Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant Greg Issac appealed a trial court ruling that denied his request for a hearing to determine whether he was immune from prosecution under the Protection of Persons and Property Act. Appellant was indicted for murder, first degree burglary, attempted armed robbery and criminal conspiracy. Appellant contended that he was not afforded a hearing on his immunity issue. The trial court determined the Act did not apply to this case as a matter of law, specifically, that the intent of the Act was not to protect intruders and afford immunity to them or those who might enter the dwelling of another to commit a criminal act. Appellant argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that the trial court's order was immediately appealable. The Supreme Court disagreed and dismissed Appellant's appeal. View "South Carolina v. Isaac" on Justia Law

The contract between the general contractor and subcontractor provided for arbitration pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act. When a complaint was filed, the general contractor Appellant Sean Barnes and property owner Appellant Wando E. sought to enforce the construction contract's arbitration clause. The trial court refused to compel arbitration on the basis that the contract did not sufficiently impact interstate commerce. Upon review, the Supreme Court found the trial court erred in finding the parties' transaction had an insufficient nexus to interstate commerce and reversed. View "Cape Romain v. Wando E., LLC" on Justia Law

Five questions of South Carolina law were certified to the State Supreme Court by the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina: (1) when a plaintiff seeks recovery for a temporary trespass or nuisance, are the damages limited to the lost rental value of the property?; (2) does South Carolina law recognize a cause of action for trespass solely from invisible odors rather than a physical invasion such as dust or water?; (3) is the maximum amount of compensatory damages a plaintiff can receive in any trespass or nuisance action (temporary or permanent) the full market value of the plaintiffs' property where no claim for restoration or cleanup costs has been alleged?; (4) when a plaintiff contends that offensive odors have migrated from a neighbor's property onto the plaintiff's property, may the plaintiff maintain an independent cause of action for negligence or is the plaintiff limited to remedies under trespass and nuisance?; and (5) if an independent cause of action for negligence exists under South Carolina law when a plaintiff contends that offensive odors have migrated from a neighbor's property onto the plaintiff's property, does the standard of care for a landfill operator and breach thereof need to be established through expert testimony? The South Carolina Supreme Court answered: (1) damages recoverable for a temporary trespass or nuisance claim are limited to the lost rental value of the property; (2) a trespass exists only when an intrusion is made by a physical, tangible thing; (3) the damages recoverable for a permanent trespass or nuisance claim are limited to the full market value of the property; (4) a negligence claim based on offensive odors is possible, but that such a claim would have to satisfy all the elements of negligence like any other negligence claim; and (5) the Court was unable to make a definitive determination as to whether establishing the standard of care of a landfill operator in regards to offensive odors required expert testimony, but offered guidelines for making such a determination. View "Babb v. Lee County Landfill" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review a Court of Appeals opinion that affirmed the convictions and sentence of Karriem Provet for trafficking cocaine and resisting arrest. Petitioner argued the Court of Appeals erred when it affirmed the trial court's determination that reasonable suspicion existed to justify extension of a traffic stop and that petitioner voluntarily consented to the search of his vehicle. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "South Carolina v. Provet" on Justia Law

Clarence Logan appealed his conviction of attempted criminal sexual misconduct in the first degree. He argued that the trial court erred in providing the circumstantial evidence charge the Supreme Court articulated in "South Carolina v. Grippon" (489 S.E.2d 462 (1997)). The question, the Supreme Court observed, was not whether the circumstantial evidence carried the same probative weight as direct evidence in this case (concluding that it did), but the proper means for evaluating the evidence and how to instruct the jury as to the jury's analytical responsibility. "Trial courts should not be constrained from providing a jury charge encompassing the determinations critical for analyzing circumstantial evidence as it appears in some cases. Additionally, defendants should not be restricted from requesting a jury charge that reflects the requisite connection of collateral facts necessary for a conviction." Thus, the Court articulated language to be used by trial courts pertaining to circumstantial evidence, in addition to a proper reasonable doubt instruction, when so requested by a defendant. View "South Carolina v. Logan" on Justia Law

Respondent Sue Taylor Colson Widenhouse sued Appellant Tammy Batson Colson in North Carolina state court for alienation of affections and criminal conversation. Respondent received a judgment for $266,000 plus interest and costs. Respondent filed notice of foreign judgment with the Greenville County clerk of court. South Carolina does not recognize alienation of affection or criminal conversation. Appellant moved for relief, arguing that respondent's judgment was not entitled to full faith and credit because the causes of action were contrary to South Carolina public policy. Respondent moved to enforce the foreign judgment. The circuit court denied appellant's motion and granted respondent's motion. Finding that the judgment was entitled to full faith and credit in South Carolina, the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's decision. View "Widenhouse v. Colson" on Justia Law

The South Carolina Association of School Administrators (SCASA) is a non-profit corporation. In 2009, Rocky Disabato sent SCASA a request for information pursuant to the FOIA. The Executive Director of SCASA refused the request, asserting that SCASA is not a public entity subject to the FOIA. Disabato thereafter filed a complaint seeking a declaration that SCASA violated the FOIA by refusing to comply with his request as well as an injunction requiring SCASA to comply with the FOIA. SCASA moved to dismiss, arguing that as a non-profit engaged in political advocacy, the FOIA unconstitutionally infringed on its free speech rights. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court held that the FOIA did not violate SCASA's rights and reversed the circuit court's order granting its motion to dismiss. View "Disabato v. SCASA" on Justia Law

Defendant-Applicant Gregory McHam appealed the denial of his application for post-conviction relief. He contended that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel because counsel failed to renew a motion to suppress drug evidence. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the PCR judge erred in finding defendant's trial counsel was not deficient, but that counsel's failure to renew the objection to drug evidence was not deficient performance such that defendant's constitutional rights were violated. However, the Court agreed with the PCR judge's ultimate findings that defendant did not establish prejudice and did not prove his claim for ineffective assistance of counsel as his Fourth Amendment claim failed on its merits. Consequently, the decision of the PCR judge was affirmed as modified. View "McHam v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

In 1999 and 2001, Respondent John Hollman went to Appellants TLC Laser Eye Centers, LLC and the TLC Laser Center (the Centers) for a series of eye surgeries. In the several years following the surgeries, respondent's vision deteriorated. He sued the Centers' doctors and the Centers themselves alleging medical malpractice. Respondent's wife sued for loss of consortium. Respondents requested a patient database the Centers maintained through the discovery process. The Centers resisted, but was eventually ordered to produce the database under a protective order. While this case was still pending, respondents joined a class action against appellants. Before the database was produced, the parties entered into a settlement agreement in which they settled all their personal state and federal claims. The Centers were subsequently dismissed from the litigation. Respondents' claims against the doctors continued. As a result of the settlement, respondents withdrew as lead plaintiffs in the class action, and a new plaintiff took their place. The class action plaintiff requested the database. Appellants filed a notice of motion and motion for rule to show cause, motion to modify the protective order, and motion for sanctions in the class action although they were no longer parties in that action. The class action court issued an order denying the motion. Appellants moved for reconsideration. Respondents then settled their individual claims against the remaining state court defendants. Appellants moved the court to order respondents' counsel to prepare an order denying appellants' Rule 59(e) motion or, in the alternative, that the court prepare such an order. The trial court held a hearing on the motion denied it in part and granted it in part. It denied appellants' motion for reconsideration, finding it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over appellants' request as a result of the dismissal of the case. Notwithstanding this finding, it also held that settlement and dismissal of the case operated as a final adjudication, barring further litigation of pre-settlement violations of the protective order. It held appellants waived their right to a written order denying the Rule 59(e) motion by failing to respond to respondents' counsel's letter advising of the impending dismissal of the case without an order on appellants' Rule 59(e) motion. With respect to the protective order, the court held it retained jurisdiction to hear appellants' request for return of the database and granted their motion for its return. Upon direct appeal to the Supreme Court, the issue was the denial of a motion for entry of a ruling on a motion for reconsideration and the motion for rule to show cause, for sanctions, and for modification of a protective order. The Court concluded that the trial court erred when it held it lacked jurisdiction to enter an order ruling on appellants' motion for reconsideration after the action had been dismissed when a protective order governed disclosure of certain materials discovered in that action. View "TLC Laser Eye Centers v. Woolfson" on Justia Law

Appellant Thalma Barton appealed an Administrative Law Court's order that affirmed the South Carolina Department of Probation, Parole and Pardon Services' (DPPPS) decision to deny her parole. Although two-thirds of the members of the Parole Board voted in favor, the Board ultimately denied parole, citing the seriousness of Appellant's offense. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Administrative Law Court erred in interpreting the two-thirds provision requiring Appellant to obtain five Parole Board votes instead of four, and that retroactive application of that provision constituted an ex post facto violation. Because Appellant received the necessary number of votes, she should have been granted parole. The Court therefore reversed the Administrative Law Court's decision. View "Barton v. SCDPPP" on Justia Law