Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant Creola Young appealed an order of the circuit court which upheld the Charleston County School Board's (Board) decision not to renew her employment contract, on the ground that the Board violated her procedural due process rights. Appellant taught fifth grade at E.B. Ellington Elementary School in Charleston County for six years. During Appellant's tenure there, she received multiple warnings and feedback about inappropriate conduct and poor judgment with students, and her failure to provide instruction in a satisfactory manner. In 2009, the Associate Superintendent of the Charleston County School District (District) recommended the Board not renew Appellant's teaching contract. Appellant made a timely request for a hearing before the Board concerning the recommendation. The Board delegated the hearing function to a three-member committee comprised of Board members. The Committee reported a quorum of the Board during a special telephone executive session. Appellant was not present at that meeting. At the end of the executive session, the Board reconvened in open session and voted to accept the committee's recommendation not to renew Appellant's contract by a vote of four to three. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the review undertaken by the Board of Appellant's non-renewal hearing was insufficient to satisfy due process requirements. The Court reversed the circuit court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Young v. Charleston County School District" on Justia Law

In 1969, the State sued Appellant Yelsen Land Company alleging that the State owned "all tidelands, submerged lands, and waters" adjacent to Morris Island.  Appellant answered and claimed it owned all the tidelands, submerged lands, and marshes adjacent to Morris Island. Appellant also counterclaimed for trespass on those lands by the Corps of Engineers in the form of spoilage dredged from Charleston Harbor, the digging of a ditch, and the erection of a dike. In the first appeal, the Supreme Court held that the legal questions of title to the land should be tried to a jury and that the trial judge erred in denying the State a jury trial. The jury returned a general verdict for the State, having been charged that title to tidelands, submerged lands, and all land below the high water mark on navigable streams were presumptively the State's unless the entity claiming title can show a specific grant from the sovereign that included the words "to the low water mark."  It was also charged that it was to determine title to marshlands and to return damages for appellant if it found the State had trespassed on marshland owned by appellant or if it found a taking. Following the jury verdict, Appellant moved for a judgment non obstante verdicto and a new trial, both of which the trial judge denied in a written order. In 2007, Appellant brought this suit against the State contending that the dredging spoils placed in the tidelands had created new highlands, and that as the adjacent highland owner, it was the owner of the newly “accreted” highlands as well.  The State Ports Authority (SPA) sought to intervene, but in lieu of intervention, Appellant was permitted to amend its complaint to add the SPA. A Master granted the State and the SPA summary judgment, and Appellant appealed.  The Supreme Court affirmed, finding res judicata applied to bar Appellant's attempt to relitigate title to the property. View "Yelsen Land Company v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

In 2004, Petitioner Reginald Latimore pled guilty to committing a lewd act on a child. He was released from prison in 2005, and was required to register as a sex offender by the Sex Offender Registry Act. In 2006, the General Assembly revised the sex offender registry statute to require offenders to re-register twice a year, once in their birth month and again six months later. Petitioner did not re-register before September 2006, when he was originally informed he must re-register, nor did he re-register in December 2006, as required by the amended statute. Petitioner was charged under the amended act with failing to register in December 2006. At trial, the State relied on both the forms Petitioner had executed in August 2005 requiring he register and upon the testimony of the sex offender registry coordinator that Petitioner had no contact with the office during 2006. After the State rested, Petitioner moved for a directed verdict on due process grounds because he had not received actual notice of the change in the registration statute. The trial judge denied the motion. Petitioner testified that he called the sex offender registry coordinator in February 2006 to obtain approval to move into a new house, and he was under the belief that this phone call satisfied his re-registration requirement. At the close of the defense case, Petitioner renewed his directed verdict motion, which was again denied. The court of appeals affirmed Petitioner's sentence. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider Petitioner's argument that the court of appeals erred in affirming the circuit court's denial of Petitioner's directed verdict motion, and after review, affirmed that decision as modified. View "South Carolina v. Latimore" on Justia Law

Petitioner Oseil Gomez Narciso appealed his conviction for trafficking cocaine, asserting that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to suppress drug evidence seized by police during a routine traffic stop. Following his conviction, Petitioner signed a Consent Order Granting Belated Direct Appeal and waived his right to raise any other post-conviction relief allegations. Petitioner requested the Supreme Court remand his case to determine whether that waiver was entered into knowingly and voluntarily. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's order denying Petitioner's motion to suppress, and remanded the case for a determination as to whether Petitioner's waiver was entered into knowingly and voluntarily. View "Narciso v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

Petitioner Marcus Hyman appealed the denial of his request for post-conviction relief (PCR) on the ground that his counsel was ineffective. In June 2007, a grand jury indicted Petitioner for a third offense of distributing of cocaine, and distributing cocaine within the proximity of a school or park.  He pleaded guilty to these charges, and after a colloquy with the plea judge, he relinquished various constitutional rights, including his right to a jury trial. The plea judge sentenced Petitioner to the mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen years imprisonment for the distribution charge and ten years for the proximity charge, to run concurrently.  No direct appeal was taken. However, Petitioner subsequently filed an application for PCR. Defense counsel had entered plea negotiations with the solicitor that ultimately resulted in the solicitor agreeing to reduce the distribution charge to a second offense, in exchange for Petitioner's agreement to serve five years in prison. This offer was conditioned on Petitioner's agreement not to view a videotape recording of the drug transaction that formed the basis of the charges against him. The solicitor sought to protect the identity of a confidential informant who would have been revealed to Petitioner if Petitioner watched the tape. At the evidentiary hearing, Petitioner testified he repeatedly told defense counsel that he wanted to watch the videotape, and stated that his personal review of the videotape was critical to whether he planned to accept the offer because he wanted to discern whether the videotape depicted his involvement in the drug transaction. Defense counsel testified that Petitioner stated he wanted her to watch the videotape. Consequently, defense counsel testified she watched the videotape that the videotape "clearly" depicted Petitioner engaged in a drug transaction. Defense counsel relayed these impressions to Petitioner while the five-year offer was still on the table. Petitioner testified he recognized himself as the subject of photographs made from the tapes, but testified that the images did not show him engaged in a drug transaction. Petitioner still refused to accept the solicitor's offer. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the denial of Petitioner's request for PCR. View "Hyman v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

Kristi McLeod (Mother) and Robert Starnes (Father) divorced in 1993. Mother received custody of their two minor children, and Father was required to pay child support. Despite rather sizable increases in Father's income, Mother never sought modification of his child support obligation. In August 2006, the parties' older child, Collin, reached the age of majority and enrolled as a college student. Father wholly supported his son's to attend college, and agreed to repay all of Collin's student loans upon graduation. Father took it upon himself to unilaterally decrease his weekly child support to which Mother later acquiesced in consideration of Father's assurances that he would support the son while he was in college.  However, Father did not uphold his end of the bargain, nor did he regularly pay a percentage of his bonus as promised. Mother filed suit in March 2007 seeking an award of college expenses, an increase in child support for the couple's other child, plus attorney's fees and costs.  Father counterclaimed, asking that the court terminate: (1) his child support for the eldest son because he had attained the age of majority and graduated from high school; (2) his support for the younger child upon graduation from high school; (3) and the requirement that he pay a percentage of his annual bonus as child support.  He also denied that he should be required to pay any college expenses for his oldest son.  A temporary order was filed in June 2007 that set child support for the younger child, ordered Father to contribute towards college expenses, and left intact the thirty-five percent of Father's annual bonus payable as support. The court dismissed Mother's claim for college expenses on the ground that it violated the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. Less than two years ago, the Supreme Court decided "Webb v. Sowell,"(692 S.E.2d 543 (2010)), which held that ordering a non-custodial parent to pay college expenses violated equal protection. The Court granted permission in this case to argue against that precedent so that the Court could revisit its holding in "Webb."  In his holding in this case, the Court concluded that "Webb" was wrongly decided and remanded this case for reconsideration in light of the law as it existed prior to "Webb." View "McLeod v. Starnes" on Justia Law

Appellant John Sterling, Jr. was charged with three criminal offenses: securities fraud, making false or misleading statements to the State Securities Commission, and criminal conspiracy. He was convicted of securities fraud, acquitted of making a false or misleading statement and conspiracy, and received a five-year sentence.  Appellant appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing the trial judge abused his discretion in permitting testimony from investors, in denying appellant's directed verdict motion, and that the trial court committed reversible error in charging the jury. Charges against Appellant stemmed from a business venture related to the retail mortgage lending industry. After a merger between two companies, Appellant ceased being an employee of one of the acquired companies, but remained on the Board of Directors of the newly formed entity. The new entity had financial trouble from the onset, and began moving debts and assets among the surviving entities to hide its financial difficulties. Appellant's defense was predicated in large part on the fact that the financial maneuvers that took place were approved by outside auditors. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court found no error and affirmed Appellant's conviction. View "South Carolina v. Sterling" on Justia Law

Appellant State Law Enforcement Division (SLED) appealed the circuit court order relieving Respondent Jeremy Lane Edwards from registering as a sex offender registration. In 1998, Respondent pled guilty to two counts of being a "Peeping Tom." Respondent served a probationary sentence including one hundred hours of community service. In 2004, Respondent received a pardon from the South Carolina Department of Probation, Parole, and Pardon Services (SCDPPPS). In 2009, Respondent filed petitions requesting that the circuit court issue an order mandating that he was no longer required to register as a sex offender. The Attorney General opposed the petition, and asserted that Respondent's pardon did not relieve him from the requirement that he register as a sex offender. The Attorney General argued that the amendments to the applicable statute were remedial and procedural in nature, and thus applied retroactively to Respondent's case. The circuit court disagreed, and ruled that the 2004 pardon relieved Respondent from the registration requirements of the statute, and that the 2005 and 2008 amendments did not apply retroactively. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Respondent's 2004 pardon relieved him of all consequences of his conviction. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the circuit court's order relieving Respondent of his duty to report. View "In the Matter of the Care and Treatment of Jeremy Lane Edwards" on Justia Law

Appellant Jerry Inman pled guilty to murder, first-degree burglary, first-degree criminal sexual conduct, and kidnapping of a Clemson University student. The judge sentenced Appellant to death for murder and two consecutive thirty-year sentences for first-degree burglary and first-degree criminal sexual conduct. On appeal, Appellant challenged the judge's acceptance of his guilty plea because he maintained it was conditional and that he was entitled to be sentenced by a jury despite his plea of guilty. Furthermore, Appellant contended the trial court erred in (1) refusing to recuse the Solicitor's Office from any further involvement in the case; (2) declining defense counsel's request to question the Solicitor on the issue of prosecutorial misconduct; and (3) declining to grant a mistrial despite a finding of prosecutorial misconduct. Finding that Appellant entered a valid guilty plea that was not conditioned on the preservation or outcome of the jury sentencing issue, the Supreme Court affirmed Appellant's convictions. Moreover, even if Appellant properly preserved this issue, the Court concluded Appellant abandoned it on appeal. As to the propriety of the sentencing proceedings, the Court concluded the judge did not abuse his discretion in denying Appellant's requests to recuse the Solicitor's office as advocates and to question members of the office. Although Court found the Solicitor committed prosecutorial misconduct in his treatment of Appellant's expert witness, the Court concluded that Appellant was not sufficiently prejudiced to warrant the grant of a mistrial. View "South Carolina v. Inman" on Justia Law

Petitioner Kevin Odems appealed the Court of Appeals' decision that affirmed his 2005 convictions for first degree burglary, grand larceny, criminal conspiracy, and malicious injury. The State's case against Petitioner consisted solely of circumstantial evidence. Petitioner argued on appeal the Supreme Court that the State failed to present substantial circumstantial evidence of his involvement in any of the crimes charged, and thus the circuit court should have directed a verdict on all four counts. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court agreed and reversed. View "South Carolina v. Odems" on Justia Law