Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant pled guilty to two counts of indecent exposure and was sentenced to two consecutive three-year terms, with credit for 253 days already served. Appellant contended the trial court erred in denying his request for a full evidentiary hearing before the circuit court determined whether appellant's indecent exposure pleas should have been classified as sexually violent offenses for purposes of the Sexually Violent Predator Act (the SVP Act). Under the facts of this case, the Supreme Court found no reversible error, and therefore affirmed the trial court. View "South Carolina v. Wessinger" on Justia Law

Appellant Donta Reid challenged the trial court's failure to suppress his confession, arguing it was obtained in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The Supreme Court disagreed, finding the facts of this case fell within the purview of "Montejo v. Louisiana," (556 U.S. 778 (2009)). Furthermore contended the trial court erred in failing to grant a directed verdict of acquittal on the charges for possession of a firearm during the commission of a violent crime because the State failed to prove he actually or constructively possessed a firearm. The Supreme Court found those charges were properly submitted to the jury and therefore affirmed his convictions. View "South Carolina v. Reid" on Justia Law

Appellant Anthony Nation appealed a circuit court's decision to statutorily impose lifetime global positioning satellite (GPS) monitoring on him due to his prior guilty plea for a sex offense with a minor and subsequent probation violations. On appeal, Appellant brought various constitutional challenges to section 23-3-540 and contests the validity of five of our previous decisions involving the South Carolina Sex Offender Registry and statutory authorization of GPS monitoring of sex offenders. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "South Carolina v. Nation" on Justia Law

Lawrence Burgess was convicted of possession of crack cocaine with intent to distribute and sentenced to three years in prison and ordered to pay a $25,000 fine. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Following the denial of his petition for rehearing, Burgess petitioned for a writ of certiorari to review the decision. The South Carolina Supreme Court granted the petition to review whether: (1) the multi-jurisdictional drug-enforcement agreement (which formed the purported basis of the arresting officer's authority to arrest Burgess outside of the officer's territorial jurisdiction) satisfied the statutory prerequisites to constitute a valid agreement; and (2) whether Burgess should have been permitted to cross-examine the arresting officer with his personnel records pursuant to Rule 608(c) of the South Carolina Rules of Evidence. Although the Supreme Court found the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed Burgess's conviction, it disagreed with the court's conclusion regarding the multijurisdictional drug-enforcement agreement. Accordingly, the Court affirmed as modified. View "South Carolina v. Burgess" on Justia Law

The South Carolina Supreme Court answered certified two questions from the U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina. The case concerned supplemental health insurance policies, which differ from ordinary health insurance policies in both purpose and operation. The questions were: (1) whether the definition of "actual charges" contained within S.C. Code Ann. 38-71-242 be applied to insurance contracts executed prior to the statute's effective date; and (2) whether the South Carolina Department of Insurance could mandate the application of "actual charges" to policies already inexistence on the statute's effective dates by prohibiting an insurance company from paying claims absent the application of that definition. The South Carolina Supreme Court answered both questions "no." View "Kirven v. Central States" on Justia Law

Appellant Ashley Hepburn appealed her conviction for homicide by child abuse. Sixteen-month-old Audrina Hepburn became unresponsive and was admitted to the hospital one evening in 2009. No one (including appellant) disputed the child died from child abuse. Only two people could have killed the child: appellant or her then-boyfriend, co-defendant Brandon Lewis. The jury found Appellant guilty of homicide by child abuse and Lewis guilty of aiding and abetting homicide by child abuse. The trial court sentenced Appellant to 45 years' imprisonment and Lewis to ten years' imprisonment suspended upon the service of seven years. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. Appellant argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that the trial court erred in denying her mid-trial motion for directed verdict. After its review, the Supreme Court found the trial court should have granted appellant's motion, and directed a verdict of acquittal. View "South Carolina v. Hepburn" on Justia Law

Petitioner Richard Jordan appealed the denial of his application for post-conviction relief. Petitioner was arrested and later indicted for possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine and trafficking in methamphetamine. At the suggestion of his girlfriend Cynthia Summers, petitioner retained attorney Harry DePew to represent him on the methamphetamine charges. DePew was then representing Summers on an unrelated charge. DePew did not inform the trial court at any time that he represented both petitioner and Summers. At trial, evidence was introduced pointing to Summers' involvement with the methamphetamine lab operation. The trial court invited Petitioner to present evidence as to Summers' third-party guilt. DePew, however, did not present any evidence to incriminate Summers, though Petitioner testified at the PCR hearing that he had several witnesses that were prepared to testify as to Summers' guilt. Petitioner was convicted on both charges and sentenced to twenty-five years in prison. Petitioner later sought PCR alleging ineffective assistance of counsel because DePew's dual representation of petitioner and Summers constituted an actual conflict of interest. During the PCR hearing, petitioner testified that he was not informed of the conflict of interest, did not waive the conflict of interest, and wanted to present a third-party guilt defense as to Summers. View "Jordan v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

Appellant James Curry, Jr. was convicted and sentenced for voluntary manslaughter and possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime. Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant immunity under the Protection of Persons and Property Act, and because Appellant was not prejudiced by the section 16-11-440(C) jury instruction given at his trial, Appellant's convictions and sentence were affirmed.View "South Carolina v. Curry" on Justia Law

Appellant Damien Inman was convicted and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole for the robbery, kidnapping, and murder of Mary Stutts. Appellant was seventeen years old at the time of the crimes. On appeal, Appellant challenged his convictions on several grounds, including that the circuit court improperly granted the State's motion pursuant to "Batson v. Kentucky" after Appellant offered a race-neutral explanation for striking a particular juror. The Supreme Court agreed after review and reversed and remanded the case for a new trial. View "South Carolina v. Inman" on Justia Law

In 2008, at a regularly scheduled meeting of the Saluda County Council, a motion was made and seconded to amend the posted agenda to take up a resolution. Both the motion and the resolution were voted upon and passed unanimously during the meeting, which was open to the public. The nonbinding resolution pertained to water and sewer services, although that subject was not originally listed on County Council's agenda. Dennis Lambries filed this action in the circuit court against the Saluda County Council and its members alleging County Council's amendment of the agenda without notice and in the absence of exigent circumstances and its passage of a resolution that was not on the posted agenda violated FOIA's notice provision in section 30-4-80. Lambries brought the action as a citizen of Saluda County and noted he was also the Chairman of the Saluda County Water and Sewer Authority. Specifically, Lambries asked the circuit court to declare that all resolutions, acts, ordinances, and statements made by County Council in violation of FOIA were null and void, and he sought injunctive relief to prevent future amendments of an agenda in the absence of "truly exigent circumstances." The circuit court noted the purpose of FOIA is for the activities of government "to be in open session and not behind closed doors." The court found that "the amendment of the agenda was performed in open session and in accordance with Saluda County Council rules of order as codified in their ordinances," and S.C. Code Ann. 4-9-110 (1986) authorized counties to establish their own rules and order of business. The circuit court denied Lambries's motion to alter or amend under Rule 59(e), SCRCP, reiterating that it "d[id] not agree with the plaintiff's fundamental position that a county council cannot amend agendas for regularly scheduled meetings without advance notice or exigent circumstances." The Court of Appeals reversed in a split decision, the majority finding (1) an agenda is required for regularly scheduled meetings, and (2) County Council's amendment of an agenda less than twenty-four hours before the meeting violated the "spirit" and "purpose" of FOIA's notice requirement. The Supreme Court concluded FOIA's notice statute did not require an agenda to be issued for a regularly scheduled meeting, and FOIA contained no prohibition on the amendment of an agenda for a regularly scheduled meeting. View "Lambries v. Saluda County Council" on Justia Law