Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After finding a card for flowers for another woman in her husband’s car, Petitioner Gail Jennings confronted him. Respondent M. Lee Jennings confessed he had fallen in love with someone else, and although he refused to divulge her name, he admitted the two had been corresponding via e-mail for some time. Gail confided this situation to her daughter-in-law, Petitioner Holly Broome. Broome had previously worked for Jennings and knew he maintained a personal Yahoo! e-mail account. She accessed his account by guessing the correct answers to his security questions and read the e-mails exchanged between Jennings and his paramour. Broome then printed out copies of the incriminating e-mails and gave them to Thomas Neal, Gail’s attorney in the divorce proceedings, and Brenda Cooke, a private investigator Gail hired. Broome was sued civilly for hacking Lee Jennings' Yahoo! e-mail account. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Broome on all claims, including violation of the federal Stored Communications Act (SCA). The court of appeals reversed, finding that the e-mails she obtained from hacking Jennings' account were in electronic storage and thus covered by the SCA. The Supreme Court disagreed and reversed. After opening them, Jennings left the single copies of his e-mails on the Yahoo! server and apparently did not download them or save another copy of them in any other location. The Court therefore declined to hold that retaining an opened e-mail constitutes "storing it for backup protection" under the Act. "We emphasize that although we reject the contention that Broome's actions [gave] rise to a claim under the SCA, this should in no way be read as condoning her behavior. Instead, we only hold that she is not liable under the SCA because the e-mails in question do not meet the definition of 'electronic storage' under the Act." View "Jennings v. Jennings" on Justia Law

Margaret Mims (Mims), as guardian ad litem for her son Edward, filed a complaint against the Babcock Center and others alleging Edward sustained physical injuries and was mistreated while under their care. The circuit court dismissed the complaint based on issues related to timeliness of service and the application of S.C. Code Ann. 15-3-20(B) (2005). Mims appealed. After review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded. The Court concluded the trial court erred in finding Mims's amended complaint should have been dismissed for failure to serve it within 120 days of filing the original complaint. Moreover, the Court agreed with Mims that, contrary to Defendants' assertion, Rule 15(a), SCRCP does allow the filing and service of an amended complaint without leave of court, even if the original complaint has not been served, because a party may amend her pleadings once without leave of court before a responsive pleading is served, and no responsive pleading had been served by Defendants prior to Mims's service of the amended complaint. To the extent the trial court found an alleged absence of proper service resulted in a lack of personal and subject matter jurisdiction and a failure to prosecute, the Court reversed these findings as they were premised on the perceived error regarding service. View "Mims v. Babcock Center" on Justia Law

This case involved a contest over the private adoption of a child born in Oklahoma to unwed parents, one of whom is a member of the Cherokee Nation. After a four day hearing in September 2011, the family court issued a final order on November 25, 2011, denying the adoption and requiring the adoptive parents to transfer the child to her biological father. The transfer of custody took place in Charleston, South Carolina, on December 31, 2011, and the child now resides with her biological father and his parents in Oklahoma. THe adoptive parents appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the family court which denied the adoption and awarded custody to the biological father. View "Adoptive Couple v. Cherokee Nation" on Justia Law

Appellant Lisa Argabright and Respondent Wayne Argabright were formerly married, are now divorced and share joint custody of their minor daughter. Appellant appealed the family court's issuance of a restraining order enjoining her from permitting any contact between her boyfriend, a convicted sex offender, and the parties' minor daughter. The family court further required Appellant to pay Respondent's attorney's fees and the guardian ad litem fees. Appellant appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Appellant was the only person available to supervise contact between Child and the boyfriend. And given Appellant's pattern of deception and pursuit of her own interests over those of Child, an order entrusting Appellant to ensure no future unsupervised contact between Child and the boyfriend would be suspect. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's order. View "Argabright v. Argabright" on Justia Law

Kristi McLeod (Mother) and Robert Starnes (Father) divorced in 1993. Mother received custody of their two minor children, and Father was required to pay child support. Despite rather sizable increases in Father's income, Mother never sought modification of his child support obligation. In August 2006, the parties' older child, Collin, reached the age of majority and enrolled as a college student. Father wholly supported his son's to attend college, and agreed to repay all of Collin's student loans upon graduation. Father took it upon himself to unilaterally decrease his weekly child support to which Mother later acquiesced in consideration of Father's assurances that he would support the son while he was in college.  However, Father did not uphold his end of the bargain, nor did he regularly pay a percentage of his bonus as promised. Mother filed suit in March 2007 seeking an award of college expenses, an increase in child support for the couple's other child, plus attorney's fees and costs.  Father counterclaimed, asking that the court terminate: (1) his child support for the eldest son because he had attained the age of majority and graduated from high school; (2) his support for the younger child upon graduation from high school; (3) and the requirement that he pay a percentage of his annual bonus as child support.  He also denied that he should be required to pay any college expenses for his oldest son.  A temporary order was filed in June 2007 that set child support for the younger child, ordered Father to contribute towards college expenses, and left intact the thirty-five percent of Father's annual bonus payable as support. The court dismissed Mother's claim for college expenses on the ground that it violated the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. Less than two years ago, the Supreme Court decided "Webb v. Sowell,"(692 S.E.2d 543 (2010)), which held that ordering a non-custodial parent to pay college expenses violated equal protection. The Court granted permission in this case to argue against that precedent so that the Court could revisit its holding in "Webb."  In his holding in this case, the Court concluded that "Webb" was wrongly decided and remanded this case for reconsideration in light of the law as it existed prior to "Webb." View "McLeod v. Starnes" on Justia Law

Susan Chisholm (Wife) appealed the court of appeals' reversal of the family court's grant of attorney's fees. She argued that the court of appeals incorrectly held the family court erred by solely considering beneficial results in determining the award because the court of appeals had remanded that issue for that very reason. Moreover, Wife contended that the record contains sufficient evidence to support the family court's award. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed and reversed the appellate court's holding. View "Chisholm v. Chisholm" on Justia Law

Appellant Sean Taylor appealed an order which terminated his parental rights to his six-year-old daughter on three grounds: willful failure to visit, willful failure to support, and because the child had been in foster care for fifteen out of the previous twenty-two months.  Following a review of the record, the Supreme Court held that Respondent Charleston County Department of Social Services (DSS) did not meet its burden with respect to the first two grounds, and that the child's placement in foster care for at least fifteen of the last twenty-two months was not a sufficient ground for termination of Appellant's rights under the facts of this case. Accordingly, the Court reversed the family court's decision and directed DSS to implement a plan to reunify Appellant with his daughter, or to place the child with her grandparents until reunification could be achieved. View "Charleston County DSS v. Marccuci" on Justia Law

Before the Supreme Court was whether an action for separate maintenance and support could be pursued when the parties were still living together. Eileen (Wife) and Clifford (Husband) Theisen were married in 1980. At the time of this action, the parties owned three properties: the marital home, which was in Wife's name, and two rental properties, both of which were in Husband's name. Wife had filed for divorce on two previous occasions, at least one of which was premised on the fault ground of physical cruelty. Wife filed this action for separate maintenance alleging Husband "has engaged and continue[ed] to engage in a course of conduct making it unreasonable and unfair to require [Wife] to continue to live with him." Husband counterclaimed for equitable distribution of the marital assets and debts as well as attorney's fees. Husband further made motions to dismiss Wife's complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Both of Husband's motions were premised on the fact that Husband and Wife were not living separate and apart. He also moved to cancel the lis pendens placed on his rental properties. The court found it "ha[d] the jurisdiction to order separate support and maintenance, [but it did] not have the authority to do so when the parties [were] living together." Accordingly, the court dismissed her complaint. The Supreme Court affirmed the family court because Wife failed to allege that she and Husband were living separate and apart at the time of filing. Furthermore, because Wife's lis pendens and claim for attorney's fees hinged on the validity of her complaint, the Court found no error in the family court's denial of that relief. View "Theisen v. Theisen" on Justia Law

Petitioner Brian DiMarco sought a writ of certiorari to review the court of appeals' decision that affirmed, as modified, a family court's contempt order against him.  Petitioner was subject to a court order to make monthly child support payments to Cheryl DiMarco (Mother).  According to Petitioner, he had made child support payments for over ten years before Mother filed for an increase in 2006.  The family court instead decreased the support order and ordered the payments be made through the court beginning on April 1, 2008.  Petitioner asserts he timely attempted to make the first payment to the court, but the court lacked record of the order and could not accept the payment. In May 2008, the clerk of the family court filed a Rule to Show Cause because Petitioner was behind on his child support payments. The hearing was scheduled for June 25, 2008. On June 23, 2008, Petitioner paid the arrearage, bringing his child support account to a zero balance. On the morning of June 25, Petitioner did not appear on time for the Rule to Show Cause hearing. The judge issued a warrant for Petitioner's arrest.  No testimony was taken on whether or not Petitioner had failed to pay child support.  Shortly thereafter, Petitioner arrived at the courthouse.  During the hearing, everyone who spoke noted Petitioner did not owe any outstanding child support at that time. During his argument, Mother's attorney stated, "I think the court needs to very much impress upon him taking the law into his own hands and not showing up, not being here on time it's just, just it's driving everyone nuts." From the bench the judge held Petitioner in civil contempt, suspended confinement and a levied a fine. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals because the sanction ordered by the family court violated Petitioner's rights under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The court of appeals said "the family court's contempt sanction has elements of both civil and criminal contempt."  The civil element of the sanction, the court found, was that the incarceration would not be imposed unless Petitioner failed to pay the $250.00 to the court.  The criminal element was that if Petitioner failed to pay the $250.00, he would be incarcerated for a definite period of time.  To remedy the family court's unclear sanction, the court of appeals modified the order and held Petitioner must pay the $250.00 in court costs, and if he failed to do so by the deadline established, then he would be incarcerated for twelve months.  In doing so, the court of appeals crafted a sanction that violated Petitioner's Sixth Amendment rights. View "DiMarco v. DiMarco" on Justia Law

The South Carolina Department of Social Services (DSS) initiated termination of parental rights (TPR) proceedings against M.R.C.L. (mother) and R.L. (father). Child was removed from mother and father's home in May 2007 due to allegations of physical neglect, after both parents tested positive for crack cocaine. Child, who was one year old at the time, was placed in a pre-adoptive foster home with two of her siblings. After a merits hearing, the family court ordered mother and father to complete a treatment plan, including a drug and alcohol assessment and a parental assessment, and to maintain safe and appropriate housing. Mother and father did not complete the treatment plan. The Guardian Ad Litem (GAL) testified that, in her opinion, it was in child's best interest to terminate mother and father's parental rights and allow the foster parents to adopt child. The family court terminated mother and father's parental rights, generally finding (1) mother and father willfully failed to visit the child; (2) mother and father willfully failed to support the child; and (3) termination was in the best interest of the child. Mother appealed the termination, and the Court of Appeals reversed, holding DSS failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that mother willfully failed to support or visit the child. Because the Court of Appeals found DSS failed to prove any statutory ground for TPR, it did not reach the issue whether TPR was in the best interest of the child. Upon review, the Supreme Court found the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the family court's finding that mother willfully failed to support the child. Specifically, considering all the facts and circumstances of this case, DSS showed by clear and convincing evidence that mother willfully failed to support child. The Court held the family court properly found TPR was in child's best interest. View "So. Carolina Dept. of Social Svcs. v. M.R.C.L." on Justia Law