Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2008, respondent Brittany Johnson was arrested in Darlington County by United States Marshals for the shooting death of Monica Burroughs. At trial, the State sought to introduce a videotaped recording of the police's interrogation of respondent after she was arrested, and the court held a "Jackson v. Denno" hearing to assess the voluntariness of the statement. During cross-examination, the State sought to discredit Respondent's testimony by eliciting testimony that she was experienced with the criminal justice system and had been represented by counsel in the past in the juvenile justice system. In addition, respondent acknowledged that despite understanding her rights, she wished to waive them at that time, and further confirmed the recorded statement displayed her telling officers that she wished to waive her rights. Based on this testimony, the trial court determined that the confession was voluntarily given. The State subsequently introduced respondent's videotaped statement at trial over defense counsel's objection. The jury ultimately found respondent guilty of murder, and the trial court sentenced her to thirty years' imprisonment. Without discussion, the court of appeals reversed and remanded the conviction, finding the trial court erred in admitting respondent's statement to police. On appeal, the State argued the court of appeals: (1) applied an incorrect appellate standard of review in assessing the trial judge's factual findings; (2) erred in reversing the trial court's ruling where respondent was not being interrogated when she inquired about counsel and did not unequivocally invoke her right to counsel; and (3) failed to consider if respondent was prejudiced by the admission of the evidence. Because the effect of the trial court's credibility finding was that respondent did not unequivocally invoke her right to counsel, the Supreme Court upheld the trial court's finding that respondent's statement was voluntary. View "South Carolina v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Respondent and his wife (collectively, the Larmands) owned a branch of "Pop-A-Lock," a national locksmith franchise company. Ryan Lochbaum worked at the Larmands' branch of Pop-A-Lock for several years until he was fired. The Larmands became suspicious that he and one of their current employees, Mike Taylor, were conspiring to defraud Pop-A-Lock by masquerading as a locksmith; after the customer paid Lochbaum for "Pop-A-Lock's" services, Taylor and Lochbaum would split the money between themselves, and Taylor would inform the Larmands that the customer had cancelled the call. To confirm their suspicions, the Larmands "mystery shopped" Taylor. Respondent's brother-in-law, Leo Lemire, posed as the customer. Neither Lochbaum nor Taylor answered the mystery shopper's call. Lochbaum and three of his neighbors (Mark Whittington, Devin Fivecoat, and Ron Lee) were socializing outside Lochbaum's house at the time of the call. Respondent approached the group, and subsequently got into an argument with Lochbaum. One minute into the exchange, Respondent broke eye contact with Lochbaum and saw Lemire approaching quickly and pointing a handgun at Lochbaum. Lochbaum seized the gun and began to struggle with Lemire. Respondent placed Lochbaum in a chokehold and attempted to pull him away from Lemire. A grand jury would indict Respondent and Lemire for lynching, conspiracy, and pointing and presenting a firearm. At trial, Respondent moved for failed to provide any testimony that the attack on Lochbaum was premeditated, or that Respondent and Lemire jointly planned the attack. Rather, Respondent asserted he was merely speaking with Lochbaum when Lemire appeared, and he only reacted to Lochbaum's "affirmative action" of "jump[ing] on [] Lemire" to grab the gun. The trial court denied Respondent's motion, and the jury later convicted Respondent and Lemire of second-degree lynching, criminal conspiracy, and pointing and presenting a firearm. The court of appeals reversed the trial court's decision on the directed verdict. The Supreme Court granted the State's petition for a writ of certiorari to review the court of appeals' decision. "Although Respondent presented plausible explanations for each of these facts," and "[g]iven the deferential standard of review, we find the State presented sufficient circumstantial evidence of premeditation and a common plan or scheme such that the trial judge properly denied Respondent's motion for a directed verdict." Accordingly, the court of appeals erred in reversing Respondent's convictions, and the Supreme Court reversed that court's decision. View "South Carolina v. Larmand" on Justia Law

In October 2011, respondent Cody Gordon was stopped at a license and registration checkpoint by a South Carolina Highway Patrol Officer. The officer administered several field sobriety tests. The test at issue in this case was the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus (HGN) test. The dashboard camera on the officer's patrol car recorded the entire incident, including all field sobriety tests, with continuous recording. The stop occurred at night, so the lighting was not perfect, but the officer had Gordon stand in the light of his patrol car's headlights and further illuminated Gordon by shining a flashlight directly on his face. The State appealed the Court of Appeals' affirmation of the circuit court's interpretation of section 56-5-2953 of the South Carolina Code. The appellate court found that the statute required officers to record the head of the motorist when administering the HGN field sobriety test and that respondent's head was not sufficiently visible. The State contended that a plain reading of the statute made no mention of the motorist's "head." Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the statute required that the motorist's head be recorded in the video; however, the Court vacated the mandate to remand to the magistrate court for further consideration. The Court reinstated respondent's conviction as it found that the officer complied with the statute in recording Gordon's HGN test. View "South Carolina v. Gordon" on Justia Law

The minor lived with Appellant and her mother for approximately six years from the time she was five years old until she was eleven. Appellant and the child had a close relationship, even as her mother's and Appellant's relationship ended. In November 2009, when she was eleven years old, the victim told her mother that Appellant had been sexually abusing her, including intercourse, since she was seven years old. There was no physical evidence of abuse, and Appellant denied the accusations. Appellant was convicted of first degree criminal sexual conduct with a minor, and received a life sentence without the possibility of parole (LWOP). On appeal, he challenged the constitutionality of S.C. Code Ann. 17-23-175 (2014) on Confrontation Clause grounds, and contended the trial court erred in qualifying one of the testifying witnesses as an expert in both forensic interviewing and child abuse assessment. Furthermore, Appellant alleged that witness' testimony impermissibly bolstered that of the minor. Upon review, the Supreme Court found the statute constitutional, but agreed with Appellant that the trial court erred in qualifying the witness as an expert, and in allowing bolstering testimony. Accordingly, the Court reversed Appellant's conviction and sentence. View "South Carolina v. Anderson" on Justia Law

Petitioners Julia Gorman and Robert Palmer were tried jointly for the death of Gorman's seventeen month-old grandson. Palmer and Gorman, who lived together but were not married, were each convicted of homicide by child abuse, aiding and abetting homicide by child abuse, and unlawful conduct towards a child. On direct appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed both Palmer's and Gorman's aiding and abetting convictions, and a majority affirmed both petitioners' homicide and unlawful conduct convictions. The South Carolina Supreme Court granted both petitioners' and the State's petitions for writs of certiorari to review the directed verdict issues. Upon review of the arguments on appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' reversal of both aiding and abetting convictions, finding the State did not present enough evidence to support those convictions. With regard to the denial of Gorman's homicide and unlawful conduct directed verdict motions, the Supreme Court affirmed. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals' affirmance of Palmer's convictions for homicide and unlawful conduct finding he was entitled to a directed verdict on both charges. View "South Carolina v. Palmer" on Justia Law

The State appealed the court of appeals' decision to reverse respondent Christopher Broadnax's convictions for armed robbery and kidnapping, and remanding for a new trial. During his testimony, respondent denied any involvement in the robbery. However, Respondent's counsel elicited testimony regarding respondent's prior convictions for armed robbery. The State likewise questioned respondent about his prior convictions. The jury found respondent guilty of armed robbery and four counts of kidnapping, and the trial judge sentenced respondent to a mandatory minimum sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole based on the prior armed robbery convictions. On appeal to the court of appeals, respondent argued, inter alia, that the trial court erred in admitting his prior armed robbery conviction for impeachment purposes. The court of appeals reversed and remanded the case to the trial court for a new trial. Specifically, the court of appeals found: (1) respondent's prior armed robbery convictions, without more, did not constitute crimes of dishonesty, and therefore, the trial court should have conducted a balancing test prior to admitting testimony regarding Respondent's prior armed robbery convictions; and (2) such error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Upon review, the Supreme Court disagreed with the State's argument that the court of appeals erred in reversing the trial court because armed robbery was a "crime of dishonesty or false statement" such that it is automatically admissible under Rule 609(a)(2), SCRE. The Court agreed, however, with the State's contention that the error in admitting the prior armed robbery convictions was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court found other evidence implicating respondent in those crimes was overwhelming. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "South Carolina v. Broadnax" on Justia Law

Petitioner Rushan Counts was convicted of possession with intent to distribute marijuana, third offense. On appeal, he argued the circuit court judge erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence that was found at his residence after he opened his door in response to police officers knocking on the door. Petitioner claimed the use of the "knock and talk" investigative technique at his home violated his rights under the state and federal constitutions. The Court of Appeals summarily affirmed Counts' conviction and sentence. The South Carolina Supreme Court granted Counts' petition for a writ of certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court found that the appellate court erred in failing to rule on Counts' argument regarding the heightened privacy protection afforded by the South Carolina Constitution. "For our state constitutional right to privacy to have any significance, we believe there must be some minimum evidentiary standard met before law enforcement conduct a warrantless search of a South Carolina citizen's home. Therefore, we hold that law enforcement must have reasonable suspicion of illegal activity before approaching the targeted residence and conducting the 'knock and talk' investigative technique." The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision, as modified. View "South Carolina v. Counts" on Justia Law

The State of South Carolina appealed the Court of Appeals' decision reversing respondent Christopher Broadnax's convictions for armed robbery and kidnapping, and remanding for a new trial. The State argued: (1) the appellate court erred in reversing the trial court on the issue of whether armed robbery was a "crime of dishonesty or false statement;" and (2) the appellate court erred in refusing to find error in the admission of respondent's prior criminal record harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Court disagreed with the State that armed robbery was a "crime of dishonesty," but agreed that the appeals court erred in refusing to find error in the admission of respondent's criminal record. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "South Carolina v. Broadnax" on Justia Law

A witness observed a vehicle being driven erratically on I-385 and ultimately wrecking. Police responded to the wreck and organized a search after learning from a witness that the driver had fled the scene. Officers were unable to locate the driver and cleared the scene. Several hours later, police responded to a call indicating an individual had been found walking down I-385. When police arrived, respondent was receiving medical care in an ambulance. The responding officer read respondent his Miranda rights and conducted a horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) test while respondent was in the ambulance. The officer initiated his audio recording device by a switch on his belt during the HGN test. After the HGN test, respondent did not go to the hospital, so the officer conducted a few more tests. Respondent failed both the HGN and ABC tests. The ABC test and the officer's admonitions while administering the HGN test were captured by audio recording. Neither test was captured by video recording. Respondent was arrested for DUI, and placed in a patrol vehicle. Facing the in-car camera towards respondent, the officer read respondent his Miranda rights again. Respondent sought dismissal of the DUI charge, alleging the videotape of his conduct at the scene failed to comply with the statutory videotaping requirements, because the statute governing the recording mandated inclusion of the individual being advised of his Miranda rights prior to the administration of field sobriety tests. The trial court denied respondent's motion to dismiss. The trial court recognized this incident was not a typical DUI stop because the officer's investigation began hours after respondent's wreck. The South Carolina Supreme Court granted the State's petition for a writ of certiorari to review the Court of Appeals' opinion that found the trial court should have dismissed respondent's DUI charge because the videotape did not comply with the statutory requirements for videotaping respondent's conduct at the scene of his DUI arrest. After review, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated respondent's conviction because the videotape satisfied the requirements of the applicable statute once videotaping became practicable. View "South Carolina v. Henkel" on Justia Law

Respondent Steven Barnes' first capital conviction and sentence were reversed on appeal because he was denied his constitutional right to represent himself at trial. In that first case, the South Carolina Supreme Court declined to adopt the heightened competency standard for a defendant who seeks to represent himself which is permitted, but not required, by "Indiana v. Edwards," (554 U.S. 164 (2008)). Since the "Edwards" standard had been applied by the circuit judge in this case, the South Carolina Court held it was "constrained to reverse" respondent's conviction and sentence. The State planned to retry respondent, and indicated it would again seek the death penalty. Respondent sought the appointment of counsel to represent him in these new proceedings. At the appointment hearing, the State argued that in seeking representation for the retrial, respondent essentially conceded that his prior conviction was constitutionally obtained. The State contended that in light of this concession, respondent's original conviction and sentence should be reinstated and the Supreme Court should proceed to review the issues raised but not reached in the first appeal. The circuit court denied the State's request. The South Carolina Supreme Court, in review of this case, found that the State relied on appellate decisions that remanded the question of the defendant's waiver of his right to counsel to the trial court for reconsideration. "It is apparent to us that the State now regrets that in respondent's first appeal it chose to argue only that the trial court's adoption and application of the standard announced in Edwards, [. . .], was correct, rather than to ask in the alternative for a remand if the Court were not to adopt Edwards. The State did not seek this alternative relief, we decided the appeal on its merits, and properly returned the remittitur to the circuit court. Respondent is entitled to the new trial, with all its attendant constitutional rights, pursuant to our decision in his first appeal." View "South Carolina v. Barnes" on Justia Law