Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Ten health care entities, along with the South Carolina Hospital Association and the South Carolina Health Care Association sought a declaration from the Supreme Court that the South Carolina Department of Health and Human Services (DHEC) was obligated to enforce the State Certification of Need and Health Facility Licensure Act (the CON Act) and fund the certificate of need (CON) program despite the South Carolina House of Representative's failure to override the Governor's veto of the line item in the state budget providing funding for the program. Upon review of matter in its original jurisdiction, the Supreme Court granted the Petitioners' requested relief. View "Amisub v. SCDHEC" on Justia Law

Appellant Ida Lord appealed the circuit court's order granting summary judgment in favor of D & J Enterprises, Inc., d/b/a Cash on the Spot ("D & J"). Lord argued on appeal that the circuit court erred in: (1) finding the balancing approach adopted in "Bass v. Gopal, Inc.," (716 S.E.2d 910 (2011) ("Gopal II")), used to determine a business owner's duty to protect a patron based on the foreseeability of violent acts by third parties, applied prospectively; and (2) granting summary judgment as she presented a genuine issue of material fact on each element of her negligence claim. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court reversed the circuit court and remanded the case for trial because the Court found "Gopal II" applied here and its application warranted the denial of D & J's motion for summary judgment. View "Lord v. D & J Enterprises" on Justia Law

Appellants appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the respondents in this case. The case was dismissed after respondents moved for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c), SCRCP. Because the Supreme Court found issues of fact raised by the complaint that needed to be resolved before the constitutionality of 2009 Act No. 99 could be determined, the case was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. "The circuit court and respondents [relied] on a single sentence found in 'Bradley v. Cherokee School Dist. No. One,' [470 S.E.2d 570 (1996)]: A law that is special only in the sense that it imposes a lawful tax limited in application and incidence to persons or property within a certain school district does not contravene the provisions of Article III, section 34(IX)." In this case, the Supreme Court held that Appellant's complaint centered on an impact fee, not a tax, and one that is placed on only some persons and not others. Moreover, since 'Bradley' was decided, the Court clarified that all challenges to education-related special legislation were subject to the test set forth in 'Kizer v. Clark,'(600 S.E.2d 529 (2004)). The Supreme Court found that appellants' complaint alleged facts which, if resolved in their favor, would result in a declaration that the Act is unconstitutional. The order granting respondents' Rule 12(c) motion was therefore reversed.View "Home Builders Association v. School District No. 2 of Dorchester County" on Justia Law

In a matter of first impression, the Supreme Court was asked to determine if an unsuccessful party in an arbitration proceeding could prevent the confirmation of an award by paying the award prior to the confirmation proceeding. Diane Henderson filed an action against Summerville Ford-Mercury, Inc. alleging the dealer made misrepresentations to her when she purchased a used vehicle. The circuit court granted the dealer's motion to compel arbitration, and an arbitrator found for Henderson on her claims for violation of the South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act and the South Carolina Regulation of Manufacturers, Distributors, and Dealers Act. Henderson moved to confirm the arbitration award, which was granted by the circuit court. The dealer appealed, arguing the circuit court erred: (1) in rejecting its assertion that payment of the award mooted the request for confirmation, leaving no "justiciable controversy"; and alternatively (2) in applying the provision for confirming awards contained in the South Carolina Uniform Arbitration Act ("UAA"), rather than the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"). Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the unsuccessful party could not prevent confirmation of the award by paying it before confirmation. View "Henderson v. Summerville Ford-Mercury" on Justia Law

The Catawba Indian Nation brought a declaratory judgment action against the State (and Mark Keel) to determine the effect of the Gambling Cruise Act on its gambling rights. The circuit court granted summary judgment to the State, finding: (1) the Tribe's action was precluded by collateral estoppel and/or res judicata, and (2) the Gambling Cruise Act does not confer upon the Tribe the right to offer video poker and similar electronic play devices on its Reservation as the Act does not alter the statewide ban on video poker. The Tribe appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed in part, and reversed in part: the circuit court's determination that the Gambling Cruise Act did not authorize the Tribe to offer video poker on its Reservation in contravention of the existing statewide ban on video gambling devices was affirmed; the Tribe's action was not precluded by collateral estoppel or res judicata, reversing this finding by the circuit court. View "Catawba Indian Nation v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

Appellant Dorris Green, representing his child who was injured while a passenger in his mother's automobile, contended that as a matter of public policy the courts of South Carolina should refuse to recognize the validity of a family member exclusion in a Florida car insurance policy. Further, he contended that the circuit court erred in finding there was no uninsured motorist coverage for his minor child under his Florida policy. The Supreme Court agreed with the circuit court that enforcement of this exclusion, valid under Florida law, did not offend South Carolina public policy, and that there was no underinsured coverage for father's minor child under the father's policy. The Court therefore affirmed the grant of summary judgment to the insurance company. View "Green v. USAA" on Justia Law

In an expedited appeal, Michelle G. challenged the termination of her parental rights to two of her three sons. The family court terminated her rights as to two, and denied the mother's motion to dismiss on grounds that section 63-7-2570(1) was unconstitutionally vague. On appeal, the mother argued that the TPR statute violated the Fourteenth Amendment and was void for vagueness. After review of the facts of this case, the Supreme Court found no reversible error, and affirmed the family court's termination decision. View "SCDSS v. Michelle G." on Justia Law

Appellant Cynthia Holmes, MD was previously a member of the consulting medical staff of the Respondent East Cooper Community Hospital, Inc. During the relevant time period, Appellant was a member of the Hospital's medical consulting staff, appointed in two-year increments. In October 2006, she submitted a reappointment application seeking advancement in medical staff category and clinical privileges to perform surgery. The Hospital's credentialing committee found Appellant unqualified for the level of privileges she requested. Appellant received administrative review of this decision, and was ultimately reappointed as consulting medical staff for another two-year term. In October 2008, Appellant submitted another reappointment application requesting advancement. This time, the Hospital determined that Appellant's application was incomplete and requested she voluntarily resign from the medical staff without appellate rights under the medical staff bylaws. This appeal stemmed from the Hospital's privileging decisions. Respondent successfully moved summary judgment on several grounds, including that the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to review the medical staff privileging decisions of a private hospital. Thereafter, Respondent filed a motion for sanctions under the Frivolous Civil Proceedings Sanctions Act (FCPSA), arguing, inter alia, that the circuit court should sanction Appellant for "seeking adjudication of claims over which this Court does not have jurisdiction" and "raising issues which have been previously adjudicated against [Appellant] and in [Respondents'] favor." Appellant appealed the sanctions order, arguing the circuit court erred in awarding sanctions against her, and challenging the Act's constitutionality. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's decisions. View "Holmes v. East Cooper Community Hospital" on Justia Law

The circuit court granted petitioner Joseph Walker's request for post-conviction relief on the ground that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance for failing to investigate a potential alibi witness. The court of appeals reversed, holding that while trial counsel's representation was deficient, petitioner was not prejudiced by it. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court disagreed with the appellate court and reversed its holding. View "Walker v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

Petitioner Beulah Butler appealed the court of appeals' decision to affirm her convictions for voluntary manslaughter and possession of a firearm or a knife during the commission of a violent crime. She claimed appellate court erred in affirming the denial of her motion for a directed verdict on self-defense. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "South Carolina v. Butler" on Justia Law