Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Ricky Rhame filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits. The single commissioner found the claim compensable. Respondent Charleston County School District sought review, and the matter was heard by an Appellate Panel of the Commission. The Appellate Panel reversed, denying the claim. Petitioner filed a motion for rehearing before the Appellate Panel. He did not file his notice of appeal until after the Appellate Panel denied his motion for rehearing. The notice of appeal was filed more than thirty days after the Appellate Panel's initial denial of the claim. The court of appeals dismissed Petitioner's appeal because the notice of appeal was not filed within thirty days from the date the Appellate Panel denied his claim. The court of appeals held that motions for rehearing are not permitted before the Commission on review of a single commissioner's decision. After its review, the South Carolina Supreme Court held Rhame's motion for rehearing to the Appellate Panel was proper and stayed the time for serving the notice of appeal for thirty days from receipt of the decision denying the motion. The case was remanded to the court of appeals for consideration of Rhame's appeal. View "Rhame v. Charleston County School District" on Justia Law

Petitioner LeAndra Lewis was injured by an errant bullet at Studio 54 Boom Boom Room while she was working as an exotic dancer. The question this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether she was an employee of the Club and thus eligible for workers' compensation. After review of the facts entered in the trial court record, the Supreme Court found the Club exercised control over the manner in which she performed her work and therefore concluded she was an employee. View "Lewis v. L.B. Dynasty" on Justia Law

The federal district court certified a question of South Carolina law to the South Carolina Supreme Court. Behrooz Taghivand was the manager of a Rite Aid store in a high crime area of North Charleston. While on duty, Taghivand observed a patron acting strangely and milling around the store with no apparent purpose. The patron stopped briefly in the section directly in front of the cashier, selected a few items, and made a purchase. After the patron checked out, the cashier told Taghivand that when the patron entered the store, he was carrying a bag that appeared to be empty but now had items in it. Taghivand instructed the cashier to call the police. An officer arrived at the scene and gathered together the items the patron claimed he purchased from the store, and Taghivand confirmed these as belonging to the patron. The officer also searched the patron's bag, and found it contained only dirty clothes. Taghivand was terminated effective that day, and was informed the incident was the reason for his termination. As a result, Taghivand filed this action against Rite Aid Corporation, Eckerd Corporation d/b/a Rite Aid, and Steve Smith in federal court for wrongful termination; the defendants moved to dismiss. After finding that South Carolina law was not clear on the issue raised by the motion to dismiss, the federal district court certified this question: under the public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine in South Carolina, does an at-will employee have a cause of action in tort for wrongful termination where: (1) the employee, a store manager, reasonably suspects that criminal activity, specifically, shoplifting, has occurred on the employer's premises; (2) the employee, acting in good faith, reports the suspected criminal activity to law enforcement; and (3) the employee is terminated in retaliation for reporting the suspected criminal activity to law enforcement? After review, the South Carolina Supreme Court answered the certified question: no. View "Taghivand v. Rite Aid" on Justia Law

In late 2008, Cynthia McNaughton, who was in her early to mid 50's at the time, was accepted into the South Carolina Department of Education's Program of Alternative Certification for Educators (PACE program), which enabled individuals who earned a college degree but did not complete a traditional teacher preparation program, to become certified South Carolina public school teachers. When she was hired, Appellant Charleston Charter School of Math & Science, Inc. knew that McNaughton was participating in the PACE program, and that her completion of the program was contingent upon her fulfillment of further requirements, including the completion of an induction teaching year. McNaughton signed an employment agreement, which stated that McNaughton "agree[d] to be a full-time teacher at Charleston Charter School for Math and Science for the school year 2010–2011." The employment agreement further stated that it was "contingent on funding and enrollment." McNaughton received positive feedback from her students and their parents. Neither the principal nor any other faculty member experienced any problems with McNaughton's performance as a teacher, and McNaughton was never disciplined for any matter. However, on December 1, 2010 (in the middle of the school year) the principal informed McNaughton that the school was terminating her employment. The principal told McNaughton that Appellant needed to use the funds designated for McNaughton's salary to hire and pay a new math teacher because some of the students had performed poorly on a recent math achievement test. McNaughton sued and won on her wrongful termination/breach of contract complaint. The School appealed the trial court's decisions denying its motions for a directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV); permitting the jury to award special damages; and granting attorney's fees to McNaughton. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "McNaughton v. Charleston Charter School" on Justia Law

Employee-petitioner Judy Barnes was employed as an administrative assistant at Charter 1 Realty. On the day of her injury, Barnes was asked to check the e-mail of one of the realtors before noon. Around 11:30 a.m., Barnes left her desk and walked toward the realtor's office. However, she stumbled, fell, and sustained serious injuries: a broken left femur, broken left humerus and a torn rotator cuff.Barnes subsequently filed a claim for workers' compensation. At the hearing, Barnes testified she was hurrying to the realtor's office to check her e-mail and that caused her to fall. Evidence was also introduced that her husband did not like the shoes she wore, and he had told her she needed to pick up her feet when she walked. The single commissioner and appellate panel found that her fall was idiopathic and therefore noncompensable. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court disagreed with the commissioner and appellate panel's findings, reversed, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Barnes v. Charter 1 Realty" on Justia Law

Claimant-petitioner Carolyn Nicholson, a supervisor in the investigations area of child protective services for the South Carolina Department of Social Services (DSS), was on her way to a meeting when her foot caught on the hall carpet and she fell. She received treatment for pain to her neck, left shoulder, and left side connected with her fall. Nicholson's claim for workers' compensation was denied by the single commissioner because she failed to prove a causal connection between her fall and employment. The commissioner held there was nothing specific to the floor at DSS which contributed to Nicholson's fall and that she could have fallen anywhere. The question this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether petitioner was entitled to workers' compensation. "Despite how straightforward this issue appears to be," both the commissioner and the court of appeals found petitioner was not entitled to recover. The Supreme Court disagreed with both, reversed, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Nicholson v. SC Dept. of Social Services" on Justia Law

North American Rescue Products, Inc. (NARP) brought a declaratory judgment action to determine whether P. J. Richardson had the right to purchase 7.5% of NARP's stock at a discount despite the fact that he had been terminated, the agreement to which purported to end the parties' relationship. A jury's verdict allowed Richardson to purchase the stock, but both parties appealed. The Supreme Court granted review of the appellate court's decision affirming the jury's verdict. After that review, the Supreme Court concluded the termination agreement unambiguously ended any right Richardson had to purchase the stock. The appellate court was reversed and the case remanded for entry of judgment in favor of NARP. View "North American Rescue Products v. Richardson" on Justia Law

Respondent Kimberly Legette was employed by Appellant Nucor Corporation from 1998, through 2010. Nucor terminated Legette's employment after she failed a random on-site drug test in violation of Nucor's drug policy. Although Legette obtained an independent drug test, which tested negative for drugs, she was fired from her job at Nucor based on the two positive drug test results. Legette subsequently applied for unemployment benefits. Nucor requested that Legette be denied unemployment benefits, contending she was statutorily ineligible to receive them because she was fired for violating Nucor's drug policy by testing positive for drugs. This direct appeal from the Administrative Law Court (ALC) presented for the Supreme Court's review a threshold procedural challenge to appealability, and substantively, to the awarding of unemployment benefits to an employee terminated for failing a drug test administered by a laboratory that was not properly certified. Because this appeal arose from a final resolution of all issues, the Court found the matter is appealable. The Court affirmed the ALC. View "Nucor v. SCDEW" on Justia Law

Stephen Whigham was injured playing kickball during an event he organized for his employer, Jackson Dawson Communications. He filed a claim for workers' compensation. The commissioner denied the claim because she found the injury did not arise out of or in the course of his employment, and that decision was affirmed by the full commission and the court of appeals. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, finding that under the facts of this case, Whigham was entitled to workers' compensation because he was impliedly required to attend the kickball game he organized, and therefore, his injury arose out of and in the course of his employment. View "Whigham v. Jackson Dawson Communications" on Justia Law

Claimant Johnny Adger suffered an accidental injury to his left knee on while working as a police officer with the Manning Police Department. As a result, he was treated using various non-operative methods, including steroid injections. In January 2008, Claimant reached maximum medical improvement (MMI) and was assigned a 32% permanent impairment rating to his lower left extremity. However, in April 2008, Claimant returned to the doctor because he continued to experience swelling and pain in his left knee. Ultimately, Claimant underwent knee replacement surgery. Claimant continued to experience swelling and pain in his left knee, and Claimant followed up with the orthopaedic center for several months after the surgery. At the time of his injury, Claimant suffered from preexisting diabetes, which Claimant's employer was aware of prior to the injury. Claimant experienced problems with his diabetes for years before the accident and required medication to control the condition. Claimant's diabetes was medically controlled around the time of the injury; however, Claimant's diabetes was uncontrolled on several occasions during the course of his knee treatment. The State Accident Fund appealed an order from the Appellate Panel of the South Carolina Workers' Compensation Commission denying its request for reimbursement from the South Carolina Second Injury Fund for benefits paid to Claimant. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded. The Commission denied Appellant's claim for reimbursement in full. Without mentioning medical payments, the Commission stated that "Claimant's preexisting diabetes did not create substantially greater liability for permanent disability nor did it result in substantially greater lost time from work." However, these facts fell under the compensation liability prong of the applicable statute. Furthermore, the Supreme Court found that the Commission ignored expert opinion that Claimant's injury most probably aggravated his diabetes and resulted in substantially greater medical costs than would have resulted from his work-related injury alone. The Second Industry Fund presented no evidence or expert opinion that contradicted the statement concerning medical costs. Therefore, based on the fact that the medical evidence supported the conclusion that the Claimant's work-related injury aggravated his diabetes and resulted in increased medical costs, the Court held that the State Accident Fund satisfied the requirements of section 42-9-400(a), and the Commission's decision to deny its claim for reimbursement of medical payments was clearly erroneous. View "State Accident Fund v. SC Second Injury Fund" on Justia Law