Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Gary DuBose Terry was sentenced to death for murder, life imprisonment for first-degree burglary, thirty years' imprisonment for first-degree criminal sexual conduct, and ten years' imprisonment for malicious injury to a telephone system. Petitioner argued in his application for post-conviction relief (PCR) that his trial counsel were ineffective in failing to argue during the hearing on the State's in limine motion that certain statements should have been introduced because of the State's misconduct and trial counsels' detrimental reliance on the State's "apparent intent" to offer those statements into evidence. Furthermore, Petitioner contended trial counsel were ineffective in failing to adjust their defense strategy in the guilt phase of trial in order to maintain credibility with the jury during sentencing. Specifically, petitioner argued trial counsel had a duty, after stating during the opening statement that petitioner "confessed," to adjust their trial strategy and not continue to pursue a reasonable doubt defense. Upon review, the Supreme Court found sufficient evidence to support the PCR court’s dismissal of Petitioner’s application, and affirmed the lower court’s decision. View "Terry v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

In response to population growth and business development along U.S. Highway 278 in Beaufort County, the South Carolina Department of Transportation ("the Department") engaged experts for the purpose of streamlining the flow of traffic on that highway. The properties on the north side of Highway 278 agreed among themselves to share the cost of modifying and/or building private roads that would allow left turn access to all of their properties by way of the new median crossover.  The properties on the south side of the highway, however, were unable to reach such an agreement.  As a result, Appellant Hilton Head Automotive's (HHA) property—which is on the south side of the highway—lost its immediate left turn access to and from Highway 278.  Nonetheless, HHA retained direct right turn access to and from the eastbound lanes of Highway 278. HHA argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that the Department's reconfiguration of the median crossovers on U.S. Highway 278 was a taking because it deprived Appellant and its customers of the ability to enter or exit the highway by making a left turn.  Upon review of the applicable legal authority and the trial court record, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the circuit court granting summary judgment in favor of the Department of Transportation. View "Hilton Head Automotive, LLC v. So. Carolina Dept. of Transportation" on Justia Law

Petitioner Roy Tennant challenged the trial court's rulings on several evidentiary issues in his trial for first degree kidnapping, and assault and battery.  In particular, Petitioner argued the trial court erred in excluding the testimony of a forensic psychologist, erred in excluding a note written by Petitioner addressed to the victim, and erred in excluding proffered statements regarding the sexual history between the victim and the defendant. Upon review of the trial court's record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's decision to uphold the trial court, finding that Petitioner's proffered evidence was irrelevant or otherwise inadmissible, and therefore, Petitioner was not prejudiced by the trial court's exclusion. View "South Carolina v. Tennant" on Justia Law

Petitioner Brian DiMarco sought a writ of certiorari to review the court of appeals' decision that affirmed, as modified, a family court's contempt order against him.  Petitioner was subject to a court order to make monthly child support payments to Cheryl DiMarco (Mother).  According to Petitioner, he had made child support payments for over ten years before Mother filed for an increase in 2006.  The family court instead decreased the support order and ordered the payments be made through the court beginning on April 1, 2008.  Petitioner asserts he timely attempted to make the first payment to the court, but the court lacked record of the order and could not accept the payment. In May 2008, the clerk of the family court filed a Rule to Show Cause because Petitioner was behind on his child support payments. The hearing was scheduled for June 25, 2008. On June 23, 2008, Petitioner paid the arrearage, bringing his child support account to a zero balance. On the morning of June 25, Petitioner did not appear on time for the Rule to Show Cause hearing. The judge issued a warrant for Petitioner's arrest.  No testimony was taken on whether or not Petitioner had failed to pay child support.  Shortly thereafter, Petitioner arrived at the courthouse.  During the hearing, everyone who spoke noted Petitioner did not owe any outstanding child support at that time. During his argument, Mother's attorney stated, "I think the court needs to very much impress upon him taking the law into his own hands and not showing up, not being here on time it's just, just it's driving everyone nuts." From the bench the judge held Petitioner in civil contempt, suspended confinement and a levied a fine. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals because the sanction ordered by the family court violated Petitioner's rights under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The court of appeals said "the family court's contempt sanction has elements of both civil and criminal contempt."  The civil element of the sanction, the court found, was that the incarceration would not be imposed unless Petitioner failed to pay the $250.00 to the court.  The criminal element was that if Petitioner failed to pay the $250.00, he would be incarcerated for a definite period of time.  To remedy the family court's unclear sanction, the court of appeals modified the order and held Petitioner must pay the $250.00 in court costs, and if he failed to do so by the deadline established, then he would be incarcerated for twelve months.  In doing so, the court of appeals crafted a sanction that violated Petitioner's Sixth Amendment rights. View "DiMarco v. DiMarco" on Justia Law

Appellant Charleston County School District (School District) appealed a circuit court's order that granted a Rule 12(b)(6) SCRCP motion to dismiss its complaint that alleged the unconstitutionality of Act. No. 189 of 2005 (Act 189), as well as its decision to dismiss the Governor as a party to this action. South Carolina adopted a charter school law in 1996, called the South Carolina Charter Schools Act.  The General Assembly amended the Charter Schools Act once in 2002 and again in 2006.  In the Charter Schools Act, the General Assembly provided rules governing all aspects of the organization, approval, and operation of charter schools in South Carolina, as well as the obligations of each sponsoring school district. The School District filed a complaint against Speaker of the House Robert Harrell, President of the Senate Andre Bauer, Governor Mark Sanford, and the State of South Carolina seeking a declaratory judgment that Act 189 was unconstitutional.  The complaint alleged that Act 189 was special legislation in violation of the South Carolina Constitution because the subject of charter schools was already comprehensively addressed by the Charter Schools Act and Act 189 only applied to Charleston County's charter schools without any reasonable basis for doing so. Though the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's dismissal of the Governor, the Court found that the School District's complaint sufficiently states a cause of action that Act 189 is unconstitutional.   The Court remanded the case back to the district court for further proceedings. View "Charleston County School District v. Harrell" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted the State's petition for a writ of certiorari to review a circuit court's order granting post-conviction relief (PCR) to Defendant Kelle Holden as to her guilty plea.  The State contended the circuit court judge erred in finding plea counsel ineffective for failing to adequately (1) discuss the charges with Holden, and (2) explaining to Defendant that she was pleading guilty without a sentence recommendation from the State. In 2005 Defendant was arrested and indicted for numerous charges stemming from her participation, along with several other co-defendants, in a series of car break-ins that occurred in Greenville County over a six-month period.  Following her arrest, Holden cooperated with law enforcement and gave a statement regarding her involvement. In 2006, Defendant pled guilty to multiple drug, larceny and theft charges. The plea judge sentenced Defendant to several concurrent sentences for each of the charges against her. Defendant appealed her guilty plea and sentences to the Court of Appeals.  She voluntarily chose to withdraw her appeal.  After the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal, Defendant filed a timely application for PCR in which she alleged that ineffective assistance of plea counsel rendered her guilty plea involuntary. When asked about the plea proceeding, Defendant acknowledged the judge had questioned her regarding her decision to plead guilty and had discussed the maximum sentences for each of the charges.  Defendant also recalled the solicitor's statement that there was no sentence recommendation.  At the conclusion of her cross-examination testimony, Defendant admitted she would not have filed the PCR application had she received less than a three-year sentence. The judge concluded that plea counsel "misadvised [Holden] about the sentence she would receive if she accepted the State's plea offer and entered a guilty plea."  The Supreme Court's review of the plea proceeding revealed that Defendant was clearly aware of the elements of the charged offenses, the State's evidence as to the charges, and the potential sentences. The Court found no probative evidence to support the PCR judge's finding that Holden received ineffective assistance of counsel with respect to her guilty plea. The Court reversed the PCR judge's decision and reinstated Defendant's guilty plea. View "Holden v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

Appellant Abel Jacobs appealed a circuit court's decision holding that a sentence for burglary in the first degree cannot be suspended under the language of South Carolina Code section 24-21-410.  In January 2010, Appellant pled guilty to a variety of criminal charges, including a charge for first degree burglary.  At the plea hearing, defense counsel asked the circuit judge to suspend the minimum fifteen year sentence for first degree burglary in lieu of placing Appellant under probation.  Defense counsel opined that state courts have routinely suspended sentences for first degree burglary, and the State has never appealed those sentences.  The circuit judge deferred sentencing Appellant for the first degree burglary conviction at the plea hearing, and requested the parties submit memoranda in support of their positions regarding the suspension issue.  The circuit judge subsequently issued an order finding that a sentence for the conviction of first degree burglary is not suspendable under section 24-21-410 of the South Carolina Code.  At the sentencing hearing, the circuit judge sentenced Appellant to fifteen years imprisonment for first degree burglary, along with  concurrent sentences for remaining charges, crediting Appellant for time served prior to his guilty plea. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that section 24-21-410 of the South Carolina code does not give courts the authority to suspend sentences for crimes punishable by death or life imprisonment, and this includes crimes that include lesser sentences than death or life imprisonment.  Therefore, the Court affirmed the circuit court's order. View "South Carolina v. Jacobs" on Justia Law

The State appealed the trial court's grant of Respondent Robert Nance's pre-trial motion to suppress the testimony of the victim in Respondent's new trial after the Supreme Court granted post-conviction relief (PCR) in "Nance v. Ozmint" (Nance II). Robert Fraley survived Respondent's attack in 1993 and testified at the first trial but died before Respondent was retried. Respondent argued that, because in "Nance II" the Supreme Court found he received ineffective assistance of counsel due to defense counsel's failure to subject the State's case to meaningful adversarial testing, he lacked the opportunity to cross-examine Mr. Fraley as required by the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Therefore, Respondent argued, the State could not read Mr. Fraley's testimony into the record as an unavailable witness under Rule 804 of the rules of evidence, because it would violate his constitutional right to confront witnesses against him. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Mr. Fraley was sworn during the first trial, and Respondent had the opportunity to cross-examine him as required by the Sixth Amendment. Accordingly, the Court found that the circuit court erred in suppressing Mr. Fraley's testimony. The Court reversed the circuit court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "South Carolina v. Nance" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to review the court of appeals' analysis and disposition of Petitioner Jamey Reid's conviction and sentence for attempted second-degree criminal sexual contact (CSC) with a minor. The single issue before the Court was whether the court of appeals erred in upholding the trial court's denial of Petitioner's directed verdict motion. Petitioner entered an Internet chat room believing he was chatting with a fourteen-year-old female. The supposed minor was, in fact, a Westminster Police Officer. Petitioner quickly turned the conversation to one of a sexual nature, as he desired a sexual encounter with the girl. Petitioner would later be indicted and tried. At the close of the State's case, Petitioner moved for a directed verdict in connection with the attempted CSC charge, arguing that the State had failed to present evidence of an overt act as required by the attempted CSC charge. Because the trial court held there was sufficient evidence presented to create a jury question, the directed verdict motion was denied. The jury convicted Petitioner on both charges, and he was sentenced. Petitioner contended the evidence, as a matter of law, was insufficient on the question of specific intent and further rose only to the level of "mere preparation," entitling him to a directed verdict of acquittal on the attempted CSC charge. Under the facts of this case, the Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeals that because a jury question was presented, the directed verdict motion was properly denied. View "South Carolina v. Reid" on Justia Law

The Town of Mount Pleasant (Town) appealed the circuit court's order reversing and dismissing Defendant Treva Roberts's municipal court conviction for driving under the influence (DUI) on the ground the arresting officer's vehicle was not equipped with a video camera pursuant to the pertinent section of the South Carolina Code. The Town argued on appeal that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction because Defendant failed to obtain a bond or pay her court-ordered fine prior to initiating her appeal. Furthermore, the Town contended that the court erred in "narrowly construing" the pertinent code to require the reversal of Defendant's DUI conviction and dismissal of the charge. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the circuit court judge erred in classifying the Town's jurisdictional challenge as one involving subject matter jurisdiction. Because Defendant timely served her notice of appeal on the municipal court, she met the procedural requirements. As such, her failure to obtain a bond or pay the court-ordered fine did not divest the circuit court of appellate jurisdiction. As to the merits, the Court found that the Town's prolonged failure to equip its patrol vehicles with video cameras defeated the intent of the state law mandating their use. Therefore, the Court concluded that the Town should not be able to avoid its statutorily created obligation to produce a videotape by repeatedly relying on the code. Because the Town failed to establish any statutory exception to excuse its noncompliance, the Court affirmed the circuit court's dismissal of Defendant's DUI charge and conviction and dismissed the charge. View "Town of Mt. Pleasant v. Roberts" on Justia Law