Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The disputed actions at issue here occurred during special meetings for which the Town of Mount Pleasant issued agendas listing an executive session but not indicating Town Council would take action following the executive session. Petitioner Stephen Brock, who was a member of the Town's Planning Commission and the president and general manager of a local television station, filed a complaint against the Town alleging numerous violations of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The South Carolina Supreme Court granted certiorari review of the court of appeals' decision that the Town did not violate FOIA by taking unnoticed action following executive sessions at special meetings. Having carefully reviewed the record and law, the Supreme Court agreed with Petitioner that the Town technically violated FOIA and that the court of appeals erred in relying on the discussion of regular meetings in "Lambries v. Saluda County Council," (760 S.E.2d 785 (2014)), in resolving the underlying challenge concerning special meetings. The Court modified the court of appeals' decision. View "Brock v. Town of Mount Pleasant" on Justia Law

Five separate lawsuits were consolidated for the purposes of this opinion. County administrators and registers of deeds in Allendale, Beaufort, Colleton, Hampton, and Jasper Counties (collectively, Respondents) filed suit against MERSCORP Holdings, Inc.; Mortgage Electronic Registrations Systems, Inc. (MERS); and numerous banking institutions (collectively, Petitioners). Respondents contended Petitioners engaged in a practice of fraudulent recordings that have disrupted the integrity of the public index Respondents were statutorily required to maintain. Petitioners moved to dismiss, arguing Respondents "lack contractual standing," the lawsuit was barred by section 30-9-30 of the South Carolina Code (2007), the parties could designate MERS as mortgagee, and the complaints failed to state a cognizable claim. The motion was denied, and Petitioners appealed. The Supreme Court found that Respondents failed to state a claim and therefore reversed the trial court's denial of Petitioners' motion to dismiss. View "Kubic v. MERSCORP" on Justia Law

Respondents were former South Carolina Law Enforcement Division (SLED) agents who retired and were rehired by then SLED Chief Robert Stewart for a period of four years pursuant to a rehire program formulated by Chief Stewart. At the conclusion of Respondents' service under the rehire program, they filed suit against SLED and the State under various theories, all premised on the allegation that SLED deducted from their salaries the amount of the employer's contribution to the retirement system. The State was granted dismissal of the Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), SCRCP. On appeal, taking the allegations of the Complaint as true, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded. On remand and following discovery, the trial court granted SLED summary judgment, which the court of appeals reversed. Having carefully reviewed the record, the Supreme Court found the trial court properly granted summary judgment to SLED, because the record made clear that Respondents were rehired at reduced salaries and the employer contributions to the retirement system were not deducted from those salaries, but were paid by SLED. As a result, the Court reversed the court of appeals and directed that judgment be entered for SLED. View "Grimsley v. SLED" on Justia Law

Diane and Otis Bass had three children: Brittany, Hanna, and Alex. All three children were special needs, but Hanna and Alex were also autistic. Otis worked outside the home, and Diane cared for the children. Due to their forms of autism and their other cognitive issues, both Hanna and Alex were prescribed Clonidine to help them sleep at night, in addition to other medications. A compounding pharmacy filled the Clonidine prescription. In April 2008, the prescription was inadvertently mixed at one thousand times the recommended concentration. Diane administered the wrongly compounded Clonidine to Hanna and later to Alex. Both children had serious reactions that required hospitalization. DSS received a report that two special needs children were in the hospital due to "possible poisoning by parents." The agency assigned an overall danger rating of "medium" to the case. A caseworker assigned to the case recommended the children be removed from the Bass home and placed with Diane's sister, Linda. Linda would later learn that the compounding pharmacy improperly filled the Clonidine prescription. Linda notified DSS, and the agency subsequently concluded that the medication was the cause of the children's hospitalization. This revelation led to the eventual return of the children to Diane and Otis. However, DSS continued to make announced and unannounced visits at the Bass home through the end of 2008 and refused to remove its finding that Diane and Otis "harmed their children" from the agency's file on Petitioners. Petitioners filed a lawsuit against DSS, the compounding pharmacy, and the pharmacist, alleging negligence and gross negligence, and seeking actual and punitive damages. After settling with the pharmacy and the pharmacist, Petitioners served DSS with an amended complaint alleging causes of action for gross negligence, defamation, and outrage, and sought actual damages. DSS moved for a directed verdict at the conclusion of Petitioners' case, and again at the conclusion of all of the evidence. The trial judge denied both motions. At the conclusion of the evidence, Petitioners withdrew their defamation cause of action, and moved for a directed verdict regarding DSS's defenses of discretionary immunity and negligence of a third party. The trial judge granted Petitioners' motions for directed verdict as to those defenses. Ultimately, the jury returned a verdict for Petitioners, and awarded them $4 million in damages. DSS subsequently filed motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), for new trial absolute, and to reduce the verdict. The trial court issued an order denying DSS's post-trial motions. However, the trial court granted DSS's motion to reduce the verdict. The court of appeals reversed the jury's verdict. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, finding the trial court did not err in its decision. View "Bass v. SCDSS" on Justia Law

Appellant Deerfield Plantation Phase II B Property Homeowners Association appealed an Administrative Law Court's (ALC) decision affirming Respondent South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control's (DHEC) decision to grant a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) General Permit for Storm Water Discharges from Large and Small Construction Activity and Coastal Zone Consistency Certification to Respondent Deertrack Golf, Inc. Deertrack Golf owns the real property that is the subject of this dispute, a non-operational golf course known as the Old South Golf Course. Bill Clark Homes entered into a contract with Deertrack Golf to purchase the Old South Course. Bill Clark Homes designed a residential subdivision to be constructed within the acreage known as Phase I of the Old South Course, and obtained approval from Horry County for a subdivision consisting of 278 lots and comprising approximately 85 acres. The Old South Course is adjacent to an existing residential development known as Deerfield Plantation Phase II B, and Appellant represents its residents, who oppose the residential redevelopment of the Old South Course. The redevelopment plan necessitated the construction of a new stormwater management system utilizing an existing drainage network of stormwater ponds on the Old South Course. The redevelopment required a jurisdictional determination from the Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps) regarding whether any portion of proposed redevelopment acreage contained "waters of the United States" subject to the Corps' jurisdiction. In 2006, the Corps determined that the tract did not contain any federal waters subject to the Corps' jurisdiction. However, in 2010, upon Appellant's application, the Corps declared federal jurisdiction over .37 acres of the existing waters on the proposed 85-acre redevelopment tract. Appellant appealed the decision to the federal district court, arguing the Corps erred in failing to declare federal jurisdiction over the remaining waters found within the proposed redevelopment tract, and the district court granted summary judgment to the Corps. Appellant appealed the district court's decision to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, which affirmed. During the pendency of the federal appeals, the South Carolina Court of Appeals variously stayed and held in abeyance the state appeal. However, in 2012, the court of appeals remanded the case "to the ALC to further remand the matter to DHEC for additional administrative action." The ALC remanded the case to DHEC. After DHEC took no additional administrative action, the court of appeals dismissed the appeal. After Respondents filed petitions for rehearing claiming the court of appeals misapprehended DHEC's reasons for taking no action on the Permit, the court of appeals reinstated the appeal. The South Carolina Supreme Court then certified the case for review, and affirmed (as modified) the ALC's decision upholding DHEC's issuance of the permit. Further, in light of the subsequent declaration of federal jurisdiction as to part of the acreage subject to the permit, the South Carolina Supreme Court remanded the case to DHEC for further administrative action. View "Deerfield Plantation v. SCDHEC" on Justia Law

For more than a decade, the City of Columbia has been allocating substantial amounts of revenue generated from user fees for water and sewer services to its General Fund and for economic development purposes. Appellants filed this action contending the City's practices violated sections 6-1-330 and 6-21-440 of the South Carolina Code. The trial court granted the City summary judgment. Because there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether the City's expenditures of water and sewer revenues were lawful, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings to determine whether the funds transferred into the City's General Fund were properly considered "surplus revenues" under section 6-21-440 and could therefore be spent for unrelated purposes and whether the City's direct economic-development expenditures bore a sufficient nexus to its provision of water and sewer services such that they would be considered "related" expenditures under the terms of section 6-1-330(B) of the South Carolina Code. View "Azar v. City of Columbia" on Justia Law

Michael Cunningham was terminated from his position as the county administrator for Anderson County. Cunningham brought this action alleging breach of contract, wrongful discharge, and violation of the Payment of Wages Act. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the County on all causes of action. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court on the breach of contract and Payment of Wages claims, but reversed and remanded the wrongful discharge claim. The County argued on appeal that the court of appeals erred by reversing the trial court's grant of summary judgment on the wrongful discharge claim because Cunningham has never argued he was a noncontractual, at-will employee. After review, the Supreme Court agreed and reversed the portion of the court of appeals' opinion reversing and remanding that claim. View "Cunningham v. Anderson County" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, formerly the part-time Chief Magistrate of Newberry County, brought this action in the South Carolina Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to determine whether defendants Newberry County and Wayne Adams, County Administrator, had the authority to abolish part-time magistrate positions in Newberry County. In addition, the Court permitted the Senate President Pro Tempore to intervene in this action. Defendants and the Intervenor agreed with plaintiff that defendants did not have such authority, contending that all of defendants' actions have been done in compliance with the South Carolina Constitution and applicable statutes. After review, the Supreme Court agreed with all parties that defendants did not have the authority to abolish part-time magistrate positions in Newberry County. Rather, as permitted by code section 22-4-80(E), the part-time magisterial positions, including the one previously held by plaintiff, had been combined into one full-time magistrate position, and the Newberry County magistrates have been lawfully appointed pursuant to S.C. Const. art. V, sec. 26. While the Court declined plaintiff's invitation to expand the scope of this case to address issues of an alleged constitutional conflict between S.C. Const. art V, sec. 26 and art. V, sec. 4, and his related statutory claims, the Court reviewed all of plaintiff's arguments and found nothing of merit warranting the exercise of our authority to add necessary parties and address these additional arguments. View "Jayroe v. Newberry County" on Justia Law

Christopher Taft was found to be a sexually violent predator and was committed to the South Carolina Department of Mental Health. He now argues the trial court should have granted his motion for directed verdict because the State failed to present sufficient evidence under the Sexually Violent Predators Act (the SVP Act) that he was presently likely to reoffend if not confined. Accordingly, we find the State failed to present sufficient evidence that Taft had a current risk of reoffending which would allow a jury to conclude he was a sexually violent predator. View "In the Matter of the Care & Treatment of Christopher Taft" on Justia Law

Petitioner Ricky Rhame filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits. The single commissioner found the claim compensable. Respondent Charleston County School District sought review, and the matter was heard by an Appellate Panel of the Commission. The Appellate Panel reversed, denying the claim. Petitioner filed a motion for rehearing before the Appellate Panel. He did not file his notice of appeal until after the Appellate Panel denied his motion for rehearing. The notice of appeal was filed more than thirty days after the Appellate Panel's initial denial of the claim. The court of appeals dismissed Petitioner's appeal because the notice of appeal was not filed within thirty days from the date the Appellate Panel denied his claim. The court of appeals held that motions for rehearing are not permitted before the Commission on review of a single commissioner's decision. After its review, the South Carolina Supreme Court held Rhame's motion for rehearing to the Appellate Panel was proper and stayed the time for serving the notice of appeal for thirty days from receipt of the decision denying the motion. The case was remanded to the court of appeals for consideration of Rhame's appeal. View "Rhame v. Charleston County School District" on Justia Law