Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Devin Jamel Johnson was convicted of murdering Akeem Smalls. The incident stemmed from a dispute over a debt Smalls owed Johnson for stolen marijuana. On the night of the murder, surveillance footage showed Johnson and an unidentified man, referred to as "Creep," arriving at the scene. Johnson initially denied involvement but later admitted to driving the car seen in the footage. Evidence included Johnson's fingerprints on a bullet cartridge found at the scene and cell phone records indicating his presence near the crime scene.The case was tried three times. In the first trial, Johnson was convicted after the trial court gave an accomplice liability instruction following a jury question. The South Carolina Court of Appeals reversed this conviction, citing fundamental unfairness due to the trial court's change in instructions. A second trial ended in a mistrial. In the third trial, Johnson was again convicted, but the Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, ruling that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on accomplice liability, as there was no evidence that Johnson acted in concert with another person.The South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the case and disagreed with the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court held that the evidence supported the trial court's decision to instruct the jury on accomplice liability. The court found that Johnson's actions and communications indicated a mutual plan to murder Smalls, and the presence of "Creep" at the scene supported the inference that they acted together. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and reinstated Johnson's murder conviction. View "The State v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Adam Rowell was convicted by a jury of two felony driving under the influence charges. After the trial, Rowell discovered that Juror 164 had failed to disclose during voir dire that he had been recently arrested for several charges, including possession with intent to distribute marijuana. Rowell included this information in his motion for a new trial. Although the State consented to a second hearing to examine Juror 164, the circuit court denied the motion without holding the hearing.The Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court's decision, stating that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by not conducting an evidentiary hearing with Juror 164. The appellate court agreed with the circuit court's finding that Juror 164's failure to disclose his arrest was unintentional and that no further inquiry was necessary.The Supreme Court of South Carolina reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeals' decision. The Supreme Court held that the distinction between intentional and unintentional concealment of information during voir dire should be abandoned. Instead, the focus should be on whether the concealed information suggests bias and whether it would have been material to the use of a peremptory strike or a challenge for cause. The court emphasized the importance of a hearing to determine if the juror's nondisclosure indicated potential bias.The Supreme Court vacated the lower court's decision and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing to examine Juror 164. The circuit court is instructed to determine if the concealed information suggests bias and if it would have been material to Rowell's use of peremptory strikes or a challenge for cause. The standard for materiality is whether a reasonable party would have exercised a strike had the information been disclosed. View "The State v. Rowell" on Justia Law

The petitioner was convicted of first-degree criminal sexual conduct with a minor. The trial court refused the State's request to instruct the jury that the testimony of an alleged victim of criminal sexual conduct need not be corroborated, as per section 16-3-657 of the South Carolina Code. However, the court allowed the State to cite and quote the statute during its closing argument, over the petitioner's objection. The victim testified that the petitioner sexually abused her from the age of four or five until she was nine, with no corroborating evidence presented.The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the issue of whether the State could argue section 16-3-657 was unpreserved for appellate review. The petitioner then sought post-conviction relief, arguing that his trial counsel failed to perfect his direct appeal. The post-conviction relief court granted a belated appeal, but the Court of Appeals again found the issues unpreserved and affirmed the conviction, also noting that the petitioner conceded the State could argue the statute during its closing argument.The Supreme Court of South Carolina reviewed the case and found that the petitioner's objections to the State arguing section 16-3-657 were preserved for appellate review. The court held that it is improper for a party to argue the statute to the jury, as it could unduly influence the jury to believe the victim's testimony without corroboration. The court noted that the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury on the statute, combined with the State's argument and assurance that the trial court would correct any misstatement of the law, compounded the error. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and remanded the case for a new trial. View "Cone v. State" on Justia Law

Gregg Pickrell was convicted of murdering Robert Lamont Demary. Pickrell and Demary were romantically involved but did not live together. Pickrell claimed that Demary routinely abused her and that she shot him in self-defense as he lunged toward her in her bedroom. The entry wound was in Demary's back, which Pickrell did not dispute.The Circuit Court of Kershaw County admitted testimony from SLED Agent Dawn Claycomb and Kershaw County Sheriff's Investigator Rick Bailey. Pickrell objected to both testimonies. The court of appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that any error in admitting Agent Claycomb's testimony was harmless and that Pickrell's objection to Investigator Bailey's testimony was not preserved for appellate review. The court also found Bailey's testimony admissible under Rule 701 of the South Carolina Rules of Evidence.The Supreme Court of South Carolina reviewed the case on certiorari. The court agreed with the court of appeals that the error in admitting Agent Claycomb's testimony was harmless because the location of the shooting was not in dispute. However, the court disagreed with the court of appeals regarding Investigator Bailey's testimony, finding that Pickrell's objection was sufficient to preserve the issue for appeal. The court held that Bailey's testimony did not meet the foundational requirements of Rule 701 and should have been excluded. Despite this, the court found the error harmless because Bailey's testimony was cumulative to that of Investigator Miles Taylor, who provided similar testimony without objection.The Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed the court of appeals' decision as modified, maintaining Pickrell's conviction. View "State v. Pickrell" on Justia Law

Respondent Olandio R. Workman was convicted by a jury of domestic violence of a high and aggravated nature (DVHAN), kidnapping, and possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime. The trial court sentenced him to concurrent prison terms of twelve, fifteen, and five years, respectively. The case arose from an incident in August 2016, where Workman confined and beat his wife, Loretta Workman, for over forty-eight hours. The abuse included physical violence, threats with firearms, and preventing her from leaving the house or contacting anyone for help.The Court of Appeals reviewed the case and reversed Workman's DVHAN conviction, remanding for a new trial. The appellate court found that the trial court's jury instruction on the lesser-included offense of first-degree domestic violence (DV1) was erroneous. Specifically, the instruction failed to include the definition of "moderate bodily injury" and did not explain second-degree domestic violence (DV2), which is relevant to establishing DV1. The appellate court held that this omission was not harmless and warranted a new trial.The Supreme Court of South Carolina reviewed the case and agreed that the trial court's jury instruction was incomplete and erroneous. However, the Supreme Court held that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The court found that the evidence overwhelmingly supported Workman's conviction for DVHAN, as his actions demonstrated extreme indifference to human life and would reasonably cause fear of imminent great bodily injury or death. Consequently, the Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's finding of error but reversed its decision on harmless error, reinstating Workman's DVHAN conviction. View "The State v. Workman" on Justia Law

Richard Kenneth Galloway was convicted of sexually assaulting his girlfriend's daughter between 1988 and 1990. The victim, who was in elementary and middle school at the time, reported the abuse to the police in 2016. At trial, she testified about multiple incidents of sexual abuse by Galloway. The jury convicted Galloway on two charges: one count of first-degree criminal sexual conduct with a minor and one count of lewd act upon a child. He was sentenced to consecutive terms of thirty years and ten years, respectively. Galloway appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed his convictions.Galloway's appeal to the South Carolina Supreme Court focused on two main issues: the exclusion of expert testimony on "false memories" and the admission of testimony about his violence toward the victim's mother. The trial court had excluded the expert testimony because the expert had not evaluated the victim and could not reliably apply his theories to her specific case. The court of appeals upheld this exclusion, finding that the testimony would not assist the jury and was speculative.The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision. It held that the trial court did not err in excluding the expert testimony on false memories, as it was not reliably applied to the victim and would not assist the jury. The court also found no reversible error in admitting testimony about Galloway's violence toward the victim's mother, as it was relevant to explaining the victim's delayed disclosure of the abuse and did not unfairly prejudice the jury against Galloway. The court dismissed the writ of certiorari on a third issue regarding the contents of a letter Galloway wrote, finding no reason to disagree with the court of appeals' analysis. View "The State v. Galloway" on Justia Law

Four condemned inmates challenged the constitutionality of a South Carolina statute that provides three methods of execution: electrocution, lethal injection, and firing squad. They argued that the statute violates the South Carolina Constitution's prohibition against cruel, corporal, or unusual punishment.The Richland County Circuit Court ruled in favor of the inmates, declaring the statute unconstitutional. The court found that electrocution and firing squad methods violate the state constitution's prohibition on cruel, corporal, or unusual punishment. It also found the statute's provision allowing inmates to choose their method of execution unconstitutionally vague and an improper delegation of authority. The court further ruled that the retroactive application of the amended statute violated ex post facto prohibitions.The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision. The court held that the statute does not violate the South Carolina Constitution. It found that electrocution is not unconstitutionally cruel, corporal, or unusual, noting that the inmates did not meet their burden of proving that electrocution causes unnecessary and excessive pain. The court also held that lethal injection, as conceded by the inmates, is constitutional if properly administered. Regarding the firing squad, the court found it to be a relatively quick and painless method of execution, thus not cruel or unusual.The court also addressed the inmates' claims about the statute's vagueness and improper delegation of authority, finding that the term "available" is not unconstitutionally vague and that the statute does not unlawfully delegate authority to the Director of the Department of Corrections. The court emphasized that the statute's provision allowing inmates to choose their method of execution is a constitutional innovation aimed at making the death penalty less inhumane. The court concluded that the statute is constitutional in its entirety. View "Owens v. Stirling" on Justia Law

In December 2014, the petitioner and his son met Charles Brown to sell a motorcycle. The transaction failed, and the petitioner and his son allegedly robbed and killed Brown. Both were indicted for murder and armed robbery and proceeded to a joint jury trial. The jury was instructed to consider each charge separately for each defendant. After deliberations, the jury convicted the petitioner's son of armed robbery but acquitted him of murder. The jury then reported being deadlocked on the petitioner's charges, leading the trial court to declare a mistrial and discharge the jury.After the jury was dismissed, a bailiff found documents indicating the jury had reached a guilty verdict for the petitioner's armed robbery charge. The trial court recalled the jury, which confirmed it had reached a verdict on the armed robbery charge before being discharged. The jury was polled individually, and all jurors affirmed the guilty verdict. The trial court then entered the guilty verdict and sentenced the petitioner to life imprisonment without parole.The petitioner appealed to the South Carolina Court of Appeals, arguing the trial court erred in recalling the jury. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction on procedural grounds. The South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the case and found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's decision to recall the jury. The Supreme Court emphasized that the jury was recalled shortly after discharge, remained on the courthouse premises, and was not subjected to outside influences. The recall served only to confirm the verdict reached before discharge. The Supreme Court affirmed the petitioner's conviction and sentence for armed robbery. View "The State v. Mills" on Justia Law

In 2018, Montrelle Campbell was convicted of one count of murder and two counts of attempted murder. The case involved a shooting at an apartment in Charleston, where Campbell allegedly fired fourteen rifle rounds, resulting in one death and two injuries. The key issues on appeal were the trial court's instruction on malice inferred from the use of a deadly weapon, the requirement of expressed malice for attempted murder, and the accomplice liability instruction.The Court of Appeals reversed Campbell's convictions, citing errors in the trial court's instructions. It held that the instruction on inferred malice from a deadly weapon was erroneous and not harmless, that expressed malice was required for attempted murder under State v. King, and that the accomplice liability instruction was improper. The court remanded the case for a new trial.The South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeals. It held that the erroneous instruction on inferred malice was harmless due to overwhelming evidence of malice. The court clarified that attempted murder can be proven by either expressed or implied malice. Additionally, it found sufficient circumstantial evidence to support the accomplice liability instruction, noting that the evidence allowed the jury to reasonably conclude that Campbell and another individual were acting together during the shooting. The Supreme Court's decision reinstated Campbell's convictions. View "The State v. Campbell" on Justia Law

Phillip Wayne Lowery was convicted of second offense driving under the influence (DUI). He admitted to being under the influence but contested that the only evidence of him driving came from statements he made to a patrol trooper, which he argued were inadmissible under Miranda v. Arizona. Additionally, Lowery argued that the charge should be dismissed because field sobriety tests and Miranda warnings from another trooper's dash camera video were not shown to the jury.The Circuit Court in Greenville County admitted Lowery's statements and denied his motion for a directed verdict. The court found that the State had substantially complied with the statutory requirements for videotaping field sobriety tests and Miranda warnings. The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, agreeing with Lowery that his statements were inadmissible and remanded for a new trial. However, it held that dismissal of the charge was not required despite the video deficiencies.The South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the case. It reversed the Court of Appeals' decision regarding the admissibility of Lowery's statements, holding that even if the initial statements were inadmissible, subsequent volunteered statements were admissible and created a jury issue on whether Lowery was driving. The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision that the absence of the sobriety tests and Miranda warnings on the video did not warrant dismissal of the charge. The Supreme Court reinstated Lowery's conviction, emphasizing that the statute does not require the State to offer any portion of the incident site video into evidence. View "The State v. Lowery" on Justia Law