Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Constitutional Law
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Ontavious Plumer shot and wounded Oshamar Wells during an aborted drug deal. Plumer was convicted of attempted murder and possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime. He was sentenced to life without parole (LWOP) for attempted murder and to a concurrent five-year term on the weapon charge. The court of appeals affirmed Plumer's convictions but vacated the five-year weapon sentence. The South Carolina Supreme Court granted cross-petitions for certiorari and address two issues: (1) Plumer's contention that the court of appeals erred in affirming the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury on self- defense; and (2) the State's contention that even though the five-year weapon sentence was prohibited by statute, that issue was not raised to the trial court and was thus not preserved for appellate review. As was the case in South Carolina v. Williams, 830 S.E.2d 904 (2019), Plumer unlawfully possessed the firearm he employed during this illegal drug transaction. Plumer argued there was evidence he was not aware the gathering in the kitchen was for an illegal drug deal. The Supreme Court found the only reasonable inference to be derived from the record was that Plumer intentionally took a loaded firearm to what he knew would be an illegal drug transaction. "It matters not who drew his weapon first or who fired first." With regard to the State's argument, the Supreme Court occasionally encountered illegal sentences to which no objection was taken in the trial court. "In such cases, it is inefficient and a waste of judicial resources to delay the inevitable by requiring the appellant to file a post-conviction relief action or petition for a writ of habeas corpus." Therefore, the Court modified South Carolina v. Johnston, 510 S.E.2d 423 (1999) and held that when a trial court imposes what the State concedes is an illegal sentence, the appellate court may correct that sentence on direct appeal or remand the issue to the trial court even if the defendant did not object to the sentence at trial and even if there is no real threat of incarceration beyond the limits of a legal sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals as modified on both issues. View "South Carolina v. Plumer" on Justia Law

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After receiving frequent criticism from tourists and residents alike, the City of Myrtle Beach, South Carolina became concerned that the proliferation of smoke shops and tobacco stores were repelling families from the area due to those stores' merchandise and advertising practices. More specifically, the city was troubled with those shops' sale of sexually explicit items, cannabidiol (CBD)-infused products, and tobacco paraphernalia. In an effort to improve the "family friendly" nature of the downtown area, the city created a zoning overlay district that prohibited the operation of smoke shops and tobacco stores, among others, in the city's downtown. Appellants, nine of the twenty-five affected stores located in the area, were each issued a citation by the city's zoning administrator for failing to comply with the zoning overlay ordinance. Following a complicated legal battle, appellants raised a host of constitutional challenges to the zoning overlay ordinance. The circuit court found the ordinance survived appellants' complaints, and appellants directly appealed that decision to the South Carolina Court. The Supreme Court held that, under its long-standing precedent, the overlay ordinance did not impermissibly spot zone the city's historic downtown area. Additionally, the Court found the overlay ordinance was a constitutional exercise of the city's police powers. The Court therefore affirmed the decision of the circuit court and upheld the validity of the ordinance. View "Ani Creation, Inc., et al. v. City of Myrtle Beach" on Justia Law

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Respondent Russell Johnson was indicted on charges of kidnapping and criminal domestic violence in the first degree. The events leading to the indictment began in Marion County and progressed over the course of approximately thirteen hours into Dillon and Marlboro Counties, then back to Marion County. The trial court admitted evidence of Johnson's alleged acts of domestic violence in Dillon and Marlboro Counties and denied Johnson's request for a limiting instruction. Johnson was acquitted of kidnapping but was convicted of criminal domestic violence. The court of appeals reversed Johnson's conviction, holding the trial court erred in failing to issue a limiting instruction. The South Carolina Supreme Court found that though Johnson preserved the issue of a limiting instruction, he was not entitled to one. Therefore, it reversed the court of appeals and reinstated Johnson's conviction. View "South Carolina v. Johnson" on Justia Law

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Appellant Mary Ann German was convicted of felony driving under the influence ("DUI") resulting in death and sentenced to eleven years' incarceration. Before trial, Appellant moved to suppress evidence of her blood alcohol content ("BAC") obtained through a warrantless blood draw, which was taken pursuant to section 56-5-2946 of the South Carolina Code while she was hospitalized after an automobile accident. Finding that section 56-5-2946 was constitutional as applied and unchanged by the holdings of Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141 (2013) and Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579 U.S. 438 (2016), the trial court denied the motion to suppress. The court concluded that law enforcement had probable cause to suspect Appellant of felony DUI and properly obtained the blood draw pursuant to section 56-5-2946. Appellant appealed her conviction based on the denial of her motion, and the court of appeals requested certification pursuant to Rule 204(b), SCACR. The South Carolina Supreme Court agreed to consider whether the warrantless blood draw based on section 56-5-2946 violated Appellant's Fourth Amendment rights or her rights under the South Carolina Constitution and, in effect, whether section 56-5-2946 was constitutional. The Court concluded section 56-5-2946 was facially constitutional but unconstitutional as applied in Appellant's case. However, the Court found the trial court did not err in denying Appellant's motion to suppress because law enforcement acted in good faith based on existing precedent at the time of the blood draw. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed Appellant's conviction. View "South Carolina v. German" on Justia Law

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Respondent Braden's Folly, LLC owned two small, contiguous, developed coastal properties on the northeast end of Folly Beach, South Carolina. The City of Folly Beach amended an ordinance to require certain contiguous properties under common ownership to be merged into a single, larger property. The ordinance did not impact the existing uses of Braden's Folly's contiguous lots. Nevertheless, Braden's Folly challenged the merger ordinance, claiming it had planned to sell one of the developed properties, and that the merger ordinance interfered with its investment-backed expectation under the test announced in Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of N.Y., 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). Folly Beach denied the claim of an unconstitutional regulatory taking. Pursuant to cross-motions for summary judgment, the circuit court agreed with Braden's Folly, finding the merger ordinance effected an as-applied taking of Braden's Folly's beachfront property. Folly Beach appealed the judgment in favor of Braden's Folly. Underlying the South Carolina Supreme Court's application of the Penn Central factors was the "distinct fragility" of Folly Beach's coastline, which was subject to such extreme erosion that the General Assembly exempted Folly Beach from parts of the South Carolina Beachfront Management Act. This exemption gave the city the authority to act in the State's stead in protecting the beach there. One of Braden's Folly's properties was contributing to worsening erosion rates on Folly Beach and, along with similarly situated properties, was threatening the existence of the entire beach in that area of the state. The Court concluded Braden's Folly had not suffered a taking under the Penn Central test. Therefore, the judgment was reversed and the case remanded for entry of judgment in favor of Folly Beach. View "Braden's Folly, LLC v. City of Folly Beach" on Justia Law

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Petitioner Quincy Allen, a formerly death-sentenced inmate housed at Broad River Correctional Institution, appealed to the Administrative Law Court (ALC) the denial by the South Carolina Department of Corrections (SCDC) of his grievance concerning visitation with persons not known to him prior to his incarceration. Following the ALC's dismissal of Petitioner's appeal, Petitioner appealed to the court of appeals. The court of appeals affirmed the order of the ALC. Petitioner now sought certiorari review by the South Carolina Supreme Court. The Supreme Court granted the petition, dispensed with briefing, and affirmed the decision of the court of appeals as modified. The Court determined the court of appeals incorrectly analyzed the issue as one of "subject matter jurisdiction" when it affirmed the ALC's decision. However, the Supreme Court affirmed the holding that the denial of Petitioner's visitation with persons not known to him prior to incarceration did not implicate a state-created liberty interest, and the Supreme Court agreed with the result of the court of appeals' decision to affirm the dismissal of Petitioner's appeal by the ALC. View "Allen v. SCDC" on Justia Law

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Appellant Timothy Jones, Jr. admitted to killing his five young children and was indicted for five counts of murder. He was convicted by jury and sentenced to death. In a direct appeal to the South Carolina Supreme Court, Jones raised eight issues centering on three points: juror qualification, requested voir dire and a related jury instruction, and evidentiary rulings made during the guilt and sentencing phases. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the juror qualification, voir dire, and jury instruction rulings. The Court held the trial court erred in certain evidentiary rulings; however, the Court found the errors were harmless and affirmed Jones's conviction and death sentence. View "South Carolina v. Jones" on Justia Law

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At Stewart Middleton's trial for third-degree criminal sexual conduct, the State introduced a police detective's testimony that Middleton was evasive in response to her attempts to get Middleton to come in for an interview. The trial court admitted this testimony over Middleton's relevance objection. The jury found Middleton guilty and the court of appeals affirmed. The South Carolina Supreme Court held that the trial court erred in finding the testimony relevant because the State did not establish a nexus between Middleton's conduct and a consciousness of his guilt. The conviction was reversed and the case remanded for a new trial. View "South Carolina v. Middleton" on Justia Law

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Craig Busse appealed his conviction for second-degree criminal sexual conduct with a minor, claiming the deputy solicitor improperly vouched for the victim's credibility in a statement he made during closing argument. The court of appeals affirmed. The South Carolina Supreme Court found the deputy solicitor's statement was technically in error and the trial court should have sustained Busse's objection. However, the statement did not amount to vouching. Therefore, the Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed. View "South Carolina v. Busse" on Justia Law

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Four prisoners filed a declaratory judgment action challenging two of the execution methods set forth in South Carolina's death penalty statute: electrocution and firing squad. The prisoners contend the methods violate the South Carolina Constitution's article I, section 15 prohibition against cruel, corporal, or unusual punishment. The circuit court concluded electrocution and the firing squad were unconstitutional under state law, and the parties filed cross-appeals with the South Carolina Supreme Court. The primary appeal concerned the merits of the ruling, and the prisoners' cross-appeal challenged the partial denial of their pretrial discovery request for information on the availability of a third statutory method of execution, lethal injection. At this time, the Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's discovery ruling (which was the subject of the cross-appeal), and remanded the discovery issue to the circuit court for further proceedings to be completed in accordance with time limits set forth in this opinion. The Supreme Court held the remainder of the appeal in abeyance pending the circuit court's resolution of the discovery issue. View "Owens, et al. v. Stirling, et al." on Justia Law