Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2005, Island Pointe, LLC contracted Complete Building Corporation (CBC) to construct a condominium project, Palmetto Pointe at Peas Island. CBC subcontracted Tri-County Roofing (TCR) for roofing and related work. In 2014-2015, Palmetto discovered construction defects and sued CBC, TCR, and others for negligence and breach of warranty. Palmetto received $6,800,000 in settlements, including $1,000,000 from CBC's insurer for a covenant-not-to-execute and $1,975,000 from four other defendants.The trial began in May 2019, and the jury found CBC and TCR liable for $6,500,000 in actual damages and $500,000 each in punitive damages. The trial court apportioned 5% liability to two other defendants, making CBC and TCR jointly and severally liable for the remaining 90% of actual damages. TCR sought setoff for the $1,000,000 payment and the settlements from the four other defendants. The trial court denied TCR's motion for setoff, except for partial amounts conceded by Palmetto.The South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the case. It reversed the court of appeals' decision, holding that TCR is entitled to set off the full $1,000,000 paid by CBC's insurer. The court affirmed the lower court's decision regarding the settlements from Novus, Atlantic, H and A, and Cohen's, agreeing that the trial court reasonably allocated the settlement amounts. The case was remanded to the trial court for the calculation of the judgment against TCR. View "Palmetto Pointe v. Tri-County Roofing" on Justia Law

Rory M. Isaac and Kimberly J. Isaac, buyers in a residential real estate transaction, sued the sellers' real estate agent, Laura Kopchynski, for failing to disclose high moisture levels in the crawl space and mischaracterizing a wood infestation report as "good." The Isaacs claimed fraud, fraud in the inducement, negligent misrepresentation, civil conspiracy, and violation of the South Carolina Residential Property Condition Disclosure Act.The Circuit Court granted summary judgment to Kopchynski on all claims. The Isaacs appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed the summary judgment on the negligent misrepresentation and Disclosure Act claims, while affirming the summary judgment on the fraud and civil conspiracy claims. Kopchynski then petitioned for certiorari.The South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the case. It found that the Isaacs' agent did not rely on Kopchynski's statement about the June CL-100 report being "good" and that the Isaacs had a duty to inspect the property themselves. Therefore, the Isaacs could not establish justifiable reliance, a necessary element for negligent misrepresentation. The Court also held that the South Carolina Residential Property Condition Disclosure Act does not create a private cause of action against real estate licensees, only against property owners.The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and reinstated the Circuit Court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Kopchynski on both the negligent misrepresentation and Disclosure Act claims. View "Isaac v. Kopchynski" on Justia Law

James and Lori Marlowe own a home on Highway 378 in Florence County, South Carolina. In 2015, the South Carolina Department of Transportation (SCDOT) began construction to widen and realign a portion of Highway 378 adjacent to the Marlowes' home. During the construction, the home flooded twice, once in October 2015 and again in October 2016, during major storm events. The Marlowes filed a lawsuit against SCDOT, alleging inverse condemnation, conversion, due process violations, and negligence.The Circuit Court granted summary judgment in favor of SCDOT on all claims. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Circuit Court's decision on the negligence claim but reversed on the inverse condemnation claim. The Court of Appeals also held that the Stormwater Management and Sediment Reduction Act did not immunize SCDOT from liability. SCDOT petitioned for a writ of certiorari on the inverse condemnation and Stormwater Act issues, which the South Carolina Supreme Court granted.The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision that the Stormwater Act did not immunize SCDOT from liability. However, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision on the inverse condemnation claim, finding that there was insufficient evidence on the causation issue to allow the claim to proceed. The court held that the evidence, including expert testimony, did not rise above speculation regarding whether the construction of the new roadway caused the flooding of the Marlowes' home. Consequently, the Supreme Court reinstated the grant of summary judgment in favor of SCDOT on the inverse condemnation claim. View "Marlowe v. SC DOT" on Justia Law

James Smith Jr. initiated a civil action against Rufus and Merle Rivers in magistrates court, claiming to be their landlord and seeking their eviction. The Rivers contended that Smith did not own the property where they resided. The magistrates court sided with Smith and ordered the Rivers' eviction. The Rivers appealed, and the circuit court upheld the eviction order. However, the court of appeals reversed the decision, citing a South Carolina Code provision that barred the magistrates court from handling the eviction due to the Rivers' challenge to Smith's property title.The magistrates court initially ruled in favor of Smith, determining that he was the lawful owner and that a landlord-tenant relationship existed. The Rivers filed motions for reconsideration, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction due to a pending circuit court case challenging Smith's ownership. The magistrates court denied these motions, and the Rivers appealed to the circuit court. The circuit court affirmed the magistrates court's decision, finding no evidence to dispute Smith's ownership and confirming the landlord-tenant relationship.The South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the court of appeals' decision. The Supreme Court held that the magistrates court had the authority to conduct the eviction proceeding because it had determined that a landlord-tenant relationship existed between Smith and the Rivers. The court emphasized that the existence of such a relationship precludes the tenant from challenging the landlord's title in an eviction proceeding. Consequently, the Supreme Court reinstated the magistrates court's eviction order. View "Rivers v. Smith" on Justia Law

In 2001, Frances Mack-Marion refinanced her property, taking out a new mortgage. In 2020, U.S. Bank National Association, the successor-in-interest to the mortgage, initiated foreclosure proceedings against her. Mack-Marion counterclaimed, seeking a declaratory judgment that U.S. Bank was barred from foreclosure because the mortgage closed without attorney supervision, referencing the Matrix Financial Services Corporation v. Frazer decision. The Master-in-Equity dismissed her claim, ruling it lacked subject matter jurisdiction and that the mortgage was recorded before the effective date of Matrix.The Master-in-Equity interpreted Hambrick v. GMAC Mortgage Corporation to mean only the South Carolina Supreme Court could determine unauthorized practice of law claims. Additionally, the Master found Mack-Marion's claim insufficient as the mortgage predated Matrix. Mack-Marion appealed, and the South Carolina Supreme Court granted her motion to certify the appeal.The South Carolina Supreme Court overruled Hambrick to the extent it held that circuit courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction over unauthorized practice of law claims. The Court clarified that circuit courts do have jurisdiction over such claims and reaffirmed that Matrix applies prospectively. The Court held that the Master had subject matter jurisdiction but correctly dismissed Mack-Marion's claim under Rule 12(b)(6), SCRCP, because her mortgage was recorded before the effective date of Matrix. The Court affirmed the Master's dismissal as modified, maintaining that U.S. Bank could pursue foreclosure. View "U.S. Bank National Association v. Mack" on Justia Law

In the mid-1990s, Bradford Jeffcoat and Sandra Perkins began a long-term relationship and lived together in a house Jeffcoat purchased in Charleston, South Carolina. In 2000, Jeffcoat deeded the property to himself and Perkins as joint tenants with the right of survivorship. Perkins developed dementia in 2009, and in 2015, her daughter Vanessa Williams took her to Alabama without Jeffcoat's knowledge. Williams was later appointed as Perkins' guardian and conservator by an Alabama probate court and deeded Perkins' interest in the property to herself. Perkins died in November 2015.Williams filed a petition in Charleston County court to partition the property by sale. Jeffcoat counterclaimed, alleging fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and slander of title, and argued that the conveyance was invalid. The Charleston County Master-in-Equity granted summary judgment to Williams, finding that a joint tenant could unilaterally sever the joint tenancy under South Carolina law. The court of appeals affirmed the decision.The South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that there were genuine issues of material fact regarding Jeffcoat's unclean hands defense, which precluded summary judgment. The court also held that the Alabama probate court had subject matter jurisdiction over the guardianship and conservatorship proceedings. However, the court determined that South Carolina Code section 27-7-40, which allows unilateral severance of joint tenancies, did not apply retroactively to the joint tenancy created before the statute's enactment. Under common law, the joint tenancy could be severed by unilateral conveyance.The Supreme Court reversed the summary judgment in part, affirmed the decision as modified in part, and remanded the case to the Master-in-Equity to resolve the unclean hands defense and determine whether it would defeat Williams' demand for partition. View "Williams v. Jeffcoat" on Justia Law

Alvetta Massenberg inherited a 2.54-acre tract of undeveloped land in Clarendon County, South Carolina. After failing to pay property taxes for 2016, the Clarendon County Treasurer issued a tax execution to collect the delinquent taxes. The tax collector followed the statutory procedure by sending notices via regular and certified mail, but the certified mail was returned undelivered. Subsequently, a private contractor posted a "Notice of Levy" on a tree facing a one-lane dirt road on the property. The property was later sold at a public auction to Blacktop Ventures, LLC, which paid the outstanding taxes.The master-in-equity court refused to set aside the tax sale, concluding that the notice met the legal requirements for posting. The court did not specifically analyze whether the notice was posted in a "conspicuous" place. Massenberg appealed, and the South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the master's decision. Massenberg then petitioned for a writ of certiorari, which was granted.The South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the case and focused on whether the notice was posted in a "conspicuous" place as required by subsection 12-51-40(c) of the South Carolina Code. The Court found that the tax collector failed to exercise judgment in ensuring the notice was posted conspicuously. The notice was posted on a tree facing a less-traveled dirt road, making it difficult to see. The Court determined that the notice should have been posted on the side of the property facing a more frequently traveled paved road. Consequently, the Court held that the tax collector did not comply with the statutory requirement, rendering the tax sale invalid.The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals, setting aside the tax sale. View "Massenberg v. Clarendon County Treasurer" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute over a real estate development project in Beaufort County, South Carolina. The developer, Road, LLC, purchased a 229-acre peninsula with plans to develop it. However, the project was contingent on resolving two disputes concerning the only access road to the peninsula. The first dispute involved neighboring landowners who claimed ownership of a parcel of land the access road crossed. The second dispute involved Beaufort County's denial of the developer's request for a zoning variance to relocate and improve the access road. The developer, the neighboring landowners, and Beaufort County settled both disputes in a written "Settlement Agreement." However, the developer eventually defaulted on its loan and the lender took title to the peninsula. After the developer's options to repurchase the peninsula expired, Beaufort County purchased the peninsula to prevent its development. Road, LLC argued that Beaufort County breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the Settlement Agreement by purchasing the peninsula, thereby extinguishing any opportunity Road might later gain to sell the parcel to another developer.The trial court initially ruled in favor of Road, LLC, but later granted Beaufort County's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, arguing that there was no breach of the Settlement Agreement and that Road presented no evidence to support the jury's $5 million award. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision on the grounds that there was no evidence Beaufort County was the proximate cause of Road's damages and that the evidence showed Road did not suffer $5 million in damages because the property was still worth $5 million after the County purchased the peninsula.The Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed the court of appeals' decision in result. The court held that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing cannot create new contractual duties not expressly stated or fairly implied in the contract itself. The court found that the Settlement Agreement did not prohibit Beaufort County from purchasing the peninsula once the developer's option expired. Therefore, the court concluded that Beaufort County could not have breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the Settlement Agreement. View "Road, LLC and Pinckney Point, LLC v. Beaufort County" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute over a real estate commission. Andrew Waldo, a broker in charge of a realty company, represented buyers in the purchase of thirteen golf courses from National Golf Management, LLC (NGM). Michael Cousins, another broker, who had previously represented NGM in an earlier transaction, claimed a commission for the golf course deal despite not having a written representation agreement. Cousins, Waldo, and Waldo's agent agreed to arbitrate their dispute. The arbitration panel ruled in favor of Cousins, awarding him half of the commission earned on the golf course sale.The circuit court initially dismissed the lawsuit, ruling that oral agreements for a commission were unenforceable under South Carolina law. However, the arbitration panel later ruled in favor of Cousins. Waldo petitioned the circuit court to vacate the award, which was referred to the Master-in-Equity. The Master-in-Equity vacated the award, stating that the arbitration panel ignored statutory law regarding real-estate agency. The court of appeals reversed this decision, ruling that there was a "barely colorable" ground for the arbitration award based on a line of cases upholding oral and implied contracts for real estate commissions.The Supreme Court of South Carolina reversed the court of appeals' decision and vacated the award. The court held that the arbitration panel had manifestly disregarded several statutes governing real-estate agency law in awarding Cousins half of the commission. The court noted that the Act, which governs real-estate licensing, requires written agreements for real estate agency and forbids oral or implied ones. The court also rejected Cousins' argument that he was entitled to a commission based on a series of cases that recognized a realtor's right to a commission through an oral or implied contract, as these cases were decided before the Act became law. View "Waldo v. Cousins" on Justia Law

In this case, the South Carolina Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a state statute that limits reimbursement of reestablishment expenses in condemnation proceedings to $50,000. The appellant, Applied Building Sciences, Inc., an engineering firm, was forced to move its operations when its leased building was condemned for public use by the South Carolina Department of Commerce, Division of Public Railways. The company sought reimbursement for reestablishment expenses exceeding $560,000 but was limited by state statute to $50,000. The company argued that the cap was unconstitutional under the Takings Clauses of the South Carolina and United States Constitutions. The court found that reestablishment expenses are separate from damages awardable as just compensation under both constitutions, thus upholding the constitutionality of the statutory cap. The court affirmed the lower court's granting of summary judgment in favor of the Department of Commerce, Division of Public Railways. View "Applied Building Sciences v. SC Dept of Commerce" on Justia Law