Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Danny Cortez Brown was convicted of trafficking in cocaine and sentenced to twenty-five years in prison. He appealed, arguing the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the cocaine, which was seized from a duffel bag after his arrest for an open container violation during an automobile stop. The Court of Appeals reversed on the basis the search was improper under "Arizona v. Gant," (556 U.S. 332 (2009)). Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Court of Appeals properly applied "Gant" and found the warrantless police search conducted incident to Defendant's arrest for an open container violation was illegal. Furthermore, the Court held that pursuant to the United States Supreme Court's subsequent pronouncement in "United States v. Davis," (131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011)) that the exclusionary rule was not applicable to this case because the officer relied upon existing appellate precedent at the time he conducted his search. Consequently, the decision of the Court of Appeals was reversed. View "South Carolina v. Brown" on Justia Law

In a declaratory judgment action, the parties appealed the circuit court's order authorizing Storm M. H. ("Student"), who resided in Berkeley County, to enroll in the Academic Magnet High School ("AMHS") located in the Charleston County School District ("CCSD") provided she purchase real property in the CCSD with a tax-assessed value of $300 or more. Student resided with her parents in Berkeley County. In January 2010, she applied for admission to the 9th grade class at the AMHS for the following academic year. In her application, Student identified her Berkeley County address. Student was accepted by the AMHS and required to confirm her intention to enroll by January 28, 2010. The Confirmation Form requested a "Charleston County Residence Address." After seeing this request, Student's mother, Gayla S. L. McSwain ("Parent"), spoke with someone at the AMHS and explained that Student could not provide a Charleston County address because she did not "live in Charleston County yet." As a result of this conversation, Parent completed the Confirmation Form by indicating that she would "provide [a Charleston County residence address] prior to enrollment." The circuit court held that the CCSD's policy of requiring domicile for a child to attend a CCSD magnet school violated section 59-63-30(c) because "domicile" by a child and that child's parent or guardian was not required by the statute only property ownership. Both parties appealed the circuit court's order to the court of appeals. Subsequently, Student purchased real property in Charleston County and enrolled in the AMHS on August 18, 2010. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that CCSD's policy of excluding all non-resident children from attendance at its magnet schools was contrary to the plain language of section 59-6330, and the Student was entitled to continue attending AMHS. "We are not unsympathetic to the Board's argument that allowing non-resident children to attend its magnet schools displaces other qualified resident children. However, we are constrained to interpret the unambiguous language of section 59-63-30. . . . As the statute is written, the Board does not have the authority to unilaterally exclude children who qualify to attend its schools." View "Storm M. H. v. Charleston County Board of Trustees" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court accepted the petition of Harleysville Mutual Insurance Company (Petitioner) in its Original Jurisdiction to assess constitutional challenges to Act No. 26 of the South Carolina Acts and Joint Resolutions, which regulates coverage provided by commercial general liability (CGL) insurance policies for construction-related work. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the retroactivity clause of Act No. 261 violated the Contract Clauses of the state and federal Constitutions, and that the statute may only apply prospectively to CGL insurance contracts executed on or after its effective date of May 17, 2011. View "Harleysville Mutual v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

This case returns to the Supreme Court on remand from the United States Supreme Court (USSC) for reconsideration in light of its decision in "Williamson v. Mazda Motor of America, Inc.," (131 S.Ct. 1311 (2011)). In the South Carolina Court's previous decision, it concluded Appellant's state-law products liability claims against Ford Motor Company were preempted by Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard ("FMVSS") 205. The Court reaffirmed its previous decision. Appellant filed a products liability claim against Respondent Ford Motor Company premised on the allegation that its 1997 Ford F-150 pick-up truck was defective and unreasonably dangerous because it did not incorporate laminated glass in the vehicle's side and rear windows. In connection with implied conflict preemption, "Williamson" revisited the Supreme Court's decision in "Geier v. American Honda Motor Co.," (529 U.S. 861 (2000)). "We construe the key language in Williamson to hold that manufacturer choice among alternatives operates to preempt a state law claim only where the state law stands as an obstacle to a significant federal regulatory objective. Similarly, our previous decision was not based upon the notion that the mere presence of manufacturer choices in FMVSS 205 preempted Appellant's state tort suit. We adhere to the view that the manifest purpose of the federal regulatory scheme underlying FMVSS 205 would be frustrated if these state claims were allowed to proceed. Assuming implied conflict preemption remains a viable part of preemption, we believe it applies here to preclude Appellant's state law claims." View "Priester v. Cromer" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether Section 1-7-330 of the South Carolina Code (2005), which vested control of the criminal docket in the circuit solicitor, violated the separation of powers principle embodied in Article 1, Section 8 of the South Carolina Constitution. In 1980, the Court recognized that "[t]he authority of the court to grant continuances and to determine the order in which cases shall be heard is derived from its power to hear and decide cases. . . .This adjudicative power of the court carries with it the inherent power to control the order of its business to safeguard the rights of litigants." The Court concluded that section 1-7-330 was at odds with "this intrinsically judicial power." The Court therefore held that section 1-7-330 violated the separation of powers and therefore was unconstitutional. However, because Appellant K.C. Langford, III suffered no prejudice as a result of section 1-7-330, the Court affirmed his convictions. View "South Carolina v. Langford" on Justia Law

The State appealed the Court of Appeals' decision invalidating respondent's sentence of life without parole. Respondent was convicted of second-degree arson and sentenced to life without parole (LWOP). The Court of Appeals affirmed the second-degree arson conviction, but reversed and remanded as to the LWOP sentence finding the use of a 1979 burning conviction was inappropriate for sentence enhancement purposes. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Court of Appeals erroneously interpreted former section 16-11110(B), though the Court noted that the impact of this erroneous interpretation has been limited by the 2010 amendment to the statute. The portion of the Court of Appeals' opinion reversing respondent's sentence was affirmed as modified. View "South Carolina v. Phillips" on Justia Law

Vernon Sulton was rendered paraplegic by gunshot wounds he received as a bystander at an armed robbery. After initial treatment at Richland Memorial Hospital, he was transferred to the HealthSouth Rehab Hospital in Columbia. He was admitted with a sacral stage two pressure ulcer. In the eleven days Sulton remained at HealthSouth, the pressure ulcer progressed from stage two to stage four. Sulton underwent a colostomy and surgery that included a skin graft, and the pressure ulcer eventually fully healed. Sulton and his wife, Willie Mae Scott (Scott), sued HealthSouth and several of its nurses, alleging that Sulton had been injured by the defendants’ negligent provision of nursing care. Scott alleged a cause of action for loss of consortium. Sulton died of unrelated causes prior to trial. In the survival action, a jury found against all defendants and awarded $306,693.25 in economic damages but no non-economic damages. In the loss of consortium action, the jury found HealthSouth alone liable to Scott for four million dollars in non-economic damages. The jury also found that HealthSouth had been willful, wanton, or reckless. In the punitive damages phase of the bifurcated proceedings, the jury awarded eight million dollars in punitive damages. HealthSouth moved for JNOV, new trial absolute, and new trial nisi remittitur. These motions were denied. HealthSouth and the individual named nurse defendants challenged the jury’s verdict in a negligence and loss of consortium action. Because the trial court improperly instructed the jury that Appellants owed Respondents a heightened duty of care, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for a new trial on all issues as to all Appellants. View "Sulton v. HealthSouth" on Justia Law

William E. Terry, Jr. appealed a family court order holding him in contempt for failing to vacate the parties' marital residence as required under the temporary order. The appeal was manifestly without merit, and the Supreme Court affirmed pursuant to Rule 220, SCACR. Because Appellant erroneously believed that the filing and service of a notice of appeal from the family court's temporary order divested the family court of jurisdiction from considering the contempt matter, the Court elected to address and clarify the effect of an attempted appeal from a family court temporary order: "Perceived errors in family court temporary orders are to be redressed as they always have, at the final hearing. For issue preservation purposes, any such challenge must be placed on the record at the commencement of the final hearing. The family court has wide discretion in fashioning equitable relief, including the authority to make adjustments in the equitable distribution and otherwise to remedy an error in the temporary order. If a party desires to challenge the family court's final resolution of the matter, the aggrieved party may appeal from final judgment." View "Terry v. Terry" on Justia Law

Nathan Stallings leased a home in Mt. Pleasant where he lived with his fiancee and a roommate. He used an internet networking site to meet other poker players, and established a regular Sunday night game in his home. Players would buy into the game for a minimum of $5 and a maximum of $20. Respondents Robert Chimento, Scott Richards, Michael Williamson, Jeremy Brestel and John Willis were convicted in municipal court of violating S.C. Code Ann. 16-19-40(a) (2003) which made it unlawful to "play . . . in any house used as a place of gaming . . . any game with cards. . . ." after they were found playing Texas Hold'em and gambling in Stallings' home. On appeal, the circuit court reversed respondents’ convictions finding they were entitled to directed verdicts or, alternatively, that section 16-19-40(a) was unconstitutional. The municipal judge found, based on expert testimony presented by the respondents, that Texas Hold'em is a game of skill. The municipal judge also held that if a game of skill were without the ambit of gaming, then he would acquit the respondents, but that there was no clear indication whether the legislature intended to criminalize only gambling on games of chance. At the hearing, the municipal judge declined to find section 16-19-40 unconstitutional. The circuit court reversed, and the Town appealed that order. The issues before the Supreme Court were reduced to: (1) whether respondents were entitled to directed verdicts because betting money on a game of skill at a residence is not prohibited by section 16-19-40; and (2) if respondents were not entitled to directed verdicts, should their convictions have been set aside because section 16-19-40(a) was unconstitutional? The Court found that the circuit court erred in reversing respondents' convictions, and therefore the order on appeal is itself was reversed. View "Town of Mount Pleasant v. Chimento" on Justia Law

Robert W. Oskin, Glenn Small, and Freddie Kanos (collectively "Appellants") contested the Master-in-Equity's ruling that the assignment of a note and mortgage on a Myrtle Beach property did not violate the South Carolina Fraudulent Conveyance Statute, and that a payment made to South Carolina Bank & Trust (SCB&T) did not result in a pay-off of the amount due under the note and mortgage. Oskin entered into a contract to broker the sale of Wild Wing Plantation and Golf Course on behalf of Respondent Stephen Johnson (Johnson). The contract obligated Johnson to pay Oskin a finder's fee upon closing. Oskin found a buyer for the property, and the deal was closed. Johnson, however, failed to pay the finder's fee, and Oskin brought suit successfully obtaining a judgment against Johnson. While the breach of contract action was pending, Johnson approached his uncle, Respondent Michael Brown, about jointly purchasing an oceanfront lot and home located in Myrtle Beach. Johnson and Brown co-signed a promissory note to jointly purchase the property. Title to the property was conveyed to Brown and Johnson as tenants in common. In addition to the SCB&T mortgage, the property was later encumbered by a second mortgage lien in favor of Ameris Bank. Initially, Johnson made the monthly interest-only payments on the SCB&T note until early 2008 when he could no longer afford to; Brown paid the remaining monthly payments. Faced with his nephew unable to make payments on the loan, and because the Myrtle Beach property was appraised at a value considerably less than what was owed, Brown's wife Joan Brown formed an LLC to obtain another loan to pay down debt owed to SCB&T. The parties disputed the motive for the formation of the LLC and the subsequent assignment of the note. Oskin's complaint centered enforcement of his judgment for the finder's fee and its subrogation to that of the various banks once notes on the property were reassigned. Finding no error with the Master-in-Equity's ruling, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Oskin v. Johnson" on Justia Law