Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Two children, E.G. and J.J., through their guardian ad litem, John D. Elliott, filed a lawsuit against the South Carolina Department of Social Services (DSS) and others, alleging that the children were sexually molested by P.M., the adopted son of Annie Montgomery, while in Montgomery's foster care. The plaintiffs claimed that DSS and Montgomery were negligent in placing and accepting the children into the foster home, knowing or having reason to know of P.M.'s history of sexually abusive behavior. They sought discovery of DSS's adoption files to support their claims.The circuit court issued a protective order for certain DSS foster care files but did not rule on the adoption files. The plaintiffs then filed a motion in family court to unseal the adoption files, which was denied. The family court ruled that the plaintiffs had no legal interest in the records and had not shown good cause under section 63-9-780(C) of the South Carolina Code. The court of appeals affirmed this decision.The South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the confidentiality provision in section 63-9-780(C) does not insulate DSS adoption files from civil discovery if they meet the criteria under the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. The court determined that if the files are discoverable under Rule 26(b), then good cause exists for their inspection. The court reversed the court of appeals' decision, emphasizing that protective orders can be used to maintain confidentiality while allowing necessary discovery. View "E.G. v. SCDSS" on Justia Law

Dr. Earl Bostick Sr. and Josie Bostick married in 1970, and Dr. Bostick developed two successful dental practices in South Carolina. In 2009, he sold one practice and continued with the other until the couple separated in 2017, after which he sold the remaining practice for $569,000. The sales contract indicated that $424,140 of this amount was for goodwill and a non-compete agreement. The couple agreed to an equal division of the marital estate but disputed whether the goodwill was personal (nonmarital) or enterprise (marital) property.The Family Court granted the divorce and ruled that the goodwill in Dr. Bostick's practice was personal, thus not subject to division. The court based its decision on the evidence that the goodwill was tied to Dr. Bostick's personal reputation and professional skills. Josie Bostick appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed the Family Court's decision, determining that the goodwill should be considered enterprise goodwill and thus marital property.The South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeals' decision, reinstating the Family Court's ruling. The Supreme Court found that the goodwill was indeed personal, as it was closely tied to Dr. Bostick's reputation, community involvement, and professional skills. The Court emphasized that Josie Bostick did not present evidence to prove the goodwill was enterprise in nature. The presence of a non-compete agreement further supported the conclusion that the goodwill was personal. Consequently, the value of the goodwill was excluded from the marital estate, and the Family Court's judgment was reinstated. View "Bostick v. Bostick" on Justia Law

Petitioner Alicia Rudick (Wife) raised a single issue before the South Carolina Supreme Court: whether a former spouse who was both the primary wage earner and caretaker could be a "supported spouse" under South Carolina's statutory scheme governing alimony. The family court awarded Respondent Brian Rudick periodic alimony of $3,000 a month, and the court of appeals affirmed, reducing it by $300 monthly based on a mathematical miscalculation. Wife contended Husband was not a "supported spouse" and therefore did not meet the legal requirement to receive alimony or in the alternative, that the alimony award should have been reduced. Specifically, Wife argued that because Husband did not depress his income by seeking employment which would allow him more time to care for the children, he was not a supported spouse. Additionally, Wife argued the family court overemphasized the statutory factor addressing the parties' standard of living during the marriage. Conversely, Husband argued the court of appeals properly affirmed the family court's decision to award alimony, that Wife's argument elevates the term "supported spouse" to a contrived meaning not contemplated by the General Assembly, and that the term is descriptive only, and simply designates the person who receives alimony. Further, Husband argues the family court properly considered the parties' standard of living as one factor in awarding alimony. The Supreme Court agreed with Husband and affirmed the court of appeals. View "Rudick v. Rudick" on Justia Law

Wife Olivia Seels Smalls died during the pendency of her divorce from Husband Joe Truman Smalls. The couple accumulated significant assets, including the marital home; eighteen rental properties; and multiple retirement, checking, savings, and investment accounts. Both parties worked during the marriage and contributed to the acquisition of the marital assets. The parties separated in July 2014 when Wife left the marital home. On October 10, 2014, Wife filed the underlying action seeking an order that would, among other things: (1) allow her to live separate and apart from Husband pendente lite and permanently; (2) restrain Husband from harassing her or cancelling her health insurance; (3) permit her to enter the marital home to retrieve her personal belongings; (4) provide separate support and maintenance and/or alimony pendente lite and permanently; and (5) equitably apportion the marital property. Wife alleged she was in poor health and had been subjected to an extended pattern of abusive behavior from Husband, which escalated after she underwent surgery for lung cancer in 2013. Wife also alleged Husband committed adultery at various times during their marriage. Husband filed an answer denying the allegations and asserting counterclaims. He likewise sought a divorce and equitable apportionment of the marital assets. The parties engaged in mediation, but Wife suffered a recurrence of cancer and they never formally entered into a signed agreement resolving their dispute. The issue this case presented for the South Carolina Supreme Court's review centered on whether the family court properly retained jurisdiction to rule on the apportionment of the marital property of the parties when the Wife died. The Court ruled the appellate court did not err in determining the family court properly retained jurisdiction to rule. View "Seels v. Smalls" on Justia Law

Petitioner Reginald Swain (Grandfather) appealed the denial of a request to terminate a father's parental rights ("TPR") and to adopt the child. The family court determined Grandfather proved a statutory ground for TPR, but concluded TPR and adoption would not be in the child's best interests because the child was already in a stable custody situation with her grandparents, Father had seemingly reformed his ways while in prison, and the child might benefit in the future from having a relationship with him. The court of appeals affirmed, and the South Carolina Supreme Court granted certiorari. Grandfather contended the court of appeals erred in affirming the family court's decision to deny TPR and adoption. Specifically, Grandfather contended both courts ignored the recommendation of the guardian ad litem, conflated the status of custody of a child with the permanency of TPR and adoption, and erroneously focused on the appearance of the new birth certificate, ignoring Mother's consent to the adoption. Conversely, Father argued both courts correctly found Grandfather failed to meet his burden of demonstrating TPR and adoption were in Child's best interests. Exercising its de novo review, the South Carolina believed TPR and adoption were in Child's best interests. "Because the focus is on the child's best interests rather than the parents' interest when determining whether TPR and adoption is appropriate," the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, terminated Father's parental rights, and granted the adoption. View "Swain v. Bollinger" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was a family court order terminating Mallory Sweigart's parental rights to her nine-year-old daughter. The court of appeals reversed, finding Mallory had not "wilfully failed to visit the child," the statutory ground for termination alleged in this case. Mallory Sweigart, the Child's biological mother, was twenty-five years old when the Child was born. Brittney Stasi was Mallory's sister, and Lukas Stasi was Brittney's husband. Mallory suffered from severe mental illness, diagnosed with borderline personality disorder and attempting suicide multiple times. The Child stayed with the Stasis in Fort Mill, South Carolina, from June 2014 until August 2014. Following another of Mallory's suicide attempts, in 2015 the Stasis filed an action in family court seeking custody of the Child. From December 2014 until September 2017, Mallory saw the Child only four times. When the Stasis first started taking care of the Child, Brittney and Mallory had a strong and loving relationship. Beginning in December 2014, however, their relationship began to deteriorate when Mallory claimed the Stasis coerced her into signing the custody agreement. In April 2016, represented by counsel for the first time, Mallory filed an action seeking to have custody of the Child returned to her. Mallory filed an affidavit in support of the claim and made extreme allegations against Brittney. The family court dismissed Mallory's action. In April 2017, the Stasis filed this action for termination of Mallory's parental rights and adoption of the Child. In November 2018, the family court terminated Mallory's parental rights and granted the adoption. In its order, the family court noted that in the twenty-nine months the Child lived with the Stasis before this proceeding was filed, Mallory visited the Child only four times, including two incidental visits while she was in town for hearings. The family court found by clear and convincing evidence Mallory willfully failed to visit the Child and termination of Mallory's parental rights was in the Child's best interests. The court of appeals found the Stasis "did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that [Mallory's] failure to visit was willful" and reversed the termination of Mallory's parental rights in an unpublished opinion. The South Carolina Supreme Court found by the required clear and convincing standard of proof that Mallory's failure to visit the Child was willful, and that termination of Mallory's parental rights is in the Child's best interest. Therefore, the Court reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the family court's order terminating Mallory's parental rights and granting the Stasis' adoption of the Child. View "Stasi v. Sweigart" on Justia Law

Respondent Simran Singh (Mother) and Petitioner Gunjit Singh (Father) separated in January of 2012. They entered into a settlement agreement which resolved all issues arising from their marriage, including custody and visitation matters involving their two children, then aged eleven and two. Pursuant to that agreement, Mother received primary custody, and the parties consented to submit any future disputes regarding child support or visitation to a mutually agreed-upon arbitrator, specifically providing that his or her decision would "be binding and non-appealable." The family court approved the agreement and granted the parties a divorce in February of 2013. Approximately nine months later, Father filed an action in family court seeking modification of custody, visitation, and child support, alleging Mother had violated a provision of the agreement when she failed to return to South Carolina with the children after embarking on a cross-country tour as a motivational speaker. From January through August of 2014, four family court judges issued decisions— one dismissing Father’s complaint due to the parties' decision to arbitrate; a second issuing a consent order to arbitrate; and two approving amended agreements to arbitrate. The arbitrator issued a "partial" arbitration award finding a substantial and material change of circumstance affecting the welfare and custody of the minor children, and awarding Father temporary custody. A thirty-two-page final arbitration award was issued the next month, awarding custody to Father. A fifth family court judge issued an order in January 2015 confirming both the partial and final arbitration awards. Thereafter, Mother filed five separate Rule 60(b)(4), SCRCP, motions to vacate all the orders approving the parties' agreements to arbitrate. The court of appeals issued its unanimous decision in December of 2019, holding that the parties could not divest the family court of jurisdiction to determine issues relating to custody, visitation, and child support. One month prior, another panel of the court of appeals issued a decision in Kosciusko v. Parham, 836 S.E.2d 362 (Ct. App. 2019), holding the family court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction to approve the binding arbitration of children's issues. The South Carolina Supreme Court granted certiorari, and affirmed as modified, the appellate court's order. View "Singh v. Singh" on Justia Law

The South Carolina Supreme Court granted Michael Landry's petition for a writ of certiorari to determine whether the court of appeals erred in affirming the family court's denial of his motion under Rule 60(a), SCRCP, to correct an alleged clerical error in a final order. Michael Landry (Husband) filed an action against Angela Landry (Wife) seeking a divorce on the ground of one year's continuous separation. On the morning of trial, the parties drafted and signed a handwritten agreement resolving all of the issues between them except for the divorce. Thereafter, the parties informed the court they had reached a final agreement, marked the agreement as Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, and submitted it to the court for approval. The agreement consisted of three pages and seventeen paragraphs, resolving issues of alimony, equitable distribution of property, child support, custody and visitation of the minor child, and attorney's fees. The terms of the agreement were not read into the record; instead, the court questioned both parties about their general understanding of the agreement and whether they entered into it freely and voluntarily. Satisfied, approved and made it the final order of the court. Thereafter, Husband's attorney drafted the order, incorporating the handwritten agreement by typing its terms into the final order. After sending it to opposing counsel for his approval, Husband submitted the order to the family court judge, who signed it on January 18, 2017. Nine weeks later, Husband noticed the order contained a provision requiring him to pay Wife one-half of his military retirement benefits - the focal point of this appeal. believing the addition of paragraph 2 to be a mistake - albeit one made by his own attorney in drafting the order - Husband moved for relief under Rule 60(a), SCRCP, based upon a clerical mistake "arising from oversight or omission." the court denied the motion, finding Husband should have requested relief pursuant to Rule 59(e), SCRCP, rather than through Rule 60(a), SCRCP, and accordingly, the court lacked jurisdiction to consider the merits of the motion. Alternatively, the court found the parties had agreed that one-half of Husband's military retirement benefits would be paid to Wife. Husband appealed to the court of appeals, which affirmed the family court's decision in an unpublished per curiam opinion pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR. The Supreme Court concluded the court of appeals erred in affirming the family court's denial of Husband's Rule 60(a) motion based on lack of jurisdiction. The matter was remanded for an evidentiary hearing to determine what the parties actually agreed to with respect to Husband's military retirement benefits and whether Husband was entitled to relief. View "Landry v. Landry" on Justia Law

George and Patricia Clark married in 1987 and filed for divorce twenty-five years later in 2012 after Husband discovered Wife had a multi-year affair with one of Husband's employees. In this cross-appeal concerning the apportionment of marital assets, the issues before the South Carolina Supreme Court stemmed from the valuation of a minority interest in a family-held business. Specifically, the question was whether the court of appeals erred in its handling of the family court's application of two discounts when determining the fair market value of a 25% interest for purposes of equitable apportionment: one for marketability and the other for a lack of control. Relying on Moore v. Moore 779 S.E.2d 533 (2015), the court of appeals rejected the marketability discount but applied the lack of control discount. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, reiterating that the applicability of these discounts was determined on a case-by-case basis. View "Clark v. Clark" on Justia Law

In August 2013, Timothy York drowned when his boat capsized on a pond at Longlands Plantation in Greeleyville, South Carolina. The deceased's brother and personal representative of the estate filed a claim for death benefits under the Workers’ Compensation Act. Although there were initially several individuals who were potential dependents, only York's mother and his girlfriend, Yvonne Burns, claimed death benefits. Burns noted she began seeing the deceased in the late 1990s, but the parties separated before reuniting sometime in 2004-2005. She worked approximately fifty hours per week as a nurse's aide, and filed as head of the household on her tax returns, indicating no one else could claim her as a dependent. Her house was in her name, and she only used "York" on a furniture contract, purportedly because she planned to marry him. Although several witnesses testified she planned to marry while others were unaware of this fact, no one testified that they were in fact married. Burns claimed she was the deceased's common-law wife or alternatively, that she was a dependent under the Act. Whether Burns could qualify as a dependent was the issue this case presented for the South Carolina Supreme Court’s review. The commission found that because Burns was engaged in an illicit relationship in violation of South Carolina’s fornication statute, she could not recover the death benefits as a matter of public policy. The court of appeals reversed, finding, notwithstanding the fact the girlfriend’s initial claim was based on being the deceased's common-law wife, there was no evidence of fornication in the record. Because the relevant facts were not in dispute, the Supreme Court reversed and awarded benefits to the deceased’s mother. View "York v. Longlands Plantation" on Justia Law