Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court in this case centered on the interplay between the Subcontractors' and Suppliers' Payment Protection Act (SPPA), the Tort Claims Act (TCA), and the Court's opinion in "Sloan Construction Co. v. Southco Grassing, Inc. (Sloan I)," (659 S.E.2d 158 (2008)). When subcontractors Shirley's Iron Works, Inc. and Tindall Corporation (collectively Respondents) did not receive full payment from the general contractor Gilbert Group, LLC for their work on a public construction project for the City of Union, they filed suit, asserting the City failed to comply with the statutory bond requirements pertaining to contractors working with subcontractors on public projects found in the SPPA. The circuit court granted summary judgment to the City. The court of appeals reversed and remanded. The Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to review the court of appeals decision, and affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. Furthermore, the Court clarified "Sloan I" and held that a governmental entity may be liable to a subcontractor only for breach of contract for failing to comply with the SPPA bonding requirements. View "Shirley's Iron Works v. City of Union" on Justia Law

This case was one of two heard by the Court that presented the question of whether a pre-breath test videotape recording was required upon an arrest for driving under the influence (DUI) if the arrestee refused the breath test. At both trials, the trial court dismissed the DUI charges, finding that the arresting officers did not comply with section 56-5-2953(A)(2)(d) of the South Carolina Code by failing to videotape a twenty-minute pre-test waiting period. The same panel of the court of appeals affirmed defendant Ryan Hercheck's dismissal, but reversed defendant Justin Elwell's dismissal seven months later. Elwell appealed the reversal of the dismissal in his case, and the State appealed the dismissal of Hercheck's case. With respect to Elwell's case, the Supreme Court affirmed. The State argued that section 56-5-2953(A)(2)(d) does not require a law enforcement officer to videotape the entire twenty-minute pre-test waiting period once the arrestee refuses a breath test. Elwell argued that his case was simple, in that the videotape was produced, it was incomplete and therefore the statute was violated. Moreover, Elwell interpreted the statute's repeated reference to "conduct" to mean that the State was required to videotape all conduct, not just pre-test conduct, for the full twenty minutes. Here the Court disagreed and concluded that the court of appeals correctly and reasonably interpreted the applicable statute, concluding that only when the waiting period is required can the videotape recording also be required. On the other hand, if no test is administered, then the waiting period is rendered unnecessary, and so then is the videotape recording of that waiting period. View "South Carolina v. Elwell" on Justia Law

Appellant Jennifer Dykes appealed a circuit court's order requiring that she be subject to satellite monitoring for the rest of her life pursuant to sections 23-3-540(C) and (H) of the South Carolina Code of Laws (Supp. 2011). When she was twenty-six years old, Appellant was indicted for lewd act on a minor in violation of Section 16-15-140 of the South Carolina Code (2006) as a result of her sexual relationship with a fourteen-year-old female. Appellant pled guilty and was sentenced to fifteen years' imprisonment, suspended upon the service of three years and five years' probation. Upon her release, Appellant was notified verbally and in writing that pursuant to section 23-3-540(C) she would be placed on satellite monitoring if she were to violate the terms of her probation. Shortly thereafter, Appellant violated her probation. She did not contest any of these violations, though she did offer testimony in mitigation. At her probation revocation hearing, Appellant objected to the constitutionality of mandatory lifetime monitoring. In support of her arguments, Appellant presented expert testimony that she posed a low risk of reoffending and that one's risk of reoffending cannot be determined solely by the offense committed. The State offered no evidence, relying instead on the mandatory, nondiscretionary requirement of the statute. The circuit court found Appellant to be in willful violation of her probation and that she had notice of the potential for satellite monitoring. The court denied Appellant's constitutional challenges and found it was statutorily mandated to impose satellite monitoring without making any findings as to her likelihood of reoffending. The court also revoked Appellant's probation for two years, but it ordered that her probation be terminated upon release. This appeal followed. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Appellant asserted that she had a fundamental right to be "let alone." The Supreme Court disagreed, and affirmed the circuit court. View "South Carolina v. Dykes" on Justia Law

Palmetto Hardwood, Inc., employed Petitioner Clifton Sparks as a saw operator. Petitioner suffered three work-related injuries during this employment, the first two of which injured Petitioner's lower back. In the third incident, Petitioner was required to remove a piece of metal from under a gang saw. In the process, the metal exploded and a three- to four-inch cubic piece struck him in the head. Petitioner subsequently sought workers' compensation for his injuries. At the hearing, Petitioner testified to substantial head pain, loss of cognitive ability, and other brain-function-related symptoms, including inability to read without severe headache, loss of his mathematical abilities, inability to balance while standing or to walk without a cane, hand tremors, anxiety, and more. Petitioner argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that the Court of Appeals erred when it applied an improper definition of "physical brain damage" within the meaning of section 42-9-10(C). The Supreme Court disagreed. Because "physical brain damage" as contemplated in S.C. Code Ann. 42-9-10 required "severe and permanent physical brain damage as a result of a compensable injury" and the Workers' Compensation Commission's finding that Petitioner did not suffer such brain damage was supported by substantial evidence in the record, the Court affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "Sparks v. Palmetto Hardwood" on Justia Law

Defendant Myron Samuels was romantically involved with two women, Patricia Speaks and Carla Daniels, among others, but told each woman he was involved with her alone. Eventually, Speaks and Daniels learned of the other's relationship with Samuels. Daniels traveled to Speaks' home in Columbia, suspecting Samuels was there and wanting to confront him. Samuels was there, and after Daniels entered the home, she and Speaks began to discuss their situation. Speaks informed Daniels that Samuels was romantically involved with two additional women and that she had copied their telephone numbers from his phone. They then decided to call the other women in Samuels' presence, presumably to tell the others of "the health dangers inherent in Samuels' duplicity." While Daniels was speaking to one of the other women on the phone, she felt something touch her forehead. She looked up to see Samuels holding the barrel of Speaks' pistol against her forehead. Speaks began screaming, and Samuels then turned to her and threatened her with the gun. Samuels then fled from the home, and when Speaks ran after him to retrieve her pistol, Samuels hit her, knocking her to the ground. The women then called the police. Samuels was indicted for one count of assault with intent to kill. He challenged his conviction and sentence on the grounds the indictment was duplicitous. Because of the distinct risks created by duplicitous indictments, the Supreme Court held that an indictment is defective and entitles a defendant to relief if it is duplicitous, providing it results in prejudice to the defendant. Although the Court agreed the indictment was duplicitous, the Court found that Samuels was not prejudiced and accordingly affirmed his conviction and sentence. View "South Carolina v. Samuels" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to review the denial of petitioner Clarence Gibbs's second application for post-conviction relief (PCR). After being convicted by a jury of kidnapping, armed robbery, and possession of a deadly weapon during the commission of a violent crime, and unsuccessfully pursuing a direct appeal, Petitioner sought PCR on two grounds: (1) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to contemporaneously object to the introduction of a lineup, a show-up, and in-court identifications; and (2) trial counsel was ineffective in failing to request a jury instruction on the law of alibi as part of the defense strategy. Finding that the trial court record did not support petitioner's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Gibbs v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

In an original jurisdiction action, Petitioner alleged that the sheer number of exemptions to and caps on South Carolina's sales and use tax removed any rational relationship they have to the underlying tax itself. He therefore requested that the Supreme Court strike down all of the exemptions and caps as being unconstitutional, leaving behind only the imposition of the tax. In particular, Petitioner contended that the entire exemption and cap scheme violated the State constitution's equal protection guarantee and prohibition against special legislation. The Court disagreed, finding that Petitioner did not meet his burden of proof. "We emphasize that our holding rests solely on the fact that [Petitioner's] challenge is to the number of caps and exemptions and not whether individual ones would withstand constitutional scrutiny. Thus, nothing in our opinion today should be construed as precluding a challenge based on the content of individual caps and exemptions at a later date." View "Bodman v. SCDOR" on Justia Law

In March of 2007, Mother gave birth to Child. Five months later, the Pickens County Department of Social Services (DSS) received a report of neglect from a sheriff's deputy. Three families (six adults and eleven children) resided in Child's home, trash was overflowing, moldy dishes and food were strewn about, Mother and Father admitted to using cocaine, and Child had a visibly flat head which Mother explained resulted from her being left in a car seat for extended periods. Mother also admitted that Child had received her immunizations from the health department, but had not seen a doctor since birth. DSS filed a complaint for removal of Child and her older half-sister (Sister) due to abuse and neglect. The following day, Child tested positive for cocaine. Child and Sister were removed from the home and placed in emergency protective custody. A week later, Child was placed with the Appellants the Brooms for foster care. Following a hearing, the family court found probable cause for removal of Child based on the positive drug test and Mother's admission of substance abuse. The court also gave legal custody of Child to DSS and directed the appointment of counsel for Mother. At some point thereafter an attorney was appointed to represent Mother. "This would [have been] a straightforward appeal in a termination of parental rights action but for the fact that the mother whose rights were terminated was erroneously denied counsel." Because, after its review, the Supreme Court held that the Mother was not prejudiced by the error, the grounds for termination were established by clear and convincing evidence, and termination was in the child's best interest. Accordingly, the Court affirmed. View "Broom v. Derrick" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the court of appeals decision affirming the circuit court's order that upheld an arbitration award. The underlying dispute arose from a construction contract whereby general contractor respondent C-Sculptures, LLC agreed to build a home for Petitioners Gregory and Kerry Brown. The contract price was in excess of $800,000. However, Respondent only possessed what is referred to as a Group II license, limiting Respondent to construction projects that did not exceed $100,000. A dispute arose between the parties, and Respondent filed an action in circuit court seeking to enforce a mechanic's lien against Petitioners. Upon Petitioners' motion and pursuant to an arbitration clause in the parties' contract, the circuit court matter was stayed pending arbitration. Petitioners sought to have the matter dismissed after they learned Respondent held only a Group II license. The arbitrator was apprised of the applicable law, but nevertheless denied Petitioners' motion to dismiss "after due consideration of all the evidence and authorities presented by the parties in this Arbitration." Respondent prevailed at arbitration, receiving an award of damages and an award of attorney's fees as the prevailing party pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. section 29-5-10(b) (Supp. 2012). Petitioners challenged the arbitration award, contending the arbitrator's denial of their motion to dismiss amounted to a manifest disregard of the law. Following adverse decisions in the circuit court and the court of appeals, the Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari. Petitioners argue the court of appeals erred in refusing to find the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law in declining to dismiss the action. Upon review, the Court agreed, and reversed the appellate court and directed that judgment be entered for Petitioners. View "C-Sculptures v. Brown" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court was presented with policy dispute: whose policy choice concerning health insurance premiums for State employees controlled, the General Assembly's or the Budget and Control Board's? The Court found that under the South Carolina Constitution, the General Assembly had and exercised the power to determine the contribution rates of enrollees for the State's health insurance plan in 2013. The Court hold the Budget and Control Board violated the separation of powers provision by substituting its own policy for that of the General Assembly, entered judgment for the petitioners, and directed the Board to use the appropriated funds for premium increases and return the premium increases previously collected from enrollees. View "Hampton v. Haley" on Justia Law