Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant RFT Management Co., L.L.C. (RFT) brought this action against respondents Tinsley & Adams, L.L.P. and attorney Welborn D. Adams (collectively, Law Firm) based on their legal representation of RFT during the closing of its purchase of two real estate investment properties in Greenwood County. RFT alleged claims for (1) professional negligence (legal malpractice), (2) breach of fiduciary duty, (3) violation of the South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act1 (UTPA), and (4) aiding and abetting a securities violation in contravention of the South Carolina Uniform Securities Act of 2005 (SCUSA). The trial court granted a directed verdict in favor of Law Firm on RFT's causes of action regarding the UTPA and SCUSA, and it merged RFT's breach of fiduciary claim with its legal malpractice claim. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Law Firm on RFT's remaining claim for legal malpractice. RFT appealed, and the Supreme Court certified the case from the Court of Appeals for its review. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court with respect to all issues brought on appeal. View "RFT Management Co. v. Tinsley & Adams" on Justia Law

Margaret Mims (Mims), as guardian ad litem for her son Edward, filed a complaint against the Babcock Center and others alleging Edward sustained physical injuries and was mistreated while under their care. The circuit court dismissed the complaint based on issues related to timeliness of service and the application of S.C. Code Ann. 15-3-20(B) (2005). Mims appealed. After review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded. The Court concluded the trial court erred in finding Mims's amended complaint should have been dismissed for failure to serve it within 120 days of filing the original complaint. Moreover, the Court agreed with Mims that, contrary to Defendants' assertion, Rule 15(a), SCRCP does allow the filing and service of an amended complaint without leave of court, even if the original complaint has not been served, because a party may amend her pleadings once without leave of court before a responsive pleading is served, and no responsive pleading had been served by Defendants prior to Mims's service of the amended complaint. To the extent the trial court found an alleged absence of proper service resulted in a lack of personal and subject matter jurisdiction and a failure to prosecute, the Court reversed these findings as they were premised on the perceived error regarding service. View "Mims v. Babcock Center" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the Alltel Entities (collectively Petitioners Alltel Communications, Inc. and its regional subsidiaries), were included in the definition of "telephone company" for the purpose of increased license fees in S.C. Code Ann. section 1220-100 (2000). Pursuant to cross motions for summary judgment, the Administrative Law Court (ALC) granted summary judgment in favor of Petitioners, finding that they were not telephone companies for purposes of section 12-20-100. Alternatively, the ALC found that if the statute were ambiguous, Petitioners would prevail under the rule that an ambiguity in a taxing statute must be construed in favor of the taxpayer. Though the court of appeals recognized that the application of section 12-20-100 to Petitioners was not "absolutely clear," it reversed the grant of summary judgment and remanded the matter to the ALC for additional fact finding. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the ALC's grant of summary judgment in favor of Petitioners. The term "telephone company" was not a defined term and its application to Petitioners was "doubtful." The presence of an ambiguity in a tax assessment statute requires that a court resolve that doubt in favor of the taxpayer. View "Alltel v. SCDOR" on Justia Law

Petitioner Monica Weston purchased a pair of prescription decorative, colored contact lenses without a prescription from Respondent Kim's Dollar Store, an unauthorized seller. The lenses were manufactured by Respondent CIBA Vision (CIBA). Petitioner developed an eye infection which led to the loss of vision in her left eye. Thereafter, Petitioner brought an action against the store and CIBA alleging six causes of action. The trial court granted partial summary judgment in favor of CIBA as to three of the six causes of action based on federal preemption, and the court of appeals affirmed. On certiorari, Petitioner conceded the lenses she purchased were Class III medical devices but argued her claims were not preempted because CIBA failed to show the lenses were approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) through the pre-market approval (PMA) process. Upon review of the record of this case, the Supreme Court concluded that the lenses were FDA approved through the PMA process. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the court of appeals to the extent partial summary judgment was granted on claims that would impose common-law requirements "different from, or in addition to" applicable FDA requirements. As to the remaining causes of action, the Court remanded for further proceedings. View "Weston v. Kim's Dollar Store" on Justia Law

Milliken & Company sued Brian Morin after he resigned from the company and started a new venture using Milliken's proprietary information. The primary basis of the suit was that Morin breached the confidentiality and invention assignment agreements he signed when he started working for Milliken. A jury found for Milliken, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the narrow issue of whether these agreements are overbroad as a matter of law. Upon review, the Court held that they were not and affirmed as modified. View "Milliken & Company v. Morin" on Justia Law

Cathy Bone filed a workers' compensation claim form (Form 50) dated August 7, 2007 alleging that she injured her back on Tuesday, June 26, 2007 while employed with U.S. Food Service. Her job consisted of power washing and cleaning the insides of truck trailers that transported food. Bone alleged that she hurt her back when she lifted two pallets inside a trailer to clean under them. She did not report the incident immediately because she needed to continue working and thought she would be okay, but thereafter she developed increasing pain. On Tuesday, July 3, 2007, Bone reported the injury to one of her supervisors shortly after she arrived at work. The same morning she reported her injury, Bone had a flat tire on her way to work, and she called in to advise her office of this fact. The employer, U.S. Food Service, and its carrier, Indemnity Insurance Co. of North America denied Bone's claim, disputing that she had injured her back on June 26 and asserting the injury occurred when her tire was changed on July 3. The employer and its carrier appealed the circuit court's order that determined the employee's claim was compensable and remanded the matter to the South Carolina Workers' Compensation Commission for further proceedings. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal as interlocutory. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's decision. View "Bone v. U.S. Food Service" on Justia Law

This case involved a contest over the private adoption of a child born in Oklahoma to unwed parents, one of whom is a member of the Cherokee Nation. After a four day hearing in September 2011, the family court issued a final order on November 25, 2011, denying the adoption and requiring the adoptive parents to transfer the child to her biological father. The transfer of custody took place in Charleston, South Carolina, on December 31, 2011, and the child now resides with her biological father and his parents in Oklahoma. THe adoptive parents appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the family court which denied the adoption and awarded custody to the biological father. View "Adoptive Couple v. Cherokee Nation" on Justia Law

Two issues came before the Supreme Court in this case: (1) whether an assignee of a note and mortgage has a right to surplus funds generated by the foreclosure of a prior mortgage on the property; and (2) whether that assignee is barred from recovering the surplus funds because the note and mortgage assigned to it allegedly were closed without attorney participation. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the assignee may recover the surplus funds even though it was not a lienholder of record at the time of the sale. The Court took the opportunity of this case to clarify its decision in "Matrix Financial Services Corp. v. Frazer," (714 S.E.2d 532 (2011)), and held that because the mortgage at issue in this case was filed before "Matrix," whether it was closed without the services of an attorney would not bar the assignee from receiving the surplus funds. View "BAC Home Loan Servicing, L.P. v. Kinder " on Justia Law

South Carolina Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. (Farm Bureau) brought a declaratory judgment action to determine whether Henry Kennedy was entitled to underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage for an accident. The trial court found Kennedy was entitled to UIM coverage under the terms of the policy because Kennedy was "upon" and thus "occupying" the insured vehicle at the time of the accident. The Court of Appeals reversed. The Supreme Court granted Kennedy's petition for a writ of certiorari to review the appellate court's decision. Initially, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court's finding of actual physical contact was supported by the evidence. The trial court found Kennedy had left the engine running on his employer's vehicle; that he was in physical contact with the covered vehicle (with his hand on the truck) when the other vehicle careened towards him, forcing him to relinquish his contact in order to attempt to avoid injury; that Kennedy was "upon" and "occupying" the vehicle at the time of the accident; and he was entitled to UIM coverage under the Farm Bureau policy. Moreover, a second, resultant physical contact was established when Kennedy was pinned against the insured vehicle. The Supreme Court concluded that a requirement that an insured remain in physical contact with the insured vehicle in the face of imminent danger was unreasonable and unconscionable. Consequently, the Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals. View "SC Farm Bureau v. Kennedy" on Justia Law

Employee-Respondent Aletha Johnson hurt her back while working for Employer-Appellant Rent-A-Center, Inc. The company contended that the appellate panel of the Workers' Compensation Commission erred by awarding Respondent workers' compensation benefits. The appellate panel found Respondent was disabled and did not constructively refuse light duty work. The Supreme Court found that Respondent qualified as disabled under section 42-1-120 of the South Carolina Code, and affirmed the appellate panel's decision to award benefits. View "Johnson v. Rent-A-Center" on Justia Law