Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Civil Rights
Owens v. Stirling
Four condemned inmates challenged the constitutionality of a South Carolina statute that provides three methods of execution: electrocution, lethal injection, and firing squad. They argued that the statute violates the South Carolina Constitution's prohibition against cruel, corporal, or unusual punishment.The Richland County Circuit Court ruled in favor of the inmates, declaring the statute unconstitutional. The court found that electrocution and firing squad methods violate the state constitution's prohibition on cruel, corporal, or unusual punishment. It also found the statute's provision allowing inmates to choose their method of execution unconstitutionally vague and an improper delegation of authority. The court further ruled that the retroactive application of the amended statute violated ex post facto prohibitions.The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision. The court held that the statute does not violate the South Carolina Constitution. It found that electrocution is not unconstitutionally cruel, corporal, or unusual, noting that the inmates did not meet their burden of proving that electrocution causes unnecessary and excessive pain. The court also held that lethal injection, as conceded by the inmates, is constitutional if properly administered. Regarding the firing squad, the court found it to be a relatively quick and painless method of execution, thus not cruel or unusual.The court also addressed the inmates' claims about the statute's vagueness and improper delegation of authority, finding that the term "available" is not unconstitutionally vague and that the statute does not unlawfully delegate authority to the Director of the Department of Corrections. The court emphasized that the statute's provision allowing inmates to choose their method of execution is a constitutional innovation aimed at making the death penalty less inhumane. The court concluded that the statute is constitutional in its entirety. View "Owens v. Stirling" on Justia Law
Gore v. Dorchester County Sheriff’s Office
The case at hand involves Candise Gore, who sued various individuals and governmental entities claiming she was wrongfully strip-searched at the Dorchester County Detention Center. Gore claimed against the Dorchester County Sheriff's Office, which operates the facility, for reckless infliction of emotional distress. The case was moved to the United States District Court due to the inclusion of federal law claims. The court had to decide whether the bar under the South Carolina Tort Claims Act of claims of "intentional infliction of emotional harm" applied to claims of reckless infliction of emotional distress.The court examined past South Carolina case law and the South Carolina Tort Claims Act. It noted that the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, also known as outrage, could be caused by extreme and outrageous conduct that intentionally or recklessly inflicts severe emotional distress. The court further indicated that several jurisdictions consider intentional infliction of emotional distress and reckless infliction of emotional distress as the same cause of action. Consequently, the court concluded that reckless infliction of emotional distress was a subset of intentional infliction of emotional distress and that there was no separate cause of action in South Carolina for the reckless infliction of emotional distress.However, to provide a complete response, the court also considered the definition of "loss" in the South Carolina Tort Claims Act. The court concluded that since reckless infliction of emotional distress was a subset of intentional infliction of emotional distress, the bar to recovery for the intentional infliction of emotional distress also covered any conduct by a governmental entity that might be merely reckless but yet satisfied the elements of the cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court therefore held that the bar to recovery for the intentional infliction of emotional distress applied to the subset of claims for the reckless infliction of emotional distress. View "Gore v. Dorchester County Sheriff's Office" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Civil Rights, Government & Administrative Law
Allen v. SCDC
Petitioner Quincy Allen, a formerly death-sentenced inmate housed at Broad River Correctional Institution, appealed to the Administrative Law Court (ALC) the denial by the South Carolina Department of Corrections (SCDC) of his grievance concerning visitation with persons not known to him prior to his incarceration. Following the ALC's dismissal of Petitioner's appeal, Petitioner appealed to the court of appeals. The court of appeals affirmed the order of the ALC. Petitioner now sought certiorari review by the South Carolina Supreme Court. The Supreme Court granted the petition, dispensed with briefing, and affirmed the decision of the court of appeals as modified. The Court determined the court of appeals incorrectly analyzed the issue as one of "subject matter jurisdiction" when it affirmed the ALC's decision. However, the Supreme Court affirmed the holding that the denial of Petitioner's visitation with persons not known to him prior to incarceration did not implicate a state-created liberty interest, and the Supreme Court agreed with the result of the court of appeals' decision to affirm the dismissal of Petitioner's appeal by the ALC. View "Allen v. SCDC" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law
So. Car. Human Affairs Commission v. Yang
The South Carolina Human Affairs Commission (the Commission) brought this action against respondents Zeyi Chen and Zhirong Yang, alleging they violated the South Carolina Fair Housing Law by discriminating against a prospective tenant. The action was based on a complaint received from Stacy Woods, who reported that she responded to an ad on Craigslist for a rental residence in Mount Pleasant and was told it was not available. Woods maintained she was refused the rental property because she had a four-year-old daughter. The Commission appealed circuit court orders:(1) denying the Commission's motion pursuant to Rule 43(k), SCRCP to enforce the parties' settlement agreement; (2) finding certain information was obtained by the Commission during the conciliation process and was, therefore, subject to orders of protection and inadmissible under S.C. Code Ann. section 31-21-120(A) (2007) of the Fair Housing Law; and (3) ultimately dismissing the Commission's action based on a finding section 31-21-120(A) was unconstitutional and the entire statute was void. After review, the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The Court found the requirements of Rule 43(k) clearly were not met, for the reasons found by the circuit court. Consequently, the circuit court's order denying the Commission's motion to compel enforcement of the settlement agreement was affirmed. The Commission contended the circuit court declined to give adequate consideration to comparable federal law to aid its decision and gave no deference to the Commission's interpretation. To this, the Supreme Court agreed and reversed the circuit court as to orders of protection related to conciliation efforts. Further, the Supreme Court concurred with the Commission the circuit court erred in dismissing claims against Respondents pursuant to section 31-21-120(A) as unconstitutional. The Supreme Court held Respondents did not meet their "heavy burden" of proving the statute was unconstitutionally vague. View "So. Car. Human Affairs Commission v. Yang" on Justia Law
Hueble v. SCDNR
In 2003, William Hueble purchased 220 acres of farming and hunting property in Greenwood County. At the time of closing, the seller informed Hueble that Respondent Eric Vaughn, a corporal for the South Carolina Department of Natural Resources (DNR), had a personal deer stand on the property and had hunted there in the past. The seller indicated it would be a "good idea" to allow Vaughn continued access. Hueble declined the suggestion. During 2004, Hueble received a call from the seller informing him that Vaughn had recently been on the property and left four wheeler tracks. The seller again suggested that it would be in Hueble's "best interest" to allow Vaughn to hunt on the property, and provided Vaughn's phone number to Hueble. Hueble once again declined the suggestion and did not contact Vaughn. Hueble then acquired additional land and invested substantial sums of money to improve and maintain his property for hunting dove. More than one month prior to the opening day of dove season, Hueble believed the field was non-baited and in compliance with all regulations and guidelines. On opening day, Hueble's friends and family joined him for the first hunt of the season. Shortly into the hunt, Vaughn and other DNR officers entered Hueble's property unannounced. Vaughn and the DNR officers gathered the hunters together and began threatening them with fines and confiscation of property for baiting the dove field. Vaughn dug into Hueble's property with a knife blade to produce seeds and claimed that one seed constituted baiting a field. During this interaction, Hueble learned Vaughn was the DNR officer the seller had mentioned. Ultimately, Hueble was the only hunter charged by DNR with baiting the field. Hueble ultimately pled no contest to the baiting charge, believing this would resolve Vaughn's animosity. Hueble was accused of baiting at the start of turkey season too. Based on these encounters with Vaughn, Hueble believed that Vaughn had a "vendetta" against him and that Vaughn's supervisor was fully aware of the alleged threats he was making against Hueble. Because of these concerns, Hueble initiated a complaint with Vaughn's supervisor at DNR. However, the supervisor responded with allegations of Hueble's illegal activity based upon Vaughn's version of the events. Hueble filed a complaint against DNR and Vaughn. He obtained a Rule 68, SCRCP, judgment of $5,100 in his favor at the close of litigation. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether Hueble was a prevailing party within the meaning of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 1988 (2006), and was therefore entitled to attorneys' fees. The Court held that he was, and reversed the lower courts' holdings to the contrary, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Hueble v. SCDNR" on Justia Law
Taghivand v. Rite Aid
The federal district court certified a question of South Carolina law to the South Carolina Supreme Court. Behrooz Taghivand was the manager of a Rite Aid store in a high crime area of North Charleston. While on duty, Taghivand observed a patron acting strangely and milling around the store with no apparent purpose. The patron stopped briefly in the section directly in front of the cashier, selected a few items, and made a purchase. After the patron checked out, the cashier told Taghivand that when the patron entered the store, he was carrying a bag that appeared to be empty but now had items in it. Taghivand instructed the cashier to call the police. An officer arrived at the scene and gathered together the items the patron claimed he purchased from the store, and Taghivand confirmed these as belonging to the patron. The officer also searched the patron's bag, and found it contained only dirty clothes. Taghivand was terminated effective that day, and was informed the incident was the reason for his termination. As a result, Taghivand filed this action against Rite Aid Corporation, Eckerd Corporation d/b/a Rite Aid, and Steve Smith in federal court for wrongful termination; the defendants moved to dismiss. After finding that South Carolina law was not clear on the issue raised by the motion to dismiss, the federal district court certified this question: under the public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine in South Carolina, does an at-will employee have a cause of action in tort for wrongful termination where: (1) the employee, a store manager, reasonably suspects that criminal activity, specifically, shoplifting, has occurred on the employer's premises; (2) the employee, acting in good faith, reports the suspected criminal activity to law enforcement; and (3) the employee is terminated in retaliation for reporting the suspected criminal activity to law enforcement? After review, the South Carolina Supreme Court answered the certified question: no. View "Taghivand v. Rite Aid" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Civil Rights, Labor & Employment Law
Tant v. South Carolina Dept. of Corrections
Following his conviction for one count of assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature (ABHAN), one count of possession of a dangerous animal, and multiple counts of animal fighting, David Tant was remanded to the Department of Corrections. Upon receipt of his sentencing sheets, the Department recorded his sentence as fifteen years' imprisonment. However, the Department later determined the judge intended to sentence Tant to forty years' imprisonment and changed its records without notifying Tant. The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court was whether the Department of Corrections had the authority to alter its initial determination as to the length of an inmate's sentence. The Court held that when the Department decides its original recordation of a sentence was erroneous, it must afford the inmate formal notice of the amended sentence and advise him of his opportunity to be heard through the grievance procedure. Furthermore, "the Department is generally confined to the face of the sentencing sheets in determining the length of a sentence, but may refer to the sentencing transcript if there is an ambiguity in the sentencing sheets." Because the Court found that the sentencing sheets and the transcript in this case were ambiguous, it held Tant's sentences ran concurrently for a total of fifteen years' imprisonment.
View "Tant v. South Carolina Dept. of Corrections" on Justia Law