Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In the mid-1990s, Bradford Jeffcoat and Sandra Perkins began a long-term relationship and lived together in a house Jeffcoat purchased in Charleston, South Carolina. In 2000, Jeffcoat deeded the property to himself and Perkins as joint tenants with the right of survivorship. Perkins developed dementia in 2009, and in 2015, her daughter Vanessa Williams took her to Alabama without Jeffcoat's knowledge. Williams was later appointed as Perkins' guardian and conservator by an Alabama probate court and deeded Perkins' interest in the property to herself. Perkins died in November 2015.Williams filed a petition in Charleston County court to partition the property by sale. Jeffcoat counterclaimed, alleging fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and slander of title, and argued that the conveyance was invalid. The Charleston County Master-in-Equity granted summary judgment to Williams, finding that a joint tenant could unilaterally sever the joint tenancy under South Carolina law. The court of appeals affirmed the decision.The South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that there were genuine issues of material fact regarding Jeffcoat's unclean hands defense, which precluded summary judgment. The court also held that the Alabama probate court had subject matter jurisdiction over the guardianship and conservatorship proceedings. However, the court determined that South Carolina Code section 27-7-40, which allows unilateral severance of joint tenancies, did not apply retroactively to the joint tenancy created before the statute's enactment. Under common law, the joint tenancy could be severed by unilateral conveyance.The Supreme Court reversed the summary judgment in part, affirmed the decision as modified in part, and remanded the case to the Master-in-Equity to resolve the unclean hands defense and determine whether it would defeat Williams' demand for partition. View "Williams v. Jeffcoat" on Justia Law

Alvetta Massenberg inherited a 2.54-acre tract of undeveloped land in Clarendon County, South Carolina. After failing to pay property taxes for 2016, the Clarendon County Treasurer issued a tax execution to collect the delinquent taxes. The tax collector followed the statutory procedure by sending notices via regular and certified mail, but the certified mail was returned undelivered. Subsequently, a private contractor posted a "Notice of Levy" on a tree facing a one-lane dirt road on the property. The property was later sold at a public auction to Blacktop Ventures, LLC, which paid the outstanding taxes.The master-in-equity court refused to set aside the tax sale, concluding that the notice met the legal requirements for posting. The court did not specifically analyze whether the notice was posted in a "conspicuous" place. Massenberg appealed, and the South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the master's decision. Massenberg then petitioned for a writ of certiorari, which was granted.The South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the case and focused on whether the notice was posted in a "conspicuous" place as required by subsection 12-51-40(c) of the South Carolina Code. The Court found that the tax collector failed to exercise judgment in ensuring the notice was posted conspicuously. The notice was posted on a tree facing a less-traveled dirt road, making it difficult to see. The Court determined that the notice should have been posted on the side of the property facing a more frequently traveled paved road. Consequently, the Court held that the tax collector did not comply with the statutory requirement, rendering the tax sale invalid.The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals, setting aside the tax sale. View "Massenberg v. Clarendon County Treasurer" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute over a real estate development project in Beaufort County, South Carolina. The developer, Road, LLC, purchased a 229-acre peninsula with plans to develop it. However, the project was contingent on resolving two disputes concerning the only access road to the peninsula. The first dispute involved neighboring landowners who claimed ownership of a parcel of land the access road crossed. The second dispute involved Beaufort County's denial of the developer's request for a zoning variance to relocate and improve the access road. The developer, the neighboring landowners, and Beaufort County settled both disputes in a written "Settlement Agreement." However, the developer eventually defaulted on its loan and the lender took title to the peninsula. After the developer's options to repurchase the peninsula expired, Beaufort County purchased the peninsula to prevent its development. Road, LLC argued that Beaufort County breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the Settlement Agreement by purchasing the peninsula, thereby extinguishing any opportunity Road might later gain to sell the parcel to another developer.The trial court initially ruled in favor of Road, LLC, but later granted Beaufort County's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, arguing that there was no breach of the Settlement Agreement and that Road presented no evidence to support the jury's $5 million award. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision on the grounds that there was no evidence Beaufort County was the proximate cause of Road's damages and that the evidence showed Road did not suffer $5 million in damages because the property was still worth $5 million after the County purchased the peninsula.The Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed the court of appeals' decision in result. The court held that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing cannot create new contractual duties not expressly stated or fairly implied in the contract itself. The court found that the Settlement Agreement did not prohibit Beaufort County from purchasing the peninsula once the developer's option expired. Therefore, the court concluded that Beaufort County could not have breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the Settlement Agreement. View "Road, LLC and Pinckney Point, LLC v. Beaufort County" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute over a real estate commission. Andrew Waldo, a broker in charge of a realty company, represented buyers in the purchase of thirteen golf courses from National Golf Management, LLC (NGM). Michael Cousins, another broker, who had previously represented NGM in an earlier transaction, claimed a commission for the golf course deal despite not having a written representation agreement. Cousins, Waldo, and Waldo's agent agreed to arbitrate their dispute. The arbitration panel ruled in favor of Cousins, awarding him half of the commission earned on the golf course sale.The circuit court initially dismissed the lawsuit, ruling that oral agreements for a commission were unenforceable under South Carolina law. However, the arbitration panel later ruled in favor of Cousins. Waldo petitioned the circuit court to vacate the award, which was referred to the Master-in-Equity. The Master-in-Equity vacated the award, stating that the arbitration panel ignored statutory law regarding real-estate agency. The court of appeals reversed this decision, ruling that there was a "barely colorable" ground for the arbitration award based on a line of cases upholding oral and implied contracts for real estate commissions.The Supreme Court of South Carolina reversed the court of appeals' decision and vacated the award. The court held that the arbitration panel had manifestly disregarded several statutes governing real-estate agency law in awarding Cousins half of the commission. The court noted that the Act, which governs real-estate licensing, requires written agreements for real estate agency and forbids oral or implied ones. The court also rejected Cousins' argument that he was entitled to a commission based on a series of cases that recognized a realtor's right to a commission through an oral or implied contract, as these cases were decided before the Act became law. View "Waldo v. Cousins" on Justia Law

In this case, the South Carolina Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a state statute that limits reimbursement of reestablishment expenses in condemnation proceedings to $50,000. The appellant, Applied Building Sciences, Inc., an engineering firm, was forced to move its operations when its leased building was condemned for public use by the South Carolina Department of Commerce, Division of Public Railways. The company sought reimbursement for reestablishment expenses exceeding $560,000 but was limited by state statute to $50,000. The company argued that the cap was unconstitutional under the Takings Clauses of the South Carolina and United States Constitutions. The court found that reestablishment expenses are separate from damages awardable as just compensation under both constitutions, thus upholding the constitutionality of the statutory cap. The court affirmed the lower court's granting of summary judgment in favor of the Department of Commerce, Division of Public Railways. View "Applied Building Sciences v. SC Dept of Commerce" on Justia Law

This case involved promises made and broken to homeowners by a developer and its affiliated entities. A jury returned verdicts on several causes of action in favor of the homeowners, and the developer appealed. The court of appeals initially upheld the jury's verdict for $1.75 million on the homeowners' breach of fiduciary claim and a verdict for $10,000 on a breach of contract claim by an individual homeowner. Thereafter, upon petitions for rehearing, the court of appeals completely reversed course, dismissing all of the homeowners' claims as a matter of law and reversing and remanding the breach of contract claim by the individual homeowner. The South Carolina Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed in part and reversed in part, thus reinstating the jury's verdicts. The Court: (1) reversed the court of appeals' ruling on the statute of limitations because the issue as to when Homeowners had adequate notice to begin the limitations clock was properly presented to the jury and resolved by it; (2) found any procedural issues related to the derivative claims either (a) moot as the HOA was realigned as a plaintiff and the trial court explicitly found it adopted its own claims against the Developers, or (b) demand was saved by futility due to the Developer's continuing veto power; (3) held that Developers breached the fiduciary duties owed to Homeowners; (4) reversed the court of appeals' decision that Developers could not be amalgamated, as there was more than enough evidence of bad faith, abuse, fraud, wrongdoing, or injustice resulting from the blurring of the entities' legal distinctions; and (5) affirmed the court of appeals that the recreational easement was invalid. View "Walbeck, et al. v. The I'On Company" on Justia Law

Jimmy and Laura Bailey mortgaged their home in October 2009 to Quicken Loans (first mortgage). A week later, the Baileys entered into an equity line of credit a month later with ArrowPointe Federal Credit Union (the LOC) to the maximum principal amount. The ArrowPointe LOC was secured by a mortgage; ArrowPointe had record notice of the first mortgage. Shortly after taking out the second mortgage, the Baileys refinanced the first mortgage with Quicken in a greater amount than the previous first mortgage. The Baileys executed a “Title Company Client Acknowledgement” at the closing of the refinanced mortgage, which stated the only outstanding lien on the subject property was the first mortgage. There was no clear explanation in the record as to whether Quicken obtained a title examination to ascertain whether there were any outstanding additional liens; Quicken did not ask ArrowPointe to sign a subordination agreement, and ArrowPointe was unaware of the refinance. The Baileys used money from the refinance to pay the first mortgage. Quicken released the first mortgage and recorded the refinance. The Baileys ultimately defaulted on the LOC, and ArrowPointe filed an action to declare its lien had priority over the refinance. US Bank, assignee to the Quicken refinance, argued it was entitled to priority under the replacement mortgage doctrine. ArrowPointe argued it was entitled to priority because Quicken had record notice of its LOC at the time of refinancing. A referee concluded South Carolina did not recognize the replacement mortgage doctrine, and because there was no subordination agreement, ArrowPointe had priority under the race-notice statute. The referee ordered foreclosure and sale of the subject property. Finding no reversible error in the referee’s order, the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed. View "ArrowPointe Federal Credit Union v. Bailey" on Justia Law

Barry Clarke brought this action for specific performance of a right of first refusal. Clarke owned a strip club at 2015 Pittsburgh Avenue in Charleston, South Carolina. Group Investment Company, Inc., whose shareholders were John Robinson and Robin Robinson, owned a strip club across the street at 2028 Pittsburgh Avenue (the Subject Property). The Subject Property included buildings, a parking lot, and other land. In 1999, Clarke and Group Investment entered into a recorded lease that allowed Clarke to use half of the parking spaces located on the Subject Property. In 2007, Group Investment conveyed the Subject Property to RRJR, LLC for the stated consideration of $5.00. John Robinson and Robin Robinson were members of RRJR. Clarke testified he "probably" knew Group Investment transferred the Subject Property to RRJR, but Clarke claimed he did not seek to exercise the Right at that time because Group Investment and RRJR were "the same people." In 2013, RRJR conveyed the Subject Property to Fine Housing for $150,000.00. Fine Housing's closing attorney did not take note of the Lease or the Right prior to the closing, but Fine Housing conceded it had record notice of both the Lease and the Right. Neither Fine Housing nor RRJR notified Clarke of the sale of the Subject Property. Clarke learned of the sale in March 2014, and in May 2015, Clarke initiated this action for specific performance against Fine Housing and RRJR. RRJR did not answer and was in default. After a bench trial, the trial court ruled the Right was enforceable as to the entire Subject Property and ordered Fine Housing to convey title to the Subject Property to Clarke upon his payment of $350,000.00. The court of appeals reversed, holding the Right was an unreasonable restraint on alienation and was therefore unenforceable. The South Carolina Supreme Court found the Right did not identify the property it encumbered, contain price provisions, or contain procedures governing the exercise of the Right. Therefore, the Court concluded the Right was an unreasonable restraint on alienation, and affirmed the court of appeals' holding that the Right was unenforceable. View "Clarke v. Fine Housing, Inc." on Justia Law

This case arose from a construction defect suit brought by a number of homeowners (Petitioners) against their homebuilder and general contractor, Lennar Carolinas, LLC (Lennar). Lennar moved to compel arbitration, citing the arbitration provisions in a series of contracts signed by Petitioners at the time they purchased their homes. Petitioners pointed to purportedly unconscionable provisions in the contracts generally and in the arbitration provision specifically. Citing a number of terms in the contracts, and without delineating between the contracts generally and the arbitration provision specifically, the circuit court denied Lennar's motion to compel, finding the contracts were grossly one-sided and unconscionable and, thus, the arbitration provisions contained within those contracts were unenforceable. The court of appeals reversed, explaining that the United States Supreme Court's holding in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co. forbade consideration of unconscionable terms outside of an arbitration provision (the Prima Paint doctrine). The court of appeals found the circuit court's analysis ran afoul of the Prima Paint doctrine as it relied on the oppressive nature of terms outside of the arbitration provisions. While the South Carolina Supreme Court agreed that the circuit court violated the Prima Paint doctrine, it nonetheless agreed with Petitioners and found the arbitration provisions, standing alone, contained a number of oppressive and one-sided terms, thereby rendering the provisions unconscionable and unenforceable under South Carolina law. The Court further declined to sever the unconscionable terms from the remainder of the arbitration provisions, as "it would encourage sophisticated parties to intentionally insert unconscionable terms—that often go unchallenged—throughout their contracts, believing the courts would step in and rescue the party from its gross overreach. ... Rather, we merely recognize that where a contract would remain one-sided and be fragmented after severance, the better policy is to decline the invitation for judicial severance." View "Damico v. Lennar Carolinas, LLC et al." on Justia Law

A church entity became the legal or beneficial owner of certain real and personal property after The Protestant Episcopal Church in the Diocese of South Carolina (Disassociated Diocese) and thirty-six individual Episcopal Parishes (Parishes) disassociated from The Episcopal Church in the United States of America (National Church). The dispute presented two broad questions to the South Carolina Supreme Court: (1) who owned the real estate long-owned and occupied by the individual Parishes; and (2) who was the beneficiary of a statutorily-created trust controlled by the Trustees of The Protestant Episcopal Church in South Carolina (Trustees). The National Church and the Episcopal Church in South Carolina (Associated Diocese) contended the South Carolina Supreme Court made a final decision as to who owned all the disputed property when the Court heard the case in 2015 and each Justice sitting on the Court in 2015 issued a separate opinion in 2017. The Parishes disagreed the Court made a final decision as to the real property occupied by twenty-nine Parishes, and contended the Court left much to be decided by the circuit court as to these Parishes. The Disassociated Diocese and the Trustees agreed the Supreme Court made a final decision as to real and personal property the Trustees formerly held in trust for the Lower Diocese—the second question—but they disagree what that decision was. To the second question presented, the Supreme Court agreed with the National Church and the Associated Diocese that the 2017 Court decided the real and personal property held in trust by the Trustees was held for the benefit of the Associated Diocese. As to the first question, the Supreme Court determined the 2017 Court did not make a final decision as to the real property owned by the twenty-nine Parishes. As to some Parishes, the Court held the circuit court correctly ruled the individual Parish retained ownership of its property. As to other Parishes, those Parishes created an irrevocable trust in favor of the National Church and its diocese, now the Associated Diocese. As to the Parishes that created a trust, the Court directed that appropriate documentation be filed in the public record indicating the National Church and the Associated Diocese now owned that real estate. From its decision here, there will be no remand. "The case is over." View "The Protestant Episcopal Church v. The Episcopal Church" on Justia Law