Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Suits were filed in Alabama and South Carolina in this divorce case. In 2007, the husband filed for divorce in Alabama, alleging he was a resident of Alabama, and his wife was a resident of South Carolina. Wife accepted service of the complaint, but approximately one month later, sued in South Carolina effectively responding point for point to the husband's Alabama case. After the wife's attempts to serve her husband failed, she was permitted to serve her husband by publication in Alabama. The husband never responded to her pleading. An Alabama attorney filed a limited notice of appearance on the wife's behalf in Alabama, challenging jurisdiction and moving the court to dismiss the husband's complaint. The Alabama court denied the wife's motion and set the matter for trial. Meanwhile, in South Carolina, the court awarded the wife alimony and divided the marital property. The South Carolina court found it had jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter jurisdiction over the division of property, noting the husband's Alabama attorney sought to have the South Carolina action dismissed, but was not admitted pro hac vice in South Carolina, and therefore did not respond to husband's motion. A hearing was held in Alabama; wife's counsel had withdrawn and was not replaced. The Alabama court found it had jurisdiction over the parties and their property, declared the South Carolina judgment null and void, and divided the parties' marital property. With his Alabama judgment, the husband filed a Rule 60(b) motion in South Carolina to have wife's judgment vacated. Upon review, the South Carolina Supreme Court concluded: the Alabama court's grant of divorce should be given full faith and credit; the wife was not entitled to bring her South Carolina action for division of property or attorney's fees; by making a limited appearance in Alabama, wife was bound by Alabama law, and abandoned her opportunity to contest personal jurisdiction there. Since Alabama would have given its order res judicata effect, it was entitled to full faith and credit. Therefore, the husband's Rule 60(b) motion the South Carolina orders should have been granted. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Ware v. Ware" on Justia Law

In March of 2007, Mother gave birth to Child. Five months later, the Pickens County Department of Social Services (DSS) received a report of neglect from a sheriff's deputy. Three families (six adults and eleven children) resided in Child's home, trash was overflowing, moldy dishes and food were strewn about, Mother and Father admitted to using cocaine, and Child had a visibly flat head which Mother explained resulted from her being left in a car seat for extended periods. Mother also admitted that Child had received her immunizations from the health department, but had not seen a doctor since birth. DSS filed a complaint for removal of Child and her older half-sister (Sister) due to abuse and neglect. The following day, Child tested positive for cocaine. Child and Sister were removed from the home and placed in emergency protective custody. A week later, Child was placed with the Appellants the Brooms for foster care. Following a hearing, the family court found probable cause for removal of Child based on the positive drug test and Mother's admission of substance abuse. The court also gave legal custody of Child to DSS and directed the appointment of counsel for Mother. At some point thereafter an attorney was appointed to represent Mother. "This would [have been] a straightforward appeal in a termination of parental rights action but for the fact that the mother whose rights were terminated was erroneously denied counsel." Because, after its review, the Supreme Court held that the Mother was not prejudiced by the error, the grounds for termination were established by clear and convincing evidence, and termination was in the child's best interest. Accordingly, the Court affirmed. View "Broom v. Derrick" on Justia Law

The parties lived together as husband and wife for thirty years, enjoying a comfortable standard of living and raising two sons. Following the onset of serious health problems for both, they ultimately separated, and it became the task of the family court judge to identify and divide their rather estate and dissolve their marriage in an equitable fashion. Among other issues, the issue before the Supreme Court on appeal in this matter was whether trust distributions could be marital property, and after review, the Court held that they can in certain limited circumstances. Furthermore, while the Court affirmed the majority of the family court's equitable division, the Court reversed the inclusion of one tract of timber as marital property and the reservation of alimony to the wife. The Court modified that portion of the order which required the husband to pay for the wife's attorney's fees and costs. View "Wilburn v. Wilburn" on Justia Law

Sarah W. (Mother) is the biological mother of a minor boy and a minor girl. In 2007, Mother and the children's father, Vaughn S. (Father; parents collectively, defendants), and the children resided in a home without heat, electricity, or running water. Mother arranged for her brother and sister-in-law, Thomas W. and Brittney W., to take primary responsibility for the children. The South Carolina Department of Social Services (DSS) requested that the family court issue an ex parte order granting DSS emergency protective custody of Boy. DSS alleged it had probable cause to believe that Boy faced imminent and substantial danger to his health or physical safety. The family court agreed, basing its determination on the fact that Defendants were "unable to provided[sic] even marginally suitable housing" for Boy, and finding that Thomas W. and Brittney W. "apparently abused a sibling" of Boy. The family court awarded emergency protective custody to DSS. The family court held a probable cause hearing and found sufficient probable cause to issue the ex parte order. The family court also found that Thomas W. and Brittney W. were no longer willing to maintain custody of Girl, and the court ordered DSS to take emergency protective custody of Girl. Ultimately DSS moved to terminate Mother's rights to both children; the appellate court disagreed with the trial court and reversed. Upon further review, the Supreme Court held that the trial court properly terminated Mother's parental rights, and reversed the appellate court. View "SCDSS v. Sarah W." on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether former foster parents had standing to petition to adopt a child placed for adoption by the Department of Social Services (DSS) with a different family. Upon review of the trial court record in this case, the Supreme Court concluded that the former foster parents possessed neither statutory or constitutional standing, and therefore vacated the order that granted the parents' petition, and remanded custody of the child to DSS for adoptive placement. "[R]ecognizing that children develop rapidly, and that stability and attachment are important components in their growth and development, [the Court directed] DSS to consider [the] child's present best interests in placing her for adoption." View "Youngblood v. South Carolina Dep't of Soc. Svcs" on Justia Law

The parties in this case were married for thirty years. Following the onset of serious health problems (for both), they separated. A family court judge was tasked with identifying and dividing the marital estate upon dissolution of the marriage. The issue before the Supreme Court in this matter centered on whether trust distributions could be considered marital property. The Court ruled that they can in limited circumstances. Further, the Court affirmed the family court's division of the marital estate, but reversed the inclusion of one tract of timber. The Court also reversed the reservation of alimony to the wife and modified that portion of the order that required the husband to pay the wife's attorney's fees and costs. View "Wilburn v. Wilburn" on Justia Law

William E. Terry, Jr. appealed a family court order holding him in contempt for failing to vacate the parties' marital residence as required under the temporary order. The appeal was manifestly without merit, and the Supreme Court affirmed pursuant to Rule 220, SCACR. Because Appellant erroneously believed that the filing and service of a notice of appeal from the family court's temporary order divested the family court of jurisdiction from considering the contempt matter, the Court elected to address and clarify the effect of an attempted appeal from a family court temporary order: "Perceived errors in family court temporary orders are to be redressed as they always have, at the final hearing. For issue preservation purposes, any such challenge must be placed on the record at the commencement of the final hearing. The family court has wide discretion in fashioning equitable relief, including the authority to make adjustments in the equitable distribution and otherwise to remedy an error in the temporary order. If a party desires to challenge the family court's final resolution of the matter, the aggrieved party may appeal from final judgment." View "Terry v. Terry" on Justia Law

After finding a card for flowers for another woman in her husband’s car, Petitioner Gail Jennings confronted him. Respondent M. Lee Jennings confessed he had fallen in love with someone else, and although he refused to divulge her name, he admitted the two had been corresponding via e-mail for some time. Gail confided this situation to her daughter-in-law, Petitioner Holly Broome. Broome had previously worked for Jennings and knew he maintained a personal Yahoo! e-mail account. She accessed his account by guessing the correct answers to his security questions and read the e-mails exchanged between Jennings and his paramour. Broome then printed out copies of the incriminating e-mails and gave them to Thomas Neal, Gail’s attorney in the divorce proceedings, and Brenda Cooke, a private investigator Gail hired. Broome was sued civilly for hacking Lee Jennings' Yahoo! e-mail account. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Broome on all claims, including violation of the federal Stored Communications Act (SCA). The court of appeals reversed, finding that the e-mails she obtained from hacking Jennings' account were in electronic storage and thus covered by the SCA. The Supreme Court disagreed and reversed. After opening them, Jennings left the single copies of his e-mails on the Yahoo! server and apparently did not download them or save another copy of them in any other location. The Court therefore declined to hold that retaining an opened e-mail constitutes "storing it for backup protection" under the Act. "We emphasize that although we reject the contention that Broome's actions [gave] rise to a claim under the SCA, this should in no way be read as condoning her behavior. Instead, we only hold that she is not liable under the SCA because the e-mails in question do not meet the definition of 'electronic storage' under the Act." View "Jennings v. Jennings" on Justia Law

Margaret Mims (Mims), as guardian ad litem for her son Edward, filed a complaint against the Babcock Center and others alleging Edward sustained physical injuries and was mistreated while under their care. The circuit court dismissed the complaint based on issues related to timeliness of service and the application of S.C. Code Ann. 15-3-20(B) (2005). Mims appealed. After review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded. The Court concluded the trial court erred in finding Mims's amended complaint should have been dismissed for failure to serve it within 120 days of filing the original complaint. Moreover, the Court agreed with Mims that, contrary to Defendants' assertion, Rule 15(a), SCRCP does allow the filing and service of an amended complaint without leave of court, even if the original complaint has not been served, because a party may amend her pleadings once without leave of court before a responsive pleading is served, and no responsive pleading had been served by Defendants prior to Mims's service of the amended complaint. To the extent the trial court found an alleged absence of proper service resulted in a lack of personal and subject matter jurisdiction and a failure to prosecute, the Court reversed these findings as they were premised on the perceived error regarding service. View "Mims v. Babcock Center" on Justia Law

This case involved a contest over the private adoption of a child born in Oklahoma to unwed parents, one of whom is a member of the Cherokee Nation. After a four day hearing in September 2011, the family court issued a final order on November 25, 2011, denying the adoption and requiring the adoptive parents to transfer the child to her biological father. The transfer of custody took place in Charleston, South Carolina, on December 31, 2011, and the child now resides with her biological father and his parents in Oklahoma. THe adoptive parents appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the family court which denied the adoption and awarded custody to the biological father. View "Adoptive Couple v. Cherokee Nation" on Justia Law