Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Bobby Stone shot and killed Charlie Kubala of the Sumter County Sheriff's Office. Stone filed an application for post-conviction relief (PCR) alleging he received ineffective assistance of counsel. The PCR court denied relief. Stone filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, which was granted as to three sets of issues: (1) whether Stone's trial and appellate counsel were ineffective in dealing with victim impact evidence; (2) whether Stone's trial counsel was ineffective in investigating and presenting evidence of brain damage; and (3) whether Stone's trial counsel was ineffective in investigating and presenting evidence of the accident theory of the case. Finding trial and appellate counsel's performance was reasonable in almost every respect, the Supreme Court affirmed: counsel's performance did not meet an objective standard of reasonableness, and thus was deficient under the first prong of "Strickland." However, as to each of these failures, Stone did not prove a reasonable probability the outcome would have been different as required by the second prong. View "Stone v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

Petitioner-defendant Charles Cain appealed after he was convicted for trafficking methamphetamine. He argued the State produced insufficient evidence as to the quantity of drugs required for trafficking, and thus the trial court erred when it denied his motion for a directed verdict. The Court of Appeals found the core of Cain’s argument was not preserved for appellate review and affirmed. Finding however, that the argument was indeed preserved, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "South Carolina v. Cain" on Justia Law

Petitioner Michael Gonzales was convicted for trafficking 400 grams or more of methamphetamine, for which he was sentenced to thirty years’ imprisonment. Petitioner applied for post-conviction relief (PCR), arguing his trial counsel had a conflict of interest that adversely affected counsel’s performance. The PCR judge denied relief, and in a split decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the PCR judge’s order. The South Carolina Supreme Court found the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the PCR judge’s order, so it reversed denial of petitioner’s application for PCR. View "Gonzales v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

Ruben Ramirez was sixteen years old when he was indicted for assault and battery with intent to kill, kidnapping, first-degree criminal sexual conduct with a minor, first-degree burglary, and lewd act upon a child. The issue his case presented for the Supreme Court’s review was whether a severely mentally retarded individual should be afforded post-conviction relief (PCR) where his plea counsel failed to request an independent competency evaluation prior to his guilty plea. The PCR court denied relief, finding plea counsel was not deficient nor was Ramirez prejudiced by counsel's representation. Although the court of appeals disagreed that plea counsel was not deficient, the court affirmed based on its application of the "any evidence" standard to the PCR court's prejudice finding. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, upholding the court of appeals' finding of deficiency but reversing its finding as to lack of prejudice to Ramirez. View "Ramirez v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

Appellant Michael Beaty, Jr. was convicted of murdering his girlfriend, for which he was sentenced to life imprisonment. After the jury was sworn the trial judge gave preliminary remarks. Appellant objected to the use of the terms "search[ing] for the truth," "true facts," and "just verdict." Appellant complained these terms were especially concerning when linked with the Solicitor's "misstatement" of circumstantial evidence and reasonable doubt in his opening statement, and because the Solicitor had informed the jury that it would have to pick between two competing theories. Ultimately, the Supreme Court affirmed appellant's conviction, but took the opportunity of this case to discuss two issues appellant raised in his appeal. "We instruct trial judges to omit any language, whether in remarks to the jury or in an instruction, which might have the effect of lessening the State's burden of proof in a criminal case. Further, we hold that in criminal cases tried after this opinion becomes final, if requested by the party with the right to second argument, the party with the right to open and close will be required to open in full on the law and the facts, and be limited in reply to addressing the other party's argument and not permitted to raise new matters." View "South Carolina v. Beaty" on Justia Law

Walter Bash was indicted for trafficking in cocaine and cocaine base. The circuit court found officers conducted an illegal search, and suppressed the drugs. The State appealed. The court of appeals reversed the circuit court's suppression order and remanded for trial. The Supreme Court granted certiorari review and reversed, finding that the officers entered the curtilage of this home for the purpose of conducting a search for drugs. Because the officers did not have a warrant for the search and no exception to the warrant requirement was applicable, the officers violated the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. The Court reinstated the circuit court's judgment in this case. View "South Carolina v. Bash" on Justia Law

In this capital Post-Conviction Relief ("PCR") case, petitioner James Robertson filed a second PCR application alleging, among other things, that his prior PCR counsel were not qualified under section 17-27160(B) of the South Carolina Code and failed to competently represent him. Without a hearing, the PCR judge dismissed the application on the grounds that it was successive and barred by the one-year statute of limitations and laches. The South Carolina Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the circuit court's dismissal of Petitioner's application. Petitioner argued his second PCR application should not have been summarily dismissed as successive because his case presented unique circumstances warranting review of prior PCR counsel's assistance under "Martinez v. Ryan," (132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012)). The South Carolina Court found that there was indeed a genuine issue of fact as to whether prior PCR counsel were statutorily qualified, and that petitioner should have been afforded a hearing on this limited issue. As such, the Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Robertson v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

Petitioner Steven Berry was convicted of criminal sexual conduct with a minor, second degree. At trial, the State called Kim Roseborough who was qualified as an expert in the field of "child sexual abuse assessment and treatment." The relevant section of Roseborough's testimony consisted of three distinct parts: (1) testimony regarding the victim's demeanor witnessed by Roseborough during therapy; (2) testimony explaining and discussing delayed disclosure as part of the Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome; and (3) testimony addressing trauma associated with sexual abuse and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Trial counsel objected to Roseborough's testimony with respect to PTSD, and approached the bench for an off-record conference. After the conference, neither the grounds for the objection nor the trial judge's ruling were placed on the record, and Roseborough continued to testify about trauma and PTSD. After the State concluded its case-in-chief, trial counsel placed the objection discussed at sidebar, on the record. The trial judge reiterated his sidebar determination that one did not need to be a medical doctor to diagnosis PTSD. The Court of Appeals found the issue of whether Roseborough's testimony regarding trauma symptoms and PTSD was preserved for appeal. The Supreme Court disagreed with the appellate court's conclusion with respect to the PTSD testimony. The Court found that any other issues raised with Roseborough's testimony were sustained but not preserved for review because counsel did not take further action to have the testimony stricken from the record, or curative instructions given, or a mistrial granted. View "South Carolina v. Berry" on Justia Law

Louis Winkler, Jr. was convicted of murder for the shooting death of his estranged wife. He received the death sentence. He applied for post-conviction relief (PCR), arguing he received ineffective assistance of counsel during the sentencing phase of trial, for not objecting when the trial court did not answer the jury's questions about the consequences of failure to reach a unanimous verdict. The PCR court granted relief, but the State appealed. After review, the Supreme Court reversed on Winkler's ineffective assistance claim. The Court also reversed the PCR court's denial of Winkler's pretrial motions in the PCR action in which he requested additional time to obtain and analyze evidence related to his alleged brain damage. Because the denial of additional time deprived Winkler of the opportunity to adequately develop his PCR claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate brain damage, the Court vacated the PCR court's ruling denying that claim. The Supreme Court remanded this case back to the PCR court for further proceedings. View "Winkler v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

Rocky Linkhorn was arrested and charged with Criminal Sexual Conduct with a Minor in the First Degree, Lewd Act on a Minor, and Disseminating Obscene Material to a Minor. After finding Linkhorn was incompetent to stand trial and unlikely to become fit in the foreseeable future, the circuit court ordered the solicitor to initiate judicial admission proceedings with the probate court to have Linkhorn involuntarily committed to the South Carolina Department of Disabilities and Special Needs ("DDSN"). Before the probate court determined whether Linkhorn was intellectually disabled, the solicitor filed a motion for a rule to show cause at the circuit court, requesting DDSN be ruled into court "to show just cause for services being denied to [Linkhorn] as previously ordered." The circuit court granted the solicitor's motion and ordered DDSN to, inter alia, take custody of Linkhorn and house him in a secure facility until the probate court determines whether Linkhorn is intellectually disabled. Additionally, the court prohibited DDSN from refusing involuntary commitment of individuals similarly situated to Linkhorn. DDSN appealed. The Supreme Court found the statutes concerning the involuntary commitment of individuals to DDSN were “clear and unambiguous: [. . .] only individuals who developed an ‘intellectual disability’ during the developmental period or a ‘related disability’ before the age of twenty-two can be involuntarily committed to DDSN.” The Court concluded the circuit court erred in applying the broad definition of "person with intellectual disability" found in the applicable statutes to Linkhorn. Because this issue was dispositive of the appeal, the Court declined to address DDSN's remaining arguments, and reversed the circuit court’s decision. View "Ex parte So. Carolina Dept. of Disabilities & Spec. Needs v. Linkhorn" on Justia Law