Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court held that the failure to complete a mediation conference in a timely manner does not divest a trial court of jurisdiction, and dismissal is not mandated. South Carolina Code 15-79-125 requires a pre-suit mediation process for medical malpractice claims, and that the conference be completed within a 120-day period, which may be extended. The issue before the Court centered on whether the failure to complete the mediation conference in a timely manner divested the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction and required dismissal. The contrary decision of the trial court was reversed and the case remanded for the pre-suit mediation process to be completed. View "Ross v. Waccamaw Community Hospital" on Justia Law

Lawton Limehouse, Sr. ("Father") and Lawton Limehouse, Jr. ("Son") each sued attorney Paul Hulsey, and his law practice (collectively, "Hulsey") for defamation arising out of statements Hulsey made about L&L Services, LLC ("L&L"), a staffing agency they owned. Local newspapers published articles concerning housing raids performed on homes rented by L&L and fines assessed for overcrowding, inadequate heating and plumbing, and running illegal boarding houses. Hulsey filed a class action lawsuit in federal court on behalf of former employees of L&L, alleging violations of the RICO Act and other state and federal laws. One article quoted Hulsey as stating that L&L engaged in a "classic racketeering scheme . . . just like Tony Soprano." Neither Father nor Son was mentioned by name in the article. The case was moved to federal court based on the RICO claim; the federal court remanded the case back to the state court on the ground it lacked federal question jurisdiction over the issues presented. After the remand, the state court clerk of court entered a default against Hulsey. Following a damages hearing, a jury awarded Father $2.39 million in actual damages and $5 million in punitive damages. While the appeal in Father's case was pending, a damages hearing was held for Son's case. A jury awarded Son $1 million in actual damages and $2.6 million in punitive damages. Hulsey appealed both judgments. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court found that the state court proceedings were void as the lack of a certified remand order precluded the state court from resuming jurisdiction over the cases. The cases were remanded back to the circuit court to start over from the procedural point at which the state court received a certified remand order from the federal court. View "Limehouse v. Hulsey" on Justia Law

Petitioner Robert Taylor appealed the post-conviction relief court's denial of relief on the grounds that he did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel though his plea counsel failed to advise him of the consequences of a guilty plea. He also argued that counsel failed to fully investigate one of the charges prior to his plea. Finding that Petitioner did not demonstrate he was prejudiced by his counsel's alleged ineffectiveness, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Taylor v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

In 2001, Petitioner James Miller pled guilty to committing a lewd act on a child under sixteen, and criminal domestic violence of a high and aggravated nature. He was sentenced for the lewd act to fifteen years in prison, suspended upon ten years of service and five years' probation. Petitioner was also to undergo counseling and have no contact with children while on probation. Probation began in 2005; however Petitioner was not immediately released, but referred for review as to whether he should be deemed a sexually violent predator (SVP) and subjected to civil commitment. The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court was the question of whether Petitioner's probation for a criminal offense should have been tolled during his civil commitment as a SVP. The lower courts affirmed the tolling, but the Supreme Court disagreed and reversed. View "South Carolina v. Miller" on Justia Law

Appellant John Rainey sued the Honorable Nikki Haley, Goveror of South Carolina, seeking a declaration that the Governor violated the State Ethics Act when she was a member of the House of Representatives. The circuit court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction, finding the House Ethics Committee had exclusive jurisdiction to hear ethics complaints against its members. The Supreme Court agreed and affirmed. View "Rainey v. Haley" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Edward Sloan and the South Carolina Public Interest Foundation filed suit in the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction for a determination of whether the South Carolina Transportation Infrastructure Bank was constitutional. Plaintiffs alleged the Bank violated both the dual office holding and the separation of powers prohibitions of the South Carolina Constitution. Finding the statute at issue here (11-43-140, So. Car. Code (2011)) was constitutional, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Bank. View "SC Public Interest Foundation v. SC Transportation Infrastructure Bank" on Justia Law

Suits were filed in Alabama and South Carolina in this divorce case. In 2007, the husband filed for divorce in Alabama, alleging he was a resident of Alabama, and his wife was a resident of South Carolina. Wife accepted service of the complaint, but approximately one month later, sued in South Carolina effectively responding point for point to the husband's Alabama case. After the wife's attempts to serve her husband failed, she was permitted to serve her husband by publication in Alabama. The husband never responded to her pleading. An Alabama attorney filed a limited notice of appearance on the wife's behalf in Alabama, challenging jurisdiction and moving the court to dismiss the husband's complaint. The Alabama court denied the wife's motion and set the matter for trial. Meanwhile, in South Carolina, the court awarded the wife alimony and divided the marital property. The South Carolina court found it had jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter jurisdiction over the division of property, noting the husband's Alabama attorney sought to have the South Carolina action dismissed, but was not admitted pro hac vice in South Carolina, and therefore did not respond to husband's motion. A hearing was held in Alabama; wife's counsel had withdrawn and was not replaced. The Alabama court found it had jurisdiction over the parties and their property, declared the South Carolina judgment null and void, and divided the parties' marital property. With his Alabama judgment, the husband filed a Rule 60(b) motion in South Carolina to have wife's judgment vacated. Upon review, the South Carolina Supreme Court concluded: the Alabama court's grant of divorce should be given full faith and credit; the wife was not entitled to bring her South Carolina action for division of property or attorney's fees; by making a limited appearance in Alabama, wife was bound by Alabama law, and abandoned her opportunity to contest personal jurisdiction there. Since Alabama would have given its order res judicata effect, it was entitled to full faith and credit. Therefore, the husband's Rule 60(b) motion the South Carolina orders should have been granted. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Ware v. Ware" on Justia Law

Edward William Hunt (Father) appealed a jury verdict in favor of Don Gause which found him liable under the family purpose doctrine for damages caused by the negligence of his son Edward Raymond Hunt. Gause, a police officer for the City of Conway, was on duty when he responded to a call from a highway patrolman who had pulled over a Firebird driven by Son on suspicion of drunk driving. Instead of pulling off the highway into the emergency lane, Son stopped in the left lane of traffic on the four lane highway, and the patrolman stopped behind him with his lights flashing. When Gause arrived, he parked behind the patrolman, who subsequently left the scene, and also activated his blue lights. A second policeman also responded and eventually took Son into custody, leaving only Gause and the abandoned vehicle. Gause was filling out paperwork in his car and waiting for the tow truck to move the Firebird when a pickup truck driven by Nathan Smithers rear-ended him, propelling his cruiser into the Firebird. Gause sued Smithers and Father (assuming Father was the driver of the Firebird because it was registered in his name) for his injuries. Father moved to dismiss on the basis that Son, and not he, had been driving the Firebird that night. Realizing the mistake, Gause filed an amended complaint substituting Son as the defendant for the negligence claim and changing the claims against Father to negligent entrustment and liability under the family purpose doctrine. Son moved to be dismissed as a party because the amendment occurred after the statute of limitations had run, and the circuit court granted the motion, holding the amended complaint did not relate back under Rule 15(c), SCRCP. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Father argued he could not be found liable under the family purpose doctrine; Son's actions were not a proximate cause of Gause's injuries; he should have been granted a new trial due to prejudicial statements and a defective verdict form; and the punitive damages award should have been overturned as impermissible under the family purpose doctrine. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's award of punitive damages, but affirmed the trial court in all other respects. View "Gause v. Smithers" on Justia Law

In 1988, Respondents the Barnwell County Council passed an ordinance creating the Board of Trustees for the Barnwell County Hospital. The ordinance stated the Board was created "for the purposes of operating and maintaining adequate hospital facilities for the residents of Barnwell County[,]" and delineated the powers and duties of the Board. The ordinance also described the composition of the Board, set term limits, and provided members annual compensation. Over the years, the Council has passed various ordinances related to the Board. Appellants, former Board members, alleged that in 2009, during their time of service on the Board, the Council was developing a strategy in conjunction with Bamberg and Allendale Counties to close the respective county hospitals and create one hospital for all three counties. Appellants asserted the Council embarked upon various detrimental actions against the Hospital in connection with the strategy and maintain these actions financially crippled the Hospital. According to Appellants, when they resisted the Council's plan, which included the Hospital filing for bankruptcy, the Council voted to remove Appellants from the Board and appointed themselves as Board members. The Council, in their new, self-appointed status as Board members, placed the Hospital in bankruptcy. Appellants filed suit seeking a declaration that the Council violated the constitutional prohibition against dual office holding when it assumed positions as Board members. In response, the Council filed a motion to dismiss, arguing the claim presented a non-justiciable political question, and the dual office prohibition was not violated by what it termed a "vertical" duality. They cited no authority to support this unique theory. The circuit court granted the Council's motion to dismiss, finding the issue was a non-justiciable political question. Nevertheless, the circuit court addressed and rejected the dual office holding challenge. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the circuit court erred in granting the motion to dismiss Appellants' declaratory judgment action, and reversed and remanded. View "Alexander v. Houston" on Justia Law

This matter began as a contested case in the administrative law court (ALC) brought by Amisub of South Carolina, Inc., (d/b/a Piedmont Medical Center (Piedmont)). The dispute arose out of Piedmont's contention that an urgent care center operated by a competitor, Carolinas Physicians Network, Inc. (CPN), was required to have a Certificate of Need (CON) or a Non-Applicability Determination (NAD) from the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (DHEC). The ALC granted summary judgment to CHS and CPN on the basis the urgent care center was a licensed private physician's office and, thus, exempt from CON review as a matter of law. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding summary judgment was premature, and remanded to allow Piedmont the opportunity to conduct discovery. The Court of Appeals rejected DHEC's argument that the ALC did not have subject matter jurisdiction in this case because the agency had issued no staff decision subject to a contested case hearing. The Supreme Court granted DHEC's petition for a writ of certiorari as to the issue of jurisdiction and reversed. The Court concluded the Court of Appeals erred in finding Piedmont has established the existence of a staff decision by DHEC that was properly the subject of a contested case hearing and in remanding the matter for discovery and further proceedings. View "Amisub of South Carolina, Inc. v. SCDHEC" on Justia Law