Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant Jennifer Dykes appealed a circuit court's order that she be subject to satellite monitoring for the rest of her natural life pursuant to Section 23-3-540(C) of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2010). She raised five constitutional challenges to this statute: (1) it violates her substantive due process rights; (2) violates her right to procedural due process; (3) violates the Ex Post Facto clause; (4) violates the Equal Protection Clause; and (5) violates her right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the mandatory imposition of lifetime satellite monitoring indeed violates Appellant's substantive due process rights and reversed the circuit court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "South Carolina v. Dykes" on Justia Law

Petitioner Zeb Eron Binnarr was convicted by a jury for failing to timely register as a sex offender. He appealed his conviction primarily on the ground that he did not receive actioal notice of a change of the law regarding sex offender registration. The court of appeals affirmed Petitioner's conviction, and Petitioner again appealed. In view of the Supreme Court's decision in "South Carolina v. Latimore" (Op. 27102, Mar. 14, 2012), the Court concluded that the Court of Appeals erred in declining to find that actual notice of the re-registration requirement was necessary to sustain a conviction. Because the State failed to provide any direct or substantial circumstantial evidence from which a jury could determine that Petitioner had actual notice of the change in the law, the Court found the trial judge erred in failing to direct a verdict of acquittal. Accordingly, the Court reversed Petitioner's conviction. View "South Carolina v. Binnarr" on Justia Law

Respondent Robert Bayly was issued a uniform traffic ticket for simple possession of marijuana. Prior to trial, Respondent paid the required fine and did not appear in court on the trial date. Respondent did not appeal his conviction but, instead, filed a post-conviction relief (PCR) application in which he alleged the magistrate court was without subject matter jurisdiction to convict him as no arrest warrant had been issued. The PCR judge granted the petition and vacated Respondent's conviction. The Supreme Court granted the State's petition for a writ of certiorari to review the PCR judge's order. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the PCR judge erred in relying on "Town of Honea Path v. Wright," (9 S.E.2d 924 (1940)), and reversed the PCR judge's order because it was controlled by an error of law. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Bayly v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

Appellant Benjamin P. Green appealed his convictions for criminal solicitation of a minor and attempted criminal sexual conduct ("CSC") with a minor in the second-degree. In challenging his convictions, Appellant contended the trial judge erred in: (1) denying his motion to dismiss the charge of criminal solicitation of a minor on the ground the statute is unconstitutionally overbroad and vague; (2) denying his motions to dismiss and for a directed verdict on the charge of attempted CSC with a minor in the second-degree; (3) admitting certain photographs; and (4) denying his request for a jury charge on attempted assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature ("ABHAN"). Finding no merit to Appellant's issues on appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed his convictions. View "South Carolina v. Green" on Justia Law

After a bench trial, Appellant Robert Whitesides was convicted of possession of a firearm during the commission of the crime of trafficking in marijuana. On appeal, he contended that the trial court erroneously convicted him without finding that a nexus existed between his possession of firearms and his drug trafficking. While the Supreme Court agreed that a nexus between the possession of the firearm and the underlying violent crime must be established, the Court found that the trial judge made a factual finding that such a nexus existed in this case and that the finding was supported by evidence in the record. View "South Carolina v. Whitesides" on Justia Law

In 2004, Petitioner Reginald Latimore pled guilty to committing a lewd act on a child. He was released from prison in 2005, and was required to register as a sex offender by the Sex Offender Registry Act. In 2006, the General Assembly revised the sex offender registry statute to require offenders to re-register twice a year, once in their birth month and again six months later. Petitioner did not re-register before September 2006, when he was originally informed he must re-register, nor did he re-register in December 2006, as required by the amended statute. Petitioner was charged under the amended act with failing to register in December 2006. At trial, the State relied on both the forms Petitioner had executed in August 2005 requiring he register and upon the testimony of the sex offender registry coordinator that Petitioner had no contact with the office during 2006. After the State rested, Petitioner moved for a directed verdict on due process grounds because he had not received actual notice of the change in the registration statute. The trial judge denied the motion. Petitioner testified that he called the sex offender registry coordinator in February 2006 to obtain approval to move into a new house, and he was under the belief that this phone call satisfied his re-registration requirement. At the close of the defense case, Petitioner renewed his directed verdict motion, which was again denied. The court of appeals affirmed Petitioner's sentence. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider Petitioner's argument that the court of appeals erred in affirming the circuit court's denial of Petitioner's directed verdict motion, and after review, affirmed that decision as modified. View "South Carolina v. Latimore" on Justia Law

Petitioner Oseil Gomez Narciso appealed his conviction for trafficking cocaine, asserting that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to suppress drug evidence seized by police during a routine traffic stop. Following his conviction, Petitioner signed a Consent Order Granting Belated Direct Appeal and waived his right to raise any other post-conviction relief allegations. Petitioner requested the Supreme Court remand his case to determine whether that waiver was entered into knowingly and voluntarily. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's order denying Petitioner's motion to suppress, and remanded the case for a determination as to whether Petitioner's waiver was entered into knowingly and voluntarily. View "Narciso v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

Petitioner Marcus Hyman appealed the denial of his request for post-conviction relief (PCR) on the ground that his counsel was ineffective. In June 2007, a grand jury indicted Petitioner for a third offense of distributing of cocaine, and distributing cocaine within the proximity of a school or park.  He pleaded guilty to these charges, and after a colloquy with the plea judge, he relinquished various constitutional rights, including his right to a jury trial. The plea judge sentenced Petitioner to the mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen years imprisonment for the distribution charge and ten years for the proximity charge, to run concurrently.  No direct appeal was taken. However, Petitioner subsequently filed an application for PCR. Defense counsel had entered plea negotiations with the solicitor that ultimately resulted in the solicitor agreeing to reduce the distribution charge to a second offense, in exchange for Petitioner's agreement to serve five years in prison. This offer was conditioned on Petitioner's agreement not to view a videotape recording of the drug transaction that formed the basis of the charges against him. The solicitor sought to protect the identity of a confidential informant who would have been revealed to Petitioner if Petitioner watched the tape. At the evidentiary hearing, Petitioner testified he repeatedly told defense counsel that he wanted to watch the videotape, and stated that his personal review of the videotape was critical to whether he planned to accept the offer because he wanted to discern whether the videotape depicted his involvement in the drug transaction. Defense counsel testified that Petitioner stated he wanted her to watch the videotape. Consequently, defense counsel testified she watched the videotape that the videotape "clearly" depicted Petitioner engaged in a drug transaction. Defense counsel relayed these impressions to Petitioner while the five-year offer was still on the table. Petitioner testified he recognized himself as the subject of photographs made from the tapes, but testified that the images did not show him engaged in a drug transaction. Petitioner still refused to accept the solicitor's offer. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the denial of Petitioner's request for PCR. View "Hyman v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

Appellant John Sterling, Jr. was charged with three criminal offenses: securities fraud, making false or misleading statements to the State Securities Commission, and criminal conspiracy. He was convicted of securities fraud, acquitted of making a false or misleading statement and conspiracy, and received a five-year sentence.  Appellant appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing the trial judge abused his discretion in permitting testimony from investors, in denying appellant's directed verdict motion, and that the trial court committed reversible error in charging the jury. Charges against Appellant stemmed from a business venture related to the retail mortgage lending industry. After a merger between two companies, Appellant ceased being an employee of one of the acquired companies, but remained on the Board of Directors of the newly formed entity. The new entity had financial trouble from the onset, and began moving debts and assets among the surviving entities to hide its financial difficulties. Appellant's defense was predicated in large part on the fact that the financial maneuvers that took place were approved by outside auditors. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court found no error and affirmed Appellant's conviction. View "South Carolina v. Sterling" on Justia Law

Appellant State Law Enforcement Division (SLED) appealed the circuit court order relieving Respondent Jeremy Lane Edwards from registering as a sex offender registration. In 1998, Respondent pled guilty to two counts of being a "Peeping Tom." Respondent served a probationary sentence including one hundred hours of community service. In 2004, Respondent received a pardon from the South Carolina Department of Probation, Parole, and Pardon Services (SCDPPPS). In 2009, Respondent filed petitions requesting that the circuit court issue an order mandating that he was no longer required to register as a sex offender. The Attorney General opposed the petition, and asserted that Respondent's pardon did not relieve him from the requirement that he register as a sex offender. The Attorney General argued that the amendments to the applicable statute were remedial and procedural in nature, and thus applied retroactively to Respondent's case. The circuit court disagreed, and ruled that the 2004 pardon relieved Respondent from the registration requirements of the statute, and that the 2005 and 2008 amendments did not apply retroactively. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Respondent's 2004 pardon relieved him of all consequences of his conviction. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the circuit court's order relieving Respondent of his duty to report. View "In the Matter of the Care and Treatment of Jeremy Lane Edwards" on Justia Law