Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant State Law Enforcement Division (SLED) appealed the circuit court order relieving Respondent Jeremy Lane Edwards from registering as a sex offender registration. In 1998, Respondent pled guilty to two counts of being a "Peeping Tom." Respondent served a probationary sentence including one hundred hours of community service. In 2004, Respondent received a pardon from the South Carolina Department of Probation, Parole, and Pardon Services (SCDPPPS). In 2009, Respondent filed petitions requesting that the circuit court issue an order mandating that he was no longer required to register as a sex offender. The Attorney General opposed the petition, and asserted that Respondent's pardon did not relieve him from the requirement that he register as a sex offender. The Attorney General argued that the amendments to the applicable statute were remedial and procedural in nature, and thus applied retroactively to Respondent's case. The circuit court disagreed, and ruled that the 2004 pardon relieved Respondent from the registration requirements of the statute, and that the 2005 and 2008 amendments did not apply retroactively. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Respondent's 2004 pardon relieved him of all consequences of his conviction. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the circuit court's order relieving Respondent of his duty to report. View "In the Matter of the Care and Treatment of Jeremy Lane Edwards" on Justia Law

Appellant Jerry Inman pled guilty to murder, first-degree burglary, first-degree criminal sexual conduct, and kidnapping of a Clemson University student. The judge sentenced Appellant to death for murder and two consecutive thirty-year sentences for first-degree burglary and first-degree criminal sexual conduct. On appeal, Appellant challenged the judge's acceptance of his guilty plea because he maintained it was conditional and that he was entitled to be sentenced by a jury despite his plea of guilty. Furthermore, Appellant contended the trial court erred in (1) refusing to recuse the Solicitor's Office from any further involvement in the case; (2) declining defense counsel's request to question the Solicitor on the issue of prosecutorial misconduct; and (3) declining to grant a mistrial despite a finding of prosecutorial misconduct. Finding that Appellant entered a valid guilty plea that was not conditioned on the preservation or outcome of the jury sentencing issue, the Supreme Court affirmed Appellant's convictions. Moreover, even if Appellant properly preserved this issue, the Court concluded Appellant abandoned it on appeal. As to the propriety of the sentencing proceedings, the Court concluded the judge did not abuse his discretion in denying Appellant's requests to recuse the Solicitor's office as advocates and to question members of the office. Although Court found the Solicitor committed prosecutorial misconduct in his treatment of Appellant's expert witness, the Court concluded that Appellant was not sufficiently prejudiced to warrant the grant of a mistrial. View "South Carolina v. Inman" on Justia Law

Petitioner Kevin Odems appealed the Court of Appeals' decision that affirmed his 2005 convictions for first degree burglary, grand larceny, criminal conspiracy, and malicious injury. The State's case against Petitioner consisted solely of circumstantial evidence. Petitioner argued on appeal the Supreme Court that the State failed to present substantial circumstantial evidence of his involvement in any of the crimes charged, and thus the circuit court should have directed a verdict on all four counts. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court agreed and reversed. View "South Carolina v. Odems" on Justia Law

Defendant Jose Lozada appealed the circuit court's order denying his petition for a declaratory judgment to be removed from the Sex Offender Registry. Defendant argued that the crime to which he pled guilty in Pennsylvania—unlawful restraint—was not a "similar offense" to the crime of kidnapping in South Carolina. He accordingly contended that he should not have been required to register as a sex offender for unlawful restraint pursuant to Section 23-3-430(A) of the South Carolina Code (2010). Upon review of the applicable legal authorities, the Supreme Court found that though "kidnapping" allowed for a greater punishment than "unlawful restraint," that fact did not prove that the offenses were not similar because kidnapping included significantly more culpable behavior. Based on the similarity in public policy behind both the Pennsylvania and South Carolina statutes and the fact that all the conduct proscribed under unlawful restraint was proscribed under the kidnapping statute, the Supreme Court found Defendant was properly required to register as a sex offender in South Carolina. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the circuit court's order. View "Lozada v. So Car. Law Enforcement Div." on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant William Dickerson of first degree murder, kidnapping, and criminal sexual conduct, for which he was sentenced to death.  On appeal to the Supreme Court, Defendant argued the circuit court erred: (1) in not excusing a juror for cause; (2) in limiting the cross-examination of the pathologist called by the State; (3) in not charging the jury on the law of accessory after the fact; and (4) in limiting the testimony of Dickerson's cousin during the penalty phase of his trial.  Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed and further found that Defendant's sentence was proportional, supported by the evidence, and not the result of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor. View "South Carolina v. Dickerson" on Justia Law

Petitioner Jason Dickey appealed a court of appeals' decision that affirmed his conviction of voluntary manslaughter.  Petitioner worked as a security guard at an apartment building when on the night of April 29, 2004, an intoxicated water balloon toss among residents turned into a heated argument. The prank so angered visitor Joshua Boot that he threatened to physically assault the person who splashed him. Boot began banging on neighbors' doors, which prompted his resident-host to go to the security desk to ask Petitioner to evict her guest.  Petitioner testified he pulled the gun to discourage Boot and another guest from attacking him. Petitioner testified he saw Boot reach under his shirt as he came towards him, and Petitioner feared he was reaching for a weapon. Without warning, Petitioner fired three shots striking Boot. Subsequently, a Richland County grand jury indicted Petitioner for murder. Petitioner's counsel twice moved for a directed verdict of acquittal on the ground that Petitioner was acting in self-defense when he shot Boot. The circuit judge denied both motions. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the State failed to disprove the elements of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt.  Even viewing the facts in a light most favorable to the State, the evidence established that Petitioner shot and killed Boot in self-defense.  Therefore, the Court reversed the court of appeals and overturned Petitioner's conviction. View "South Carolina v. Dickey" on Justia Law

Appellant Thomas Jennings was convicted of two counts of committing a lewd act upon a minor and was sentenced to fifty-five months' imprisonment for the first charge and fifteen years, suspended upon the service of fifty months and three years' probation for the second charge, with the sentences to run consecutively.  Appellant appealed his convictions, arguing the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce the written reports of a forensic interviewer.  Appellant admitted he developed a friendly relationship with the victims and that he had engaged in incidental physical contact with them from time to time.  He vehemently denied, however, touching any of them inappropriately. The forensic interviewer interviewed each of the children.  The State called her as its first witness and asked her to briefly summarize what each of the victims told her during the interviews.  Appellant objected, and the trial court sustained the objection.  The State then moved to admit the forensic interviewer's written reports into evidence.  Over Appellant's objection, the trial court allowed the written reports into evidence. Upon review, the Supreme Court found portions of the written reports constituted inadmissible hearsay as they were out-of-court statements offered to prove that appellant did in fact inappropriately touch the children in the way that they claimed. The Court also found the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce this evidence, which was not harmless: "[the] trial hinged on the children's credibility, and the written reports were cumulative to the children's testimony." Accordingly, the Court reversed appellant's convictions and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "South Carolina v. Jennings" on Justia Law

Petitioner Gary DuBose Terry was sentenced to death for murder, life imprisonment for first-degree burglary, thirty years' imprisonment for first-degree criminal sexual conduct, and ten years' imprisonment for malicious injury to a telephone system. Petitioner argued in his application for post-conviction relief (PCR) that his trial counsel were ineffective in failing to argue during the hearing on the State's in limine motion that certain statements should have been introduced because of the State's misconduct and trial counsels' detrimental reliance on the State's "apparent intent" to offer those statements into evidence. Furthermore, Petitioner contended trial counsel were ineffective in failing to adjust their defense strategy in the guilt phase of trial in order to maintain credibility with the jury during sentencing. Specifically, petitioner argued trial counsel had a duty, after stating during the opening statement that petitioner "confessed," to adjust their trial strategy and not continue to pursue a reasonable doubt defense. Upon review, the Supreme Court found sufficient evidence to support the PCR court’s dismissal of Petitioner’s application, and affirmed the lower court’s decision. View "Terry v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

Petitioner Roy Tennant challenged the trial court's rulings on several evidentiary issues in his trial for first degree kidnapping, and assault and battery.  In particular, Petitioner argued the trial court erred in excluding the testimony of a forensic psychologist, erred in excluding a note written by Petitioner addressed to the victim, and erred in excluding proffered statements regarding the sexual history between the victim and the defendant. Upon review of the trial court's record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's decision to uphold the trial court, finding that Petitioner's proffered evidence was irrelevant or otherwise inadmissible, and therefore, Petitioner was not prejudiced by the trial court's exclusion. View "South Carolina v. Tennant" on Justia Law

Respondent Municipal Court Judge Sheryl Polk McKinney's sister, who was the Clerk of the Town of Varnville, was arrested and charged with embezzlement of public funds, forgery, and misconduct in office.  Respondent's sister was accused of issuing checks in Respondent's name, forging respondent's name to the checks and converting the money for her personal use over an eight year period. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that by her misconduct, Respondent violated multiple Canons of the Code of Judicial Conduct (Rule 501, SCACR). The Court found Respondent’s misconduct warranted a suspension from judicial duties.  Respondent was suspended for thirty days.  View "In the Matter of Municipal Court Judge Sheryl Polk McKinney" on Justia Law