Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This case returned to the South Carolina Supreme Court from the United States Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of "AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion." The underlying action originally came to the Court on appeal of the trial court's denial of Appellant Century BMW's motion to compel arbitration. The Court affirmed the trial court's denial of the motion to compel. Following that decision, Appellant filed a petition for rehearing, contending the Supreme Court's opinion was inconsistent with the federal Supreme Court's decision in "Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. Animalfeeds International Corp." which found that the federal Arbitration Act preempted South Carolina law. The South Carolina Court emphasized that its opinion was based on state law grounds, and admonished Appellant for "attempting to reframe the issues and miscast [the Court's] holding as disingenuous to the opinion and a holding [it] never made." Thereafter, Appellant petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. The South Carolina Court's opinion was vacated by the federal Supreme Court and remanded for consideration in light of its decision in "AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion." Respondents Heather Herron and several others "individually and for the benefit of all car buyers who paid 'administrative fees'" argued that the matter of preemption was not preserved in the South Carolina proceedings. The South Carolina Court agreed and therefore adhered to its initial opinion. View "Herron v. Century BMW" on Justia Law

Appellant Willard Farr owned seven gaming machines seized from a Union business. The magistrate issued an order to destroy the machines, and Appellant timely sought a post-seizure hearing in an attempt to block their destruction. Following the hearing, the magistrate affirmed the order, and Appellant appealed to the circuit court. Appellant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence presented before the magistrate concerning the State's witness and her inability to identify which of the offending machines she played. Finding that Appellant misunderstood the burden of proof at the post-seizure hearing (which rested solely on the owner to show why the machines should not have been forfeited and destroyed), the Supreme Court affirmed the magistrate's and circuit court's decisions. View "Union County Sheriff's Office v. Henderson" on Justia Law

The property which was the subject of this appeal was owned by Appellant Peggy McMaster and located in the City of Columbia in the immediate vicinity of the University of South Carolina. Pursuant to the Ordinance, only one "family" may occupy a single dwelling unit. At the time this dispute arose, the property was occupied by four unrelated individuals—Appellant Gray McGurn and three other young women, all of whom were undergraduate students at the University of South Carolina. After receiving a neighborhood complaint, the City's Zoning Administrator conducted an investigation and determined the occupants violated the Ordinance. McMaster appealed the violation notice to the City's Board of Zoning Appeals arguing the Ordinance was not violated and in the alternative, the Ordinance was unconstitutional. Following a hearing, the Board affirmed the zoning violation. Appellants appealed the Board's decision to the circuit court. The circuit court found the Ordinance's definition of "family" did not violate the Due Process Clause of the South Carolina Constitution. Following its review, the Supreme Court found the Ordinance was a valid exercise of the City's broad police power and that there was a rational relationship between the City's decision to limit the number of unrelated individuals who may live together as a single housekeeping unit and the legitimate governmental interests of controlling the undesirable qualities associated with "mass student congestion." View "McMaster v. Columbia Board of Zoning" on Justia Law

Petitioner All Things Possible, Inc. (ATP) sold an undeveloped lot to Respondents Michael and Marsha Moseley. The lot was burdened by an underground, surface-water drainage easement running diagonally across the entire length of the property, essentially cutting the lot in half. ATP, through its agents, was aware of the Moseleys' desire to build a home on the lot. According to the Moseleys, they "absolutely" relied upon the falsified plat in purchasing the lot, together with assurances from ATP related to the Moseleys' ability to build on the lot. As noted by the court of appeals, the Moseleys were induced to purchase the lot without obtaining an independent survey of the property. Conversely, the real estate contract contained standard provisions, including the right of the Moseleys to conduct a title examination and procure a survey of the lot. After purchasing the lot, the Moseleys learned of the easement and the resulting inability to build a home suited to their needs. The Moseleys sued ATP alleging multiple causes of action, including fraud. The matter was tried nonjury solely on the fraud claim. The trial court found that fraud had been established by clear and convincing evidence and awarded actual and punitive damages against ATP. The judgment against ATP was affirmed. On appeal, ATP argued that there was no clear and convincing evidence that it engaged in fraud. Furthermore, ATP argued that the alleged misrepresentation was discoverable in the chain of title, and therefore, the Moseleys' claim should have failed as a matter of law. The Supreme Court disagreed: "constructive notice is 'inapplicable especially 'where the very representations relied on induced the hearer to refrain [from] an examination of the records.'" The Court affirmed the appellate court's decision. View "Moseley v. All Things Possible" on Justia Law

Defendant Jose Lozada appealed the circuit court's order denying his petition for a declaratory judgment to be removed from the Sex Offender Registry. Defendant argued that the crime to which he pled guilty in Pennsylvania—unlawful restraint—was not a "similar offense" to the crime of kidnapping in South Carolina. He accordingly contended that he should not have been required to register as a sex offender for unlawful restraint pursuant to Section 23-3-430(A) of the South Carolina Code (2010). Upon review of the applicable legal authorities, the Supreme Court found that though "kidnapping" allowed for a greater punishment than "unlawful restraint," that fact did not prove that the offenses were not similar because kidnapping included significantly more culpable behavior. Based on the similarity in public policy behind both the Pennsylvania and South Carolina statutes and the fact that all the conduct proscribed under unlawful restraint was proscribed under the kidnapping statute, the Supreme Court found Defendant was properly required to register as a sex offender in South Carolina. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the circuit court's order. View "Lozada v. So Car. Law Enforcement Div." on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant William Dickerson of first degree murder, kidnapping, and criminal sexual conduct, for which he was sentenced to death.  On appeal to the Supreme Court, Defendant argued the circuit court erred: (1) in not excusing a juror for cause; (2) in limiting the cross-examination of the pathologist called by the State; (3) in not charging the jury on the law of accessory after the fact; and (4) in limiting the testimony of Dickerson's cousin during the penalty phase of his trial.  Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed and further found that Defendant's sentence was proportional, supported by the evidence, and not the result of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor. View "South Carolina v. Dickerson" on Justia Law

Petitioner Jason Dickey appealed a court of appeals' decision that affirmed his conviction of voluntary manslaughter.  Petitioner worked as a security guard at an apartment building when on the night of April 29, 2004, an intoxicated water balloon toss among residents turned into a heated argument. The prank so angered visitor Joshua Boot that he threatened to physically assault the person who splashed him. Boot began banging on neighbors' doors, which prompted his resident-host to go to the security desk to ask Petitioner to evict her guest.  Petitioner testified he pulled the gun to discourage Boot and another guest from attacking him. Petitioner testified he saw Boot reach under his shirt as he came towards him, and Petitioner feared he was reaching for a weapon. Without warning, Petitioner fired three shots striking Boot. Subsequently, a Richland County grand jury indicted Petitioner for murder. Petitioner's counsel twice moved for a directed verdict of acquittal on the ground that Petitioner was acting in self-defense when he shot Boot. The circuit judge denied both motions. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the State failed to disprove the elements of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt.  Even viewing the facts in a light most favorable to the State, the evidence established that Petitioner shot and killed Boot in self-defense.  Therefore, the Court reversed the court of appeals and overturned Petitioner's conviction. View "South Carolina v. Dickey" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court accepted the certified question from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina on whether the South Carolina Solid Waste Policy and Management Act, (SWPMA) preempted Horry County Ordinance 02-09 entitled "An Ordinance Regulating the County-Wide Collection and Disposal of Solid Waste Generated within Horry County and for the Prohibition of the Disposal of Solid Waste Materials in any Manner Except as Set Forth Herein; and Providing Penalties for Violation Thereof."  Plaintiffs Sandlands C&D, LLC (Sandlands) and Express Disposal Service, LLC (EDS) are related, privately-owned South Carolina companies.  Sandlands owned and operated a landfill in Marion County, approximately two miles across the Horry County border, and EDS hauls waste originating in South Carolina and North Carolina to Sandlands' landfill.  DHEC granted Sandlands a permit to accept construction and demolition (C & D) waste at the Marion County site.  Prior to the passage of Horry County Ordinance 02-09, Sandlands received C & D waste originating in Horry County and hauled by EDS, accounting for a large portion of the waste processed at its landfill. Upon review of the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court responded in the negative: the county ordinance was not preempted by the SWPMA. View "Sandlands C&D v. County of Horry" on Justia Law

Appellant Thomas Jennings was convicted of two counts of committing a lewd act upon a minor and was sentenced to fifty-five months' imprisonment for the first charge and fifteen years, suspended upon the service of fifty months and three years' probation for the second charge, with the sentences to run consecutively.  Appellant appealed his convictions, arguing the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce the written reports of a forensic interviewer.  Appellant admitted he developed a friendly relationship with the victims and that he had engaged in incidental physical contact with them from time to time.  He vehemently denied, however, touching any of them inappropriately. The forensic interviewer interviewed each of the children.  The State called her as its first witness and asked her to briefly summarize what each of the victims told her during the interviews.  Appellant objected, and the trial court sustained the objection.  The State then moved to admit the forensic interviewer's written reports into evidence.  Over Appellant's objection, the trial court allowed the written reports into evidence. Upon review, the Supreme Court found portions of the written reports constituted inadmissible hearsay as they were out-of-court statements offered to prove that appellant did in fact inappropriately touch the children in the way that they claimed. The Court also found the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce this evidence, which was not harmless: "[the] trial hinged on the children's credibility, and the written reports were cumulative to the children's testimony." Accordingly, the Court reversed appellant's convictions and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "South Carolina v. Jennings" on Justia Law

This case invoked the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction. Plaintiff Board of Trustees of the School District of Fairfield County (Board), Defendants State of South Carolina and the Legislative Delegation of Fairfield County (collectively, the State), and Defendant-Intervenors House of Representatives and the Senate (collectively, the General Assembly), jointly petitioned the Court to determine the constitutionality of Act 308 of the South Carolina Acts of 2010 (Act 308). The Board raised two challenges to the constitutionality of Act 308: (1) the Board asserted the General Assembly did not override the Governor’s veto of Act 308 in accordance with Article IV, section 21 of the South Carolina Constitution; (2) the Board asserted Act 308 is impermissible special legislation in violation of Article III, section 34 of the South Carolina Constitution. Upon review, the Supreme Court found the General Assembly did not override the Governor's veto of Act 308 in accordance with the State constitution. The Court entered judgment in favor of the Board. View "Fairfield School District v. South Carolina" on Justia Law