Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Kenneth Hilton appealed the denial of post-conviction relief (PCR), claiming the PCR court did not obtain a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel before allowing him to represent himself at his PCR trial. Hilton pled guilty to kidnapping and assault with intent to commit criminal sexual conduct in the second degree. When asked at the PCR trial about the quality of the State's evidence, plea counsel explained, "We had the actual recording of what went on, and when you listen to it, there is no defense to these charges." The plea court sentenced him to forty-five years in prison. He did not appeal. Hilton filed a PCR application alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The State requested a hearing, and the court appointed counsel to represent him. Hilton then moved to "dismiss" his appointed attorney. A few weeks later, after learning his motion was set for a hearing, Hilton filed another motion, again seeking "dismissal of PCR Court Appointed Attorney." At the hearing on Hilton's motion, the PCR court informed him of his right to counsel but did not warn him of the dangers of proceeding without an attorney. After the hearing, the PCR court entered an order granting the motion to relieve counsel. Almost a year later, Hilton appeared without an attorney before a second PCR court for trial. The PCR court began by inquiring into Hilton's waiver of his right to counsel. Both sides presented testimony. As a part of its presentation, the State informed the PCR court of Hilton's seven prior convictions for criminal sexual conduct. The PCR court took the case under advisement, and later issued a written order denying relief. The South Carolina Supreme Court found Hilton declined to have the PCR court explain "the kinds of things that an attorney might do to be of service. ... the record here is clear Hilton was already aware of several of the specific advantages of having an attorney." Finding a valid waiver of his right to counsel, the Supreme Court affirmed the denial of relief. View "Hilton v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

This case appeal presented a post-conviction relief (PCR) matter in which Petitioner Gregg Taylor, a Jamaican citizen, pled guilty to a drug offense. Petitioner resided in South Carolina for years with his wife and two children, all three of whom were United States citizens. In plea negotiations, Petitioner's primary concern was whether he would be subject to deportation. Plea counsel viewed Petitioner's grave concern with the prospect of deportation as a "collateral" issue, yet provided general assurances to Petitioner that he would not be deported. As a result, Petitioner pled guilty. The drug offense resulted in Petitioner's deportation, and this PCR application followed. The PCR court denied relief. The South Carolina Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari and reversed: "By focusing on Petitioner's decision-making, it is uncontested that he 'would have rejected any plea leading to deportation.' Because Petitioner's counsel provided deficient representation, we may not avoid a finding of prejudice on the basis of the likelihood of a guilty verdict . . . we are constrained to 'conclude [Petitioner] has demonstrated a 'reasonable probability that, but for [his] counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.'" View "Taylor v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

This case appeal presented a post-conviction relief (PCR) matter in which Petitioner Gregg Taylor, a Jamaican citizen, pled guilty to a drug offense. Petitioner resided in South Carolina for years with his wife and two children, all three of whom were United States citizens. In plea negotiations, Petitioner's primary concern was whether he would be subject to deportation. Plea counsel viewed Petitioner's grave concern with the prospect of deportation as a "collateral" issue, yet provided general assurances to Petitioner that he would not be deported. As a result, Petitioner pled guilty. The drug offense resulted in Petitioner's deportation, and this PCR application followed. The PCR court denied relief. The South Carolina Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari and reversed: "By focusing on Petitioner's decision-making, it is uncontested that he 'would have rejected any plea leading to deportation.' Because Petitioner's counsel provided deficient representation, we may not avoid a finding of prejudice on the basis of the likelihood of a guilty verdict . . . we are constrained to 'conclude [Petitioner] has demonstrated a 'reasonable probability that, but for [his] counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.'" View "Taylor v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

The South Carolina Supreme Court clarified the proper scope of a circuit judge's inquiry under Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), when a criminal defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waives his right to counsel and requests to proceed pro se. Lamont Samuel was indicted for the murder of his cousin, Taneris Hamilton. On the day his case was called to trial, Samuel indicated he was dissatisfied with defense counsel and made a Faretta motion to waive his right to counsel and proceed pro se. Rather than concluding the Faretta colloquy, the circuit judge continued to caution Samuel against representing himself, stating she did not believe he was sufficiently familiar with the law, procedure, or rules of evidence to adequately represent himself. Despite the judge's warnings and in light of the potential penalties he faced, Samuel voluntarily reaffirmed his desire to dispense with the assistance of counsel and proceed pro se. The circuit judge summoned the attorney Samuel alleged he had been coached by in order to proceed pro se, to question the attorney on his relationship with Samuel. The attorney's testimony conflicted with Samuel's asserted "coaching." The circuit judge interpreted Samuel's and the attorney's conflicting testimony to mean Samuel was lying to her and attempting to manipulate the proceedings. Samuel proceeded to trial with his counsel and was found guilty and sentenced to fifty years imprisonment. He appealed his conviction, asserting the circuit judge erred in denying his right to self-representation, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, finding Samuel made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary request to proceed pro se as required by Faretta, and he should have been given the opportunity to represent himself. View "South Carolina v. Samuel" on Justia Law

The South Carolina Supreme Court clarified the proper scope of a circuit judge's inquiry under Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), when a criminal defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waives his right to counsel and requests to proceed pro se. Lamont Samuel was indicted for the murder of his cousin, Taneris Hamilton. On the day his case was called to trial, Samuel indicated he was dissatisfied with defense counsel and made a Faretta motion to waive his right to counsel and proceed pro se. Rather than concluding the Faretta colloquy, the circuit judge continued to caution Samuel against representing himself, stating she did not believe he was sufficiently familiar with the law, procedure, or rules of evidence to adequately represent himself. Despite the judge's warnings and in light of the potential penalties he faced, Samuel voluntarily reaffirmed his desire to dispense with the assistance of counsel and proceed pro se. The circuit judge summoned the attorney Samuel alleged he had been coached by in order to proceed pro se, to question the attorney on his relationship with Samuel. The attorney's testimony conflicted with Samuel's asserted "coaching." The circuit judge interpreted Samuel's and the attorney's conflicting testimony to mean Samuel was lying to her and attempting to manipulate the proceedings. Samuel proceeded to trial with his counsel and was found guilty and sentenced to fifty years imprisonment. He appealed his conviction, asserting the circuit judge erred in denying his right to self-representation, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, finding Samuel made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary request to proceed pro se as required by Faretta, and he should have been given the opportunity to represent himself. View "South Carolina v. Samuel" on Justia Law

David Ledford was indicted for inflicting great bodily injury upon a child. The jury was sworn, and the case was tried up to the point of the charge conference between the trial court and the attorneys. During the charge conference, the State objected to the trial court's decision to give a jury charge proposed by Ledford. The trial court overruled the objection, and the State appealed. The court of appeals promptly dismissed the State's appeal, finding the issue raised was not immediately appealable. Finding no error in the appellate court's decision, the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed dismissal of the State's appeal. View "South Carolina v. Ledford" on Justia Law

David Ledford was indicted for inflicting great bodily injury upon a child. The jury was sworn, and the case was tried up to the point of the charge conference between the trial court and the attorneys. During the charge conference, the State objected to the trial court's decision to give a jury charge proposed by Ledford. The trial court overruled the objection, and the State appealed. The court of appeals promptly dismissed the State's appeal, finding the issue raised was not immediately appealable. Finding no error in the appellate court's decision, the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed dismissal of the State's appeal. View "South Carolina v. Ledford" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Marshall Collins of trafficking methamphetamine (third offense), and possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime. The trial judge sentenced Collins to an aggregate twenty-five years' imprisonment. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Subsequently, Collins filed a timely application for Post-Conviction Relief ("PCR"). After a hearing, the PCR judge issued an order granting Collins a new trial. The South Carolina Supreme Court granted the State's petition for a writ of certiorari to review whether the PCR judge erred in finding trial counsel was ineffective in failing to request a continuance and failing to properly handle an expired plea offer. Based on the trial court record, the Supreme Court found trial counsel was not deficient for failing to request a continuance, or in his handling of the expired plea offer. Additionally, the Court found Collins failed to establish prejudice resulting from either alleged deficiency. Accordingly, the Court reversed the PCR judge's decision. View "Collins v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Marshall Collins of trafficking methamphetamine (third offense), and possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime. The trial judge sentenced Collins to an aggregate twenty-five years' imprisonment. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Subsequently, Collins filed a timely application for Post-Conviction Relief ("PCR"). After a hearing, the PCR judge issued an order granting Collins a new trial. The South Carolina Supreme Court granted the State's petition for a writ of certiorari to review whether the PCR judge erred in finding trial counsel was ineffective in failing to request a continuance and failing to properly handle an expired plea offer. Based on the trial court record, the Supreme Court found trial counsel was not deficient for failing to request a continuance, or in his handling of the expired plea offer. Additionally, the Court found Collins failed to establish prejudice resulting from either alleged deficiency. Accordingly, the Court reversed the PCR judge's decision. View "Collins v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

Petitioner Stephen Smalls was convicted by jury of armed robbery for the 2007 robbery of a Bojangles restaurant in Columbus. The trial court sentenced him to twenty-five years in prison. Smalls filed an application for PCR alleging he received ineffective assistance of counsel. The PCR court first held a hearing in 2007. The court held the record open to allow PCR counsel time to investigate the circumstances under which the State dismissed a carjacking charge against Smalls’ accomplice on the morning of Smalls' trial. The hearing was not reconvened until 2012. The PCR court described the issue regarding the carjacking charge as not only one of ineffective assistance of counsel, but also whether "the State was deceptive" in representations made to the trial court and trial counsel. The PCR court ultimately denied relief. The South Carolina Supreme Court transferred Smalls' petition for a writ of certiorari to the court of appeals pursuant to Rule 243(l) of the South Carolina Appellate Court Rules, and the court of appeals granted the petition. The court of appeals then found trial counsel's performance was deficient regarding the carjacking charge and in two other instances. However, the court of appeals found "there was no prejudice resulting from trial counsel's deficient performance because the State presented overwhelming evidence of [Smalls'] guilt." The Supreme Court, in reviewing the appellate court’s judgment, agreed with the finding that trial counsel was deficient, but disagreed that the State presented overwhelming evidence of guilt that precluded a finding of prejudice under the second prong of Strickland v. Washington. The Supreme Court found the evidence was not overwhelming, and reversed the court of appeals' finding that counsel's errors resulted in no prejudice. View "Smalls v. South Carolina" on Justia Law