation of law. We overrule precedent that requires the pleading of special damages and return to the traditional definition of civil conspiracy in this state.” Consequently, the decision of the court of appeals was reversed and the matter remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "Paradis v. Charleston County School District" on Justia Law

Kristina Knight agreed to an endorsement to her Nationwide automobile insurance policy providing the coverage in the policy would not apply to her husband. During the policy period, Danny Knight was tragically killed in a motorcycle accident. Knight, as personal representative of Danny's estate, recovered $25,000 in UIM coverage under Danny's motorcycle insurance policy with Progressive Casualty Insurance Company and $25,000 in UIM coverage under a policy with ACCC Insurance Company insuring a different vehicle Danny owned. Knight made a claim with Nationwide to recover an additional $25,000 in UIM coverage under her insurance policy. Nationwide denied the claim and filed this lawsuit asking the trial court to declare Nationwide did not have to pay the $25,000 because Danny was excluded from all coverages under the policy. On appeal, Knight claimed the endorsement excluding coverage for her husband violated public policy and Nationwide could not enforce it. The South Carolina Supreme Court found the exclusion was clear and unambiguous and was not in violation of any statute. Therefore, the Court held the exclusion was enforceable. View "Nationwide Insurance Company of America v. Knight" on Justia Law

The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina certified a question to the South Carolina Supreme Court on whether a homeowner's insurance policy that did not define the term "actual cash value," an insurer could depreciate the cost of labor in determining the "actual cash value" of a covered loss when the estimated cost to repair or replace the damaged property includes both materials and embedded labor components. This issue arose in two cases in which the homes of Miriam Butler and Joseph Stewart were damaged in separate fires. Butler and Stewart each purchased a homeowner's insurance policy from one of the defendants, both of whom were subsidiaries of The Travelers Companies, Inc. Butler and Stewart elected not to immediately repair or replace their damaged property. Each thus elected not to receive replacement cost but instead to receive a cash payment for the ACV of the damaged property. The certified question addressed whether Travelers properly calculated the ACV payments Travelers offered to Butler and Stewart to settle their property damage claims. The Supreme Court responded affirmatively: “the fact the labor cost is embedded makes it impractical, if not impossible, to include depreciation for materials and not for labor to determine ACV of the damaged property. Rather, the value of the damaged property is reasonably calculated as a unit. Therefore, we answer the certified question "yes," because it makes no sense for an insurer to include depreciation for materials and not for embedded labor.” View "Butler v. The Travelers Home" on Justia Law

George Glassmeyer sent Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests to the South Carolina Lottery Commission for information relating to million-dollar lottery winners. The Lottery Commission claimed the information sought was "personal" and "disclosure . . . would constitute unreasonable invasion of personal privacy." Instead, the Lottery Commission disclosed the hometown and state of each winner, the amount of each prize, the date of each prize, and the game associated with each prize. Glassmeyer responded that the Lottery Commission's disclosure did not satisfy his requests. The Lottery Commission then filed this lawsuit seeking a declaratory judgment that the release of lottery winners' names, addresses, telephone numbers, and forms of identification would constitute an unreasonable invasion of personal privacy under subsection 30-4-40(a)(2) and could be withheld. The Lottery Commission also sought injunctive relief preventing Glassmeyer from obtaining the information. The circuit court granted the Lottery Commission's motion and declared the release of the lottery winners' personal identifying information as an unreasonably invasion of personal privacy, and also entered an injunction permanently restraining Glassmeyer from seeking the lottery winners' full names, addresses, telephone numbers, and forms of identification. The court of appeals reversed, by the South Carolina Supreme Court reversed: "a proper injunction could restrict Glassmeyer only from seeking this information from the Lottery Commission. The Lottery Commission had no right to request an injunction permanently restraining Glassmeyer from seeking this information from any source, and the circuit court had no authority to prevent Glassmeyer from doing so." View "South Carolina Lottery Commission v. Glassmeyer" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the South Carolina Supreme Court's review centered on whether an order of the Administrative Law Court (ALC) that includes a remand to a state agency is a final decision, and thus appealable. Petitioner South Carolina Department of Corrections (SCDC) appealed an adverse ruling rendered by the ALC. The court of appeals dismissed the appeal as interlocutory. After review, the Supreme Court determined the ALC's order here was a final decision notwithstanding the remand to the SCDC. Accordingly, judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for the court of appeals to address the merits of SCDC's appeal. View "Torrence v. SCDOC" on Justia Law