Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The dispute centers around an attempted annexation by the City of North Charleston of a one-acre parcel located near Highway 61 and the Ashley River. This parcel, purchased by North Charleston in 2017, is situated on the southwest side of Highway 61 and separated from both the highway and North Charleston’s existing city limits by a narrow strip of land owned by the National Trust for Historic Preservation. That narrow strip has been part of the City of Charleston since its annexation in 2005. The annexation ordinance at issue included 62 square feet of the National Trust’s strip—land within Charleston’s city limits—in its property description.The National Trust and the City of Charleston challenged the validity of North Charleston’s annexation ordinance, arguing that the parcel was not “adjacent” to North Charleston’s existing city limits as required by section 5-3-100 of the South Carolina Code. The Circuit Court for Charleston County dismissed the lawsuit, holding that neither the National Trust nor Charleston had standing to contest the annexation, but also found in the alternative that, if standing existed, the annexation was invalid because the parcel was not adjacent to North Charleston’s city limits. On appeal, the South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal for lack of standing and declined to reach the merits of the annexation’s validity.The Supreme Court of South Carolina granted review and held that both the National Trust and the City of Charleston had standing to challenge the annexation. The Court further affirmed the circuit court’s alternative ruling that North Charleston’s annexation was invalid because the parcel was not “adjacent” to its city limits, as required under state law. Thus, the decision of the court of appeals was reversed in part and affirmed in part. View "National Trust for Historic Preservation v. City of North Charleston" on Justia Law

The dispute arose from a commercial transaction in which an entity obtained a loan to purchase property, granting the lender a freely assignable and perpetual option to purchase a significant co-tenancy interest in the property. When the borrower later sought to refinance, the lender exercised the option and assigned it to another party. The borrower objected to the option’s exercise, negotiations failed over reimbursement of legal fees, and the refinancing collapsed. Litigation ensued, with the new holder of the option seeking specific performance, while the borrower claimed the option was void under South Carolina’s statutory and common law rules against perpetuities.The Circuit Court for Richland County granted partial summary judgment in favor of the borrower, holding that although the South Carolina Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities (SCUSRAP) generally superseded the common law rule against perpetuities (CLRAP), the SCUSRAP did not apply to nonvested property interests arising from nondonative transfers, such as the option in question. The Circuit Court reasoned that the common law rule continued to apply to such interests, rendering the option void. The South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed this judgment.The Supreme Court of South Carolina reviewed the statutory construction issue de novo. It held that the SCUSRAP completely abolished the common law rule against perpetuities in South Carolina. The court found that nonvested property interests arising from nondonative transfers, which are excluded from the statutory rule, are not subject to any rule against perpetuities, statutory or otherwise. Therefore, the option was not void under either the SCUSRAP or the CLRAP. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case to the circuit court for consideration of the borrower’s waiver defense, which had not been previously addressed. View "Spring Valley Interests, LLC v. The Best for Last, LLC" on Justia Law

Gulfstream Café, Inc. owns a restaurant within the Marlin Quay Planned Development (PD) in Georgetown County, South Carolina. The PD includes a shared parking lot, with Gulfstream holding a nonexclusive easement for sixty-two spaces and owning seventeen additional spaces. In 2016, Palmetto Industrial Development, LLC purchased the marina and parking lot, demolished the existing structures, and sought approval from the Georgetown County Council to build a new restaurant. After several iterations and legal challenges, the Council approved a final plan (Ordinance 2018-40) for the new restaurant, which increased evening parking demand and allegedly harmed Gulfstream’s business.Previously, Gulfstream challenged the approval process and the impact on its easement rights in the Circuit Court for Georgetown County. The court held a bench trial and ruled in favor of the County, the County Council, and Councilmember Steve Goggans on all claims, including substantive and procedural due process, takings, inverse condemnation, and alleged impropriety in the approval process. Gulfstream appealed the decision.The Supreme Court of South Carolina reviewed the case, applying a limited scope of review for factual findings and de novo review for legal and constitutional issues. The Court held that Gulfstream’s easement was nonexclusive and had not been deprived by the ordinance, that the County’s actions had a rational basis, and that the ordinance did not constitute a per se or regulatory taking under the Penn Central test. The Court also found no procedural due process violation, as Gulfstream received notice and an opportunity to be heard, and determined that Councilmember Goggans’ prior involvement did not invalidate the ordinance. The Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed the circuit court’s judgment in all respects. View "The Gulfstream Café v. Georgetown County" on Justia Law

In 2005, Island Pointe, LLC contracted Complete Building Corporation (CBC) to construct a condominium project, Palmetto Pointe at Peas Island. CBC subcontracted Tri-County Roofing (TCR) for roofing and related work. In 2014-2015, Palmetto discovered construction defects and sued CBC, TCR, and others for negligence and breach of warranty. Palmetto received $6,800,000 in settlements, including $1,000,000 from CBC's insurer for a covenant-not-to-execute and $1,975,000 from four other defendants.The trial began in May 2019, and the jury found CBC and TCR liable for $6,500,000 in actual damages and $500,000 each in punitive damages. The trial court apportioned 5% liability to two other defendants, making CBC and TCR jointly and severally liable for the remaining 90% of actual damages. TCR sought setoff for the $1,000,000 payment and the settlements from the four other defendants. The trial court denied TCR's motion for setoff, except for partial amounts conceded by Palmetto.The South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the case. It reversed the court of appeals' decision, holding that TCR is entitled to set off the full $1,000,000 paid by CBC's insurer. The court affirmed the lower court's decision regarding the settlements from Novus, Atlantic, H and A, and Cohen's, agreeing that the trial court reasonably allocated the settlement amounts. The case was remanded to the trial court for the calculation of the judgment against TCR. View "Palmetto Pointe v. Tri-County Roofing" on Justia Law

Rory M. Isaac and Kimberly J. Isaac, buyers in a residential real estate transaction, sued the sellers' real estate agent, Laura Kopchynski, for failing to disclose high moisture levels in the crawl space and mischaracterizing a wood infestation report as "good." The Isaacs claimed fraud, fraud in the inducement, negligent misrepresentation, civil conspiracy, and violation of the South Carolina Residential Property Condition Disclosure Act.The Circuit Court granted summary judgment to Kopchynski on all claims. The Isaacs appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed the summary judgment on the negligent misrepresentation and Disclosure Act claims, while affirming the summary judgment on the fraud and civil conspiracy claims. Kopchynski then petitioned for certiorari.The South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the case. It found that the Isaacs' agent did not rely on Kopchynski's statement about the June CL-100 report being "good" and that the Isaacs had a duty to inspect the property themselves. Therefore, the Isaacs could not establish justifiable reliance, a necessary element for negligent misrepresentation. The Court also held that the South Carolina Residential Property Condition Disclosure Act does not create a private cause of action against real estate licensees, only against property owners.The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and reinstated the Circuit Court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Kopchynski on both the negligent misrepresentation and Disclosure Act claims. View "Isaac v. Kopchynski" on Justia Law

James and Lori Marlowe own a home on Highway 378 in Florence County, South Carolina. In 2015, the South Carolina Department of Transportation (SCDOT) began construction to widen and realign a portion of Highway 378 adjacent to the Marlowes' home. During the construction, the home flooded twice, once in October 2015 and again in October 2016, during major storm events. The Marlowes filed a lawsuit against SCDOT, alleging inverse condemnation, conversion, due process violations, and negligence.The Circuit Court granted summary judgment in favor of SCDOT on all claims. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Circuit Court's decision on the negligence claim but reversed on the inverse condemnation claim. The Court of Appeals also held that the Stormwater Management and Sediment Reduction Act did not immunize SCDOT from liability. SCDOT petitioned for a writ of certiorari on the inverse condemnation and Stormwater Act issues, which the South Carolina Supreme Court granted.The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision that the Stormwater Act did not immunize SCDOT from liability. However, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision on the inverse condemnation claim, finding that there was insufficient evidence on the causation issue to allow the claim to proceed. The court held that the evidence, including expert testimony, did not rise above speculation regarding whether the construction of the new roadway caused the flooding of the Marlowes' home. Consequently, the Supreme Court reinstated the grant of summary judgment in favor of SCDOT on the inverse condemnation claim. View "Marlowe v. SC DOT" on Justia Law

James Smith Jr. initiated a civil action against Rufus and Merle Rivers in magistrates court, claiming to be their landlord and seeking their eviction. The Rivers contended that Smith did not own the property where they resided. The magistrates court sided with Smith and ordered the Rivers' eviction. The Rivers appealed, and the circuit court upheld the eviction order. However, the court of appeals reversed the decision, citing a South Carolina Code provision that barred the magistrates court from handling the eviction due to the Rivers' challenge to Smith's property title.The magistrates court initially ruled in favor of Smith, determining that he was the lawful owner and that a landlord-tenant relationship existed. The Rivers filed motions for reconsideration, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction due to a pending circuit court case challenging Smith's ownership. The magistrates court denied these motions, and the Rivers appealed to the circuit court. The circuit court affirmed the magistrates court's decision, finding no evidence to dispute Smith's ownership and confirming the landlord-tenant relationship.The South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the court of appeals' decision. The Supreme Court held that the magistrates court had the authority to conduct the eviction proceeding because it had determined that a landlord-tenant relationship existed between Smith and the Rivers. The court emphasized that the existence of such a relationship precludes the tenant from challenging the landlord's title in an eviction proceeding. Consequently, the Supreme Court reinstated the magistrates court's eviction order. View "Rivers v. Smith" on Justia Law

In 2001, Frances Mack-Marion refinanced her property, taking out a new mortgage. In 2020, U.S. Bank National Association, the successor-in-interest to the mortgage, initiated foreclosure proceedings against her. Mack-Marion counterclaimed, seeking a declaratory judgment that U.S. Bank was barred from foreclosure because the mortgage closed without attorney supervision, referencing the Matrix Financial Services Corporation v. Frazer decision. The Master-in-Equity dismissed her claim, ruling it lacked subject matter jurisdiction and that the mortgage was recorded before the effective date of Matrix.The Master-in-Equity interpreted Hambrick v. GMAC Mortgage Corporation to mean only the South Carolina Supreme Court could determine unauthorized practice of law claims. Additionally, the Master found Mack-Marion's claim insufficient as the mortgage predated Matrix. Mack-Marion appealed, and the South Carolina Supreme Court granted her motion to certify the appeal.The South Carolina Supreme Court overruled Hambrick to the extent it held that circuit courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction over unauthorized practice of law claims. The Court clarified that circuit courts do have jurisdiction over such claims and reaffirmed that Matrix applies prospectively. The Court held that the Master had subject matter jurisdiction but correctly dismissed Mack-Marion's claim under Rule 12(b)(6), SCRCP, because her mortgage was recorded before the effective date of Matrix. The Court affirmed the Master's dismissal as modified, maintaining that U.S. Bank could pursue foreclosure. View "U.S. Bank National Association v. Mack" on Justia Law

In the mid-1990s, Bradford Jeffcoat and Sandra Perkins began a long-term relationship and lived together in a house Jeffcoat purchased in Charleston, South Carolina. In 2000, Jeffcoat deeded the property to himself and Perkins as joint tenants with the right of survivorship. Perkins developed dementia in 2009, and in 2015, her daughter Vanessa Williams took her to Alabama without Jeffcoat's knowledge. Williams was later appointed as Perkins' guardian and conservator by an Alabama probate court and deeded Perkins' interest in the property to herself. Perkins died in November 2015.Williams filed a petition in Charleston County court to partition the property by sale. Jeffcoat counterclaimed, alleging fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and slander of title, and argued that the conveyance was invalid. The Charleston County Master-in-Equity granted summary judgment to Williams, finding that a joint tenant could unilaterally sever the joint tenancy under South Carolina law. The court of appeals affirmed the decision.The South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that there were genuine issues of material fact regarding Jeffcoat's unclean hands defense, which precluded summary judgment. The court also held that the Alabama probate court had subject matter jurisdiction over the guardianship and conservatorship proceedings. However, the court determined that South Carolina Code section 27-7-40, which allows unilateral severance of joint tenancies, did not apply retroactively to the joint tenancy created before the statute's enactment. Under common law, the joint tenancy could be severed by unilateral conveyance.The Supreme Court reversed the summary judgment in part, affirmed the decision as modified in part, and remanded the case to the Master-in-Equity to resolve the unclean hands defense and determine whether it would defeat Williams' demand for partition. View "Williams v. Jeffcoat" on Justia Law

Alvetta Massenberg inherited a 2.54-acre tract of undeveloped land in Clarendon County, South Carolina. After failing to pay property taxes for 2016, the Clarendon County Treasurer issued a tax execution to collect the delinquent taxes. The tax collector followed the statutory procedure by sending notices via regular and certified mail, but the certified mail was returned undelivered. Subsequently, a private contractor posted a "Notice of Levy" on a tree facing a one-lane dirt road on the property. The property was later sold at a public auction to Blacktop Ventures, LLC, which paid the outstanding taxes.The master-in-equity court refused to set aside the tax sale, concluding that the notice met the legal requirements for posting. The court did not specifically analyze whether the notice was posted in a "conspicuous" place. Massenberg appealed, and the South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the master's decision. Massenberg then petitioned for a writ of certiorari, which was granted.The South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the case and focused on whether the notice was posted in a "conspicuous" place as required by subsection 12-51-40(c) of the South Carolina Code. The Court found that the tax collector failed to exercise judgment in ensuring the notice was posted conspicuously. The notice was posted on a tree facing a less-traveled dirt road, making it difficult to see. The Court determined that the notice should have been posted on the side of the property facing a more frequently traveled paved road. Consequently, the Court held that the tax collector did not comply with the statutory requirement, rendering the tax sale invalid.The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals, setting aside the tax sale. View "Massenberg v. Clarendon County Treasurer" on Justia Law