Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Criminal Law
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Defendant Miama Kromah was convicted of: (1) infliction of great bodily injury upon a child; and (2) unlawful neglect of a child. She appealed, arguing the trial court abused its discretion in permitting two of the State's witnesses to testify about actions they took after hearsay conversations they had with the three-year-old victim who did not testify at trial. The Court of Appeals affirmed, finding the issue was not preserved for review. The Supreme Court granted Defendant's petition for a writ of certiorari. Upon review, the Court concluded that Defendant's issue on appeal was preserved. The Court addressed it in this opinion "in the interest of judicial economy." On the merits, Defendant did not show an abuse of discretion in the trial court's admission of certain testimony or forensic evidence. Consequently, the Court upheld the Court of Appeals' decision in result. View "South Carolina v. Kromah" on Justia Law

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Appellant Jarmel Rice was charged as a juvenile when he was fifteen years old for a series of violent crimes. Following a contested waiver from family court to general sessions court, Appellant pled guilty to three counts of armed robbery and one count of assault with intent to kill and received a sentence of eleven years in prison, with many other charges dismissed. In pleading guilty, Appellant raised no objection to the family court waiver. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Appellant sought to resurrect his family court constitutional challenge to the waiver as violative of "Apprendi v. New Jersey," (530 U.S. 466 (2000)). Because South Carolina permits only unconditional guilty pleas and no jurisdictional claim was presented, the Supreme Court concluded Appellant waived his right to assert a claim based on "Apprendi.": "[b]eyond Appellant's failure to assert a jurisdictional argument on appeal . . . Appellant's Apprendi challenge fails on the merits." The Court held that Apprendi is not applicable to a family court juvenile waiver hearing, for a decision whether to waive a juvenile to general sessions court in no manner determines the juvenile's guilt, innocence, or punishment - it merely determines the forum in which the case is to be tried. View "South Carolina v. Rice" on Justia Law

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Appellant Derrick Cheeks was convicted of trafficking in crack cocaine in excess of 400 grams and possession of crack with intent to distribute within proximity to a school and received concurrent sentences of twenty-five years (trafficking) and ten years (proximity). On appeal, he contended the trial court erred in failing to find a search warrant fatally defective, and in giving an improper jury instruction. Upon review, the Supreme Court found no merit in the warrant issue, but agreed the instruction was improper. Because the Court found appellant was not prejudiced by the erroneous charge, the Court affirmed his convictions and sentences. View "South Carolina v. Cheeks" on Justia Law

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The State appealed the court of appeals' decision which held that the police search and seizure of Respondent Sylvester Taylor was improper under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Respondent was indicted for possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine. The case proceeded to trial, and the sheriff's deputy that conducted the search testified in camera regarding the discovery of the crack cocaine. Respondent was found guilty and sentenced, as a third-time drug offender, to thirty years' imprisonment. The court of appeals overturned the conviction, finding that police did not have reasonable suspicion to stop Respondent. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court held that the court of appeals erred in finding that police did not have reasonable suspicion to justify an investigatory stop of Respondent. View "South Carolina v. Taylor" on Justia Law

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Defendant Danny Cortez Brown was convicted of trafficking in cocaine and sentenced to twenty-five years in prison. He appealed, arguing the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the cocaine, which was seized from a duffel bag after his arrest for an open container violation during an automobile stop. The Court of Appeals reversed on the basis the search was improper under "Arizona v. Gant," (556 U.S. 332 (2009)). Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Court of Appeals properly applied "Gant" and found the warrantless police search conducted incident to Defendant's arrest for an open container violation was illegal. Furthermore, the Court held that pursuant to the United States Supreme Court's subsequent pronouncement in "United States v. Davis," (131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011)) that the exclusionary rule was not applicable to this case because the officer relied upon existing appellate precedent at the time he conducted his search. Consequently, the decision of the Court of Appeals was reversed. View "South Carolina v. Brown" on Justia Law

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The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether Section 1-7-330 of the South Carolina Code (2005), which vested control of the criminal docket in the circuit solicitor, violated the separation of powers principle embodied in Article 1, Section 8 of the South Carolina Constitution. In 1980, the Court recognized that "[t]he authority of the court to grant continuances and to determine the order in which cases shall be heard is derived from its power to hear and decide cases. . . .This adjudicative power of the court carries with it the inherent power to control the order of its business to safeguard the rights of litigants." The Court concluded that section 1-7-330 was at odds with "this intrinsically judicial power." The Court therefore held that section 1-7-330 violated the separation of powers and therefore was unconstitutional. However, because Appellant K.C. Langford, III suffered no prejudice as a result of section 1-7-330, the Court affirmed his convictions. View "South Carolina v. Langford" on Justia Law

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The State appealed the Court of Appeals' decision invalidating respondent's sentence of life without parole. Respondent was convicted of second-degree arson and sentenced to life without parole (LWOP). The Court of Appeals affirmed the second-degree arson conviction, but reversed and remanded as to the LWOP sentence finding the use of a 1979 burning conviction was inappropriate for sentence enhancement purposes. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Court of Appeals erroneously interpreted former section 16-11110(B), though the Court noted that the impact of this erroneous interpretation has been limited by the 2010 amendment to the statute. The portion of the Court of Appeals' opinion reversing respondent's sentence was affirmed as modified. View "South Carolina v. Phillips" on Justia Law

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Nathan Stallings leased a home in Mt. Pleasant where he lived with his fiancee and a roommate. He used an internet networking site to meet other poker players, and established a regular Sunday night game in his home. Players would buy into the game for a minimum of $5 and a maximum of $20. Respondents Robert Chimento, Scott Richards, Michael Williamson, Jeremy Brestel and John Willis were convicted in municipal court of violating S.C. Code Ann. 16-19-40(a) (2003) which made it unlawful to "play . . . in any house used as a place of gaming . . . any game with cards. . . ." after they were found playing Texas Hold'em and gambling in Stallings' home. On appeal, the circuit court reversed respondents’ convictions finding they were entitled to directed verdicts or, alternatively, that section 16-19-40(a) was unconstitutional. The municipal judge found, based on expert testimony presented by the respondents, that Texas Hold'em is a game of skill. The municipal judge also held that if a game of skill were without the ambit of gaming, then he would acquit the respondents, but that there was no clear indication whether the legislature intended to criminalize only gambling on games of chance. At the hearing, the municipal judge declined to find section 16-19-40 unconstitutional. The circuit court reversed, and the Town appealed that order. The issues before the Supreme Court were reduced to: (1) whether respondents were entitled to directed verdicts because betting money on a game of skill at a residence is not prohibited by section 16-19-40; and (2) if respondents were not entitled to directed verdicts, should their convictions have been set aside because section 16-19-40(a) was unconstitutional? The Court found that the circuit court erred in reversing respondents' convictions, and therefore the order on appeal is itself was reversed. View "Town of Mount Pleasant v. Chimento" on Justia Law

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Appellant was convicted of murder and possession of a weapon during a crime of violence and received concurrent sentences of life (murder) and five years (weapon). On appeal, he alleged the trial judge committed reversible error in charging the jury that they were acting "for the community" and that their verdict "will represent truth and justice for all parties that are involved." The Supreme Court agreed that these charges were erroneous, but because appellant did not properly preserve his issues for appeal, the Court affirmed. View "South Carolina v. Daniels" on Justia Law

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Petitioner Jason Ervin Black appealed his convictions for criminal sexual conduct (CSC) with a minor in the first degree and committing a lewd act upon a minor. Petitioner contended on appeal that the trial court committed reversible error in allowing the State to impeach his defense witness with two manslaughter convictions that were more than ten years old because their introduction violated Rules 404 and 609 of the South Carolina Rules of Evidence (SCRE), and that the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Upon review, the Supreme Court found no error and affirmed. View "South Carolina v. Black" on Justia Law