Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Criminal Law
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A jury found Petitioner Carmie Nelson ("Carmie") guilty of murdering her roommate, and the trial court sentenced her to life imprisonment. Carmie appealed, arguing, among other things, that the trial court erred in admitting gruesome autopsy photos in contravention of Rule 403, SCRE. The court of appeals, finding no error, affirmed in an unpublished opinion. The South Carolina Supreme Court granted Carmie's petition for a writ of certiorari, and reversed: “the photos admitted here surpassed ‘the outer limits of what our law permits a jury to consider.’” View "South Carolina v. Nelson" on Justia Law

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Respondent John Perry, Jr. was convicted by jury of the attempted murder of a police officer. During deliberations, the jury requested a recharge on intent. Over the defense's objection, the trial court instructed, "When the intent to do an act that violates the law exists motive becomes immaterial." The court of appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial, concluding the statement improperly instructed the jury on general intent for the crime of attempted murder. While the South Carolina Supreme Court agreed that the trial court erred in giving the jury this recharge, the Supreme Court believed the error was harmless. Accordingly, it reversed the decision of the court of appeals. View "South Carolina v. Perry" on Justia Law

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The South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner Tappia Green's convictions for kidnapping, armed robbery, and possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime. During an in camera hearing, the parties offered competing evidence as to whether Green was given his Miranda warnings, with law enforcement officers claiming they did not Mirandize Green at the time of his arrest and Green asserting they did. The trial court found the State's evidence more credible, determining Green was not Mirandized and, therefore, a violation of Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610(1976) did not occur. As a result, the trial court denied Green's motion for a mistrial. Nevertheless, the State did not further pursue Green's post-arrest silence. The court of appeals affirmed, focusing on the novel question of whether the State or the defendant had the burden of proof in a Doyle hearing and, ultimately, concluding the defendant had the burden to prove Miranda warnings were given and a Doyle violation occurred. The South Carolina Supreme Court took the opportunity of this case to clarify the proper procedure when a potential Doyle violation arises. "Care must be taken when the State seeks to impeach a defendant with his post-arrest silence." As the proponent of such impeachment evidence, the Court held the State bears the burden of proving the evidence is admissible and will not violate the defendant's right to due process as articulated in Doyle and its progeny. "In its role as the gatekeeper of admissibility, the trial court must evaluate the evidence and determine whether the State has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was not given his Miranda warnings." Here, the Court found the trial court properly fulfilled its role and issued a detailed ruling supported by a number of facts in evidence. The Court therefore held the trial court did not commit error in denying Green's motion for a mistrial. The decision of the court of appeals was affirmed as modified and vacated in part. View "South Carolina v. Green" on Justia Law

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Petitioner Anthony Jones pleaded guilty to first-degree burglary and armed robbery, crimes he committed at the ages of sixteen and seventeen, respectively. Pursuant to subsection 63-19-20(1), South Carolina's definitional statute of chapter nineteen in the Juvenile Justice Code, the circuit court had jurisdiction over Jones's charges, rather than the family court. The circuit court judge sentenced Jones to ten years in prison for armed robbery and fifteen years for first-degree burglary, with the sentences to run concurrently. Jones did not file a direct appeal. Instead, he filed an application for post-conviction relief ("PCR") on several grounds, including a challenge to the constitutionality of subsection 63-19-20(1). After a hearing, the PCR court dismissed the application, finding the constitutional challenge was not a cognizable PCR claim and, even if it were, the statute was constitutional. The South Carolina Supreme Court concluded Jones properly brought this challenge in his PCR application and subsection 63-19-20(1) was constitutional. However, in keeping with prior decisions regarding sentencing juveniles, the Court held circuit court judges had to consider the mitigating factors of youth as identified in Aiken v. Byars when sentencing. "Consideration of these factors can be done at sentencing; therefore, a separate Aiken hearing is not required." Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "Jones v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

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Petitioner Jon Smart and his co-defendant, Stephen Hutto, were in custody at a Department of Juvenile Justice detention facility near Rimini in Clarendon County in August 1999 when they brutally murdered a citizen volunteer who graciously allowed the boys to work on his family farm under his supervision as a part of their rehabilitation. Smart and Hutto then stole the man's truck and drove it on a violent crime spree. After Horry County Police officers stopped them for a traffic violation and discovered the truck was stolen, Smart and Hutto led officers on a thirty-mile high-speed chase during which Smart fired shots at pursuing law enforcement vehicles. Smart was sixteen years old. Smart pled guilty in 2001 to murder, armed robbery, grand larceny, criminal conspiracy, and escape. The plea court sentenced him to life in prison for the murder. The issue his appeal presented for the South Carolina Supreme Court's review centered on whether a juvenile sentenced to life in prison, bore any burden of proof or persuasion when seeking resentencing under Aiken v. Byars, 765 S.E.2d 572 (2014). The Supreme Court held there was no such burden—on either party—and the resentencing court did not impose such a burden. View "South Carolina v. Smart" on Justia Law

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Petitioner Richard Passio Jr. was convicted of murdering his wife and sentenced to thirty years' imprisonment. Passio appealed, arguing the trial court erred in: (1) denying his motion for a directed verdict; and (2) admitting a screenshot of his Facebook page. Finding no error by the trial court on either issue, the court of appeals affirmed. Having carefully examined Passio's challenges, the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals in upholding the trial court's denial of Passio's motion for a directed verdict. The Supreme Court concluded, however, that the admission of Passio's Facebook page was error, albeit harmless. The Court therefore affirmed the court of appeals' decision as modified. View "South Carolina v. Passio" on Justia Law

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In a matter of first impression, the South Carolina Supreme Court considered a Sexually Violent Predator Act case arising under subsection 44-48-100(B) of the South Carolina Code (2018). The circuit court in this case found Francis Oxner committed the acts with which he was charged. On appeal, Oxner claimed a lengthy delay before his subsection 44-48-100(B) hearing violated his right to a speedy trial, the fact he was never convicted precluded proceedings under the Act, and conducting the subsection 44-48-100(B) hearing while he was incompetent violated his due process rights. The Supreme Court found no reversible error in the circuit court's finding that Oxner "committed the act or acts with which he is charged" under subsection 44-48-100(B). The Court remanded the case to the circuit court for "a trial to determine whether [Oxner] is a sexually violent predator" as required by subsection 44-48-90(A) of the South Carolina Code (2018). View "In the Matter of Oxner" on Justia Law

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Petitioner Justin Lewis represented himself at trial and was convicted of distribution of heroin. Lewis timely filed an application for post- conviction relief (PCR), alleging pretrial counsel was ineffective in several respects. The PCR court summarily dismissed Lewis' application, and the South Carolina Supreme Court granted his petition for certiorari review of the PCR court's order. After review, the Supreme Court reversed the PCR court's order in part and remanded for a hearing on Lewis's claims that pretrial counsel failed to adequately investigate the criminal charge, failed to communicate with material witnesses whose testimony would have allegedly been favorable to the defense, failed to advise him of the right to appeal, failed to provide the necessary information for filing a notice of appeal, and failed to file a notice of appeal on his behalf. View "Lewis v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

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Travis Lawrence was convicted by jury of attempted murder following a brawl at the home of a friend, Clayton Baxter. At trial, Lawrence argued that he acted in self-defense. To support this, he subpoenaed his co-defendant present at the scene, Terell Bennett. Bennett, however, invoked his Fifth Amendment right while awaiting his own, separate trial. Bennett's in camera testimony tended to show that he and Lawrence traveled to Baxter's house that day to purchase marijuana. Bennett's version of events established that Baxter attacked Lawrence first. The trial court was made aware of the nature of Bennett's testimony; in asking for the court to conduct the in camera examination, Lawrence's counsel stated "[the State] know[s] that the alleged co-defendant has come in and told them this was an act of self-defense." The trial court clarified: "I just want to make sure I understand the full breadth of what you're saying so I know whether or not you can invoke your right as far as implication. You're putting yourself at the scene of this alleged crime; do you understand that?" Bennett's counsel then argued that any questioning by the State would reveal incriminating information. Lawrence argued on appeal to the South Carolina Supreme Court that the hazards of self-incrimination from Bennett's testimony were not openly apparent because the purported crime, the purchase of marijuana, was never completed. Lawrence maintained that Bennett's testimony would show he and Lawrence acted in self-defense. Conversely, the State contended that the hazard of self-incrimination was openly apparent because Bennett was awaiting trial on indictments resulting from the same incident and there was "obvious potential" for any answers to be incriminating. The court of appeals concluded the hazard of incrimination was openly apparent, and the Supreme Court concurred, affirming the trial and appellate courts. View "South Carolina v. Lawrence" on Justia Law

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Guadalupe Guzman Morales was convicted in 2017 of criminal sexual conduct with a minor in the first and second degree. On appeal, he contended evidence he sexually assaulted the victim's sister should have been excluded under Rule 404(b) of the South Carolina Rules of Evidence. He argued the trial court erred in admitting the evidence pursuant to the "common scheme or plan" exception, both under the "substantial similarities" test from South Carolina v. Wallace, 683 S.E.2d 275 (2009), and under the "logical connection" standard later articulated in South Carolina v. Perry, 842 S.E.2d 654 (2020). The court of appeals agreed as to Perry and reversed. The South Carolina Supreme Court found both the Wallace and Perry issues were unpreserved for appellate review. The Court therefore reversed the court of appeals and reinstated Morales' convictions. View "South Carolina v. Morales" on Justia Law