Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The State appealed the court of appeals' decision to reverse respondent Christopher Broadnax's convictions for armed robbery and kidnapping, and remanding for a new trial. During his testimony, respondent denied any involvement in the robbery. However, Respondent's counsel elicited testimony regarding respondent's prior convictions for armed robbery. The State likewise questioned respondent about his prior convictions. The jury found respondent guilty of armed robbery and four counts of kidnapping, and the trial judge sentenced respondent to a mandatory minimum sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole based on the prior armed robbery convictions. On appeal to the court of appeals, respondent argued, inter alia, that the trial court erred in admitting his prior armed robbery conviction for impeachment purposes. The court of appeals reversed and remanded the case to the trial court for a new trial. Specifically, the court of appeals found: (1) respondent's prior armed robbery convictions, without more, did not constitute crimes of dishonesty, and therefore, the trial court should have conducted a balancing test prior to admitting testimony regarding Respondent's prior armed robbery convictions; and (2) such error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Upon review, the Supreme Court disagreed with the State's argument that the court of appeals erred in reversing the trial court because armed robbery was a "crime of dishonesty or false statement" such that it is automatically admissible under Rule 609(a)(2), SCRE. The Court agreed, however, with the State's contention that the error in admitting the prior armed robbery convictions was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court found other evidence implicating respondent in those crimes was overwhelming. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "South Carolina v. Broadnax" on Justia Law

Petitioner Rushan Counts was convicted of possession with intent to distribute marijuana, third offense. On appeal, he argued the circuit court judge erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence that was found at his residence after he opened his door in response to police officers knocking on the door. Petitioner claimed the use of the "knock and talk" investigative technique at his home violated his rights under the state and federal constitutions. The Court of Appeals summarily affirmed Counts' conviction and sentence. The South Carolina Supreme Court granted Counts' petition for a writ of certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court found that the appellate court erred in failing to rule on Counts' argument regarding the heightened privacy protection afforded by the South Carolina Constitution. "For our state constitutional right to privacy to have any significance, we believe there must be some minimum evidentiary standard met before law enforcement conduct a warrantless search of a South Carolina citizen's home. Therefore, we hold that law enforcement must have reasonable suspicion of illegal activity before approaching the targeted residence and conducting the 'knock and talk' investigative technique." The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision, as modified. View "South Carolina v. Counts" on Justia Law

The State of South Carolina appealed the Court of Appeals' decision reversing respondent Christopher Broadnax's convictions for armed robbery and kidnapping, and remanding for a new trial. The State argued: (1) the appellate court erred in reversing the trial court on the issue of whether armed robbery was a "crime of dishonesty or false statement;" and (2) the appellate court erred in refusing to find error in the admission of respondent's prior criminal record harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Court disagreed with the State that armed robbery was a "crime of dishonesty," but agreed that the appeals court erred in refusing to find error in the admission of respondent's criminal record. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "South Carolina v. Broadnax" on Justia Law

A witness observed a vehicle being driven erratically on I-385 and ultimately wrecking. Police responded to the wreck and organized a search after learning from a witness that the driver had fled the scene. Officers were unable to locate the driver and cleared the scene. Several hours later, police responded to a call indicating an individual had been found walking down I-385. When police arrived, respondent was receiving medical care in an ambulance. The responding officer read respondent his Miranda rights and conducted a horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) test while respondent was in the ambulance. The officer initiated his audio recording device by a switch on his belt during the HGN test. After the HGN test, respondent did not go to the hospital, so the officer conducted a few more tests. Respondent failed both the HGN and ABC tests. The ABC test and the officer's admonitions while administering the HGN test were captured by audio recording. Neither test was captured by video recording. Respondent was arrested for DUI, and placed in a patrol vehicle. Facing the in-car camera towards respondent, the officer read respondent his Miranda rights again. Respondent sought dismissal of the DUI charge, alleging the videotape of his conduct at the scene failed to comply with the statutory videotaping requirements, because the statute governing the recording mandated inclusion of the individual being advised of his Miranda rights prior to the administration of field sobriety tests. The trial court denied respondent's motion to dismiss. The trial court recognized this incident was not a typical DUI stop because the officer's investigation began hours after respondent's wreck. The South Carolina Supreme Court granted the State's petition for a writ of certiorari to review the Court of Appeals' opinion that found the trial court should have dismissed respondent's DUI charge because the videotape did not comply with the statutory requirements for videotaping respondent's conduct at the scene of his DUI arrest. After review, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated respondent's conviction because the videotape satisfied the requirements of the applicable statute once videotaping became practicable. View "South Carolina v. Henkel" on Justia Law

Respondent Steven Barnes' first capital conviction and sentence were reversed on appeal because he was denied his constitutional right to represent himself at trial. In that first case, the South Carolina Supreme Court declined to adopt the heightened competency standard for a defendant who seeks to represent himself which is permitted, but not required, by "Indiana v. Edwards," (554 U.S. 164 (2008)). Since the "Edwards" standard had been applied by the circuit judge in this case, the South Carolina Court held it was "constrained to reverse" respondent's conviction and sentence. The State planned to retry respondent, and indicated it would again seek the death penalty. Respondent sought the appointment of counsel to represent him in these new proceedings. At the appointment hearing, the State argued that in seeking representation for the retrial, respondent essentially conceded that his prior conviction was constitutionally obtained. The State contended that in light of this concession, respondent's original conviction and sentence should be reinstated and the Supreme Court should proceed to review the issues raised but not reached in the first appeal. The circuit court denied the State's request. The South Carolina Supreme Court, in review of this case, found that the State relied on appellate decisions that remanded the question of the defendant's waiver of his right to counsel to the trial court for reconsideration. "It is apparent to us that the State now regrets that in respondent's first appeal it chose to argue only that the trial court's adoption and application of the standard announced in Edwards, [. . .], was correct, rather than to ask in the alternative for a remand if the Court were not to adopt Edwards. The State did not seek this alternative relief, we decided the appeal on its merits, and properly returned the remittitur to the circuit court. Respondent is entitled to the new trial, with all its attendant constitutional rights, pursuant to our decision in his first appeal." View "South Carolina v. Barnes" on Justia Law

During her commute to work, H.M., the victim, frequently passed by a local grocery store and casually greeted the people loitering outside, many of whom lived in the area and often gathered there. Although the victim did not know any of these people beyond exchanging a passing greeting, she came to learn that one of the people with whom she exchanged pleasantries was nicknamed "Black." Black followed H.M. home one day, forcibly entered her apartment, beat and raped her, threatening to kill her if she told anyone of the incident. The victim ultimately did call police, and "Black" was revealed to be Respondent Daniel Jenkins. The nurse conducting the rape found semen on vaginal and rectal swabs taken from the victim, as well as on various clothing and bodily swabs. A forensic DNA analyst developed a DNA profile from the rape examination swabs, and compared that profile to Respondent's DNA profile. The DNA profiles matched. Respondent moved to suppress the DNA evidence, arguing that the affidavit did not establish probable cause. The trial court denied the motion to suppress. Ultimately, a jury convicted Respondent of CSC-First. Because of Respondent's two prior convictions for CSC-First and carjacking, both of which are "most serious offenses" under section 17-25-45(C)(1) of the South Carolina Code, the trial court imposed a mandatory sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole. After its review, the court of appeals held that the affidavit in support of the warrant did not establish probable cause because it contained only conclusory statements; failed to set forth the source of the facts contained therein; lacked any information allowing the Magistrate to make a credibility determination regarding the source of the information; and that the affidavit was defective because it did not contain any indication that the police had obtained DNA evidence from the rape examination, and thus it did not establish that Respondent's DNA would have been relevant to the investigation. The court of appeals concluded that admitting the DNA evidence was not harmless error because it bolstered the victim's credibility regarding two critical facts: that Respondent was her attacker, and that the sexual intercourse was not consensual. Despite reversing the trial court's admission of the DNA evidence, the court of appeals did not order a new trial, but instead remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing in response to the State's argument that Respondent's DNA would have been inevitably discovered regardless of the defective search warrant. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals. Notwithstanding the DNA evidence, there was abundant, independent evidence in the record from which the jury could have found Respondent guilty. Accordingly, contrary to the court of appeals' assertion, the Court held that this case was not dependent on the credibility of the victim and Respondent, with the DNA evidence serving as the only physical evidence that Respondent committed the assault. View "South Carolina v. Jenkins" on Justia Law

In exchange for the State's promise not to seek the death penalty on three charges of murder, Anthony Sanders consented to a bench trial and waived his right to any appellate, post-conviction, or habeas corpus review. He was convicted of three counts of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. His subsequent application for post-conviction relief (PCR) was dismissed based on the agreement. Sanders argued the PCR court erred in failing to allow him to present evidence that his waiver was entered into upon the advice of constitutionally ineffective trial counsel. The Supreme Court agreed, and remanded back to the PCR court for an evidentiary hearing. View "Sanders v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

This case arose from the death of Martin Gasque after a 2010 University of South Carolina football game against the University of Alabama. Both Appellant Curtis Simms and the victim tailgated near the stadium during the football game, and both were intoxicated as they left the area. Appellant, wearing an Alabama jersey, left the tailgate with friends, riding as the front-seat passenger in a green truck driven by a friend. As they attempted to exit the tailgate parking lot, the victim, a South Carolina fan, was the front-seat passenger in a black truck driven by his friend, and was boisterously engaging South Carolina fans through his open window. The two trucks and passengers crossed paths when the black truck blocked the green truck from exiting the parking lot. Appellant exited the green truck and approached the black truck's passenger side, where the victim was sitting. Appellant punched the victim once while he was seated in the truck, and then hit the victim four or five more times as he exited the black truck. The victim was knocked unconscious, and fell into the roadway parallel to the truck on the white line comprising the edge of the lane of traffic. After the victim hit the ground, the victim's friend began pulling his truck forward to the right in order to move the truck onto the shoulder and out of the roadway. As he did so, he unknowingly began to slowly roll over the victim between his legs, then over his groin, his abdomen, his chest, and finally, his head. Appellant yelled at the black-truck-driver to stop, and banged on the truck with his fists, but this only caused the driver to accelerate. The victim died at the scene after suffering a life-threatening hinge fracture. Appellant was charged with both aggravated breach of the peach and involuntary manslaughter. The jury returned a verdict of not guilty on the involuntary manslaughter charge, but found Appellant guilty of aggravated breach of the peace. The trial court sentenced Appellant to ten years' imprisonment, suspended upon the service of five years' imprisonment and three years' probation, but later reduced Appellant's sentence to ten years' imprisonment suspended upon the service of three years' imprisonment, plus three years' probation. Appellant argued on appeal of his conviction and sentence that: (1) the trial court erred in refusing to direct a verdict of acquittal with respect to the breach of the peace charge; (2) the trial court imposed an illegal sentence; and (2) the trial court erred in refusing to admit certain eyewitness testimony. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "South Carolina v. Simms" on Justia Law

Respondent Richard Niles, Jr. was convicted of murder, armed robbery, and possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime. Respondent, his girlfriend and Ervin Moore met the victim, James Salter, in a store parking lot intending to purchase drugs. The evidence at trial focused on whether respondent was the aggressor in the encounter. On the facts entered into evidence at trial, the trial court instructed the jury on the law of murder and self-defense, but refused Niles's request to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter, reasoning that the evidence showed Niles was either guilty of murder or he was not guilty of any crime based on his claim of self-defense. The court of appeals reversed Niles's murder conviction and remanded the case for a new trial, finding the evidence compelled a jury instruction on the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter. The Supreme Court granted the State's for certiorari review to consider the State's argument that the court of appeals erred in determining Niles was entitled to a jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter because there was no evidence at trial that Niles acted in the sudden heat of passion. The Supreme Court held that the evidence did not warrant a voluntary manslaughter charge, and reversed the court of appeals. View "South Carolina v. Niles" on Justia Law

Petitioner-respondent Roger Bruce was convicted of murder for the death of his girlfriend Laura Creel. Police performed a welfare check on the home Bruce and Creel shared. Bruce allowed the officers inside. Finding nothing, officers questioned Bruce, who told them Creel had left after the two argued. During the conversation, the officers noticed a cell phone and car keys on a table nearby. Bruce informed the officers they both belonged to Creel and an officer picked up the keys and went outside to the vehicle. The officer looked through the windows into the interior of the car and then attempted to open the trunk, but it would not open. He then asked Bruce which key opened the trunk and Bruce moved toward the officer as if to grab the keys. The officer pulled the keys back, and a second officer pressed the trunk release button. Inside the trunk, the officers discovered Creel's body. During the course of testimony regarding how the police found Creel's body in the trunk, Bruce objected "to the discovery of the body in this fashion" on the basis that there was no consent and no search warrant was obtained. When the trial court asked what basis Bruce had to object, he responded that it was on his property and the keys were in his house. The solicitor argued it was Creel's car and Bruce therefore had no expectation of privacy. He further claimed the officer who initially took the keys had testified the previous day that Bruce offered to open the trunk for them. Ultimately, the court denied the motion stating, "[i]t appears that this is inevitable discovery; but/for hitting the release button and opening the trunk according to the earlier testimony Mr. Bruce was gonna [sic] open the trunk for them, or at least was providing the keys to do so." Bruce was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, Bruce argued the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress because Bruce never consented to the officers taking the keys from his home. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court did not err in denying Bruce's motion to suppress. View "South Carolina v. Bruce" on Justia Law