Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Terrance Stewart was convicted by jury of distribution of heroin and two crimes based on his knowing possession of illegal drugs: trafficking in heroin and what we commonly refer to as "simple possession" of oxycodone. The South Carolina Supreme Court granted certiorari review to two aspects of the jury instructions: (1) the trial court's definition of constructive possession; and (2) the trial court's explanation of an inference of "knowledge and possession" that the court told the jury it may draw when illegal drugs are found on the defendant's property. The Supreme Court found the trial court erred by instructing the jury on the inference of knowledge and possession. The Court reversed the trafficking and simple possession convictions and remanded those charges for a new trial. However, because the erroneous jury instruction did not prejudice Stewart on the distribution charge, the distribution conviction was affirmed. View "South Carolina v. Stewart" on Justia Law

John Willie Mack, Sr. petitioned the South Carolina Supreme Court for review of the dismissal of his second application for post-conviction relief. He alleged his DNA counsel failed to timely appeal the denial of his application for DNA testing under the Access to Justice Post-Conviction DNA Testing Act ("DNA Act"). The Supreme Court found that because Mack was prevented from seeking appellate review, it was necessary to provide an avenue of relief akin to Austin v. South Carolina, 409 S.E.2d 395 (1991) that afforded him the opportunity to obtain belated review. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded to the court of general sessions for an evidentiary hearing. View "Mack v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

South Carolina Governor Henry McMaster issued an order suspending Mohsen Baddourah from his position as a member of the Columbia City Council after Baddourah was indicted for second-degree domestic violence. Baddourah initiated this declaratory judgment action seeking a determination that: (1) he was a member of the Legislative Branch and was, therefore, excepted from the Governor's suspension power under the South Carolina Constitution; and (2) second-degree domestic violence was not a crime involving moral turpitude, so it was not an act that was within the scope of the Governor's suspension power. The circuit court dismissed Baddourah's complaint on the ground the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and, alternatively, for failure to state a cause of action. The South Carolina Supreme Court concluded Baddourah's indictment charged a crime involving moral turpitude, and the Governor had the constitutional authority to issue the Executive Order suspending Baddourah from his position as a member of the Columbia City Council. Although Baddourah disputed whether the suspension was warranted, "where the Governor was constitutionally authorized to impose a suspension, the decision whether to do so is a matter committed to the Governor's discretion after considering all of the attendant circumstances." Consequently, the circuit court's order dismissing Baddourah's challenge to the suspension order is affirmed as modified. View "Baddourah v. Baddourah" on Justia Law

Appellant James Harrison, a former state legislator, was convicted and sentenced to eighteen months' imprisonment in a public corruption probe. The case was prosecuted by David Pascoe, Solicitor of the First Judicial Circuit, who was serving as the acting Attorney General. As recognized in prior case law, Solicitor Pascoe's authority to pursue the corruption probe was bestowed on him by South Carolina's then-current Attorney General, Alan Wilson. Appellant contended Solicitor Pascoe's authority did not grant the solicitor the power to investigate or prosecute Appellant. Conversely, Solicitor Pascoe dismissed any suggestion that his authority was limited, contending he had the authority to prosecute public corruption wherever the investigation led. The South Carolina Supreme Court determined Solicitor Pascoe had the authority to prosecute Appellant for perjury, but did not have the authority to prosecute Appellant for misconduct in office. Consequently, the Court affirmed Appellant's conviction and eighteen-month sentence for perjury, but reversed the statutory and common law misconduct in office charges, and remanded to the presiding judge of the State Grand Jury for further proceedings. View "South Carolina v. Harrison" on Justia Law

Jose Reyes Reyes was convicted by a jury of first-degree criminal sexual conduct with a minor. The court of appeals affirmed the conviction. The South Carolina Supreme Court granted Reyes's petition for a writ of certiorari to address two questions: (1) whether the trial court improperly ruled in the jury's presence that the child victim (Minor) was competent to testify; and (2) whether the solicitor improperly bolstered Minor's credibility by phrasing questions to Minor in the first person. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' judgment. View "South Carolina v. Reyes" on Justia Law

Petitioners' real property was sold at a delinquent tax sale. They filed an action in circuit court to challenge the sale, and all parties consented to have the case referred to a special referee for trial. Petitioners agreed to allow defendants (respondents here) to present their evidence first. After the testimony of one witness, the county's tax collector, defendants moved to approve the sale. The special referee granted the motion. Petitioners objected, arguing they were not permitted to give their factual presentation of the case. The special referee denied the motion, and the court of appeals affirmed. On appeal to the South Carolina Supreme Court, petitioners argued they were deprived of due process, including the right to be heard and the right to present witnesses and other evidence. The Supreme Court granted the petition, dispensed with briefing, reversed the court of appeals, and remanded to the circuit court for a new trial. "The special referee made factual findings and issued judgment in the middle of a trial after hearing from only one witness. ... The law ... does not permit a court to issue judgment against a party before giving that party an opportunity to present evidence in support of her position." View "Halsey v. Simmons" on Justia Law

Appellant Don Weaver brought a declaratory judgment action to challenge the constitutionality of S.C. Code Ann. section 6-11-271 (2004), which addressed the millage levied in certain special purpose districts. Appellant owned property and was a taxpayer in the Recreation District, a special purpose district created to fund the operation and maintenance of parks and other recreational facilities in the unincorporated areas of Richland County, South Carolina. Appellant first argued section 6-11-271 was unconstitutional because it violated the South Carolina Constitution's prohibition on taxation without representation. Appellant next contended section 6-11-271 did not affect all counties equally and was, therefore, special legislation that was prohibited by the South Carolina Constitution. Appellant lastly argued section 6-11-271 was void because it violated Home Rule as set forth in the state constitution and the Home Rule Act. The circuit court found Appellant failed to meet his burden of establishing any constitutional infirmity. To this, the South Carolina Supreme Court concurred and affirmed judgment. View "Weaver v. Recreation District" on Justia Law

Petitioner Sha'quille Washington was indicted for the murder of Herman Manigault and was convicted of the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter. The court of appeals affirmed Petitioner's conviction. The South Carolina Supreme Court granted petitioner's petition for certiorari review of the appellate court's judgment. After such review, the Supreme Court determined the trial court erred in giving an accomplice liability instruction, and held petitioner was prejudiced by this error. Therefore, the Court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and reversed in part, and remanded to the circuit court for a new trial on the charge of voluntary manslaughter. View "South Carolina v. Washington" on Justia Law

The South Carolina Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) suspended Bradley Sanders' driver's license pursuant to South Carolina's implied consent statute after he refused to take a blood-alcohol test following his arrest for driving under the influence (DUI). The suspension was upheld by the Office of Motor Vehicles and Hearings (OMVH), the Administrative Law Court (ALC), and the court of appeals. Sanders argued on appeal to the South Carolina Supreme Court that the decision of the court of appeals should have been reversed due to a lack of substantial evidence in the record to support the suspension. Specifically, Sanders argued the court of appeals erred in: (1) determining there was substantial evidence that a nurse, who was working in the emergency room at the time Sanders was admitted, qualified as licensed medical personnel; and (2) holding the statements used to establish his alleged inability to submit to a breath test were not hearsay. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the suspension. View "Sanders v. So. Carolina Dept. Motor Veh." on Justia Law

The South Carolina Human Affairs Commission (the Commission) brought this action against respondents Zeyi Chen and Zhirong Yang, alleging they violated the South Carolina Fair Housing Law by discriminating against a prospective tenant. The action was based on a complaint received from Stacy Woods, who reported that she responded to an ad on Craigslist for a rental residence in Mount Pleasant and was told it was not available. Woods maintained she was refused the rental property because she had a four-year-old daughter. The Commission appealed circuit court orders:(1) denying the Commission's motion pursuant to Rule 43(k), SCRCP to enforce the parties' settlement agreement; (2) finding certain information was obtained by the Commission during the conciliation process and was, therefore, subject to orders of protection and inadmissible under S.C. Code Ann. section 31-21-120(A) (2007) of the Fair Housing Law; and (3) ultimately dismissing the Commission's action based on a finding section 31-21-120(A) was unconstitutional and the entire statute was void. After review, the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The Court found the requirements of Rule 43(k) clearly were not met, for the reasons found by the circuit court. Consequently, the circuit court's order denying the Commission's motion to compel enforcement of the settlement agreement was affirmed. The Commission contended the circuit court declined to give adequate consideration to comparable federal law to aid its decision and gave no deference to the Commission's interpretation. To this, the Supreme Court agreed and reversed the circuit court as to orders of protection related to conciliation efforts. Further, the Supreme Court concurred with the Commission the circuit court erred in dismissing claims against Respondents pursuant to section 31-21-120(A) as unconstitutional. The Supreme Court held Respondents did not meet their "heavy burden" of proving the statute was unconstitutionally vague. View "So. Car. Human Affairs Commission v. Yang" on Justia Law