Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Jon Smart and his co-defendant, Stephen Hutto, were in custody at a Department of Juvenile Justice detention facility near Rimini in Clarendon County in August 1999 when they brutally murdered a citizen volunteer who graciously allowed the boys to work on his family farm under his supervision as a part of their rehabilitation. Smart and Hutto then stole the man's truck and drove it on a violent crime spree. After Horry County Police officers stopped them for a traffic violation and discovered the truck was stolen, Smart and Hutto led officers on a thirty-mile high-speed chase during which Smart fired shots at pursuing law enforcement vehicles. Smart was sixteen years old. Smart pled guilty in 2001 to murder, armed robbery, grand larceny, criminal conspiracy, and escape. The plea court sentenced him to life in prison for the murder. The issue his appeal presented for the South Carolina Supreme Court's review centered on whether a juvenile sentenced to life in prison, bore any burden of proof or persuasion when seeking resentencing under Aiken v. Byars, 765 S.E.2d 572 (2014). The Supreme Court held there was no such burden—on either party—and the resentencing court did not impose such a burden. View "South Carolina v. Smart" on Justia Law

Petitioner Richard Passio Jr. was convicted of murdering his wife and sentenced to thirty years' imprisonment. Passio appealed, arguing the trial court erred in: (1) denying his motion for a directed verdict; and (2) admitting a screenshot of his Facebook page. Finding no error by the trial court on either issue, the court of appeals affirmed. Having carefully examined Passio's challenges, the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals in upholding the trial court's denial of Passio's motion for a directed verdict. The Supreme Court concluded, however, that the admission of Passio's Facebook page was error, albeit harmless. The Court therefore affirmed the court of appeals' decision as modified. View "South Carolina v. Passio" on Justia Law

In a matter of first impression, the South Carolina Supreme Court considered a Sexually Violent Predator Act case arising under subsection 44-48-100(B) of the South Carolina Code (2018). The circuit court in this case found Francis Oxner committed the acts with which he was charged. On appeal, Oxner claimed a lengthy delay before his subsection 44-48-100(B) hearing violated his right to a speedy trial, the fact he was never convicted precluded proceedings under the Act, and conducting the subsection 44-48-100(B) hearing while he was incompetent violated his due process rights. The Supreme Court found no reversible error in the circuit court's finding that Oxner "committed the act or acts with which he is charged" under subsection 44-48-100(B). The Court remanded the case to the circuit court for "a trial to determine whether [Oxner] is a sexually violent predator" as required by subsection 44-48-90(A) of the South Carolina Code (2018). View "In the Matter of Oxner" on Justia Law

Petitioner Justin Lewis represented himself at trial and was convicted of distribution of heroin. Lewis timely filed an application for post- conviction relief (PCR), alleging pretrial counsel was ineffective in several respects. The PCR court summarily dismissed Lewis' application, and the South Carolina Supreme Court granted his petition for certiorari review of the PCR court's order. After review, the Supreme Court reversed the PCR court's order in part and remanded for a hearing on Lewis's claims that pretrial counsel failed to adequately investigate the criminal charge, failed to communicate with material witnesses whose testimony would have allegedly been favorable to the defense, failed to advise him of the right to appeal, failed to provide the necessary information for filing a notice of appeal, and failed to file a notice of appeal on his behalf. View "Lewis v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

Travis Lawrence was convicted by jury of attempted murder following a brawl at the home of a friend, Clayton Baxter. At trial, Lawrence argued that he acted in self-defense. To support this, he subpoenaed his co-defendant present at the scene, Terell Bennett. Bennett, however, invoked his Fifth Amendment right while awaiting his own, separate trial. Bennett's in camera testimony tended to show that he and Lawrence traveled to Baxter's house that day to purchase marijuana. Bennett's version of events established that Baxter attacked Lawrence first. The trial court was made aware of the nature of Bennett's testimony; in asking for the court to conduct the in camera examination, Lawrence's counsel stated "[the State] know[s] that the alleged co-defendant has come in and told them this was an act of self-defense." The trial court clarified: "I just want to make sure I understand the full breadth of what you're saying so I know whether or not you can invoke your right as far as implication. You're putting yourself at the scene of this alleged crime; do you understand that?" Bennett's counsel then argued that any questioning by the State would reveal incriminating information. Lawrence argued on appeal to the South Carolina Supreme Court that the hazards of self-incrimination from Bennett's testimony were not openly apparent because the purported crime, the purchase of marijuana, was never completed. Lawrence maintained that Bennett's testimony would show he and Lawrence acted in self-defense. Conversely, the State contended that the hazard of self-incrimination was openly apparent because Bennett was awaiting trial on indictments resulting from the same incident and there was "obvious potential" for any answers to be incriminating. The court of appeals concluded the hazard of incrimination was openly apparent, and the Supreme Court concurred, affirming the trial and appellate courts. View "South Carolina v. Lawrence" on Justia Law

Guadalupe Guzman Morales was convicted in 2017 of criminal sexual conduct with a minor in the first and second degree. On appeal, he contended evidence he sexually assaulted the victim's sister should have been excluded under Rule 404(b) of the South Carolina Rules of Evidence. He argued the trial court erred in admitting the evidence pursuant to the "common scheme or plan" exception, both under the "substantial similarities" test from South Carolina v. Wallace, 683 S.E.2d 275 (2009), and under the "logical connection" standard later articulated in South Carolina v. Perry, 842 S.E.2d 654 (2020). The court of appeals agreed as to Perry and reversed. The South Carolina Supreme Court found both the Wallace and Perry issues were unpreserved for appellate review. The Court therefore reversed the court of appeals and reinstated Morales' convictions. View "South Carolina v. Morales" on Justia Law

Ontavious Plumer shot and wounded Oshamar Wells during an aborted drug deal. Plumer was convicted of attempted murder and possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime. He was sentenced to life without parole (LWOP) for attempted murder and to a concurrent five-year term on the weapon charge. The court of appeals affirmed Plumer's convictions but vacated the five-year weapon sentence. The South Carolina Supreme Court granted cross-petitions for certiorari and address two issues: (1) Plumer's contention that the court of appeals erred in affirming the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury on self- defense; and (2) the State's contention that even though the five-year weapon sentence was prohibited by statute, that issue was not raised to the trial court and was thus not preserved for appellate review. As was the case in South Carolina v. Williams, 830 S.E.2d 904 (2019), Plumer unlawfully possessed the firearm he employed during this illegal drug transaction. Plumer argued there was evidence he was not aware the gathering in the kitchen was for an illegal drug deal. The Supreme Court found the only reasonable inference to be derived from the record was that Plumer intentionally took a loaded firearm to what he knew would be an illegal drug transaction. "It matters not who drew his weapon first or who fired first." With regard to the State's argument, the Supreme Court occasionally encountered illegal sentences to which no objection was taken in the trial court. "In such cases, it is inefficient and a waste of judicial resources to delay the inevitable by requiring the appellant to file a post-conviction relief action or petition for a writ of habeas corpus." Therefore, the Court modified South Carolina v. Johnston, 510 S.E.2d 423 (1999) and held that when a trial court imposes what the State concedes is an illegal sentence, the appellate court may correct that sentence on direct appeal or remand the issue to the trial court even if the defendant did not object to the sentence at trial and even if there is no real threat of incarceration beyond the limits of a legal sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals as modified on both issues. View "South Carolina v. Plumer" on Justia Law

After receiving frequent criticism from tourists and residents alike, the City of Myrtle Beach, South Carolina became concerned that the proliferation of smoke shops and tobacco stores were repelling families from the area due to those stores' merchandise and advertising practices. More specifically, the city was troubled with those shops' sale of sexually explicit items, cannabidiol (CBD)-infused products, and tobacco paraphernalia. In an effort to improve the "family friendly" nature of the downtown area, the city created a zoning overlay district that prohibited the operation of smoke shops and tobacco stores, among others, in the city's downtown. Appellants, nine of the twenty-five affected stores located in the area, were each issued a citation by the city's zoning administrator for failing to comply with the zoning overlay ordinance. Following a complicated legal battle, appellants raised a host of constitutional challenges to the zoning overlay ordinance. The circuit court found the ordinance survived appellants' complaints, and appellants directly appealed that decision to the South Carolina Court. The Supreme Court held that, under its long-standing precedent, the overlay ordinance did not impermissibly spot zone the city's historic downtown area. Additionally, the Court found the overlay ordinance was a constitutional exercise of the city's police powers. The Court therefore affirmed the decision of the circuit court and upheld the validity of the ordinance. View "Ani Creation, Inc., et al. v. City of Myrtle Beach" on Justia Law

Respondent Russell Johnson was indicted on charges of kidnapping and criminal domestic violence in the first degree. The events leading to the indictment began in Marion County and progressed over the course of approximately thirteen hours into Dillon and Marlboro Counties, then back to Marion County. The trial court admitted evidence of Johnson's alleged acts of domestic violence in Dillon and Marlboro Counties and denied Johnson's request for a limiting instruction. Johnson was acquitted of kidnapping but was convicted of criminal domestic violence. The court of appeals reversed Johnson's conviction, holding the trial court erred in failing to issue a limiting instruction. The South Carolina Supreme Court found that though Johnson preserved the issue of a limiting instruction, he was not entitled to one. Therefore, it reversed the court of appeals and reinstated Johnson's conviction. View "South Carolina v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Appellant Mary Ann German was convicted of felony driving under the influence ("DUI") resulting in death and sentenced to eleven years' incarceration. Before trial, Appellant moved to suppress evidence of her blood alcohol content ("BAC") obtained through a warrantless blood draw, which was taken pursuant to section 56-5-2946 of the South Carolina Code while she was hospitalized after an automobile accident. Finding that section 56-5-2946 was constitutional as applied and unchanged by the holdings of Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141 (2013) and Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579 U.S. 438 (2016), the trial court denied the motion to suppress. The court concluded that law enforcement had probable cause to suspect Appellant of felony DUI and properly obtained the blood draw pursuant to section 56-5-2946. Appellant appealed her conviction based on the denial of her motion, and the court of appeals requested certification pursuant to Rule 204(b), SCACR. The South Carolina Supreme Court agreed to consider whether the warrantless blood draw based on section 56-5-2946 violated Appellant's Fourth Amendment rights or her rights under the South Carolina Constitution and, in effect, whether section 56-5-2946 was constitutional. The Court concluded section 56-5-2946 was facially constitutional but unconstitutional as applied in Appellant's case. However, the Court found the trial court did not err in denying Appellant's motion to suppress because law enforcement acted in good faith based on existing precedent at the time of the blood draw. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed Appellant's conviction. View "South Carolina v. German" on Justia Law