Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 1993, Way pled guilty to committing a lewd act on a minor. The victim was Way's 13-year-old niece, who was spending the night with Way (who was then about 28 years old) and his wife. Way was sentenced to ten years in prison, suspended upon the service of eighteen months in prison and five years of probation. In 1995, while on probation, Way pled guilty to contributing to the delinquency of a minor. In that matter, Way allowed two girls who were runaways, one 13 and one 15, to spend the night at his home without notifying the police. While still on probation in 1997, Way pled guilty to committing a lewd act upon a minor. The victim was a 13-year-old girl, who reported that Way met her at a boat dock in 1995 and gave her marijuana, then had sexual intercourse with her. Way was sentenced to fifteen years in prison for this offense. In 2007, prior to his release from prison, Way was referred to the multidisciplinary team, which determined there was probable cause to believe Way met the statutory definition of a sexually violent predator (SVP). The circuit court concluded probable cause existed and ordered a mental evaluation of Way. At the conclusion of the evidence, the jury found Way met the definition of an SVP, and the circuit court ordered him to be civilly committed for long-term control, care and treatment. Way appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. In his appeal, Way challenged the propriety of both the State's cross-examination of Way and its invocation of the missing witness rule in closing argument. The Supreme Court concluded that the circuit court erred in allowing the State to cross-examine Way about his retention of his non-testifying expert witness. Furthermore, the Court concluded the circuit court erred in allowing the State to assert that the jury could infer the missing witness' testimony would have been adverse to Way's case. Despite these errors, the Court concluded (as did the Court of Appeals) that these errors could not have reasonably affected the outcome of Way's case. The Court of Appeals was affirmed (as modified). View "In the Matter of Vincent Neal Way" on Justia Law

The South Carolina Supreme Court granted certiorari in this post-conviction relief (PCR) action to review the Court of Appeals' decision, which remanded for a determination of the lawfulness of Antonio Bordeaux's sentence. Bordeaux's plea agreement was capped at a sentence of twenty-five years. He pled guilty to two counts of armed robbery and two counts of burglary. He was sentenced to twenty-four years' imprisonment on the armed robbery charges, and to twenty-five years' imprisonment, suspended upon the service of twenty years with three years' probation on the burglary counts. Bordeaux's plea proceeding was conducted simultaneously with that of a co-defendant, Wesley Washington. Washington had been indicted on two counts of first degree burglary, but pleaded guilty to two counts of second degree burglary. The transcript reflected that the plea colloquy with the trial judge alternated between Bordeaux and Washington. During Bordeaux's plea colloquy, he acknowledged on at least seven occasions that he was pleading guilty to two counts of first degree burglary. At sentencing, Bordeaux was again reminded, and acknowledged, that he was being sentenced pursuant to his plea negotiations for two counts of first degree burglary, each of which carried a minimum fifteen-year sentence, and a maximum of life imprisonment. The State argued the Court of Appeals erred because the unambiguous plea colloquy and imposition of sentence control over the ambiguous written sentence. To this point, the Supreme Court agreed: it was clear Bordeaux pleaded guilty to first degree burglary, was sentenced within the legal limits for that crime, and in consonance with his negotiated plea agreement. The Court therefore affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "Bordeaux v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

Respondent Matthew Jamison pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter and was sentenced to twenty years in prison. He did not petition for a direct appeal. Respondent's first application for post-conviction relief (PCR) was denied. Respondent filed a second PCR application alleging newly discovered evidence. The PCR judge granted relief, and the court of appeals affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the PCR court erred in granting relief in respondent's second PCR application. Respondent's PCR testimony revealed that his decision to plead guilty rested on several considerations: the strength of the State's evidence against him, the relative weakness of his self-defense claim, and his counseled determination that it was to his advantage to plead guilty to the lesser charge of manslaughter in order to avoid going to trial on the indicted offense of murder. "Respondent is bound by his plea and conviction unless he can demonstrate the interest of justice requires that they be vacated. To grant relief under these circumstances would undermine the solemn nature of a guilty plea and the finality that generally attaches to a guilty plea." View "Jamison v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

The State appealed the court of appeals' decision to reverse the convictions of respondent William Coaxum, Sr., who was found guilty of armed robbery and possession of a firearm during the commission of a violent crime. In 2007, two men robbed a Pizza Hut in North Charleston. The respondent, driver of the get-away vehicle, refused to pull over, and a high-speed pursuit ensued. Within two miles of the start of the chase, Respondent lost control of the vehicle and crashed into a fire hydrant. Respondent and his passenger attempted to flee on foot. The police caught and arrested respondent at the scene of the crash, and their search of his car and person revealed a sawed-off shotgun and over $1,000 in cash. Prior to Respondent's trial, the trial court conducted voir dire of the prospective jurors. Specifically, the court asked: "Are there any members of the jury panel related [by] blood or marriage, socially or casually connected with [Respondent], or that have any business dealings, any connection whatsoever?" None of the prospective jurors responded. At trial, after the State presented the first four of its eight witnesses, the judge received a note from the jury foreperson indicating that Juror #7 recognized one of respondent's family members sitting in the courtroom. The solicitor requested Juror #7 be removed from the jury, arguing that although Juror #7's initial nondisclosure during voir dire was unintentional, "these types of relationships . . . [,] ultimately she may not be able to put it out of her mind." After conducting a lengthy inquiry, the trial court found that the alleged connection between Juror #7 and Respondent would have been a material factor in the State's exercise of its peremptory challenges. The court did not view Juror #7's connection with Respondent and his family as a basis for a challenge for cause. However, the court ruled that the connection would have been a legitimate basis for the State's exercise of its peremptory strikes, and that the State would have struck Juror #7 had she disclosed the connection. Therefore, the trial court excused Juror #7 from the jury and replaced her with the alternate juror. The State then called its remaining witnesses, and the jury ultimately convicted Respondent of armed robbery and possession of a firearm during the commission of a violent crime. The court of appeals reversed respondent's convictions and remanded the case for retrial, concluding that a trial court may not "automatically" remove a juror for an unintentional failure to disclose requested personal information during voir dire. Further, the court of appeals held that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to have removed Juror #7 because, in essence, a trial court may remove a juror mid-trial only if the juror has intentionally failed to disclose. As there was no question the jury was impartial after Juror #7's removal, the Supreme Court concluded that was not entitled to a new trial. Accordingly, it reversed the court of appeals decision reversing Respondent's convictions. View "South Carolina v. Coaxum" on Justia Law

Desmond Sams was convicted of voluntary manslaughter after he strangled the victim, Jake Frazier, during an altercation. Sams appealed, arguing the circuit court erred in denying his request to instruct the jury on involuntary manslaughter. The Court of Appeals affirmed. After review, the Supreme Court found Sams was not entitled to an instruction on involuntary manslaughter because, as found by the circuit court and the Court of Appeals, Sams' actions did not fall within the range of conduct constituting involuntary manslaughter. View "South Carolina v. Sams" on Justia Law

Officers from the North Charleston South Carolina Police Department (NCPD),believed Petitioner Alfred Adams was a drug dealer. Acting without a warrant, officers placed a Global Positioning System (GPS) device on petitioner's vehicle. After monitoring petitioner's travel to Atlanta, Georgia, and upon his return to South Carolina, law enforcement stationed a drug canine unit on the interstate within the NCPD's jurisdiction, with instructions to conduct a traffic stop on petitioner's vehicle. An officer conducted the requested traffic stop and discovered cocaine in petitioner's possession, which resulted in his arrest. Petitioner moved to suppress the drugs, arguing that the warrantless installation of the GPS device violated the Fourth Amendment. The trial court denied petitioner's motion, finding no constitutional violation. The court of appeals found the warrantless installation of the GPS device violated the Fourth Amendment but determined that the exclusionary rule did not apply because "Adams's traffic violations were intervening criminal acts sufficient to cure the taint arising from unlawfully installing the [GPS] device and monitoring the vehicle." Petitioner contended on appeal to the Supreme Court that the court of appeals erred in finding that his traffic violations were intervening criminal acts that dissipated the taint from the unlawful search and concluding the facts did not warrant suppression. The Supreme Court agreed, reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "South Carolina v. Adams" on Justia Law

The Court granted the State's petition for a writ of certiorari to review an unpublished Court of Appeals decision that affirmed the circuit court's suppression of respondent Philip Sawyer's breath test results and video in a prosecution for driving under the influence (DUI). Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court affirmed, finding that a videotape from the breath test site that lacked the audio portion of the reading of Miranda rights and the informed consent law did not satisfy the requirements of S.C. Code Ann. 56-5-2953(A)(2) (2006). View "South Carolina v. Sawyer" on Justia Law

Respondent Bentley Collins was convicted of involuntary manslaughter and three counts of owning a dangerous animal causing injury to a person after a ten-year-old boy was killed and partially eaten by his dogs, most of whom were pitbull mixes. The State appealed the Court of Appeals' decision reversing and remanding the case for a new trial based solely on the trial court's admission of seven pre-autopsy photos of the victim. The State argued that the Court of Appeals: (1) failed to give due deference to the trial court's decision; (2) erred in finding that photos entered into evidence were more prejudicial than probative; (3) erred in finding the photos were not material to the elements of the offenses charged and corroborative of other evidence; and (4) erred in making a purely emotional decision to reverse and remand for a new trial. The Supreme Court agreed and reversed the appellate court's decision. View "South Carolina v. Collins" on Justia Law

Delores Williams, the personal representative of the Estate of Edward Murry, and Matthew Whitaker, Jr., the personal representative of the Estate of Annie Mae Murry (PRs), brought a declaratory judgment action to determine whether a GEICO motor vehicle insurance policy issued to the Murrys provided $15,000 or $100,000 in liability proceeds for bodily injury for an accident in which both of the Murrys were killed. The circuit court concluded coverage was limited to the statutory minimum of $15,000 based on a family step-down provision in the policy that reduced coverage for bodily injury to family members from the stated policy coverage of $100,000 to the statutory minimum amount mandated by South Carolina law during the policy period. The PRs appealed, contending the step-down provision was ambiguous and/or violative of public policy. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Court agreed with the circuit court that GEICO's policy is not ambiguous, but concluded the family step-down provision, which reduced the coverage under the liability policy from the stated policy amount to the statutory minimum, was violative of public policy and was, therefore, void. "The provision not only conflicte[d] with the mandates set forth in section 38-77-142, but its enforcement would be injurious to the public welfare." View "Williams v. GEICO" on Justia Law

The State charged appellant "Kevin R." with possessing a weapon on school grounds. Prior to his adjudicatory hearing before a family court judge, Appellant moved for a jury trial on the grounds the federal and state Constitutions guaranteed him the right to a jury trial. The judge denied the motion and proceeded to hear Appellant's case in a bench trial. Ultimately, the judge adjudicated Appellant delinquent and deferred sentencing until an evaluation of Appellant was completed. The sentencing hearing was conducted before a second family court judge, who sentenced Appellant to an indeterminate period of time not to exceed his twenty- first birthday. The judge then suspended the sentence and placed Appellant on probation until his eighteenth birthday. On appeal, Appellant contended the family court judge erred in denying his motion for a jury trial. Recently, the South Carolina Supreme Court held a juvenile did not have a constitutional right to a jury trial in adjudication proceedings. However, the Court's decision in that case was not dispositive as it was presented with additional arguments raised by Appellant and the Amici Curiae. After consideration of these issues, the Court adhered to its decision in the earlier case, and affirmed the family court. View "In the Interest of Kevin R." on Justia Law