Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Patrick Clemons, a convicted felon, was found guilty of possessing a firearm. He had two prior convictions for Criminal Domestic Violence of a High and Aggravated Nature (CDVHAN) and one for Assault and Battery Second Degree (AB2d) in South Carolina. Due to these prior convictions, Clemons was classified as an armed career criminal under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), leading to a mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen years. Clemons appealed his enhanced sentence, arguing that both CDVHAN and AB2d could be committed through reckless or negligent conduct, and therefore, neither should qualify as a predicate offense for enhanced sentencing under the ACCA's "elements clause."Clemons' appeal reached the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, which certified two questions to the South Carolina Supreme Court. The questions sought to clarify the mental state required to commit AB2d and CDVHAN in South Carolina. The South Carolina Supreme Court rephrased the questions to ask whether a defendant could be convicted of these offenses with a mens rea of recklessness as defined by the Model Penal Code.The South Carolina Supreme Court held that the answer to both questions was "yes." The court explained that the South Carolina Legislature had chosen to criminalize multiple types of conduct under the statutes for AB2d and CDVHAN. Therefore, there was not a single mens rea required for a conviction under either statute. Instead, the required mens rea depended on the actus reus of the crime being prosecuted. The court concluded that under some circumstances, a person could be convicted of AB2d and CDVHAN with a mens rea of recklessness. View "United States of America v. Clemons" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a workers' compensation claim filed by Dale Brooks, an employee of Benore Logistics Systems, Inc. Brooks claimed that he suffered a work-related repetitive trauma injury to his back due to the nature of his job as a "switcher" truck operator, which involved moving semitruck trailers and ocean freight containers to various points in a shipping yard. He substantiated his claim with medical evidence and testimony. However, his employer commissioned an ergonomics report that concluded his injury was statistically unlikely to have been caused by his work activities.The single commissioner ruled in Brooks's favor, but an appellate panel of the Workers' Compensation Commission relied on the ergonomics report, reversed the single commissioner, and denied Brooks's claim. The appellate panel concluded that Brooks's job was not repetitive and that it was statistically unlikely that his back injury was caused by his work duties. The court of appeals reversed this decision, holding that the appellate panel did not have the authority to determine whether Brooks's job was repetitive and that any reliance on the ergonomics report was impermissible.The Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed the decision of the court of appeals as modified. The court agreed that the appellate panel erred in its reliance on the ergonomics report to deny Brooks's claim. The court held that while the Commission does have the authority to determine whether an employee's job is repetitive, the appellate panel's decision that Brooks's job was not repetitive was unsupported by the substantial evidence in the record. Furthermore, the court ruled that any reliance on an ergonomics report in a work-related repetitive trauma injury case is contrary to the rule of law and constituted reversible error by the appellate panel. The court remanded the matter to the Commission for it to calculate the benefits to which Brooks is entitled. View "Brooks v. Benore Logistics System, Inc." on Justia Law

The case at hand involves Candise Gore, who sued various individuals and governmental entities claiming she was wrongfully strip-searched at the Dorchester County Detention Center. Gore claimed against the Dorchester County Sheriff's Office, which operates the facility, for reckless infliction of emotional distress. The case was moved to the United States District Court due to the inclusion of federal law claims. The court had to decide whether the bar under the South Carolina Tort Claims Act of claims of "intentional infliction of emotional harm" applied to claims of reckless infliction of emotional distress.The court examined past South Carolina case law and the South Carolina Tort Claims Act. It noted that the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, also known as outrage, could be caused by extreme and outrageous conduct that intentionally or recklessly inflicts severe emotional distress. The court further indicated that several jurisdictions consider intentional infliction of emotional distress and reckless infliction of emotional distress as the same cause of action. Consequently, the court concluded that reckless infliction of emotional distress was a subset of intentional infliction of emotional distress and that there was no separate cause of action in South Carolina for the reckless infliction of emotional distress.However, to provide a complete response, the court also considered the definition of "loss" in the South Carolina Tort Claims Act. The court concluded that since reckless infliction of emotional distress was a subset of intentional infliction of emotional distress, the bar to recovery for the intentional infliction of emotional distress also covered any conduct by a governmental entity that might be merely reckless but yet satisfied the elements of the cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court therefore held that the bar to recovery for the intentional infliction of emotional distress applied to the subset of claims for the reckless infliction of emotional distress. View "Gore v. Dorchester County Sheriff's Office" on Justia Law

In South Carolina, the case revolves around the interpretation of a law concerning the calculation of the one-year maximum Community Supervision Program (CSP) revocation sentence. The key question is whether inmates arrested for alleged CSP violations should receive credit towards their potential CSP revocation sentence for the time they spent in jail awaiting the adjudication of the CSP violation charge. The Petitioner, Stacardo Grissett, violated the terms of his CSP and was denied credit for roughly six months he spent in jail awaiting his CSP revocation hearing. His appeal was dismissed as moot because he had completed his CSP revocation sentence and original sentence by the time it reached the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court of South Carolina, however, chose to review the case due to its potential for repetition and the need for clarification. The court ruled that inmates must be given credit for any time served awaiting their CSP revocation hearing towards their CSP revocation sentence. The court's decision hinged on the interpretation of Section 24-21-560(C), which states that an inmate who is incarcerated for a CSP violation is not eligible to earn credits that would reduce the sentence. The court held that time served does not "reduce" a sentence, but only affects the date on which the sentence begins, thereby ruling in favor of the Petitioner. View "State v. Grissett" on Justia Law

In South Carolina, two hospitals, Walterboro Community Hospital and Trident Medical Center, appealed an Administrative Law Court (ALC) order which approved the certificate of need (CON) for the Medical University Hospital Authority (MUHA). MUHA had applied for a CON to construct a new general hospital in Berkeley County to address capacity issues at its existing hospital in Charleston. The appellant hospitals raised four issues against ALC's decision: 1) the ALC's dismissal of certain errors in the review by the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (DHEC), 2) a misinterpretation of the State Health Plan by the ALC, 3) the ALC's approval of MUHA's application conditional on the closure of a freestanding emergency department planned by MUHA, and 4) the appeal bond required by South Carolina law is unconstitutional.The Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed the ALC's decision and held that despite errors in DHEC's review process and decision, the ALC's de novo review rendered these errors harmless. The court also agreed with ALC's interpretation of the State Health Plan and found no issue in the ALC's condition of approval. The court further held that the appeal bond requirement was not unconstitutional, as the appellant hospitals were statutory affected persons and there was a rational basis for different treatment for a party opposing an approved CON and a party appealing the denial of its own CON application. However, the court did instruct that the appeal bond be voided and returned to Trident Medical Center. View "Walterboro Comm Hospital v. SCDHEC" on Justia Law

In this case, the South Carolina Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a state statute that limits reimbursement of reestablishment expenses in condemnation proceedings to $50,000. The appellant, Applied Building Sciences, Inc., an engineering firm, was forced to move its operations when its leased building was condemned for public use by the South Carolina Department of Commerce, Division of Public Railways. The company sought reimbursement for reestablishment expenses exceeding $560,000 but was limited by state statute to $50,000. The company argued that the cap was unconstitutional under the Takings Clauses of the South Carolina and United States Constitutions. The court found that reestablishment expenses are separate from damages awardable as just compensation under both constitutions, thus upholding the constitutionality of the statutory cap. The court affirmed the lower court's granting of summary judgment in favor of the Department of Commerce, Division of Public Railways. View "Applied Building Sciences v. SC Dept of Commerce" on Justia Law

Daufuskie Island Utility Company (DIUC) again appealed decisions by the Public Service Commission (PSC) regarding DIUC's 2015 application for ratemaking. In the PSC's first two decisions, it granted only part of the 109% rate increase requested by DIUC. DIUC appealed both decisions, and both times, the South Carolina Supreme Court reversed and remanded to the PSC for further consideration. On the final remand, the parties entered a settlement agreement allowing DIUC to recover rates equivalent to the 109% rate increase it initially requested in 2015. However, the parties continued to disagree over the propriety of DIUC's additional request to retroactively recover the 109% rate increase from the date of the PSC's first order, rather than from the date of the PSC's acceptance of the settlement agreement. The PSC rejected DIUC's request for the "reparations surcharge," finding it would amount to impermissible retroactive ratemaking. The propriety of the reparations surcharge was the only matter at issue in this appeal. The Supreme Court found the General Assembly did not authorize the PSC to grant utilities relief via a reparations surcharge, and the PSC therefore correctly rejected DIUC's request. The Court found DIUC chose not to avail itself of South Carolina Code section 58-5-240(D)'s statutory remedy prior to this final appeal. Accordingly, the PSC's decision was affirmed and the Court "end[ed] this lengthy ratemaking process." View "Daufuskie v. SC Office of Regulatory Staff" on Justia Law

The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina certified a question of law to the South Carolina Supreme Court. Plaintiff John Doe was a convicted sex offender who moved from South Carolina to Georgia in 2015. He filed suit in South Carolina in federal court against the Chief of the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division (SLED) Mark Keel, contending in part that because he no longer resided in South Carolina, SLED should be prohibited from continuing to publish his name and information on the South Carolina Sex Offender Registry. The question certified to the Supreme Court involved whether South Carolina’s Sex Offender Registry Act (SORA) permitted the publication of out-of-state offenders on the state’s public sex offender registry. The Supreme Court answered the question in the affirmative. View "John Doe v. Keel" on Justia Law

Respondent Braden's Folly, LLC owned two small, contiguous, developed coastal properties on the northeast end of Folly Beach, South Carolina. The City of Folly Beach amended an ordinance to require certain contiguous properties under common ownership to be merged into a single, larger property. The ordinance did not impact the existing uses of Braden's Folly's contiguous lots. Nevertheless, Braden's Folly challenged the merger ordinance, claiming it had planned to sell one of the developed properties, and that the merger ordinance interfered with its investment-backed expectation under the test announced in Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of N.Y., 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). Folly Beach denied the claim of an unconstitutional regulatory taking. Pursuant to cross-motions for summary judgment, the circuit court agreed with Braden's Folly, finding the merger ordinance effected an as-applied taking of Braden's Folly's beachfront property. Folly Beach appealed the judgment in favor of Braden's Folly. Underlying the South Carolina Supreme Court's application of the Penn Central factors was the "distinct fragility" of Folly Beach's coastline, which was subject to such extreme erosion that the General Assembly exempted Folly Beach from parts of the South Carolina Beachfront Management Act. This exemption gave the city the authority to act in the State's stead in protecting the beach there. One of Braden's Folly's properties was contributing to worsening erosion rates on Folly Beach and, along with similarly situated properties, was threatening the existence of the entire beach in that area of the state. The Court concluded Braden's Folly had not suffered a taking under the Penn Central test. Therefore, the judgment was reversed and the case remanded for entry of judgment in favor of Folly Beach. View "Braden's Folly, LLC v. City of Folly Beach" on Justia Law

The Town of McBee Municipal Election Commission overturned the results of the town's September 2020 mayoral and town council elections after finding Sydney Baker violated a previous version of section 7-15-330 of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2021)2 by requesting applications to vote by absentee ballot on behalf of other voters. The circuit court found there was no evidence to support the election commission's decision and reversed. The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court. View "Odom v. McBee Municipal Election Commission" on Justia Law