Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Patricia Brouwer challenged the circuit court's order dismissing her medical malpractice case for failure to file an expert witness affidavit with her Notice of Intent to File Suit ("NOI") pursuant to section 15-79-125 of the South Carolina Code. Brouwer argued she was exempt from filing an expert witness affidavit because section 15-36-100(C)(2) did not require an affidavit where the alleged negligent act "lies within the ambit of common knowledge and experience." The Supreme Court agreed because it previously held that section 15-79-125(A) incorporated section 15-36-100 in its entirety, including the common-knowledge exception codified in 15-36-100(C)(2). Furthermore, the Court concluded that Brouwer successfully invoked this exception and, thus, was not required to file an expert witness affidavit with her NOI. View "Brouwer v. Sisters of Charity Providence" on Justia Law

Claimant Johnny Adger suffered an accidental injury to his left knee on while working as a police officer with the Manning Police Department. As a result, he was treated using various non-operative methods, including steroid injections. In January 2008, Claimant reached maximum medical improvement (MMI) and was assigned a 32% permanent impairment rating to his lower left extremity. However, in April 2008, Claimant returned to the doctor because he continued to experience swelling and pain in his left knee. Ultimately, Claimant underwent knee replacement surgery. Claimant continued to experience swelling and pain in his left knee, and Claimant followed up with the orthopaedic center for several months after the surgery. At the time of his injury, Claimant suffered from preexisting diabetes, which Claimant's employer was aware of prior to the injury. Claimant experienced problems with his diabetes for years before the accident and required medication to control the condition. Claimant's diabetes was medically controlled around the time of the injury; however, Claimant's diabetes was uncontrolled on several occasions during the course of his knee treatment. The State Accident Fund appealed an order from the Appellate Panel of the South Carolina Workers' Compensation Commission denying its request for reimbursement from the South Carolina Second Injury Fund for benefits paid to Claimant. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded. The Commission denied Appellant's claim for reimbursement in full. Without mentioning medical payments, the Commission stated that "Claimant's preexisting diabetes did not create substantially greater liability for permanent disability nor did it result in substantially greater lost time from work." However, these facts fell under the compensation liability prong of the applicable statute. Furthermore, the Supreme Court found that the Commission ignored expert opinion that Claimant's injury most probably aggravated his diabetes and resulted in substantially greater medical costs than would have resulted from his work-related injury alone. The Second Industry Fund presented no evidence or expert opinion that contradicted the statement concerning medical costs. Therefore, based on the fact that the medical evidence supported the conclusion that the Claimant's work-related injury aggravated his diabetes and resulted in increased medical costs, the Court held that the State Accident Fund satisfied the requirements of section 42-9-400(a), and the Commission's decision to deny its claim for reimbursement of medical payments was clearly erroneous. View "State Accident Fund v. SC Second Injury Fund" on Justia Law

In this medical malpractice case, Vicki Wilkinson appealed the circuit court's dismissal of her civil action with prejudice based on the motions filed by respondents East Cooper Community Hospital, Inc., Carolina Aesthetic Plastic Surgery Institute, P.A., and Dr. Thomas Hahm. Wilkinson argued on appeal that the court erred in finding: (1) the statute of limitations was not tolled because she failed to file an expert witness affidavit contemporaneously with her Notice of Intent to File Suit ("NOI") pursuant to section 15-79-125 of the South Carolina Code; and (2) she failed to file her Complaint within the applicable statute of limitations given she did not contemporaneously file an expert witness affidavit with the Complaint or within forty-five days thereafter in accordance with section 15-36-100(C). This appeal implicated the Court of Appeals' decision in "Ranucci v. Crain," (723 S.E.2d 242 (Ct. App. 2012)) ("Ranucci I"). The Supreme Court reversed Ranucci I, holding that section 15-79-125(A) incorporatesdsection 15-36-100 in its entirety. Therefore, Wilkinson could invoke section 15-36-100(C)(1), which extended the time for filing the expert witness affidavit with her NOI and tolled the applicable statute of limitations. However, because the analysis in Ranucci II was limited to the dismissal of the pre-litigation NOI, it was not dispositive since this case involved the next procedural step in medical malpractice litigation. Accordingly, the circuit court's order was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Wilkinson v. East Cooper Community Hospital" on Justia Law

Shannon Ranucci appealed the circuit court's order dismissing her medical malpractice case for failing to contemporaneously file an expert witness affidavit with her Notice of Intent to File Suit ("NOI") pursuant to section 15-79-125 of the South Carolina Code. Ranucci argued on appeal that the circuit court erred in finding the affidavit of her medical expert was not timely filed because section 15-79-125 incorporated section 15-36-100, which included a "safe harbor" provision that extends the time for filing the affidavit. The Court of Appeals, holding the pre-litigation filing requirement for a medical malpractice case found in section 15-79-125 incorporated only the parts of section 15-36-100 that related to the preparation and content of an expert's affidavit. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the circuit court. The Court held that section 15-79-125(A) incorporated section 15-36-100 in its entirety. Thus, Ranucci could invoke section 15-36-100(C)(1), which extended the time for filing the expert witness affidavit and tolled the applicable statute of limitations. View "Ranucci v. Crain" on Justia Law

This case centered on a claim for equitable indemnification, which was denied by the trial court. Appellants were sued by adjacent property owners regarding environmental contamination. Appellants denied responsibility for the contamination and cross-claimed against the previous property owner, who was responsible for the damage. Because Appellants were not responsible for the ground contamination, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellants but declined to award Appellants the attorney's fees and costs incurred in defending the lawsuit. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded: "[t]he facts of this case clearly demonstrate that the attorney's fees and costs incurred by Appellants in defending the [plaintiffs'] lawsuit were the natural and probable consequences of [respondent's] breach of the purchase agreement." View "McCoy v. Greenwave Enterprises" on Justia Law

Petitioner 5 Star, Inc. is a lawn maintenance and pressure washing company owned by Stan Shelby. In February 2005, 5 Star purchased a used 1996 Ford F-250 pickup truck. Several months later, Shelby parked the truck for the weekend in 5 Star's North Charleston warehouse. Two days later, Shelby returned to the warehouse and discovered that a fire had occurred. The truck was destroyed, and the warehouse was severely damaged. The Chief Fire Investigator for the North Charleston Fire Department, performed an investigation and observed that the truck was located in the middle of the warehouse, where the most extensive damage occurred. The Chief noted the engine compartment of the truck was the likely origin of the fire. 5 Star filed a products liability action against Ford Motor Co. for negligent design of the speed control deactivation switch (deactivation switch), seeking actual and punitive damages. The court of appeals reversed a jury verdict awarding $41,000 in actual damages in a negligent design products liability action based on the failure of the trial court to grant a directed verdict. The trial court qualified petitioner-expert Leonard Greene as an expert in electrical engineering and fire origin and cause. The court of appeals, however, found that Greene was not "qualified as an expert in automotive design or any other area of expertise that would enable [him] to offer opinions as to whether Ford's conduct was negligent." 5 Star claimed that the court of appeals erred and that Greene's extensive qualifications in electrical engineering related to automobiles were sufficient to enable him to testify regarding Ford's exercise of due care. The Supreme Court agreed, reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "5 Star v. Ford Motor" on Justia Law

Petitioner was injured in a car accident while riding as a passenger in a vehicle driven by a co-employee. The liability limits of the at-fault driver were tendered, and there was no underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage on the vehicle in which he was riding. Therefore, Petitioner submitted a claim for UIM benefits under a Progressive insurance policy, issued to Sarah Severn. At the time of the accident, Petitioner resided with Severn and their child. He described Severn as "his on again off again fiancé." Both Petitioner's and Severn's names appear on the Declarations Page of the Policy under the heading "Drivers and household residents." Under the heading "Additional information," Severn is listed as the "Named insured." Progressive denied UIM coverage to Petitioner under Part III of the Policy. According to the affidavit filed by Progressive's Claims Injury Operations Manager, "[t]he claim was denied because [Petitioner] did not fall within the terms, provisions and conditions of [the Policy] to qualify for benefits under the [UIM] provisions," as Petitioner "was only listed as a 'driver' on the policy and not a named insured, nor was he a resident relative of the named insured." The Supreme Court granted Bell's petition for review of the court of appeals' decision affirming the circuit court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Progressive Direct Insurance Company. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Bell v. Progressive Direct Insurance" on Justia Law

Appellant Sarah Dawkins appealed the trial court's decision to grant Union Hospital District d/b/a Wallace Thomson Hospital's (the Hospital) motion to dismiss with prejudice and finding that Appellant was required to comply with the statutory requirements for filing a medical malpractice claim, specifically the Notice of Intent (NOI) and expert affidavit requirements. The Supreme Court emphasized that not every action taken by a medical professional in a hospital or doctor's office necessarily implicates medical malpractice and, consequently, the requirements of the applicable notice statute. Here, the Supreme Court found that Appellant's claim sounded in ordinary negligence and was not subject to the statutory requirements associated with a medical malpractice claim. Appellant's complaint made "clear that she had not begun receiving medical care at the time of her injury, nor does it allege the Hospital's employees negligently administered medical care. Rather, the complaint states that Appellant's injury occurred when she attempted to use the restroom unsupervised, prior to receiving medical care." The Supreme Court reversed the trial court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Dawkins v. Union Hospital" on Justia Law

Appellant Ida Lord appealed the circuit court's order granting summary judgment in favor of D & J Enterprises, Inc., d/b/a Cash on the Spot ("D & J"). Lord argued on appeal that the circuit court erred in: (1) finding the balancing approach adopted in "Bass v. Gopal, Inc.," (716 S.E.2d 910 (2011) ("Gopal II")), used to determine a business owner's duty to protect a patron based on the foreseeability of violent acts by third parties, applied prospectively; and (2) granting summary judgment as she presented a genuine issue of material fact on each element of her negligence claim. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court reversed the circuit court and remanded the case for trial because the Court found "Gopal II" applied here and its application warranted the denial of D & J's motion for summary judgment. View "Lord v. D & J Enterprises" on Justia Law

Appellant Dorris Green, representing his child who was injured while a passenger in his mother's automobile, contended that as a matter of public policy the courts of South Carolina should refuse to recognize the validity of a family member exclusion in a Florida car insurance policy. Further, he contended that the circuit court erred in finding there was no uninsured motorist coverage for his minor child under his Florida policy. The Supreme Court agreed with the circuit court that enforcement of this exclusion, valid under Florida law, did not offend South Carolina public policy, and that there was no underinsured coverage for father's minor child under the father's policy. The Court therefore affirmed the grant of summary judgment to the insurance company. View "Green v. USAA" on Justia Law