Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Manuel Marin was convicted of murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a violent crime. Marin appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed, rejecting his argument that the trial court committed reversible error by refusing to instruct the jury that a person acting in self-defense has the right to continue shooting until the threat has ended. The Supreme Court, after review, disagreed but affirmed, finding that the common law rule was sufficiently encompassed in the jury charge provided by the trial court. "Because the thorough jury charge included consideration of the applicable principles of self-defense, the failure to incorporate the precise 'continuing to shoot' verbiage does not rise to the level of reversible error. We therefore affirm the court of appeals' decision as modified." View "South Carolina v. Marin" on Justia Law

From 1998 to 2000, an armed perpetrator committed six robberies of hotels in Lexington, Richland, Berkeley, and Charleston counties. During each of these robberies, the perpetrator entered the hotel, held the clerk at gunpoint, restrained the clerk with either duct tape or rope, and stole money out of the hotel safe and till. After an investigation, the police arrested Clifford Thompson for these robberies, and a grand jury indicted him on multiple counts of armed robbery and kidnapping. Thompson appealed the court of appeals' decision to affirm the circuit court's refusal to grant Thompson's request for declaratory judgments finding that: (1) his kidnapping offenses did not involve a sexual element; and (2) Thompson would not need to register as a sex offender upon his release from prison in 2020. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' decision affirming the circuit court's refusal to address whether Thompson's kidnapping offenses did not involve a sexual element, and remand for a hearing on this issue. However, because the issue of whether Thompson will be required to register as a sex offender upon his release from prison is not yet ripe, and because the SCDC's classification of Thompson as a sex offender in prison was subject to internal grievance procedures, the Court affirmed the court of appeals' decision with respect to those two issues, and allowed Thompson to file a grievance with the SCDC to become reclassified in the SCDC's system. View "Thompson v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

Donald Anderson was walking in the vicinity of a drug raid when police officers located in the periphery of the search ordered him to the ground. Upon searching him, officers found crack cocaine, and Anderson was thereafter indicted for possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine. He moved to suppress the drugs, arguing the detention and subsequent pat-down were unlawful under the Fourth Amendment. The trial court denied his motion to suppress and, following a bench trial, found Anderson guilty as charged. The court of appeals affirmed in an unpublished opinion, finding the police had both reasonable suspicion to detain him and reasonable belief he was armed and dangerous to justify the pat-down. The Supreme Court reversed. The South Carolina Supreme Court could not agree the evidence supported the conclusion that the officers had a particularized and objective basis to suspect illegal activity that would justify the detention. "We remain ever mindful of the difficult and often dangerous situations officers encounter daily and acknowledge that we give great deference to their experience and expertise. Here, however, the facts amount to no more than baseless conjecture that a person in a high crime area must be engaged in illicit activity. A person's proximity to criminal activity, without more, cannot establish reasonable suspicion to detain that individual. Taken to its logical conclusion, the erosion of an individual's Fourth Amendment right would necessarily accompany his or her misfortune of living in an area plagued by crime." View "South Carolina v. Anderson" on Justia Law

Donna Phillips was convicted of homicide by child abuse and sentenced to twenty-five years' imprisonment in the death of her 21-month-old grandson (Child). Phillips was alleged to have given the Child Tussionex, a prescription medication used to treat coughs and respiratory symptoms. Child was transported to the hospital after having been found in his bedroom, cold, not breathing and with no pulse. It was determined he was in opiate-induced cardiac arrest. After resuscitation, Child was taken by helicopter to a second hospital. Ultimately Child was pronounced brain dead and removed from life support; the cause of his death was documented as a hydrocodone overdose. Phillips held the prescription for Tussionex. The court of appeals affirmed Phillips conviction. Phillips argued on appeal that the court of appeals erred in affirming the denial of her motion for directed verdict because it considered the testimony offered by a co-defendant as well as Phillips' own testimony in its analysis. Although the South Carolina Supreme Court agreed the court of appeals erred in disregarding "South Carolina v. Hepburn," (753 S.E.2d 402 (2013)), the Court ultimately found the denial of Phillips' directed verdict motion was proper and affirmed as modified. View "South Carolina v. Phillips" on Justia Law

Respondent Ashley Eugene Moore was convicted of trafficking in cocaine base and possession of a firearm during the commission of a violent crime. On appeal, Moore argued that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the admission of a large quantity of crack cocaine and a firearm, both of which were seized during a traffic stop. A majority of the court of appeals' panel reversed, finding that officers did not have reasonable suspicion to continue to detain Moore once the initial purpose of the traffic stop was concluded. State v. Moore, 404 S.C. 634, 746 S.E.2d 352 (Ct. App. 2013). We granted the State's petition for a writ of certiorari. In light of the standard of review, we reverse the court of appeals and reinstate Moore's convictions and sentence. View "South Carolina v. Moore" on Justia Law

Kevin Tyrone Bennett was convicted of petit larceny, malicious injury to property, and second degree burglary. He was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment for each offense, to be served concurrently. The court of appeals reversed his convictions, finding the trial court erred in denying Bennett's motion for directed verdict because the State failed to present substantial circumstantial evidence of guilt. After review, the Supreme Court reversed, and took the opportunity of its opinion here to more clearly articulate the standard governing whether the State has presented sufficient evidence to overcome a motion for directed verdict. View "South Carolina v. Bennett" on Justia Law

A grand jury indicted Clarence Kendall Cook for murder, unlawful possession of a pistol, and possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime. After a jury trial, Cook was convicted of voluntary manslaughter and possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime. Cook filed a post-conviction relief ("PCR") application, which was dismissed after a hearing. Following the dismissal of his PCR application, Cook petitioned for certiorari review, arguing that the trial court erred in charging the jury with the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter because there was no evidence that he was acting in the sudden heat of passion. After review, the South Carolina Supreme Court agreed and reversed Cook's voluntary manslaughter conviction. View "Cook v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

Petitioner Antonio Scott was convicted of murder. He argued on appeal of that conviction that the appellate court erred in finding that the evidence did not support a jury instruction on involuntary manslaughter. The appellate court thus upheld the trial court's failure to charge involuntary manslaughter. After review and finding no error in the trial or appellate courts' judgments, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "South Carolina v. Scott" on Justia Law

Petitioner Shawn Reaves was convicted of voluntary manslaughter after the shooting death of Keshawn Applewhite. He argued on appeal that deficiencies in the police investigation (including the loss of potentially exculpatory evidence and the failure to ascertain the identity of a second shooter) deprived him of a fair trial, and delays occasioned by the State's faulty investigation deprived him of the right to a speedy trial. After review, the Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed petitioner's conviction. View "South Carolina v. Reaves" on Justia Law

In 2008, respondent Brittany Johnson was arrested in Darlington County by United States Marshals for the shooting death of Monica Burroughs. At trial, the State sought to introduce a videotaped recording of the police's interrogation of respondent after she was arrested, and the court held a "Jackson v. Denno" hearing to assess the voluntariness of the statement. During cross-examination, the State sought to discredit Respondent's testimony by eliciting testimony that she was experienced with the criminal justice system and had been represented by counsel in the past in the juvenile justice system. In addition, respondent acknowledged that despite understanding her rights, she wished to waive them at that time, and further confirmed the recorded statement displayed her telling officers that she wished to waive her rights. Based on this testimony, the trial court determined that the confession was voluntarily given. The State subsequently introduced respondent's videotaped statement at trial over defense counsel's objection. The jury ultimately found respondent guilty of murder, and the trial court sentenced her to thirty years' imprisonment. Without discussion, the court of appeals reversed and remanded the conviction, finding the trial court erred in admitting respondent's statement to police. On appeal, the State argued the court of appeals: (1) applied an incorrect appellate standard of review in assessing the trial judge's factual findings; (2) erred in reversing the trial court's ruling where respondent was not being interrogated when she inquired about counsel and did not unequivocally invoke her right to counsel; and (3) failed to consider if respondent was prejudiced by the admission of the evidence. Because the effect of the trial court's credibility finding was that respondent did not unequivocally invoke her right to counsel, the Supreme Court upheld the trial court's finding that respondent's statement was voluntary. View "South Carolina v. Johnson" on Justia Law