Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Victim, who was fifteen at the time of trial, alleged she was sexually assaulted on multiple occasions by respondent Charles Rampey, her stepfather, when she was eleven and twelve years old. Victim testified that sometime around her birthday in June of 2013, Rampey called Victim into a room and forced her to touch his penis. On another occasion, Victim testified that Rampey had her perform oral sex on him. This escalated to multiple instances of sexual intercourse, according to Victim. In this criminal sexual conduct case with a minor, the trial judge gave an Allen charge to the jury after approximately two hours and twenty minutes of deliberations. About an hour and fifteen minutes later, the jury returned with a not guilty verdict as to criminal sexual conduct with a minor (CSC) in the second degree and a guilty verdict as to CSC third degree. Rampey, appealed, asserting the Allen charge was unconstitutionally coercive. The court of appeals reversed the conviction in an unpublished opinion, primarily citing to South Carolina v. Taylor, 829 S.E.2d 723 (Ct. App. 2019). Finding no reversible error in the appellate court's judgment, the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed. "The trial court's overemphasis of the resources expended and the need for a verdict, combined with the absence of the critical cautionary language despite being requested by defense counsel, renders the charge unconstitutional and warrants a new trial. Moreover, the post-verdict polling of the jurors by the trial court did not cure this error." View "South Carolina v. Rampey" on Justia Law

Petitioner Michael Frasier was convicted of trafficking cocaine in excess of 100 grams after police discovered cocaine during a traffic stop for an inoperable brake light. The questions this appeal presented for the the South Carolina Supreme Court's review centered on whether police had reasonable suspicion to prolong the traffic encounter and whether Frasier consented to the search. The trial court concluded the officer had reasonable suspicion and Frasier consented, and the court of appeals affirmed. In deciding these two issues, the Supreme Court clarified the scope of its standard of review in the Fourth Amendment context. Ultimately, the Court reversed the court of appeals because law enforcement lacked reasonable suspicion to prolong the traffic stop, and Frasier did not consent to the search. View "South Carolina v. Frasier" on Justia Law

Petitioner John McCarty was charged with murder and possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime. Petitioner maintained he acted in defense of another and moved for immunity from criminal prosecution pursuant to the South Carolina Protection of Persons and Property Act ("Act"). After a pretrial hearing, the circuit court denied the motion, and Petitioner was subsequently tried and convicted as charged. On appeal, Petitioner challenged the circuit court's ruling as to immunity, and the court of appeals affirmed. The South Carolina Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider Petitioner's arguments that: (1) the court of appeals erred in failing to hold the circuit court abdicated its role as the fact-finder by ruling a jury, not the court, must decide whether the individual Petitioner was defending was without fault in bringing on the difficulty; and (2) the Supreme Court should conclude Petitioner was entitled to immunity. The Supreme Court agreed with Petitioner as to the first issue, but held the issue of immunity should be decided in the first instance by the circuit court. As a result, the Court reversed the court of appeals and remanded the matter to the circuit court to make the necessary findings. View "South Carolina v. McCarty" on Justia Law

South Carolina Attorney General Alan Wilson retained Respondents Willoughby & Hoefer, P.A., and Davidson, Wren & DeMasters, P.A., (collectively, the Law Firms) to represent the State in litigation against the United States Department of Energy (DOE). Wilson and the Law Firms executed a litigation retention agreement, which provided that the Law Firms were hired on a contingent fee basis. When the State settled its claims with the DOE for $600 million, Wilson transferred $75 million in attorneys' fees to the Law Firms. Appellants challenged the transfer, claiming it was unconstitutional and unreasonable. The circuit court dismissed Appellants' claims for lack of standing, and the South Carolina Supreme Court certified the case for review of the standing issue. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's finding that Appellants lacked public importance standing and remanded the case for the circuit court to consider the merits of Appellants' claims. View "South Carolina Public Interest Foundation, et al. v. Wilson" on Justia Law

Travis Green presented a facial challenge to South Carolina's civil asset forfeiture statutory scheme following law enforcement's seizure of cash and contraband during the execution of a search warrant. The circuit court concluded sections 44-53-520 and -530 of the South Carolina Code (2018) were facially unconstitutional under both the Excessive Fines Clause and the Due Process Clause of the federal and state constitutions. An undercurrent of this case was Green's claim that the civil forfeiture process is ripe for abuse. The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's order because Green failed to overcome the high threshold for finding a statute facially unconstitutional. Green answered the Solicitor's petition and demanded a jury trial. The circuit court considered and ruled upon the constitutionality of the forfeiture statutes in the very early stages of this litigation. The case was therefore remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "Richardson v. Twenty Thousand Seven Hundred Seventy-One, U.S. Currency" on Justia Law

Joseph Bowers was involved in a shootout in which multiple people fired their guns. Four people were shot, and two of them died. A jury convicted Bowers of voluntary manslaughter, assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature (ABHAN), and possession of a firearm during the commission of a violent crime. The court of appeals reversed the convictions because the trial court should not have charged the doctrine of mutual combat to the jury. The South Carolina Supreme Court granted the State's petition for a writ of certiorari to address a narrow point: the State's contention the erroneous jury charge did not prejudice Bowers as to the ABHAN conviction. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals. View "South Carolina v. Bowers" on Justia Law

Justin Jamal Warner was convicted by jury of murder, attempted armed robbery, and possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime. The court of appeals affirmed. The South Carolina Supreme Court granted Warner's petition for a writ of certiorari to address: (1) whether the trial court was correct to deny Warner's motion to suppress cell-site location information (CSLI) seized from his cell phone service provider; and (2) whether an out-of-court viewing by Warner's probation officer of a crime-scene video and the officer's identification of Warner as the man in the video required a hearing under Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972). The Supreme Court found the trial court correctly ruled the identification made from the video did not require a Biggers hearing. As to the CSLI, the Court held the warrant the trial court found invalid because the warrant sought information stored in another state was not - at least for that reason - invalid. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals as to the Biggers issue and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings as to Warner's motion to suppress CSLI. View "South Carolina v. Warner" on Justia Law

On January 2, 2015, James Daniels entered the Sunhouse convenience store at the intersection of Highway 905 and Red Bluff Road in Longs, South Carolina, on the pretense of buying a bottle of lemonade. James' actual purpose was to scout the store for Jerome Jenkins, Jr. and James' brother McKinley Daniels to rob it. Minutes after James left the store, Jenkins and McKinley entered, masked and armed with pistols. They first encountered Jimmy McZeke, who worked at the store. Jenkins and McKinley fired at McZeke, but both missed. McZeke then ran into the bathroom at the back of the store and locked the door. Jenkins followed McZeke and shot at him through the bathroom door. The gunshots shattered several glass bottles, and the shattered glass cut McZeke on his head. McKinley stayed at the front of the store where the store clerk, Bala Paruchuri, stood behind the cash register. McKinley pointed his pistol at Paruchuri, went behind the counter, and robbed Paruchuri of the money in the register. Jenkins quickly returned to the front of the store. As he and McKinley left the store, both shot Paruchuri. According to the store's video security system that recorded the entire sequence, Jenkins and McKinley were in the store for thirty-seven seconds. Paruchuri died as a result of multiple gunshot wounds. Jenkins was convicted of murder, attempted murder, and armed robbery. A jury sentenced Jenkins to death on the murder charge. This opinion consolidated Jenkins' direct appeal and the South Carolina Supreme Court's mandatory review of his death sentence under section 16-3-25 of the South Carolina Code (2015). Judgment and sentence was affirmed. View "South Carolina v. Jenkins" on Justia Law

This case arose from the armed robbery and shooting death of a convenience store clerk, James Mahoney, at Nikki's Speedy Mart in Spartanburg County, South Carolina, in the early morning hours of September 16, 1999. Richard Moore petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus to challenge the proportionality of the death sentence that was imposed for his murder conviction. The South Carolina Supreme Court granted Moore's motion to argue against the precedent of South Carolina v. Copeland, 300 S.E.2d 63 (1982). After review of the record and applicable law and consideration of the parties' arguments, the Supreme Court clarified Copeland and noted the Court was not statutorily required to restrict its proportionality review of "similar cases" to a comparison of only cases in which a sentence of death was imposed. The Supreme Court concluded, however, that Moore did not establish he was entitled to habeas relief. View "Moore v. Stirling" on Justia Law

Kenneth Taylor was charged with driving under the influence (DUI). The magistrate court dismissed the charge, finding the State failed to comply with subsection 56-5-2953(A)'s requirement that the DUI incident site video recording "show" the defendant being advised of his Miranda rights. The circuit court and court of appeals affirmed. The South Carolina Supreme Court granted the State's petition for a writ of certiorari to address two issues: (1) the meaning of the word "show" as it was used in subsection 56-5-2953(A); and (2) whether per se dismissal of a DUI charge was the proper remedy for a video's failure to "show" a DUI defendant being advised of his Miranda rights at the incident site. The Supreme Court concluded the magistrate court correctly interpreted the meaning of the word "show" as used in subsection 56-5-2953(A); however, the Court held that failure to show a DUI defendant being advised of his Miranda rights did not mandate per se dismissal. View "South Carolina v. Taylor" on Justia Law