Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Respondent Ashley Eugene Moore was convicted of trafficking in cocaine base and possession of a firearm during the commission of a violent crime. On appeal, Moore argued that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the admission of a large quantity of crack cocaine and a firearm, both of which were seized during a traffic stop. A majority of the court of appeals' panel reversed, finding that officers did not have reasonable suspicion to continue to detain Moore once the initial purpose of the traffic stop was concluded. State v. Moore, 404 S.C. 634, 746 S.E.2d 352 (Ct. App. 2013). We granted the State's petition for a writ of certiorari. In light of the standard of review, we reverse the court of appeals and reinstate Moore's convictions and sentence. View "South Carolina v. Moore" on Justia Law

Kevin Tyrone Bennett was convicted of petit larceny, malicious injury to property, and second degree burglary. He was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment for each offense, to be served concurrently. The court of appeals reversed his convictions, finding the trial court erred in denying Bennett's motion for directed verdict because the State failed to present substantial circumstantial evidence of guilt. After review, the Supreme Court reversed, and took the opportunity of its opinion here to more clearly articulate the standard governing whether the State has presented sufficient evidence to overcome a motion for directed verdict. View "South Carolina v. Bennett" on Justia Law

A grand jury indicted Clarence Kendall Cook for murder, unlawful possession of a pistol, and possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime. After a jury trial, Cook was convicted of voluntary manslaughter and possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime. Cook filed a post-conviction relief ("PCR") application, which was dismissed after a hearing. Following the dismissal of his PCR application, Cook petitioned for certiorari review, arguing that the trial court erred in charging the jury with the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter because there was no evidence that he was acting in the sudden heat of passion. After review, the South Carolina Supreme Court agreed and reversed Cook's voluntary manslaughter conviction. View "Cook v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

Petitioner Antonio Scott was convicted of murder. He argued on appeal of that conviction that the appellate court erred in finding that the evidence did not support a jury instruction on involuntary manslaughter. The appellate court thus upheld the trial court's failure to charge involuntary manslaughter. After review and finding no error in the trial or appellate courts' judgments, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "South Carolina v. Scott" on Justia Law

Petitioner Shawn Reaves was convicted of voluntary manslaughter after the shooting death of Keshawn Applewhite. He argued on appeal that deficiencies in the police investigation (including the loss of potentially exculpatory evidence and the failure to ascertain the identity of a second shooter) deprived him of a fair trial, and delays occasioned by the State's faulty investigation deprived him of the right to a speedy trial. After review, the Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed petitioner's conviction. View "South Carolina v. Reaves" on Justia Law

In 2008, respondent Brittany Johnson was arrested in Darlington County by United States Marshals for the shooting death of Monica Burroughs. At trial, the State sought to introduce a videotaped recording of the police's interrogation of respondent after she was arrested, and the court held a "Jackson v. Denno" hearing to assess the voluntariness of the statement. During cross-examination, the State sought to discredit Respondent's testimony by eliciting testimony that she was experienced with the criminal justice system and had been represented by counsel in the past in the juvenile justice system. In addition, respondent acknowledged that despite understanding her rights, she wished to waive them at that time, and further confirmed the recorded statement displayed her telling officers that she wished to waive her rights. Based on this testimony, the trial court determined that the confession was voluntarily given. The State subsequently introduced respondent's videotaped statement at trial over defense counsel's objection. The jury ultimately found respondent guilty of murder, and the trial court sentenced her to thirty years' imprisonment. Without discussion, the court of appeals reversed and remanded the conviction, finding the trial court erred in admitting respondent's statement to police. On appeal, the State argued the court of appeals: (1) applied an incorrect appellate standard of review in assessing the trial judge's factual findings; (2) erred in reversing the trial court's ruling where respondent was not being interrogated when she inquired about counsel and did not unequivocally invoke her right to counsel; and (3) failed to consider if respondent was prejudiced by the admission of the evidence. Because the effect of the trial court's credibility finding was that respondent did not unequivocally invoke her right to counsel, the Supreme Court upheld the trial court's finding that respondent's statement was voluntary. View "South Carolina v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Respondent and his wife (collectively, the Larmands) owned a branch of "Pop-A-Lock," a national locksmith franchise company. Ryan Lochbaum worked at the Larmands' branch of Pop-A-Lock for several years until he was fired. The Larmands became suspicious that he and one of their current employees, Mike Taylor, were conspiring to defraud Pop-A-Lock by masquerading as a locksmith; after the customer paid Lochbaum for "Pop-A-Lock's" services, Taylor and Lochbaum would split the money between themselves, and Taylor would inform the Larmands that the customer had cancelled the call. To confirm their suspicions, the Larmands "mystery shopped" Taylor. Respondent's brother-in-law, Leo Lemire, posed as the customer. Neither Lochbaum nor Taylor answered the mystery shopper's call. Lochbaum and three of his neighbors (Mark Whittington, Devin Fivecoat, and Ron Lee) were socializing outside Lochbaum's house at the time of the call. Respondent approached the group, and subsequently got into an argument with Lochbaum. One minute into the exchange, Respondent broke eye contact with Lochbaum and saw Lemire approaching quickly and pointing a handgun at Lochbaum. Lochbaum seized the gun and began to struggle with Lemire. Respondent placed Lochbaum in a chokehold and attempted to pull him away from Lemire. A grand jury would indict Respondent and Lemire for lynching, conspiracy, and pointing and presenting a firearm. At trial, Respondent moved for failed to provide any testimony that the attack on Lochbaum was premeditated, or that Respondent and Lemire jointly planned the attack. Rather, Respondent asserted he was merely speaking with Lochbaum when Lemire appeared, and he only reacted to Lochbaum's "affirmative action" of "jump[ing] on [] Lemire" to grab the gun. The trial court denied Respondent's motion, and the jury later convicted Respondent and Lemire of second-degree lynching, criminal conspiracy, and pointing and presenting a firearm. The court of appeals reversed the trial court's decision on the directed verdict. The Supreme Court granted the State's petition for a writ of certiorari to review the court of appeals' decision. "Although Respondent presented plausible explanations for each of these facts," and "[g]iven the deferential standard of review, we find the State presented sufficient circumstantial evidence of premeditation and a common plan or scheme such that the trial judge properly denied Respondent's motion for a directed verdict." Accordingly, the court of appeals erred in reversing Respondent's convictions, and the Supreme Court reversed that court's decision. View "South Carolina v. Larmand" on Justia Law

In October 2011, respondent Cody Gordon was stopped at a license and registration checkpoint by a South Carolina Highway Patrol Officer. The officer administered several field sobriety tests. The test at issue in this case was the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus (HGN) test. The dashboard camera on the officer's patrol car recorded the entire incident, including all field sobriety tests, with continuous recording. The stop occurred at night, so the lighting was not perfect, but the officer had Gordon stand in the light of his patrol car's headlights and further illuminated Gordon by shining a flashlight directly on his face. The State appealed the Court of Appeals' affirmation of the circuit court's interpretation of section 56-5-2953 of the South Carolina Code. The appellate court found that the statute required officers to record the head of the motorist when administering the HGN field sobriety test and that respondent's head was not sufficiently visible. The State contended that a plain reading of the statute made no mention of the motorist's "head." Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the statute required that the motorist's head be recorded in the video; however, the Court vacated the mandate to remand to the magistrate court for further consideration. The Court reinstated respondent's conviction as it found that the officer complied with the statute in recording Gordon's HGN test. View "South Carolina v. Gordon" on Justia Law

The minor lived with Appellant and her mother for approximately six years from the time she was five years old until she was eleven. Appellant and the child had a close relationship, even as her mother's and Appellant's relationship ended. In November 2009, when she was eleven years old, the victim told her mother that Appellant had been sexually abusing her, including intercourse, since she was seven years old. There was no physical evidence of abuse, and Appellant denied the accusations. Appellant was convicted of first degree criminal sexual conduct with a minor, and received a life sentence without the possibility of parole (LWOP). On appeal, he challenged the constitutionality of S.C. Code Ann. 17-23-175 (2014) on Confrontation Clause grounds, and contended the trial court erred in qualifying one of the testifying witnesses as an expert in both forensic interviewing and child abuse assessment. Furthermore, Appellant alleged that witness' testimony impermissibly bolstered that of the minor. Upon review, the Supreme Court found the statute constitutional, but agreed with Appellant that the trial court erred in qualifying the witness as an expert, and in allowing bolstering testimony. Accordingly, the Court reversed Appellant's conviction and sentence. View "South Carolina v. Anderson" on Justia Law

Petitioners Julia Gorman and Robert Palmer were tried jointly for the death of Gorman's seventeen month-old grandson. Palmer and Gorman, who lived together but were not married, were each convicted of homicide by child abuse, aiding and abetting homicide by child abuse, and unlawful conduct towards a child. On direct appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed both Palmer's and Gorman's aiding and abetting convictions, and a majority affirmed both petitioners' homicide and unlawful conduct convictions. The South Carolina Supreme Court granted both petitioners' and the State's petitions for writs of certiorari to review the directed verdict issues. Upon review of the arguments on appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' reversal of both aiding and abetting convictions, finding the State did not present enough evidence to support those convictions. With regard to the denial of Gorman's homicide and unlawful conduct directed verdict motions, the Supreme Court affirmed. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals' affirmance of Palmer's convictions for homicide and unlawful conduct finding he was entitled to a directed verdict on both charges. View "South Carolina v. Palmer" on Justia Law