Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Georgia citizen George Skipper was involved in a motor vehicle accident with a logging truck that was driven by Harold Moors and owned by Specialty Logging, LLC. Specialty had a commercial automobile insurance policy with a $1,000,000 per occurrence limit, which was issued by ACE Property and Casualty Insurance Company (ACE). Following the accident, Skipper retained an attorney who wrote a demand letter to ACE offering to settle the case for the limits of the Policy. ACE retained two lawyers from Atlanta, Brantley Rowlen and Erin Coia, to represent Specialty and Moors. Specialty and Moors offered Skipper $50,000. Not satisfied with that offer, Skipper and his wife filed a lawsuit in the Allendale County Court of Common Pleas against Specialty and Moors. Unbeknownst to ACE or its attorneys, the Skippers entered into a settlement with Specialty and Moors, agreeing to execute a Confession of Judgment for $4,500,000, in which they admitted liability for the Skippers' injuries and losses. The Specialty Parties also agreed to pursue a legal malpractice claim against ACE and its attorneys Rowlen and Coia, and assigned the predominant interest in that claim to the Skippers.1 In exchange for the Specialty Parties' admission of liability, the Skippers agreed not to execute the judgment as long as the Specialty Parties cooperated in the legal malpractice litigation against Defendants. Armed with the assignment, the Skippers and Specialty Parties filed a legal malpractice action against the attorneys, also with the Allendale County court. The case was removed to the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina. In federal court, ACE and its attorneys argued that the assignment of the malpractice claim was invalid and that the Skippers had no valid claims to assert. Because the question of whether a legal malpractice claim could be assigned between adversaries in litigation in which the alleged malpractice arose was a novel question in South Carolina, the South Carolina Supreme Court accepted a certified question South Carolina law from the federal district court. After review, the South Carolina Court held that in South Carolina, the assignment of a legal malpractice claim between adversaries in litigation in which the alleged malpractice arose was prohibited. View "Skipper v. ACE Property" on Justia Law

Lawrence and Evelyn Morrow filed a lawsuit against THI of South Carolina at Magnolia Place at Spartanburg, LLC (Magnolia Place) alleging personal injuries to Lawrence as a resident. The Morrows alleged that due to Magnolia Place's negligence, Lawrence sustained an injury while being assisted in the shower and was required to undergo surgery to remove a penile implant. They also alleged the nursing home failed to properly monitor Lawrence's diabetes or properly care for his pressure wounds. The Morrows also brought suit against Fundamental Long-Term Care Holdings, LLC, Fundamental Clinical Consulting, LLC, Fundamental Administrative Services, LLC, THI of Baltimore, Inc., THI of South Carolina, Inc., and THI Holdings, LLC (collectively, Fundamental Entities). The Morrows alleged the Fundamental Entities were vicariously liable for the negligence of Magnolia Place, and furthermore were directly responsible for Lawrence's injuries by way of their conscious disregard for his health in underfunding Magnolia Place, which led to issues with staffing, training, and nutrition. The Fundamental Entities thereafter filed a motion to bifurcate the trial pursuant to Rule 42(b), SCRCP between the nursing home negligence claims and the corporate negligence claims, and further, to stay discovery related to the corporate negligence claims. The Fundamental Entities argued bifurcation was proper because the issues of nursing home negligence and corporate negligence were distinct, and the Morrows could only move forward on the corporate negligence claims if they were first successful against Magnolia Place. As an extension, the Fundamental Entities argued bifurcation of the trial would simplify the issues, save significant judicial resources, and cut costs related to discovery. The trial court granted the motion, finding that without first proving negligence against the nursing home the Morrows' claims for corporate negligence could not proceed. Accordingly, the trial court ordered that discovery and a trial on the nursing home negligence claims could go forward, and only if the Morrows were successful, a new jury could hear the corporate negligence claims in a later proceeding. The court of appeals dismissed as interlocutory an appeal which severed a number of defendants from this lawsuit, ostensibly under the label of "bifurcation." The Morrows appealed, and the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court's order went "far beyond our common understanding of bifurcation," thereby affecting a substantial right of the petitioners. View "Morrow v. Fundamental Long-Term Care" on Justia Law

Gregory Collins worked for West Expedited & Delivery Service, Incorporated, and was killed in an automobile collision while returning to South Carolina after making a delivery in Wisconsin for Seko Charlotte. West Expedited, as a subcontractor, contracted with Seko Charlotte to make an interstate delivery of parts. As a result of Collins' work-related death, Collins' dependents filed a workers' compensation claim against West Expedited, Seko Worldwide, Federal Insurance Company, Seko Charlotte, and Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company. A single commissioner of the Workers' Compensation Commission applied the three tests from "Voss v. Ramco, Inc.," (482 S.E.2d 582 (Ct. App. 1997)) and determined that Collins was Seko Charlotte's statutory employee at the time of his fatal accident pursuant to section 42-1-410 of the South Carolina Code. Additionally, Collins was determined to be a traveling employee. Therefore, Seko Charlotte, and its insurance company, Nationwide, were liable. Seko Charlotte and Nationwide appealed the order. The appeal was heard by the Appellate Panel of the Commission. Applying the four factors of the employee/independent contractor test, the Appellate Panel of the Commission concluded Collins was not an employee of Seko Charlotte on the return trip because West Expedited had "the exclusive right of control over [Collins]" after deliveries were made in Wisconsin. The Appellate Panel of the Commission therefore reversed the single commissioner. The Uninsured Employers Fund appealed to the Court of Appeals. The court found that the Commission committed an error of law when it applied the employee/independent contractor test instead of the statutory employee test. Applying the statutory employee test, the Court of Appeals concluded that Collins was Seko Charlotte's statutory employee, reversed the Commission's decision, and reinstated the single commissioner's order. The Supreme Court granted Seko Charlotte and Nationwide's petition for a writ of certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the Court of Appeals properly reversed the Commission's decision, and reinstated the single commissioner's order. View "Collins v. Seko Charlotte" on Justia Law

Petitioner Ricky Rhame filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits. The single commissioner found the claim compensable. Respondent Charleston County School District sought review, and the matter was heard by an Appellate Panel of the Commission. The Appellate Panel reversed, denying the claim. Petitioner filed a motion for rehearing before the Appellate Panel. He did not file his notice of appeal until after the Appellate Panel denied his motion for rehearing. The notice of appeal was filed more than thirty days after the Appellate Panel's initial denial of the claim. The court of appeals dismissed Petitioner's appeal because the notice of appeal was not filed within thirty days from the date the Appellate Panel denied his claim. The court of appeals held that motions for rehearing are not permitted before the Commission on review of a single commissioner's decision. After its review, the South Carolina Supreme Court held Rhame's motion for rehearing to the Appellate Panel was proper and stayed the time for serving the notice of appeal for thirty days from receipt of the decision denying the motion. The case was remanded to the court of appeals for consideration of Rhame's appeal. View "Rhame v. Charleston County School District" on Justia Law

Petitioner LeAndra Lewis was injured by an errant bullet at Studio 54 Boom Boom Room while she was working as an exotic dancer. The question this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether she was an employee of the Club and thus eligible for workers' compensation. After review of the facts entered in the trial court record, the Supreme Court found the Club exercised control over the manner in which she performed her work and therefore concluded she was an employee. View "Lewis v. L.B. Dynasty" on Justia Law

Employee-petitioner Judy Barnes was employed as an administrative assistant at Charter 1 Realty. On the day of her injury, Barnes was asked to check the e-mail of one of the realtors before noon. Around 11:30 a.m., Barnes left her desk and walked toward the realtor's office. However, she stumbled, fell, and sustained serious injuries: a broken left femur, broken left humerus and a torn rotator cuff.Barnes subsequently filed a claim for workers' compensation. At the hearing, Barnes testified she was hurrying to the realtor's office to check her e-mail and that caused her to fall. Evidence was also introduced that her husband did not like the shoes she wore, and he had told her she needed to pick up her feet when she walked. The single commissioner and appellate panel found that her fall was idiopathic and therefore noncompensable. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court disagreed with the commissioner and appellate panel's findings, reversed, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Barnes v. Charter 1 Realty" on Justia Law

Claimant-petitioner Carolyn Nicholson, a supervisor in the investigations area of child protective services for the South Carolina Department of Social Services (DSS), was on her way to a meeting when her foot caught on the hall carpet and she fell. She received treatment for pain to her neck, left shoulder, and left side connected with her fall. Nicholson's claim for workers' compensation was denied by the single commissioner because she failed to prove a causal connection between her fall and employment. The commissioner held there was nothing specific to the floor at DSS which contributed to Nicholson's fall and that she could have fallen anywhere. The question this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether petitioner was entitled to workers' compensation. "Despite how straightforward this issue appears to be," both the commissioner and the court of appeals found petitioner was not entitled to recover. The Supreme Court disagreed with both, reversed, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Nicholson v. SC Dept. of Social Services" on Justia Law

Roger Brock was passenger in a vehicle driven by Brian Mason, which was involved in an accident with a logging truck, driven by Ryan Stevens. At the time of the accident, Stevens was insured through the owner of the logging truck, Malachi Sanders' policy issued by Aequicap Insurance Company. Brock sustained severe injuries as a result of the wreck and filed suit. Soon after the litigation began, Brock settled his claim against Stevens and Sanders with Aequicap for $185,000 for the release of all claims. Shortly after the settlement was reached but before Brock received any payment, Aequicap was declared insolvent. Because Aequicap was an insurer licensed to do business in the State of South Carolina and the insured was a resident of South Carolina, the claim was referred to South Carolina Property and Casualty Insurance Guaranty Association (Guaranty). As a result, Brock made demand on Guaranty for payment of the full settlement amount of $185,000. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on the construction and application of the South Carolina Property and Casualty Insurance Guaranty Association Act (the Act), S.C. Code Ann. Secs. 38-31-10 to -170 (2002 and Supp. 2013), and specifically the exhaustion/non-duplication provision in section 38-31-100(1). Guaranty and Brock moved for summary judgment on the issue whether Guaranty may offset payments from solvent insurance carriers against Brock's settlement under section 38-31-100. The circuit court found section 38-31-100 was ambiguous and granted partial summary judgment to both parties, holding that Guaranty may offset some but not all of the benefits received by Brock from solvent insurance carriers. The Supreme Court disagreed that section 38-31-100 was ambiguous and hold that the unambiguous language of section 38-31-100 provides that Guaranty may offset all payments from all solvent insurers made to Brock as a result of this wreck. View "SC Property v. Brock" on Justia Law

Petitioner Alberta Major fell and sustained an ankle injury while walking across an unpaved area of an intersection, which was owned and maintained by respondent City of Hartsville. Petitioner asserted her injury was a result of a rut in the ground created by vehicles frequently driving over the unpaved area. Petitioner brought suit against respondent alleging negligence, gross negligence, and willful and wanton conduct. Prior to trial, respondent filed a motion for summary judgment contending it was not liable under the South Carolina Torts Claims Act (SCTCA) because it was not on notice of any rut at the location where petitioner allegedly sustained her injury. The trial judge granted summary judgment in favor of respondent, finding respondent's knowledge of vehicles cutting the unpaved corner at the intersection did not create a continual condition and did not place respondent on constructive notice of the actual rut. The Court of Appeals affirmed, referring to the SCTCA and finding although petitioner presented evidence that respondent had notice of circumstances it knew would eventually lead to a rut, there was no evidence respondent had notice of the specific rut petitioner alleged caused her injury. The Court of Appeals further found there was no continual condition sufficient to establish constructive notice and impute liability to respondent. Based on the testimony presented at the summary judgment hearing, the Supreme Court found, however, that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether respondent should have been charged with constructive notice on the basis that the rut existed for such a period of time that respondent, in the use of reasonable care, should have discovered it. Furthermore, the Court found a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the recurring nature of the defect created a continual condition giving rise to constructive notice. Therefore, the Court of Appeals' was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Major v. City of Hartsville" on Justia Law

Stephen Whigham was injured playing kickball during an event he organized for his employer, Jackson Dawson Communications. He filed a claim for workers' compensation. The commissioner denied the claim because she found the injury did not arise out of or in the course of his employment, and that decision was affirmed by the full commission and the court of appeals. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, finding that under the facts of this case, Whigham was entitled to workers' compensation because he was impliedly required to attend the kickball game he organized, and therefore, his injury arose out of and in the course of his employment. View "Whigham v. Jackson Dawson Communications" on Justia Law