Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The South Carolina Department of Motor Vehicles suspended Petitioner Phillip Brown's driver's license following his arrest for driving under the influence (DUI). The Hearing Officer for the South Carolina Office of Motor Vehicles Hearings ("OMVH") rescinded the suspension on the ground that the arresting officer failed to present reliable evidence that the breathalyzer test was administered and the sample obtained in accordance with the provisions of section 56-5-2950. Specifically, the OMVH found that the required "simulator test" was not conducted prior to the actual test. The Administrative Law Court (ALC) reversed and reinstated Petitioner's license suspension. On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the ALC's order, finding Petitioner's failure to contemporaneously object to the arresting officer's testimony with respect to the functioning of the breathalyzer precluded the review of the issue on appeal. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed Petitioner's driver's license suspension. View "SCDMV v. Brown" on Justia Law

On February 14, 2013, the Attorney General received an ethics complaint, alleging possible violations of the Ethics Act by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, Robert W. Harrell, Jr. The complaint was originally submitted by a private citizen to the House Legislative Ethics Committee. That same day, the Attorney General forwarded the complaint to South Carolina Law Enforcement Division (SLED), and SLED carried out a 10-month criminal investigation into the matter. At the conclusion of the investigation, the Chief of SLED and the Attorney General petitioned the presiding judge of the state grand jury to impanel the state grand jury on January 13, 2014. Acting presiding judge of the state grand jury, the Honorable L. Casey Manning, subsequently impaneled the state grand jury. On February 24, 2014, the Speaker filed a motion to disqualify the Attorney General from participating in the grand jury investigation. On March 21, 2014, a hearing was held on the motion after which the court sua sponte raised the issue of subject matter jurisdiction. Another hearing was held, and the court found, as presiding judge of the state grand jury, it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear any matter arising from the Ethics Act, and refused to reach the issue of disqualification. The court discharged the grand jury and ordered the Attorney General to cease his criminal investigation. The Attorney General appealed that order to the Supreme Court. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded the circuit court erred in concluding that the House Ethics Committee had exclusive jurisdiction over the original complaint. While the crime of public corruption could include violations of the Ethics Act, the state grand jury's jurisdiction is confined to the purposes set forth in the constitution and the state grand jury statute, as circumscribed by the impaneling order. While the Court reversed the circuit court's order, it "in no way suggest[ed] that it was error for the presiding judge to inquire whether the state grand jury was 'conducting investigative activity within its jurisdiction or proper investigative activity.'" The case was remanded for a decision on whether the Attorney General should have been disqualified from participating in the state grand jury proceedings. View "Harrell v. Attorney General of South Carolina" on Justia Law

Appellant Bruce Hill was convicted of two murders and first-degree burglary, arising from a home invasion and double homicide in Horry County in 2005. He received concurrent life sentences for the murders and a concurrent thirty-year sentence for the burglary. Prior to Appellant's trial, another individual, Richard Gagnon, was tried and convicted of these murders. During Gagnon's trial, the State maintained that there were two perpetrators involved, as there was blood at the scene that could not belong to either victim or to Gagnon. From blood droplets found at the crime scene, the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division (SLED) developed a DNA profile. The profile did not match either of the victims or Gagnon's. Approximately four years after the murders, the Horry County Police Department (HCPD) was notified in a letter from SLED of a CODIS match for the unknown individual's blood found at the crime scene: Appellant's, who, at that time, was incarcerated in Tennessee (Appellant's DNA had been placed into the CODIS database by the Tennessee Department of Corrections). HCPD agents travelled to Tennessee for the purpose of obtaining a buccal swab on Appellant for further DNA comparison. However, the investigators who obtained this order subsequently left HCPD, and the evidence of the swab was lost. Arrest warrants were issued charging Appellant with burglary and murder. In 2010, Appellant requested the final deposition of the charges pending against him in South Carolina. The solicitor's office and the clerk of court acknowledged receipt of Appellant's request in September, 2010, which triggered the IAD 180-day clock to bring trial. Appellant arrived in South Carolina on October 21, 2010; On March 1, 2011, the last day of the 180-day Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act (IAD) limit, a hearing on the State's motion for a six-month continuance was held. Appellant opposed the continuance arguing that the State did not meet its burden for obtaining a continuance under the IAD. The circuit court disagreed with Appellant and ruled that there was good cause for granting the State's request. In addition to granting a continuance, the court ordered that a "Schmerber" hearing be conducted the next week. At the final pretrial hearing, the circuit court: (1) ruled that neither the State nor Appellant could make any reference to Gagnon's conviction, as it was irrelevant to the determination of Appellant's guilt; and (2) denied Appellant's motion to suppress any mention of Appellant being in the CODIS database. Appellant was ultimately convicted on all counts, and he appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "South Carolina v. Hill" on Justia Law

Appellant pled guilty to two counts of indecent exposure and was sentenced to two consecutive three-year terms, with credit for 253 days already served. Appellant contended the trial court erred in denying his request for a full evidentiary hearing before the circuit court determined whether appellant's indecent exposure pleas should have been classified as sexually violent offenses for purposes of the Sexually Violent Predator Act (the SVP Act). Under the facts of this case, the Supreme Court found no reversible error, and therefore affirmed the trial court. View "South Carolina v. Wessinger" on Justia Law

Appellant Donta Reid challenged the trial court's failure to suppress his confession, arguing it was obtained in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The Supreme Court disagreed, finding the facts of this case fell within the purview of "Montejo v. Louisiana," (556 U.S. 778 (2009)). Furthermore contended the trial court erred in failing to grant a directed verdict of acquittal on the charges for possession of a firearm during the commission of a violent crime because the State failed to prove he actually or constructively possessed a firearm. The Supreme Court found those charges were properly submitted to the jury and therefore affirmed his convictions. View "South Carolina v. Reid" on Justia Law

Appellant Anthony Nation appealed a circuit court's decision to statutorily impose lifetime global positioning satellite (GPS) monitoring on him due to his prior guilty plea for a sex offense with a minor and subsequent probation violations. On appeal, Appellant brought various constitutional challenges to section 23-3-540 and contests the validity of five of our previous decisions involving the South Carolina Sex Offender Registry and statutory authorization of GPS monitoring of sex offenders. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "South Carolina v. Nation" on Justia Law

Lawrence Burgess was convicted of possession of crack cocaine with intent to distribute and sentenced to three years in prison and ordered to pay a $25,000 fine. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Following the denial of his petition for rehearing, Burgess petitioned for a writ of certiorari to review the decision. The South Carolina Supreme Court granted the petition to review whether: (1) the multi-jurisdictional drug-enforcement agreement (which formed the purported basis of the arresting officer's authority to arrest Burgess outside of the officer's territorial jurisdiction) satisfied the statutory prerequisites to constitute a valid agreement; and (2) whether Burgess should have been permitted to cross-examine the arresting officer with his personnel records pursuant to Rule 608(c) of the South Carolina Rules of Evidence. Although the Supreme Court found the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed Burgess's conviction, it disagreed with the court's conclusion regarding the multijurisdictional drug-enforcement agreement. Accordingly, the Court affirmed as modified. View "South Carolina v. Burgess" on Justia Law

Appellant Ashley Hepburn appealed her conviction for homicide by child abuse. Sixteen-month-old Audrina Hepburn became unresponsive and was admitted to the hospital one evening in 2009. No one (including appellant) disputed the child died from child abuse. Only two people could have killed the child: appellant or her then-boyfriend, co-defendant Brandon Lewis. The jury found Appellant guilty of homicide by child abuse and Lewis guilty of aiding and abetting homicide by child abuse. The trial court sentenced Appellant to 45 years' imprisonment and Lewis to ten years' imprisonment suspended upon the service of seven years. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. Appellant argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that the trial court erred in denying her mid-trial motion for directed verdict. After its review, the Supreme Court found the trial court should have granted appellant's motion, and directed a verdict of acquittal. View "South Carolina v. Hepburn" on Justia Law

Petitioner Richard Jordan appealed the denial of his application for post-conviction relief. Petitioner was arrested and later indicted for possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine and trafficking in methamphetamine. At the suggestion of his girlfriend Cynthia Summers, petitioner retained attorney Harry DePew to represent him on the methamphetamine charges. DePew was then representing Summers on an unrelated charge. DePew did not inform the trial court at any time that he represented both petitioner and Summers. At trial, evidence was introduced pointing to Summers' involvement with the methamphetamine lab operation. The trial court invited Petitioner to present evidence as to Summers' third-party guilt. DePew, however, did not present any evidence to incriminate Summers, though Petitioner testified at the PCR hearing that he had several witnesses that were prepared to testify as to Summers' guilt. Petitioner was convicted on both charges and sentenced to twenty-five years in prison. Petitioner later sought PCR alleging ineffective assistance of counsel because DePew's dual representation of petitioner and Summers constituted an actual conflict of interest. During the PCR hearing, petitioner testified that he was not informed of the conflict of interest, did not waive the conflict of interest, and wanted to present a third-party guilt defense as to Summers. View "Jordan v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

Appellant James Curry, Jr. was convicted and sentenced for voluntary manslaughter and possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime. Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant immunity under the Protection of Persons and Property Act, and because Appellant was not prejudiced by the section 16-11-440(C) jury instruction given at his trial, Appellant's convictions and sentence were affirmed.View "South Carolina v. Curry" on Justia Law