Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Willie James Fee died while in the care of Respondent AMISUB of South Carolina, Inc., d/b/a Piedmont Medical Center (Piedmont). Petitioner Evelyn Grier, as the personal representative of his estate, subsequently brought this medical malpractice claim against Piedmont. The circuit court dismissed Petitioner's claim on the ground that the expert witness affidavit she was required to submit pursuant to Sections 15-36-100 and 15-79-125 of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2011) did not contain a competent opinion on proximate cause. Respondent appealed, arguing the court erred in finding these statutes require the affidavit contain such an opinion. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed, reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Grier v. AMISUB" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted a petition for a writ of certiorari to review the decision in "Fairchild v. South Carolina Department of Transportation," (385 S.C. 344, 683 S.E.2d 818 (Ct. App. 2009)). The Court of Appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for a new trial a negligence action arising from a motor vehicle accident. In relevant part, the Court of Appeals determined (1) Respondent Marilee Fairchild's claim for punitive damages should have been submitted to the jury; (2) the trial court should have charged the jury on the intervening negligence of a treating physician; and (3) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant William Leslie Palmer's motion under Rule 35, SCRCP for an independent medical examination (IME) to be performed by Dr. James Ballenger. This action arose out of a motor vehicle that occurred on March 1, 2001 while several vehicles were traveling on Interstate 95. Just before the accident, an employee with the South Carolina Department of Transportation (SCDOT), was driving a dump truck with an attached trailer transporting a backhoe. The employee was traveling in the left lane of the southbound traffic (closest to the median) when he pulled in to a paved "cross-over" in the median so he could turn around and enter the northbound lanes of I-95. While he was stopped waiting for the northbound traffic to clear, the back of his trailer allegedly protruded into the left traffic lane on the southbound side. Several cars traveling south in the left lane directly behind the SCDOT truck, saw the trailer and simultaneously switched to the right lane. When those cars moved over, Fairchild, who was behind them driving a minivan, saw the trailer partially blocking the left lane where she was traveling. She "flashed" her brakes and then continued to brake while staying ahead of the vehicle behind her. Fairchild managed to avoid the trailer, but she was struck by a truck traveling behind her that was driven by William Leslie Palmer. After a trial, the jury returned a verdict in Fairchild's favor. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, which found reversible error in the trial court's failure to submit the issue of punitive damages to the jury and to charge the jury on the intervening negligence of a treating physician, and found the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Palmer's motion for an IME to be performed. View "Fairchild v. SCDOT" on Justia Law

This case presented a "novel" question of whether a member of a limited liability company could be held personally liable for torts committed while acting in furtherance of the company's business. Carl R. Aten, Jr., and his wife are the only members of R. Design Construction Co., LLC. In this particular case, R. Design selected a lot in Beaufort, South Carolina, on which it planned to build a four-unit condominium project. When Aten could not secure the necessary financing, he approached Dennis Green about entering into a contract for R. Design to construct the building. Green ultimately formed 16 Jade Street, LLC for this purpose, and R. Design entered into an agreement with Jade Street for the construction of the condominium. One of the subcontractors selected by R. Design was Catterson & Sons Construction. Michael Catterson is the sole shareholder of Catterson & Sons, and he is a specialty subcontractor with a special license for framing in addition to holding his general contractor's license. As the general contractor, it was Aten's job to supervise the project. A couple months into construction, problems arose concerning the AAC block construction and the framing. Following a progress payment dispute, Catterson & Sons left the job site and did not return. In the ensuing months, Aten's relationship with Green deteriorated as Aten tarried in fixing the defects, and the construction eventually ground to a halt. R. Design subsequently left the project, never replacing Catterson & Sons nor adequately addressing the defects. The day after R. Design left the project, Kern-Coleman conducted another inspection of the property. This time, it identified thirty-four defects in addition to the original four, which had not yet been remedied, for a total of thirty-eight. Anchor Construction was retained as the new general contractor, and its own inspection revealed sixty defects in the original construction. After Anchor began working on the project, more defects surfaced. Jade Street subsequently sued R. Design, Aten, Catterson & Sons, and Catterson for negligence and breach of implied warranties. As to Aten personally, the circuit court concluded that despite the fact he was a member of an LLC, he was personally liable because he held a residential home builder's license. In particular, the court concluded the statutes pertaining to the license create civil liability for the licensee. The court imposed no liability against Catterson himself. The court ultimately awarded Jade Street damages for its claims. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the General Assembly did not intend the LLC act to shield a member from liability for his own torts. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the circuit court's holding that Aten was personally liable for his negligence, and that Catterson was not personally liable for the acts of Catterson & Sons. View "16 Jade Street v. R. Design Construction" on Justia Law

Appellant Karen Cole, on behalf of her husband David, sued the Boy Scouts of America, Indian Waters Council Pack 48 after David was injured during a father-son softball game at a family camping trip. Respondent Jeff Wagner and his son were also on the camping trip and were playing on the opposite team from the Coles in the softball game. Apparently, some of the fathers were playing too aggressively in the minds of some participants and hitting the ball with full swings. One of the Scout leaders briefly interrupted the game and asked them to play more safely, fearing that they were putting the scouts in danger. During Wagner's next turn at bat, he hit a double. Another father came up to bat after him and hit the ball into the outfield, potentially allowing Wagner to score. As Wagner reached home plate, he collided with Cole, who had moved on top of the plate, thereby placing his body directly in the baseline. Wagner was running so fast that he was unable to stop or change directions in time to avoid Cole. Upon impact, Wagner flipped in the air and landed on a bat, breaking a rib. Cole suffered a closed head injury and was rendered semiconscious. He then began bleeding and went into convulsions. Cole had to be airlifted to Palmetto Richland Hospital where he spent two days in the intensive care unit. David Jr. witnessed the entire accident in fear that his father was going to die. Cole and his wife Karen, personally and as guardian ad litem for David Jr. brought this action against Wagner, the Boy Scouts of America, Indian Waters Council of the Boy Scouts of America, Pack 48, and Faith Presbyterian Church for personal injury, loss of consortium, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Wagner moved for summary judgment, contending he owed no duty to Cole because Cole assumed the risks incident to the sport of softball. The circuit court granted Wagner's motion. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court: "[e]ven assuming that Wagner's conduct could be characterized as reckless, it was not so reckless as to involve risks outside the scope of softball. ... Even within the context of a contact sport, players owe reciprocal duties to not intentionally injure each other. Cole [did] not allege that Wagner's conduct was intentional nor [did] he allege such recklessness as would fall outside the scope of the game of softball. Thus, Wagner's conduct fell within the duty of care he owed to Cole as a coparticipant in the game." View "Cole v. Boy Scouts of America" on Justia Law

Appellant Alexander Michau appealed a ruling by the Appellate Panel of the South Carolina Workers' Compensation Commission (Commission) denying his claim for repetitive trauma injuries to his shoulders. Specifically, Appellant challenged the Commission's interpretation and application of section 42-1-172 of the South Carolina Code. Prior to his injury in 2008, Appellant did not report any work-related problems with his arms to his employer, although he sought outside treatment. The Commission denied Appellant's claim on the grounds that "the greater weight of the medical evidence reflects [Appellant's] upper extremity and shoulder problems are related to pre-existing osteoarthritis and/or rheumatoid arthritis and not caused or aggravated by his employment with Georgetown County." Appellant disputed the admissibility of the Commission's expert doctor's report under South Carolina Code section 42-1-172 because it was not stated "to a reasonable degree of medical certainty." Appellant argued that without this evidence, the remaining competent evidence would support his claim of sustaining a compensable repetitive trauma injury. The Supreme Court concluded after a review of the Commission's record that the doctor was not Appellant's treating doctor, and his employer sought a medical "opinion" to decide the compensability of Appellant's claim. In this instance, the Court concluded that the doctor's testimony was indeed an "opinion" within the meaning of the Code, and therefore inadmissible against Appellant in adjudicating his claim. The Court reversed the Commission's decision to admit the doctor's medical opinion and remanded the case to determine whether the remaining competent evidence supported Appellant's claim of injury. View "Michau v. Georgetown County" on Justia Law

Petitioner Carolyn Holmes began working for linen company Respondent National Service Industries (National). According to Petitioner, the work environment at the facility was "very hot" and "sticky" with "a lot of lint and dust in the air," and was poorly ventilated. Petitioner was exposed to the fumes of bleach and did not wear a protective mask. In 1992, she began experiencing breathing and sinus problems. Petitioner never experienced breathing or sinus problems prior to working for National. In 1995, Petitioner was diagnosed with sarcoidosis, a respiratory and pulmonary condition. Petitioner testified that her doctor did not know what caused her sarcoidosis and that, in light of this statement, she took no further steps to determine the cause of her condition. In July 2005, Petitioner got a second opinion. Petitioner's second doctor stated in his report that it was unclear whether Petitioner's work exposure at National caused her sarcoidosis, but that it was more likely that her exposure to the airborne particles and fumes worsened her condition, which had previously developed. Based on this, Petitioner filed a workers' compensation claim alleging a compensable injury by accident to her lungs and respiratory system arising out of and in the scope of her employment with National on July 12, 2005, the date she alleges she first discovered her sarcoidosis was related to her employment. A single commissioner found Petitioner sustained a compensable injury. The full commission reversed the commissioner, finding petitioner's claim was barred by a two-year statute of limitations. Specifically, the full commission found petitioner was aware of her working conditions and, with some diligence on her part, could have discovered she had a claim more than two years before her filing date. Petitioner appealed. The circuit court and Court of Appeals affirmed the full commission's determination that petitioner failed to file her claim within the statute of limitations. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the trial and appellate courts correctly found substantial evidence in the record to support the full commission's findings that Petitioner's claim was barred by the statute of limitations. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the appellate courts' decisions. View "Holmes v. National Service Industries" on Justia Law

In the summer of 1999, Petitioner Gerald Bass was a guest at the Super 8 Motel (Super 8) in Orangeburg while he and several co-workers performed refrigeration work at a local grocery store.  Gopal, Incorporated (Respondent), a franchisee of Super 8, owned and operated the motel. At approximately 10 PM on one evening, Petitioner and his roommate were turning in for the evening when they received a knock at their door. Both men got out of bed, and without looking first to see who was at the door, the roommate opened the door. They saw a man standing a couple of feet from the door. The man then asked Petitioner for his money. When Petitioner refused, the man shot Petitioner in the leg with a small caliber handgun and fled on foot. In September 2002, Petitioner filed a complaint alleging negligence against both Respondent and Super 8. Respondent and Super 8 each filed motions for summary judgment, which were granted.  The court of appeals affirmed, and Petitioner appealed. At issue on appeal was "foreseeability": whether a business owner has a duty to protect its invitees from criminal acts of third parties. Upon review, the Supreme Court adopted a balancing approach to determine "foreseeability," but found that it was unreasonable for Respondent to have foreseen what happened to Petitioner: "[e]ven with all reasonable inferences from the evidence cast in favor of Petitioner, we find Petitioner did not provide the circuit court any evidence that Respondent's security measures were unreasonable given the risk of criminal activity on the property. " The Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Respondent. View "Bass v. Gopal" on Justia Law

Thomas Skinner received an award of benefits from the Workers' Compensation Commission for asbestosis under the scheduled loss provisions of Section 42-9-30 of the South Carolina Code.  Westinghouse Electric Corporation, Skinner's former employer, appealed that decision, arguing Skinner could not recover for a scheduled loss and must proceed under the "general disability" statutes found in Sections 42-9-10 and 42-9-20 of the South Carolina Code. Westinghouse's arguments on appeal concerned the impact of section 42-11-60 on Skinner's right to recover for his pulmonary disease.  In particular, it argued Skinner could only recover for total or partial disability under sections 42-9-10 and 42-9-20, respectively.  The Supreme Court agreed with Westinghouse and reversed the special referee's affirmation of Skinner's award based upon the clear language of section 42-11-60: "[i]n that section, the General Assembly specified that recovery for a pulmonary disease such as Skinner's hinges upon a showing of lost wages under section 42-9-10 and 42-9-20.  Because our resolution of this issue is dispositive of the appeal, it is not necessary for us to address the remaining issues raised by the parties." View "Skinner v. Westinghouse Electric Corp." on Justia Law

Appellant Theresa Clea filed suit to recover for personal injuries sustained by her son (Trevon) after he was bitten by Respondent Essix Shannon's dog. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Respondent. Upon review, the Supreme Court found the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment as to Appellant's strict liability and common law negligence claims. However, the Court found the circuit court properly granted summary judgment as to appellant's attractive nuisance claim. Accordingly, Court affirmed part, and reversed part of the circuit court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Clea v. Odom" on Justia Law

Appellant/Respondent Harleysville Mutual Insurance Company ("Harleysville") issued a series of standard CGL policies to the Respondent developers or their predecessors (collectively "Crossmann") for a series of condominium projects in the Myrtle Beach area of South Carolina. The exterior components of the condominium projects were negligently constructed, which resulted in water penetration and progressive damage to otherwise nondefective components of the projects. The homeowners settled their lawsuits against Respondents. Crossmann then filed this declaratory judgment action to determine coverage under Harleysville's policies. Upon review of the lower court’s order, the Supreme Court reversed a finding of joint and several liability against the developers and its insurer, and found the scope of Harleysville's liability was limited to damages accrued during its "time on the risk." In so ruling, the Court adhered to its holding in “Joe Harden Builders, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.”: “[u]sing our ‘time on risk’ framework, the allocation of the damage award against Crossmann must conform to the actual distribution of property damage across the progressive damage period. Where proof of the actual property damage distribution is not available, the allocation formula adopted herein will serve as an appropriate default method for dividing the loss among Crossmann's insurers.’ The Court remanded the case to the trial court for further consideration of the "time on risk" allocation. View "Crossmann Communities v. Harleysville Mutual" on Justia Law