Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Respondent AVX Corporation manufactured electronic parts at a plant in North Myrtle Beach. In 1980, respondent began using a chemical called trichloroethylene (TCE) as a degreaser to clean machine tools and parts. At some point, TCE escaped the plant and migrated beyond the boundaries of respondent's property, contaminating surrounding properties and groundwater. In December 1996, respondent entered into a consent order with the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (DHEC), in which respondent admitted that it had violated certain state environmental statutes and regulations. DHEC required respondent to implement a plan to clean up the TCE. In 2007, environmental testing performed in a ten block section north of respondent's plant showed levels of TCE greater than considered safe. On November 27, 2007, a group of residents who own real property near respondent's plant filed suit alleging causes of action for trespass, nuisance, negligence, and strict liability. The residents brought the suit both individually and as class representatives pursuant to Rule 23, SCRCP. The circuit court granted respondent's Rule 12(b)(6) motion and dismissed appellants' claims with prejudice. In dismissing appellants' trespass, negligence, and strict liability claims, the circuit court stated that such claims "cannot be maintained when there is no evidence that alleged contamination has physically impacted [appellants'] properties." Further, with respect to appellants' nuisance claim, the circuit court noted that a claimant must plead an unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of his or her property in order to state a claim for nuisance. Therefore, the circuit court found that because their properties are not contaminated, appellants' allegations did not state a claim for nuisance. Appellants appealed. We affirm the circuit court's dismissal of both appellants' nuisance and strict liability claims because the complaint alleges actual contamination of the property in pleading both of these causes of action. Since each of these claims was pled only on behalf of the Subclass A plaintiffs and not on behalf of appellants, we uphold the circuit court's dismissal of these two causes of action pursuant to Rule 220(c), SCACR. As explained below, however, we find the complaint sufficiently pleads a negligence cause of action on behalf of appellants, and therefore reverse the dismissal of this claim. View "Chestnut v. AVX Corporation" on Justia Law

Amber Johnson filed suit against her closing attorney, Stanley Alexander, arguing he breached his duty of care by failing to discover the house Johnson purchased had been sold at a tax sale the previous year. The trial court granted partial summary judgment in favor of Johnson as to Alexander's liability. On appeal, the court of appeals held Alexander could not be held liable as a matter of law simply because the attorney he hired to perform the title work may have been negligent. Instead, the court determined the relevant inquiry was "whether Alexander acted with reasonable care in relying on [another attorney's] title search"; accordingly, it reversed and remanded. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals: even absent Alexander's admissions, the Court found it was error to equate delegation of a task with delegation of liability. The Court therefore agreed with Johnson that an attorney was liable for negligence in tasks he delegates absent some express limitation of his representation. Applying this standard to the facts, the Court found the grant of summary judgment was proper because there was no genuine issue of material fact as to liability. The case was remanded back to the trial court for a determination of damages. View "Johnson v. Alexander" on Justia Law

W. H. Bundy, Jr. sought a determination of whether Bobby Brent Shirley established a prescriptive easement over a road on rural property owned by Bundy. The special referee found Shirley was entitled to the easement. The Court of Appeals reversed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the Court of Appeals' decision. The Supreme Court concluded the Court of Appeals correctly reversed the special referee's grant of a prescriptive easement to Shirley. It then modified the decision to the extent the Court held that a party claiming a prescriptive easement has the burden of proving all elements by clear and convincing evidence. View "Bundy v. Shirley" on Justia Law

Respondent David DeCarlis was the sole member of respondent Buncombe Professional Park, L.L.C., which owned an undeveloped parcel of land. In 2007, DeCarlis, as Buncombe's representative, executed a note and mortgage with Independence National Bank. At the same time, DeCarlis executed a personal guaranty. As part of this transaction, Bank satisfied the existing first mortgage at closing. Buncombe stopped paying on the mortgage. As Bank prepared to foreclose, it learned in 2010 that DeCarlis held what had been, prior to Bank's satisfaction of the original first mortgage, a second mortgage on the property executed and properly recorded in 2006. The same attorney represented both Bank and Buncombe at the 2007 mortgage closing, and had actual notice of DeCarlis' 2006 mortgage at the time of the 2007 closing since he had conducted the title search. The attorney testified at the hearing in this matter that he erroneously neglected to have DeCarlis execute a satisfaction, release, or subordination of his 2006 mortgage at the 2007 closing in order to effectuate the parties' agreement that Bank was to have a first mortgage. Since no such document was executed, DeCarlis' 2006 second mortgage became the first lien, with priority over Bank's 2007 mortgage. The Bank then foreclosed on Buncombe and DeCarlis. In a post-trial order following the parties' Rule 59 motions, the master found Bank was equitably subrogated to the original first mortgage which Bank had satisfied as part of the 2007 closing, thus giving Bank's 2007 mortgage priority over the 2006 DeCarlis mortgage on a second ground. Buncombe and DeCarlis appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the appellate court erred in finding that the Bank had notice of the 2006 second mortgage by virtue of its agent's actual knowledge of that lien. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the master's judgment. View "Independence National Bank v. Buncombe Professional Park" on Justia Law

After prevailing in a condemnation action, petitioners-landowners moved for an award of attorneys' fees pursuant to section 28-2-510(B)(1) of the Eminent Domain Procedure Act. Contrary to petitioners' view, the circuit court determined attorneys' fees should be awarded based on an hourly rate via a lodestar calculation rather than the contingency fee agreement between Petitioners and their attorney. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court interpreted section 28-2-510 and concluded the General Assembly intended for attorneys' fees to be awarded based on a constellation of factors. Specifically, section 28-2-510(B)(1) mandated that in order for a prevailing landowner to recover reasonable attorneys' fees he or she must submit an application for fees "necessarily incurred." Therefore, by implication, the General Assembly precluded a landowner from recovering attorneys' fees based solely on a contingency fee agreement without regards for section 28-2-510. The Court explained that even though the contingency fee agreement is not the sole element in the calculation, it is still a significant component as it may be used to explain the basis for the fee charged by the landowner's counsel. "Our decision should not be construed as somehow condemning or eliminating an attorney's use of a contingency fee agreement. To the contrary, we recognize that the use of these agreements is a legitimate and well-established practice for attorneys throughout our state. This practice may still be pursued. Yet, it is with the caveat that the terms of the agreement are not controlling. Rather, they constitute one factor in a constellation of factors for the court's consideration in determining an award of reasonable litigation expenses to a prevailing landowner under section 28-2-510(B)(1). The court may, in fact, conclude that the contingency fee agreement yields a reasonable fee. However, the court is not bound by the terms of the agreement. " For this case, the Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals misapplied case law precedent. Furthermore, the Court concluded the circuit court failed to conduct the correct statutory analysis, and remanded this matter to the circuit court. Petitioners' counsel was instructed to submit an itemized statement in compliance with section 28-2-510(B)(1) as counsel's original affidavit failed to identify the "fee charged" and the actual number of hours expended. View "South Carolina Dept. of Trans. v. Revels" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the South Carolina Supreme Court's review centered on the correct application of those statutes and regulations pertinent to an invaluable (environmentally, economically, and socially) stretch of tidelands located on the edge of a spit of land along the South Carolina coast. A landowner and real estate developer sought a permit to construct a bulkhead and revetment stretching over 2,700 feet in length and 40 feet in width over the State's tidelands, thereby permanently altering 111,320 square feet or over 2.5 acres of pristine tidelands. The landowner sought to halt ongoing erosion along that stretch of tidelands in order to facilitate a residential development on the adjacent highland area. The Department of Health and Environmental Control denied the majority of the requested permit and granted a small portion to protect an existing county park. An administrative law court (ALC) disagreed and found a permit should be granted for the entire structure, and this appeal followed. The Supreme Court concluded the ALC committed several errors of law and therefore, it reversed and remanded for further consideration. View "Kiawah Development v. South Carolina Dept. of Health & Env. Ctrl." on Justia Law

In approximately twenty years PCS Nitrogen, Inc. contributed to environmental contamination by manufacturing fertilizer and disturbing contaminated soil during various demolition activities. In 2003, Ashley II of Charleston, Inc. purchased 27.62 acres of the PCS's property. Since that time, Ashley II has incurred substantial costs in remediating the environmental contamination. In July 2008, Ashley II filed a complaint against PCS seeking a declaration of joint and several liability under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) due to costs of the environmental cleanup at the Site. Additionally, PCS asserted a third-party indemnification claim against the site's previous owner based on the indemnity provision in a 1966 purchase agreement, seeking indemnification for attorney's fees, costs, and litigation expenses incurred in establishing that the predecessor contributed to the contamination. The South Carolina Supreme Court anwered the following certified question from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina: "Does the rule that a contract of indemnity will not be construed to indemnify the indemnitee against losses resulting from its own negligent acts, unless such intention is expressed in clear and unequivocal terms, apply when the indemnitee seeks contractual indemnification for costs and expenses resulting in part from its own strict liability acts? " In the context of the underlying claim in federal court, the South Carolina Court answered the question, "no." View "Ashley II v. PCS Nitrogen" on Justia Law

This case centered on a claim for equitable indemnification, which was denied by the trial court. Appellants were sued by adjacent property owners regarding environmental contamination. Appellants denied responsibility for the contamination and cross-claimed against the previous property owner, who was responsible for the damage. Because Appellants were not responsible for the ground contamination, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellants but declined to award Appellants the attorney's fees and costs incurred in defending the lawsuit. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded: "[t]he facts of this case clearly demonstrate that the attorney's fees and costs incurred by Appellants in defending the [plaintiffs'] lawsuit were the natural and probable consequences of [respondent's] breach of the purchase agreement." View "McCoy v. Greenwave Enterprises" on Justia Law

"Appellant and the Respondents are neighbors who obviously do not get along." Appellant Ursula Pallares brought suit alleging five claims against two of her neighbors, respondents Sharon Seinar and Lisa Maseng. Pallares claimed respondents had "mounted a campaign to harass and humiliate" her and to "drive her from her home." Pallares outlined four areas of conduct by one or both Respondents involving: (1) code violations; (2) nuisance animals; (3) a petition for a mental evaluation; and (4) requests for restraining orders, which Pallares averred gave rise to civil tort liability. The circuit court granted partial summary judgment to Respondents on Pallares's claims for malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and civil conspiracy. Pallares appealed, and the Supreme Court certified the case for review. Based on careful consideration of the facts in record, the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's grant of partial summary judgment to Respondents on Pallares's claim for malicious prosecution. However, the Court reversed the grant of summary judgment on Pallares's claim for abuse of process. View "Pallares v. Seinar" on Justia Law

In 2005, Winyah Bay Holdings, LLC held an event aimed at selling marsh-front lots located in South Island Plantation, an affluent, unbuilt housing development. Winyah conducted the sale by lottery, and geared the event toward on-the-spot sales. Winyah had Wachovia Bank and two unrelated realty and marketing companies (the Realtors) set up booths to promote financing the lot sales. Respondents alleged that Winyah, the Realtors, and Wachovia further enticed potential buyers by promising that "day docks, roads, infrastructure, pool [sic], marsh walks, and other amenities would be in place within 18 months of the lottery." Respondents William and Judith Blackburn claimed these promises got them to participate in the lottery. Over six months later, Respondent William Blackburn delivered a promissory note to Wachovia in the amount of $463,967 to finance the purchase of one of the lots. The note was secured by a mortgage and unconditional personal guaranties executed by Tammy Winner, Watson Felder, and Respondents. Sometime in 2008, Respondents failed to make payments on the note. Wachovia then filed a foreclosure action. Respondents answered, asserting counterclaims against Wachovia, cross-claims against the South Island Plantation Association, Incorporated (the HOA), and a third-party complaint against the Seller and the Realtors. At issue here were the counterclaims against Wachovia, which included claims for negligent misrepresentation, promissory estoppel, breach of contract/breach of contract accompanied by a fraudulent act, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud/fraud in the inducement, breach of contract/negligence, breach of contract, civil conspiracy, illegality of contract, and violations of the South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act (the SCUTPA). Wachovia appealed the court of appeals' decision to reverse the circuit court's determination that Respondents' counterclaims were within the scope of a jury trial waiver in the property sales documents. The Supreme Court affirmed the portion of the appellate courts' judgment finding that the waivers were executed knowingly and voluntarily; however, the Court reversed the portion finding that the outrageous and unforeseeable torts exception to arbitration applies in the jury trial waiver context, and found instead that Respondents waived their right to a jury trial on all of their counterclaims. View "Wachovia Bank v. Blackburn" on Justia Law