Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant William Mark Brockmeyer appealed his convictions for murder and possession of a weapon during a violent crime, raising constitutional challenges to both the trial court's refusal to enforce a subpoena concerning the identity of an internet commenter and the admission of certain chain-of-custody testimony and other photographic evidence at trial. The theory of appellant's defense was that the shooting was an accident. An issue arose over posted comments to a news article by a local television station. Appellant wanted evidence supporting his claim of accident and being emotionally upset after the shooting, and contended the online post suggested its author had direct knowledge of the incident and supported his claim of accident. Accordingly, appellant served the television station with a subpoena seeking the user's gender, year of birth, ZIP code, name and email address (all requirements for creating a user account on the station's website to publish comments online). The television station resisted the subpoena on First and Fourteenth Amendment grounds. Appellant argued his constitutional right to a fair trial required disclosure of the identity of the commenter. The Supreme Court concluded after its review of the trial court record, that the subpoena issue was not properly preserved for appeal, and even if it had been, the trial court's refusal to enforce the subpoena was not reversible error. Finding no other reversible errors, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court in all other respects. View "South Carolina v. Brockmeyer" on Justia Law

Hard Hat Workforce Solutions, LLC (Hard Hat) appealed a circuit court order granting summary judgment in favor of Great American Insurance Company (GAI). Hard Hat argued it was entitled to make a claim against a payment bond GAI issued on a construction project. The threshold issue in this case was whether Hard Hat's bond claim must comply with section 29-5-440's "notice of furnishing" provision. The Supreme Court found it did not: three e-mails Hard Hat sent to a subcontractor, Walker White, created an issue of fact as to whether Hard Hat satisfied section 29-5-440's notice provisions. View "Hard Hat Workforce v. Mechanical HVAC" on Justia Law

This direct appeal involved a constitutional challenge to the Town of Hilton Head Island's business license tax ordinance, which required businesses within the Town to pay an annual license fee based upon a business's classification and gross income. "Kigre has clothed its many arguments in the premise that the Ordinance is not sound policy," but the Supreme Court found that none rose to the level to sufficiently challenge the ordinance's constitutionality. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court. View "Town of Hilton Head Island v. Kigre, Inc." on Justia Law

The Court granted the State's petition for a writ of certiorari to review an unpublished Court of Appeals decision that affirmed the circuit court's suppression of respondent Philip Sawyer's breath test results and video in a prosecution for driving under the influence (DUI). In 2007, respondent was taken to the Spartanburg County Jail following a traffic stop made by a certified Data Master operator. Respondent was placed in the "subject test area" which is a room that adjoins the Data Master room. A deputy retrieved some forms from the Data Master room and then appeared to read respondent his Miranda rights and the implied consent information. Both respondent and the deputy signed the forms. There were separate audio and video recording devices in both the subject test area and in the breathalyzer room. In this case, the audio device in the subject test area did not function. Respondent moved to suppress the evidence relating to the breath test site alleging the videotape did not meet the requirements of S.C. Code Ann. 56-5-2953(A), which required that a person charged with DUI have his conduct at both the incident site and the breath test site videotaped. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a videotape from the breath test site that lacked the audio portion of the reading of Miranda rights and the informed consent law did not satisfy the requirements of S.C. Code Ann. 56-52953(A)(2) (2006). View "South Carolina v. Sawyer" on Justia Law

Following his conviction for one count of assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature (ABHAN), one count of possession of a dangerous animal, and multiple counts of animal fighting, David Tant was remanded to the Department of Corrections. Upon receipt of his sentencing sheets, the Department recorded his sentence as fifteen years' imprisonment. However, the Department later determined the judge intended to sentence Tant to forty years' imprisonment and changed its records without notifying Tant. The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court was whether the Department of Corrections had the authority to alter its initial determination as to the length of an inmate's sentence. The Court held that when the Department decides its original recordation of a sentence was erroneous, it must afford the inmate formal notice of the amended sentence and advise him of his opportunity to be heard through the grievance procedure. Furthermore, "the Department is generally confined to the face of the sentencing sheets in determining the length of a sentence, but may refer to the sentencing transcript if there is an ambiguity in the sentencing sheets." Because the Court found that the sentencing sheets and the transcript in this case were ambiguous, it held Tant's sentences ran concurrently for a total of fifteen years' imprisonment. View "Tant v. South Carolina Dept. of Corrections" on Justia Law

Petitioner contended that the court of appeals erred by applying common law principles of accomplice liability to affirm his conviction for aiding and abetting homicide by child abuse for which he was not indicted. Petitioner was the father of the minor child (Victim) who died as a result of child abuse in 2004. Petitioner and the Victim's mother, Charlene Dandridge, were Victim's caretakers. An autopsy revealed seventeen rib fractures, some of which occurred several weeks prior to death and some that occurred in the forty-eight hours immediately prior to death. The autopsy also revealed that, on the day she died, Victim had been given approximately four times the adult dosage of pseudoephedrine. The trial court, on its own initiative, instructed the jury on both South Carolina Code section 16-3-85(A)(1), and 16-3-85(A)(2). The trial court indicated that it believed that section (A)(2) was a lesser-included offense of section (A)(1), or alternatively, that section (A)(2) was merely another means to convict a criminal defendant of the same underlying crime of homicide by child abuse but would lead to a lesser sentence. Petitioner's trial counsel objected to the jury instruction on section (A)(2) because he was not put on notice of the section (A)(2) offense. The jury subsequently found Petitioner guilty of violating the unindicted section (A)(2) offense without reaching the indicted section (A)(1) charge. The Supreme Court held that the court of appeals erred in affirming Petitioner's conviction under section (A)(2). Accordingly, the Court reversed the court of appeals and remanded this case to the trial court for a new trial on the indicted offense of homicide by child abuse pursuant to section (A)(1). View "South Carolina v. Smith" on Justia Law

Appellant Steven Barnes was convicted on kidnapping and murder charges. The jury found two aggravating circumstances and recommended the death sentence. The judge sentenced appellant to death for the murder, but no sentence for kidnapping. On appeal, appellant contended that the trial court erred in allowing his attorney to call a defense psychiatrist to testify regarding appellant's right to represent himself, by denying his "Faretta" request, in limiting voir dire, by qualifying a particular juror, and by refusing to dismiss the indictments because of the State's alleged failure to comply with the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act. Finding that the trial court applied the incorrect competency standard in its denial of the Faretta request, the Supreme Court reversed on that ground.View "South Carolina v. Barnes" on Justia Law

The South Carolina Libertarian Party sought a declaratory judgment to determine whether the Equal Access to the Ballot Act was in effect. If the Court determined the Act was effective, the Party requested that the South Carolina State Election Commission be ordered to conduct a Libertarian Party primary on June 10, 2014, and place a referendum question on the primary ballot for approval of the use of the convention method of nominating candidates by petitioner in 2016. The Supreme Court granted the petition for original jurisdiction and declared the Act was in effect. However. The Court denied the Party's request to require the Commission to conduct a primary and place a referendum question on the primary ballot. View "SC Libertarian Party v. SC Election Commission" on Justia Law

Father appealed his conviction for sexually abusing his two young daughters. He challenged the trial court's order requiring that he be entered on the Central Registry of Child Abuse and Neglect, and that prohibited him from visiting his four children until successful completion of a treatment plan. Father argued the family court erred in its interpretation of S.C. Code Ann. 19-1-180 (Supp. 2012) and in permitting the playing of videotape forensic interviews of the non-testifying child victims. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded the videotapes were inadmissible under 19-1-180(G) and reversed. View "SCDSS v. Pringle" on Justia Law

Petitioner Clinton Brantley was the pastor of St. Matthew Baptist Church. Respondents Ira Banks, James Bell, and Vernon Holmes served as trustees of the Church. At a congregational meeting, Brantley stated that without his knowledge, the Trustees had placed a mortgage upon the Church's property in order to purchase nearby apartment buildings. He further stated the Trustees failed to insure the apartment buildings and that funds were missing because of their mismanagement. He urged the congregation to remove the Trustees from their position, and the congregation subsequently did. The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court centered on whether the pastor could use the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause to shield him from tort liability for allegedly defamatory statements he made about the church trustees at the congregational meeting. While the pastor acknowledged the non-religious nature of his statements, he contends the setting in which they were made and their relationship to church governance places the trustees' defamation claim outside the jurisdiction of civil courts under the First Amendment. The circuit court dismissed the claim, and the court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court held the circuit court had jurisdiction to resolve this defamation claim using neutral principles of law and affirmed the court of appeals.View "Banks v. Brantley" on Justia Law