Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant Michael Beaty, Jr. was convicted of murdering his girlfriend, for which he was sentenced to life imprisonment. After the jury was sworn the trial judge gave preliminary remarks. Appellant objected to the use of the terms "search[ing] for the truth," "true facts," and "just verdict." Appellant complained these terms were especially concerning when linked with the Solicitor's "misstatement" of circumstantial evidence and reasonable doubt in his opening statement, and because the Solicitor had informed the jury that it would have to pick between two competing theories. Ultimately, the Supreme Court affirmed appellant's conviction, but took the opportunity of this case to discuss two issues appellant raised in his appeal. "We instruct trial judges to omit any language, whether in remarks to the jury or in an instruction, which might have the effect of lessening the State's burden of proof in a criminal case. Further, we hold that in criminal cases tried after this opinion becomes final, if requested by the party with the right to second argument, the party with the right to open and close will be required to open in full on the law and the facts, and be limited in reply to addressing the other party's argument and not permitted to raise new matters." View "South Carolina v. Beaty" on Justia Law

Walter Bash was indicted for trafficking in cocaine and cocaine base. The circuit court found officers conducted an illegal search, and suppressed the drugs. The State appealed. The court of appeals reversed the circuit court's suppression order and remanded for trial. The Supreme Court granted certiorari review and reversed, finding that the officers entered the curtilage of this home for the purpose of conducting a search for drugs. Because the officers did not have a warrant for the search and no exception to the warrant requirement was applicable, the officers violated the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. The Court reinstated the circuit court's judgment in this case. View "South Carolina v. Bash" on Justia Law

In this capital Post-Conviction Relief ("PCR") case, petitioner James Robertson filed a second PCR application alleging, among other things, that his prior PCR counsel were not qualified under section 17-27160(B) of the South Carolina Code and failed to competently represent him. Without a hearing, the PCR judge dismissed the application on the grounds that it was successive and barred by the one-year statute of limitations and laches. The South Carolina Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the circuit court's dismissal of Petitioner's application. Petitioner argued his second PCR application should not have been summarily dismissed as successive because his case presented unique circumstances warranting review of prior PCR counsel's assistance under "Martinez v. Ryan," (132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012)). The South Carolina Court found that there was indeed a genuine issue of fact as to whether prior PCR counsel were statutorily qualified, and that petitioner should have been afforded a hearing on this limited issue. As such, the Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Robertson v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

Petitioner Steven Berry was convicted of criminal sexual conduct with a minor, second degree. At trial, the State called Kim Roseborough who was qualified as an expert in the field of "child sexual abuse assessment and treatment." The relevant section of Roseborough's testimony consisted of three distinct parts: (1) testimony regarding the victim's demeanor witnessed by Roseborough during therapy; (2) testimony explaining and discussing delayed disclosure as part of the Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome; and (3) testimony addressing trauma associated with sexual abuse and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Trial counsel objected to Roseborough's testimony with respect to PTSD, and approached the bench for an off-record conference. After the conference, neither the grounds for the objection nor the trial judge's ruling were placed on the record, and Roseborough continued to testify about trauma and PTSD. After the State concluded its case-in-chief, trial counsel placed the objection discussed at sidebar, on the record. The trial judge reiterated his sidebar determination that one did not need to be a medical doctor to diagnosis PTSD. The Court of Appeals found the issue of whether Roseborough's testimony regarding trauma symptoms and PTSD was preserved for appeal. The Supreme Court disagreed with the appellate court's conclusion with respect to the PTSD testimony. The Court found that any other issues raised with Roseborough's testimony were sustained but not preserved for review because counsel did not take further action to have the testimony stricken from the record, or curative instructions given, or a mistrial granted. View "South Carolina v. Berry" on Justia Law

Louis Winkler, Jr. was convicted of murder for the shooting death of his estranged wife. He received the death sentence. He applied for post-conviction relief (PCR), arguing he received ineffective assistance of counsel during the sentencing phase of trial, for not objecting when the trial court did not answer the jury's questions about the consequences of failure to reach a unanimous verdict. The PCR court granted relief, but the State appealed. After review, the Supreme Court reversed on Winkler's ineffective assistance claim. The Court also reversed the PCR court's denial of Winkler's pretrial motions in the PCR action in which he requested additional time to obtain and analyze evidence related to his alleged brain damage. Because the denial of additional time deprived Winkler of the opportunity to adequately develop his PCR claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate brain damage, the Court vacated the PCR court's ruling denying that claim. The Supreme Court remanded this case back to the PCR court for further proceedings. View "Winkler v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

Rocky Linkhorn was arrested and charged with Criminal Sexual Conduct with a Minor in the First Degree, Lewd Act on a Minor, and Disseminating Obscene Material to a Minor. After finding Linkhorn was incompetent to stand trial and unlikely to become fit in the foreseeable future, the circuit court ordered the solicitor to initiate judicial admission proceedings with the probate court to have Linkhorn involuntarily committed to the South Carolina Department of Disabilities and Special Needs ("DDSN"). Before the probate court determined whether Linkhorn was intellectually disabled, the solicitor filed a motion for a rule to show cause at the circuit court, requesting DDSN be ruled into court "to show just cause for services being denied to [Linkhorn] as previously ordered." The circuit court granted the solicitor's motion and ordered DDSN to, inter alia, take custody of Linkhorn and house him in a secure facility until the probate court determines whether Linkhorn is intellectually disabled. Additionally, the court prohibited DDSN from refusing involuntary commitment of individuals similarly situated to Linkhorn. DDSN appealed. The Supreme Court found the statutes concerning the involuntary commitment of individuals to DDSN were “clear and unambiguous: [. . .] only individuals who developed an ‘intellectual disability’ during the developmental period or a ‘related disability’ before the age of twenty-two can be involuntarily committed to DDSN.” The Court concluded the circuit court erred in applying the broad definition of "person with intellectual disability" found in the applicable statutes to Linkhorn. Because this issue was dispositive of the appeal, the Court declined to address DDSN's remaining arguments, and reversed the circuit court’s decision. View "Ex parte So. Carolina Dept. of Disabilities & Spec. Needs v. Linkhorn" on Justia Law

Respondent Russell Earley was convicted of criminal solicitation of a minor and sentenced to eight years in prison. Respondent's criminal charge arose from an encounter with a fourteen-year-old male (Victim) outside a public restroom at Walmart in Sumter in November 2008. On the evening of the incident, the Victim visited Walmart with his grandmother, who had promised to buy him some headphones. The Victim and his grandmother went in separate directions when they entered the store—the Victim headed for the electronics department while his grandmother went to pick up a few grocery items. After separating from his grandmother, the Victim stopped to use the restroom before shopping for headphones; as he entered the restroom, he noticed Respondent following him. The Victim stated he felt uncomfortable because Respondent stood in the restroom watching the Victim use the urinal. The Victim testified Respondent thereafter followed him out of the restroom, pointed to the Victim's genitals, and offered the Victim oral sex, which the Victim declined in no uncertain terms. The Victim immediately reported the incident to Walmart security, and multiple witnesses testified the Victim was visibly upset after the incident. There were no witnesses to the incident itself, and nothing was captured on Walmart surveillance video. The theory of Respondent's defense was that the Victim fabricated the whole story and the motivation for doing so was that Respondent had caught the Victim trying to shoplift CDs. The issue in this PCR matter involved a line of questioning during the State's cross-examination of Respondent. Specifically, the State had evidence that Respondent posted the message "See ya" on the Victim's Facebook wall the week before trial, despite having been ordered after his arrest not to have any contact with the Victim. The State's theory was that by posting such a message, Respondent was attempting to intimidate or threaten the Victim on the eve of trial. Defense counsel did not object or otherwise alert the trial court that the State had failed to disclose the "See ya" Facebook posting prior to trial. After withdrawing his direct appeal, Respondent filed a post-conviction relief (PCR) application, generally alleging that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. After review of the trial court record, the PCR court granted Respondent relief. The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed and reinstated Respondent's conviction and sentence. "Because the trial court would not have been compelled to declare a mistrial, we find the PCR court committed an error of law in finding the outcome of Respondent's trial would have been different had trial counsel moved for a mistrial based on the State's failure to disclose the Facebook posting. Absent a showing of prejudice as required by Strickland, it was error to grant relief." View "Earley v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

Petitioner Alexander Hunsberger was sentenced to thirty-three years' incarceration for his part in the murder of Samuel Sturrup. Hunsberger argued on appeal that the trial judge erred in denying his speedy trial motion. Sturrup allegedly stole money from Steven Barnes, the purported head of a robbery and prostitution ring in Georgia. In an effort to force Sturrup to divulge where the stolen money was located, Barnes allegedly beat, and caused others to beat, Sturrup at a location in Augusta, Georgia. Sturrup was then placed in the trunk of a vehicle and brought from Georgia to South Carolina by petitioner and his brother Julio. Hunsberger was arrested in South Carolina and in March 2002, he was indicted for the murder of Sturrup. In June 2002, Hunsberger's request for bail was denied and his renewed request was denied in April 2004. In November 2004, Hunsberger moved for an order requiring the State to try him during the next two terms of court, or if no trial were held, that he be released on bail, citing S.C. Code Ann. Sec. 17-23-90 (2014) and the state and federal constitutional guarantees of due process and speedy trial. While this motion was denied in December 2004, the circuit court judge found the delay "clearly bordering on the excessive" and admonished the State to either try Hunsberger or release him to Georgia which had placed a hold on him. Following notification that the State would not go forward with trial, in January 2005 the circuit court judge granted bail but ordered Hunsberger held unless Georgia released its hold. Petitioner was subsequently extradited to Georgia, and in September 2006, he was convicted there of kidnapping with bodily injury of Sturrup, and sentenced to life imprisonment. In early 2011, Alex was extradited to South Carolina. In January 2012, the State called Hunsberger's case for trial and he moved for dismissal of his charges, claiming his state and federal rights to a speedy trial had been violated. The motion was denied, as was his renewed request made at mid-trial. Hunsberger argued that his right to a speedy trial under both the United States and South Carolina Constitutions was violated, and therefore, his murder charge should be dismissed. The South Carolina Supreme Court analyzed the issue under the Sixth Amendment, and agreed. The Court of Appeals' decision was reversed. View "South Carolina v. Hunsberger" on Justia Law

Respondent Theodore Manning was charged with murder following the death of his girlfriend, Mikki McPhatter. The victim died after being shot in the back of the head in Respondent's home. It was undisputed that the victim was unarmed. Another of Respondent's girlfriends, Kendra Goodman, led police to the victim's abandoned and burned vehicle, where her charred skeletal remains were discovered in the trunk. Respondent claimed self-defense. At a pre-trial hearing, Respondent's counsel relied upon Respondent's statement to police, introduced as an exhibit by the State, to support his immunity claim. In the statement, Respondent maintained he had taken a gun away from the victim during an argument, but ultimately "pulled the trigger to show her to stop playing." After considering Respondent's statement to police and hearing arguments from counsel for both sides, the trial court denied Respondent's pretrial motion for immunity. The matter then proceeded to a jury trial, where respondent was convicted of voluntary manslaughter and sentenced to thirty years in prison. Respondent appealed, and the court of appeals found, inter alia, that the trial court was required to grant Respondent a full evidentiary hearing prior to determining whether the immunity provision applied, and therefore the court of appeals remanded the case for a full hearing. The Supreme Court granted the State's petition for a writ of certiorari to decide whether the appellate court's judgment was made in error. After review, the Supreme Court concluded respondent received the pre-trial determination he was entitled to under South Carolina law, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in making that ruling without first conducting a full testimonial evidentiary hearing. As such, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals. View "South Carolina v. Manning" on Justia Law

Jimmy Johnson fled from police after being stopped for having an expired vehicle license. Armed, Johnson went to a Carolina Convenience Store in Spartanburg, where he took Saroj Patel hostage. The City's police department negotiated with Johnson in an effort to encourage Johnson to surrender. After the negotiations were unsuccessful, the police department cut off the power to the store and sent tear gas and pepper spray into the building's ventilation system in another attempt to induce surrender. After a twelve-hour standoff, the police decided to breach the building with a bulldozer, which resulted in severe physical damage to the property. Given the condition of the store, the City asked Carolina Convenience to tear it down for code violations. After Carolina Convenience refused, the City demolished the building. Carolina Convenience then brought claims for inverse condemnation and negligence against the City for damages to the store. The circuit court granted the City's summary judgment motion as to the inverse condemnation claim, but denied it as to the negligence claim. The jury returned a verdict in the City's favor as to the negligence claim. The store appealed only the inverse condemnation ruling, but the court of appeals affirmed, finding the circuit court properly granted summary judgment as to the inverse condemnation claim. Finding that the Court of Appeals erred in its analysis of the takings claim, the South Carolina Supreme Court simply held that damage to the property during the police department’s hostage rescue effort did not constitute a taking as contemplated by the State Constitution. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision as modified. View "Carolina Convenience Stores v. City of Spartanburg" on Justia Law