Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In response to population growth and business development along U.S. Highway 278 in Beaufort County, the South Carolina Department of Transportation ("the Department") engaged experts for the purpose of streamlining the flow of traffic on that highway. The properties on the north side of Highway 278 agreed among themselves to share the cost of modifying and/or building private roads that would allow left turn access to all of their properties by way of the new median crossover.  The properties on the south side of the highway, however, were unable to reach such an agreement.  As a result, Appellant Hilton Head Automotive's (HHA) property—which is on the south side of the highway—lost its immediate left turn access to and from Highway 278.  Nonetheless, HHA retained direct right turn access to and from the eastbound lanes of Highway 278. HHA argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that the Department's reconfiguration of the median crossovers on U.S. Highway 278 was a taking because it deprived Appellant and its customers of the ability to enter or exit the highway by making a left turn.  Upon review of the applicable legal authority and the trial court record, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the circuit court granting summary judgment in favor of the Department of Transportation. View "Hilton Head Automotive, LLC v. So. Carolina Dept. of Transportation" on Justia Law

Appellant Bon Secours-St. Francis Xavier Hospital (the Hospital) was a defendant at trial in the underlying civil case.  On the morning of the trial, Appellants removed the case to federal court for the second time on the same grounds as the initial removal.  The federal district court judge again remanded the case to state court.  The state trial judge, imposed severe sanctions against the Appellants for the delay created by the second removal.  Appellants argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that they should not have been sanctioned for the second removal because it was done in good faith. The Supreme Court agreed with both [the trial judge's] version of the facts and his conclusion that the second removal was not based on good grounds and was interposed solely for delay: "[w]hile Rule 11 is evaluated by a subjective standard, the rule still may be violated with a filing that is so patently without merit that no reasonable attorney could have a good faith belief in its propriety.  We find such is the case here." The Court affirmed the lower court's imposition of sanctions. View "Bon Secours-St. Francis Xavier Hospital v. Wieters" on Justia Law

Carolina Chloride, Inc. sued Richland County alleging the County incorrectly advised it of the legal zoning classification of its property and that it lost a potential sale of the property due to the zoning issue.  The trial judge directed a verdict for the County on all of Carolina Chloride's claims.  The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded as to the claims for negligence and negligent misrepresentation but upheld the directed verdict as to Carolina Chloride's remaining claims. On appeal, the County argued the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the directed verdict in its favor on Carolina Chloride's claims for negligence and negligent misrepresentation. Upon review of the trial record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court concluded that "[a]lthough it is certainly unfortunate that a mistake occurred in this case, Carolina Chloride had no legal right to rely solely upon the representations of County personnel and should have consulted the official record to determine the legal zoning classification of its property.  Carolina Chloride's owner and its broker are both experienced in business matters, but it appears that neither [the Company] nor his broker personally inspected the County's official records prior to making a sizable investment in developing the property."  The Court reversed the appellate court's decision with respect to the directed verdict as to the negligence and negligent misrepresentation claims. The Court affirmed the appellate court on all other matters. View "Carolina Chloride v. Richland County" on Justia Law

Appellant Charleston County School District (School District) appealed a circuit court's order that granted a Rule 12(b)(6) SCRCP motion to dismiss its complaint that alleged the unconstitutionality of Act. No. 189 of 2005 (Act 189), as well as its decision to dismiss the Governor as a party to this action. South Carolina adopted a charter school law in 1996, called the South Carolina Charter Schools Act.  The General Assembly amended the Charter Schools Act once in 2002 and again in 2006.  In the Charter Schools Act, the General Assembly provided rules governing all aspects of the organization, approval, and operation of charter schools in South Carolina, as well as the obligations of each sponsoring school district. The School District filed a complaint against Speaker of the House Robert Harrell, President of the Senate Andre Bauer, Governor Mark Sanford, and the State of South Carolina seeking a declaratory judgment that Act 189 was unconstitutional.  The complaint alleged that Act 189 was special legislation in violation of the South Carolina Constitution because the subject of charter schools was already comprehensively addressed by the Charter Schools Act and Act 189 only applied to Charleston County's charter schools without any reasonable basis for doing so. Though the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's dismissal of the Governor, the Court found that the School District's complaint sufficiently states a cause of action that Act 189 is unconstitutional.   The Court remanded the case back to the district court for further proceedings. View "Charleston County School District v. Harrell" on Justia Law

Appellant Georgetown County League of Women Voters appealed an order that dismissed its action that sought a declaration that Respondent Smith Land Company had unlawfully filled wetlands and dismissed its request for an injunction requiring Smith to restore those wetlands. Respondent owns a .332 acre lot in Pawleys Island, .19 acres of which are isolated wetlands often referred to as Carolina Bays. Before developing the lot, Respondent notified both the Army Corps of Engineers and the Department of Health and Environmental Control (DHEC) of its plans. While the Corps cautioned respondent to notify DHEC before performing the work and respondent did so, it received no response from DHEC. Respondent then filled the wetlands. The League then filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment and related equitable relief. After a hearing, the circuit court held that DHEC did not have jurisdiction over isolated wetlands, that Respondent complied with all requirements before filling the wetlands, and that the League could not maintain a private suit under the South Carolina Pollution Control Act. Finding that the circuit court erred in holding that: (1) the DHEC lacked jurisdiction to regulate the wetlands; (2) Respondent did not violate the Act; and (3) the Act does not create a private cause of action, the Supreme Court reversed the reversed the case and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Georgetown County League of Women Voters v. Smith Land Co." on Justia Law

Appellants A & A Taxi, Inc. and the South Carolina Workers' Compensation Uninsured Employers' Fund appealed a circuit court order that found Respondent Robert Pikaart was an employee of A & A Taxi, Inc. at the time he was injured in two automobile accidents and that he was entitled to certain workers' compensation benefits. Appellants contended Pikaart was an independent contractor, not an employee; therefore, the South Carolina Workers' Compensation Commission had no jurisdiction in this matter. They further argued the circuit court improperly made findings of fact that did not bear on the limited issue of jurisdiction that was before it. Because the issue on appeal concerned jurisdiction, the Supreme Court took its own view of the preponderance of the evidence. Accordingly, the Court held that the facts in this case were preponderantly in favor of a finding that Pikaart was the general manager of A & A Taxi and as such, was an employee subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission. To the extent Appellants contended the circuit court erred in making additional findings of fact that were not related to jurisdiction, the Court found the issue was not preserved for review. Consequently, the Court affirmed the circuit court's order in full. View "Pikaart v. A & A Taxi" on Justia Law

This case involved a dispute over the results of a town council election in Atlantic Beach, South Carolina, held on November 3, 2009. Carolyn Cole and Windy Price (Appellants) appealed the circuit court order that affirmed the Town of Atlantic Beach Municipal Election Commission's (MEC) decision to de-certify and order a new election for two Atlantic Beach Town Councilmember positions. On November 3, 2009, the Town of Atlantic Beach held an election for the two positions on town council. After the polls closed, there were 39 contested ballots. The MEC held a challenged ballot hearing, after which, 28 of the challenged ballots were accepted. These accepted ballots included those of Price and Cole. The MEC conducted two protest hearings. In pertinent part, the MEC heard testimony concerning the allegations raised in several letters of protest that contested the election of Appellants on the grounds that Appellants failed to meet the residency requirements to run as candidates. At the close of the second hearing, a majority of the Commissioners voted to grant petitions for a new election. On that same day, Appellants appealed the MEC's decision to the circuit court. The MEC did not issue a written order until January 29, 2010. That order summarily found Appellants did not meet the residency requirements of running for public office. The MEC de-certified the election results and ordered a new election. The circuit court judge heard the appeal in May 2010, and issued an order that same day affirming the decision of the MEC. Upon review, the issues before the Supreme Court pertained to whether there was sufficient evidence in the MECs record to support its decision to decertify and order new elections. Appellants argued that the Supreme Court should vacate the MEC's decision to de-certify and order a new election because the MEC failed to comply with the requirements of the South Carolina Code that delineates the procedure for contesting results of a municipal election. The Court believed that the Town's "complete disregard of the provisions of section the statute was perpetuated by a conscious decision to ignore the will of the voters, and this delay ultimately undermined the legislative purpose behind requiring the expeditious handling of election disputes." Therefore, the Court agreed with Appellants and vacated the decision of the MEC. Accordingly, the MEC's initial certification of the town council election declaring Appellants Cole and Price as winners was restored. View "Cole v. Town of Atlantic Beach Election Commission" on Justia Law

Appellant "J. Doe" brought an action against Respondent Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (Wal-Mart) alleging various theories of negligence. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Wal-Mart. This case arose from the physical and sexual abuse of then three-year-old J. Doe (also "the victim"). "F. Doe" is the victim's guardian ad litem and great uncle. F. Doe and his wife (aunt) often kept the victim for months at a time. According to the aunt, both of the victim's parents physically abused him beginning when he was three months old. In August 1997, after arriving at her house, the aunt examined the victim and found two "wide strips" of bruising on his buttocks. She did not contact the police or the Department of Social Services (DSS) or seek medical treatment. Instead, she took two photographs of the victim's buttocks. Several days later, the aunt took the roll of film to Wal-Mart to be developed. When the aunt retrieved the photos, a photo technician informed her she had destroyed some of the photos because of a store policy requiring the destruction of photos depicting nudity. The aunt claimed the employee told her she was required to "destroy them," which the aunt believed meant the employee had destroyed the photos and the negatives. The aunt left the store with the remainder of the photos and all of the negatives, but erroneously believed the negatives depicting the victim's buttocks had been destroyed. The father pled guilty to first degree criminal sexual conduct and was sentenced to twenty-five years' imprisonment. In 2003, Appellant filed suit arguing the victim's injuries from the sexual abuse were a result of Wal-Mart's failure to report the suspected physical abuse depicted in the photos as required by the Reporter's Statute and/or Wal-Mart's negligent hiring and supervision of its employees and its violations of approximately twenty internal company policies. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the circuit court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Wal-Mart was proper because there could be no civil liability under the state Reporter's Statute and Wal-Mart owed no duty to the victim. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the lower court's decision. View "Doe v. Walmart" on Justia Law

In 2007, Appellant-Attorney James Brown was appointed to represent Alfonzo Howard. Mr. Howard was charged with multiple crimes, including first degree criminal sexual conduct, two counts of kidnapping, two counts of armed robbery and possession of a weapon during the commission of a crime. From the beginning, Appellant complained about the appointment, first to the circuit's chief administrative judge, and then to the trial judge. The charges against Howard proceeded to trial.  During the trial, Appellant's belligerent unwillingness to comply with the court's order continued. The trial court, "displaying remarkable patience," only threatened Appellant with contempt and instructed Appellant to proceed.  Appellant then invoked his right to counsel.  The trial against Howard was briefly continued to allow Appellant's attorney to appear.  After consulting with his attorney, Appellant finally decided to continue with representation of the indigent defendant. The trial judge awarded costs for investigative work and expert fees, which was substantially in excess of the statutory cap of $500. However, the court denied Appellant's motion to award attorney's fees in excess of the $3,500 statutory amount. The sole basis for denying Appellant an award of fees in excess of the statutory cap was his unprofessional conduct.  During the pendency of the appeal, the Supreme Court accepted an amicus curiae brief on behalf of the South Carolina Bar concerning the potential constitutional implications arising from the court appointment of attorneys to represent indigent clients.  The Supreme Court elected to address this matter of significant public interest.  The Court held that the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment is implicated when an attorney is appointed by the court to represent an indigent litigant.  In such circumstances, the attorney's services constitute property entitling the attorney to just compensation. However in this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion for denying Appellant fees in excess of the statutory cap for his behavior at trial. The Court affirmed the lower court’s decision. View "Brown v. Howard" on Justia Law

This appeal was the culmination of the Town of James Island's (Town) third attempt to incorporate into its own municipal body. The two previous attempts were invalidated by the Supreme Court. In this case, the Court found that the Town's incorporation petition was again insufficient. In reversing a lower court's approval of the Town's petition, the Court took the opportunity to guide Petitioners with a legally sufficient framework for the Town and other unincorporated areas to successfully petition for incorporation in the future. View "Cabiness v. Town of James Island" on Justia Law