Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A jury convicted Brad Keith Sigmon of two counts of murder and burglary in the first degree, and it subsequently sentenced him to death. His convictions and sentences were affirmed on direct appeal. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the circuit court's dismissal of Sigmon's application for post-conviction relief (PCR). Sigmon contended he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Sigmon did not present evidence that trial counsel was deficient. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the PCR court's dismissal of Sigmon's application for post-conviction relief. View "Sigmon v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

Appellant John Herndon appealed a circuit court's order imposing lifetime sex offender registration for his failure to complete sex abuse counseling required by the terms of his probation. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed: "[t]he Record demonstrate[d] that Appellant maintained his innocence, but made a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent Alford plea to conclude the proceedings and place the matter behind him. Appellant simply failed to satisfy a condition of his probation, and the circuit court properly ordered him to register as sex offender for life as would have been appropriate for a defendant sentenced pursuant to a standard guilty plea. . . . the defendant entering an Alford plea is still treated as guilty for the purposes of punishment, and simply put, is not owed anything merely because the State and the court have agreed to deviate from the standard guilty plea." Appellant received notice that he would need to admit guilt through his participation in the program, and the circuit court re-ordered Appellant to complete the counseling prior to the probation revocation. However, Appellant failed to comply. View "South Carolina v. Herndon" on Justia Law

In this declaratory judgment action, the Tourism Expenditure Review Committee (TERC) appealed a circuit court's declaration of the meaning of section 6-4-10 of the South Carolina Code. At issue was the South Carolina Accommodations Tax Act (Act), which sets forth the administration of the state sales tax of seven percent imposed on all sleeping accommodations provided to overnight guests. That tax is composed of several components, including a two percent "local accommodations tax" (A-Tax), remitted to the counties and municipalities where it was collected. Counties and municipalities receiving A-Tax revenues must expend those funds in accordance with the statutory provisions governing the allocation of A-Tax revenues. Section 6-4-10 provides for the expenditure of A-Tax funds generally referred to as "65% Funds." These funds are allocated for "tourism-related expenditures." The legislature granted TERC the authority to challenge a local government's expenditure of 65% Funds. Over the years, the City of Myrtle Beach and TERC have occasionally disputed the meaning of various provisions of section 6-4-10. No particular expenditure or allocation was at issue here, nor were any A-Tax revenues being held by the State Treasurer in connection with this appeal. The City first filed an action in the Administrative Law Court, which granted TERC's motion to dismiss the matter for lack of jurisdiction. TERC then filed this action in circuit court as a declaratory judgment action seeking to have section 6-4-10 construed. The City did not challenge the jurisdiction of the circuit court. The circuit court adopted the City's view of section 6-4-10, from which TERC has appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, "since the parties cannot by consent or agreement confer jurisdiction on the court to render a declaratory judgment in the absence of an actual justiciable controversy." The Court vacated the circuit court's order for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Tourism Expenditure Review Committee v. City of Myrtle Beach" on Justia Law

"At its most basic level, this case presents a policy dispute: whose policy choice concerning health insurance premiums for State employees controls—the General Assembly's or the Budget and Control Board's?" The issue before the Supreme Court centered on "maintaining and enforcing the constitutional and statutory framework through which such issues must be resolved. " Upon review of the arguments of the parties and the applicable case law, the Supreme Court found that the General Assembly had and exercised the power to determine the contribution rates of enrollees for the State's health insurance plan in 2013. The Court held that the Budget and Control Board violated the separation of powers provision by substituting its own policy for that of the General Assembly, entered judgment for the petitioners, and directed the Board to use the appropriated funds for premium increases and return the premium increases previously collected from enrollees. View "Hampton v. Haley" on Justia Law

In 2004, petitioner was adjudicated delinquent on charges of first degree criminal sexual conduct with a minor and disturbing the schools,1 and committed to the Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) for an indeterminate period not to exceed his twenty-first birthday. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review an unpublished decision by the Court of Appeals which held that trial court did not err in permitting a witness to give an opinion. The Court agreed with petitioner and found that the lay witness was improperly allowed to offer expert opinion testimony and that this error was not harmless. The Court therefore reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "In the Matter of Thomas S." on Justia Law

In October 2009, Appellant Serria Dawson was observed making false refunds to an accomplice while working as a cashier at Walmart. Appellant later confessed to making false refunds on multiple occasions, and with the assistance of two accomplices, defrauding Walmart of approximately $5,000. Appellant pled guilty to breach of trust with fraudulent intent (valued at more than $1,000 but less than $5,000). She was sentenced under the Youthful Offender Act to a term not to exceed six years, suspended upon five years' probation and payment of restitution. Appellant appealed, arguing the circuit court erred in denying her motion to be sentenced under the Omnibus Crime Reduction and Sentencing Reform Act of 2010, which became effective after Appellant committed the crime but before she was sentenced. Prior to the sentencing hearing, Appellant filed a motion to be sentenced pursuant to the Act, which lowered the penalties for breach of trust. The circuit court denied Appellant's motion. Finding no error in the circuit court's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "South Carolina v. Dawson" on Justia Law

Appellants owned property in North Myrtle Beach bounded by water on the west and north. In early 2007, they applied to the Department of Health and Environmental Control ("DHEC") for a critical area permit to construct a replacement bulkhead. DHEC issued a Critical Area Permit to Appellants. The permit included a special condition: "Provided the proposed bulkhead is placed in the same location as the existing bulkhead." In response to a complaint, a DHEC Enforcement and Compliance Project manager inspected Appellants' property and observed the replacement bulkhead was partially constructed in a different location along the northern property line and that fill dirt had been placed in the area between the house and new bulkhead. DHEC issued Appellants various written warnings, including a Cease and Desist Directive and a Notice of Violation and Admission Letter. However, follow-up inspections revealed Appellants continued to alter the critical area and construct the replacement bulkhead in a different, unauthorized location. Accordingly, DHEC sent Appellants a Notice of Intent to Revoke the permit. Thereafter, (in 2010) DHEC issued a separate administrative enforcement order assessing against Appellants a civil penalty of $54,0002 and requiring Appellants to restore the impacted portion of the critical area to its previous condition. However, rather than requesting a contested case before the ALC, Appellants filed an action in circuit court seeking judicial review of the Enforcement Order de novo and requesting a final order "overturning [DHEC's] [Enforcement Order] and decision dated [. . .] 2010, with prejudice[.]" The circuit court granted DHEC's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court found section 48-39-180 did not confer jurisdiction on the circuit court to review administrative enforcement orders issued by DHEC. Rather, the circuit court held such orders were administrative in nature and governed by the APA. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court agreed with the appellate court and affirmed dismissal of the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Berry v. SCDHEC" on Justia Law

Sarah W. (Mother) is the biological mother of a minor boy and a minor girl. In 2007, Mother and the children's father, Vaughn S. (Father; parents collectively, defendants), and the children resided in a home without heat, electricity, or running water. Mother arranged for her brother and sister-in-law, Thomas W. and Brittney W., to take primary responsibility for the children. The South Carolina Department of Social Services (DSS) requested that the family court issue an ex parte order granting DSS emergency protective custody of Boy. DSS alleged it had probable cause to believe that Boy faced imminent and substantial danger to his health or physical safety. The family court agreed, basing its determination on the fact that Defendants were "unable to provided[sic] even marginally suitable housing" for Boy, and finding that Thomas W. and Brittney W. "apparently abused a sibling" of Boy. The family court awarded emergency protective custody to DSS. The family court held a probable cause hearing and found sufficient probable cause to issue the ex parte order. The family court also found that Thomas W. and Brittney W. were no longer willing to maintain custody of Girl, and the court ordered DSS to take emergency protective custody of Girl. Ultimately DSS moved to terminate Mother's rights to both children; the appellate court disagreed with the trial court and reversed. Upon further review, the Supreme Court held that the trial court properly terminated Mother's parental rights, and reversed the appellate court. View "SCDSS v. Sarah W." on Justia Law

A jury convicted defendant Brad Sigmon of two counts of murder and burglary in the first degree, and it subsequently sentenced him to death. His convictions and sentences were affirmed on direct appeal. Upon review of his application for post-conviction relief (PCR), the Supreme Court found that defendant did not present evidence that he was afforded ineffective assistance of counsel. In light of this conclusion, it was not necessary for the Court to reach the second prong of prejudice in analyzing Defendant's entitlement to PCR. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the PCR court's dismissal of defendant's application for post-conviction relief. View "Sigmon v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

Petitioner Steven Barnes was convicted of throwing urine on a jailor and received a fifteen-year sentence consecutive to the sentence he was then serving. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review an unpublished Court of Appeals' decision which affirmed the trial court's decision to have a twice deadlocked jury continue to deliberate in petitioner's case. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with petitioner that the trial court's decision violated the mandate of S.C. Code Ann. 14-7-1330 (1976) and that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming his direct appeal. Accordingly, the Court reversed lower courts and remanded the case for a new trial. View "South Carolina v. Barnes" on Justia Law