Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant Brandon Bentley, a deputy sheriff with the Spartanburg County Sheriff's Department, alleged that he developed Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PSTD) and depression after he shot and killed a suspect who attempted to assault him. An Appellate Panel of the Workers' Compensation Commission unanimously found that Appellant failed to meet his burden of proof in establishing a compensable mental injury that arose out of an "unusual or extraordinary condition" of employment for a Spartanburg County deputy sheriff. "Whether the shooting and killing of a suspect by a deputy sheriff while on duty is an extraordinary and unusual employment condition such that mental injuries arising from that incident are compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act" was the issue central to this case. Appellant asked the Supreme Court to reframe the issue, take it out of its particular employment context, and ask "whether killing another human being is "unusual." Upon review, the Court held that Appellant's testimony that he "might be in a situation where he might have to shoot someone," similar testimonies by Sheriff Wright that officers were aware of the possibility that they might be required to shoot and kill, Appellant's training in the use of deadly force, and the department's policy addressing when deadly force should be used constituted substantial evidence supporting the Appellate Panel's conclusion that Appellant's involvement in the shooting was not "extraordinary and unusual," but was a standard and necessary condition of a deputy sheriff's job. View "Bentley v. Spartanburg County" on Justia Law

Petitioner Mark Fountain brought this action for defamation based on a statement by Thomas C. Ewart, chief banking officer for Respondent First Reliance Bank, as to why the bank would not make a loan on a business venture between Fountain and Ernest Pennell. With at least some of Fountain's financial background known to Pennell, Fountain and Pennell approached First Reliance to request funds after two other lending institutions denied their loan requests. At this point in time, Ewart called Pennell in for a meeting to discuss the matter. Fountain was not present. At that meeting, Ewart stated that First Reliance would not be making the loan if Fountain was involved in the business. Pennell subsequently relayed Ewart's statement to Fountain, and told him to "tear up" the agreement between the two of them. Fountain later requested Pennell to meet him at his lawyer's office, where Pennell repeated the statement in front of Fountain's attorney. Fountain filed a complaint against First Reliance, Ewart, and Pennell for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress. All three defendants filed motions for summary judgment. The circuit court granted the motions, finding the statement was not defamatory, the publication of the statement was privileged, and no intentional infliction of emotional distress claim was established. Fountain appeals only the grant of summary judgment in favor of First Reliance and Ewart on his defamation claim. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded Ewart's statement was not defamatory, and even if it was, a qualified privilege existed in this case. As there was no evidence that this privilege was abused by Respondents, summary judgment was proper. View "Fountain v. First Reliance Bank" on Justia Law

Appellant Samuel Whitner was convicted and sentenced for the offense of criminal sexual conduct with a minor in the first degree. The victim of the sexual abuse was Appellant's then five- or six-year-old daughter. Appellant challenged two evidentiary rulings: (1) the denial of his motion to suppress a tape recording of his telephone conversation with the victim wherein he admitted the abuse; and (2) the denial of his motion to exclude evidence in connection with a forensic interview of the minor victim. Upon review, the Supreme Court found no error in the admission of the challenged evidence and affirmed. View "South Carolina v. Whitner" on Justia Law

Brentwood Homes, Inc. and the other appellants in this case (collectively "Brentwood Homes") appealed a circuit court's order denying a motion to stay the proceedings and compel arbitration in a lawsuit filed by Petitioner Fred Bradley that arose out of his purchase of a home in South Carolina. Although Brentwood Homes conceded the Home Purchase Agreement did not meet the technical requirements of the South Carolina Uniform Arbitration Act (the "UAA"), it claimed the court erred in denying the motion because the transaction involved interstate commerce and thus was subject to the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"). Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that because the essential character of the Agreement was strictly for the purchase of a completed residential dwelling and not the construction, the Court found the FAA did not apply. Furthermore, the existence of the national warranty and Bradley's use of out-of-state financing did not negate the intrastate nature of the transaction. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the circuit court's order denying Brentwood Homes' motion to stay the proceedings and compel arbitration as Brentwood Homes failed to offer sufficient evidence that the transaction involved interstate commerce to subject the Agreement to the FAA. View "Bradley v. Brentwood Homes" on Justia Law

Appellant Stephen Lipscomb, manager of SEL Properties, appealed a jury verdict against him for tortious interference with a contract entered into by SEL with Respondents Dutch Fork Development Group, II, LLC and Dutch Fork Realty, LLC. Appellant contended that he, as the manager of the limited liability company, could not be held individually liable in tort for a contract that was breached by SEL. Alternatively, Appellant challenged the jury's award of $3,000,000 in actual damages to Respondents on the grounds: (1) the trial judge erred in charging the jury that lost customers and lost goodwill were elements of damages as there was no evidence of such damages; and (2) the award was improper and should have been reduced as the actual damages for the tort claim were "coextensive" with or subsumed in the jury's award of actual damages to Respondents for the breach of contract claim against SEL. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Appellant was entitled to a directed verdict as to the claim of tortious interference with a contract. Accordingly, the Court reversed the jury's award of damages. View "Dutch Fork Development v. SEL Properties" on Justia Law

Appellant Richard Freemantle challenged the legality of a severance agreement between Anderson County and Respondent Joey Preston, a former Anderson County administrator. Respondent was hired as County Administrator in 1998. His contract with the County provided for an initial employment term of three years, with an annual renewal in the absence of written notice not to renew the contract. The November 2008 election changed the "balance of power" on the Anderson County Council. One of the final acts of the outgoing Council was to execute a severance agreement for Respondent that provided him over one million dollars in benefits which was "well in excess of that provided in his employment contract." The severance agreement also included a release provision stating that the County would never seek legal redress against Respondent for any claims relating to his employment with the County. Appellant filed a complaint against Respondents on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated seeking monetary relief and various declaratory judgments. Specifically, Appellant alleged that Council's vote approving the severance agreement was invalid. In addition, Appellant contended the successor Anderson County Council was not bound by the severance agreement. Relief was sought pursuant to various causes of action, including covin and collusion, breach of fiduciary duties, illegal gift of county funds, misfeasance, malfeasance, conspiracy, violations of public policy, and violations of FOIA, The trial court dismissed the action finding that Appellant's status as a taxpayer did not confer standing to challenge the severance agreement. The Supreme Court agreed with the circuit court in most respects concerning Appellant's lack of standing. However, the Court disagreed with the trial court "only insofar as the FOIA claim is concerned, for traditional standing principles do not apply under FOIA because the legislature has conferred standing on any citizen to enforce the Act's provisions." Accordingly, the Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Freemantle v. Preston" on Justia Law

Appellant Kathy Salley was found guilty of homicide by child abuse and sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment, suspendable upon eight years' service. Appellant claims the circuit judge committed reversible error by allowing into evidence a photograph of the child taken while she was alive and well, and two pieces of wood found at the home of the child. Although the Supreme Court believed that the admission of the pieces of wood was an abuse of discretion, the Court nevertheless found the error to be harmless. Accordingly, the Court affirmed Appellant's conviction. View "South Carolina v. Salley" on Justia Law

Petitioner Bobbie Manigo challenged his civil commitment to the Department of Mental Health for long-term control, care, and treatment pursuant to the Sexually Violent Predator Act ("SVPA"). Specifically, Petitioner contended that, although he has been convicted of a sexually violent offense, he was exempt from the SVPA evaluation procedure simply because his most recent offense was not explicitly designated as sexually violent. The court of appeals affirmed Petitioner's commitment, finding the language of the SVPA unambiguous and applicable to Petitioner. Upon further review, the Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court. View "In the Matter of the Care and Treatment of Bobbie Manigo" on Justia Law

Appellant Lisa Argabright and Respondent Wayne Argabright were formerly married, are now divorced and share joint custody of their minor daughter. Appellant appealed the family court's issuance of a restraining order enjoining her from permitting any contact between her boyfriend, a convicted sex offender, and the parties' minor daughter. The family court further required Appellant to pay Respondent's attorney's fees and the guardian ad litem fees. Appellant appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Appellant was the only person available to supervise contact between Child and the boyfriend. And given Appellant's pattern of deception and pursuit of her own interests over those of Child, an order entrusting Appellant to ensure no future unsupervised contact between Child and the boyfriend would be suspect. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's order. View "Argabright v. Argabright" on Justia Law

Respondents Kelly Rhoden and her daughters, Ashley Arrieta and Emerlynn Dickey, were involved in a motor vehicle accident while riding in a vehicle owned and operated by Arrieta. The parties stipulated that the Respondents are relatives residing in the same household, and that Arrieta's insurance policy with Nationwide did not provide UIM coverage. Rhoden owned two vehicles that she also insured through Nationwide under a policy that did provide UIM coverage. Rhoden's policy contained a term specifying that the insurance it provided was primary when the covered vehicle was involved in the accident but excess when the involved vehicle was not the covered vehicle but was owned by the policyholder or a resident relative. Nationwide brought a declaratory judgment action seeking a determination that UIM coverage was not available to any of the Respondents under Rhoden's policy. Nationwide contended that because Arrieta's policy had no UIM coverage, clause 3(b), a portability limitation clause, operated to prevent any Respondent from recovering under Rhoden's policy. The trial court held that UIM coverage under Rhoden's policy was available to all three Respondents because such coverage is personal and portable, and Respondents were either named insureds or resident relatives under Rhoden's policy. Nationwide appealed the decision to the court of appeals, which reversed the trial court with regard to Arrieta, and affirmed the trial court's ruling that UIM coverage was available to Rhoden and Dickey under Rhoden's policy. The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court was whether public policy was offended by the portability limitation clause preventing non-owner resident relatives from importing UIM coverage from an at-home vehicle's policy when the involved vehicle lacked UIM coverage. The Supreme Court held that South Carolina's public policy that UIM coverage is personal and portable requires UIM coverage to be provided to Rhoden and Dickey, who did not own the vehicle involved in the accident, while denied to Arrieta, who owned the vehicle involved in the accident but chose not to purchase UIM coverage. The Court affirmed the court of appeals' decision. View "Nationwide Mutual v. Rhoden" on Justia Law