Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Chris Anthony Liverman was convicted of two counts of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. The court of appeals affirmed. Petitioner sought certiorari with respect to the claim that the trial court refused to conduct a "full" in camera hearing pursuant to "Neil v. Biggers," (409 U.S. 188 (1972)). Petitioner contended the eyewitness's identification of him as the shooter at a police-orchestrated show-up was unduly suggestive and therefore tainted the in-court identification. The trial court, relying on "McLeod v. State," (196 S.E.2d 645 (1973)), did conduct an in camera hearing and found the pretrial identification was reliable, based primarily on the witness's previous knowledge of Petitioner. Following the court of appeals' decision, the United States Supreme Court issued its opinion in "Perry v. New Hampshire," (565 U.S. ___ (2012)). The issue in this case for the Supreme Court concerned "the intersection of a suggestive police show-up identification procedure and an eyewitness who knows the accused." The Court concluded that "McLeod" could not stand in light of "Perry" and overruled "McLeod" insofar as it created a bright-line rule excusing a "Neil v. Biggers" hearing where the eyewitness knows the accused. The Court nevertheless affirmed Petitioner's convictions and sentence because any error in failing to conduct a "Neil v. Biggers" hearing was harmless. View "South Carolina v. Liverman" on Justia Law

Respondent Jarod Wayne Tapp was convicted of murdering and sexually assaulting his upstairs neighbor, Julie Jett (victim), and of burglarizing her apartment. Respondent received a life sentence for murder and two thirty-year sentences for the first degree criminal sexual conduct and burglary charges. The Supreme Court granted the State's request for certiorari to review the appellate court's decision to overturn and remand Respondent's convictions and sentences for a new trial. The court of appeals found that the record in this case was insufficient for determining whether the circuit judge properly considered the reliability of a special agent's testimony prior to introducing that testimony to the jury. The Supreme Court agreed that its decision in "State v. White,"(676 S.E.2d684 (2009) governed Respondent's case, but took the opportunity to clarify "White" in light of the court of appeals' misreading of "White" in the opinion below. The Supreme Court's reading of the record convinced the Court that the circuit judge stopped short of determining the reliability of the agent's testimony prior to admitting it into evidence, and therefore the trial court erred. However, the Court found that the error in admitting the testimony at issue was harmless. Accordingly, the Court reversed the court of appeals and reinstated Respondent's convictions. View "South Carolina v. Tapp" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was declaratory relief in connection with an alleged improper certification of certain candidates by the Florence County Republican Party for the June 12, 2012, party primary.  Plaintiffs Florence County Election Commission, David Alford, South Carolina State Election Commission, and Marci Andino contended these candidates were improperly certified because they failed to comply with the requirements for filing a Statement of Economic Interests (SEI) contained in S.C. Code Ann. 8-13-1356 (Supp. 2011), as interpreted by the Court in "Anderson v. S.C. Election Comm'n," Op. No. 27120 (S.C. Sup. Ct. filed May 2, 2012).  The County Republicans argued the candidates were exempt under 8-13-1356(A) from the filing requirements of 8-13-1356(B).  The Court granted declaratory relief to Plaintiffs and declared the County Republicans improperly construed the relevant statutory provisions to determine certain candidates were exempt from the requirements of 8-13-1356(B). View "Florence County Democratic Party v. Florence County Republican Party" on Justia Law

Appellant Joey Ellis appealed a circuit court order that revoked and terminated his probation. He argued that the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the probation violation warrant was not issued during the term of his probation. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Appellant's sentence of probation for his attempted burglary in the second degree conviction began after his parole concluded for his conviction for burglary in the second degree, and not following his release from incarceration. Thus, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in revoking Appellant's probation. View "South Carolina v. Ellis" on Justia Law

Petitioner Neeltec Enterprises, Inc., d/b/a/ Fireworks Supermarket, appealed an order requiring it to substitute two corporations as defendants in its SCUPTA suit in lieu of the individual Willard Long against whom it had brought suit. Petitioner operated a fireworks store near I-95. Defendant Long was alleged to have operated a competing fireworks store "Fireworks Superstore" near I-95. Petitioner alleged that Long first changed his store's name to closely resemble Petitioner's. Petitioner then redecorated the outside of his building facing I-95 traffic with an advertising display. Long allegedly retaliated by moving a 45- foot long, 9-foot tall storage container onto his property, effectively blocking travelers' views of Petitioner's wall advertisement. Petitioner alleged that, by his actions, Long had violated the SCUTPA. Long answered, and subsequently filed a "Motion for Summary Judgment or, in the Alternative, for Substitution of Parties." Long asserted he never owned the Fireworks Superstore, but that it had been owned by Hobo Joes, Inc., when the suit was commenced and was now owned by Foxy's Fireworks Superstore, Inc., both South Carolina corporations.  He sought either summary judgment because Petitioner had sued the wrong party or an order that Long be dropped as a party and that Hobo Joe's and Foxy's Fireworks be added as defendants. The special referee granted Long's motion in part, finding he was not "the proper defendant. Petitioner appealed and the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the order requiring Petitioner to discontinue its SCUPTA suit against Long affected its substantial right to name its defendant, making it immediately appealable. The decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing the appeal was reversed, and the matter was remanded for consideration of the merits of Petitioner's appeal. View "Neeltec Enterprises v. Long" on Justia Law

Petitioner Michael Goins pled guilty to a second possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine, and possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine within the proximity of a school. He received a negotiated ten-year sentence for both convictions, to run concurrently.  The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the circuit court's denial of post-conviction relief (PCR).  Petitioner argued the PCR court erred in failing to find plea counsel ineffective for allowing him to plead guilty when the drugs obtained were found pursuant to an illegal search.  Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed Petitioner's conviction. Although counsel provided ineffective assistance in failing to properly advise Petitioner on the law regarding whether a motel owner can freely admit police into a rented room, Petitioner failed to prove this advice was his reason for electing not to go to trial and has thus failed to establish prejudice. View "Goins v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

Respondent Atlantic Coast Builders and Contractors, LLC brought an action against its landlord, Petitioner Laura Lewis, for negligent misrepresentation, unjust enrichment, and breach of contract.  Atlantic also sought a return of the security deposit it paid pursuant to its lease with Lewis.  The master-in-equity entered judgment in favor of Atlantic, and the court of appeals affirmed. The landlord appealed, arguing the appellate court erred in its return of the security deposit and in calculating its damages award. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the court of appeals erred in concluding the issue regarding the security deposit was preserved for review. Because the deposit issue was not preserved, the landlord was entitled to retain the deposit. Consequently, Atlantic's damages were reduced by $3500. The Court affirmed the appellate court as to the entry of judgment against the landlord for negligent misrepresentation and unjust enrichment. View "Atlantic Coast Builders and Contractors v. Lewis" on Justia Law

Appellant Jennifer Dykes appealed a circuit court's order that she be subject to satellite monitoring for the rest of her natural life pursuant to Section 23-3-540(C) of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2010). She raised five constitutional challenges to this statute: (1) it violates her substantive due process rights; (2) violates her right to procedural due process; (3) violates the Ex Post Facto clause; (4) violates the Equal Protection Clause; and (5) violates her right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the mandatory imposition of lifetime satellite monitoring indeed violates Appellant's substantive due process rights and reversed the circuit court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "South Carolina v. Dykes" on Justia Law

Petitioner Zeb Eron Binnarr was convicted by a jury for failing to timely register as a sex offender. He appealed his conviction primarily on the ground that he did not receive actioal notice of a change of the law regarding sex offender registration. The court of appeals affirmed Petitioner's conviction, and Petitioner again appealed. In view of the Supreme Court's decision in "South Carolina v. Latimore" (Op. 27102, Mar. 14, 2012), the Court concluded that the Court of Appeals erred in declining to find that actual notice of the re-registration requirement was necessary to sustain a conviction. Because the State failed to provide any direct or substantial circumstantial evidence from which a jury could determine that Petitioner had actual notice of the change in the law, the Court found the trial judge erred in failing to direct a verdict of acquittal. Accordingly, the Court reversed Petitioner's conviction. View "South Carolina v. Binnarr" on Justia Law

William Watson Eldridge III (Father) created two trusts for the ultimate benefit of his sons, William Watson Eldridge IV (Bill) and Thomas Hadley Eldridge (Tom). In 1973, Father formed a revocable trust (R-trust), for which he was the trustee. When Mother died in 1992, Father amended the R-trust to name Bill and Tom as co-successor trustees. In 1999, Father formed an irrevocable Qualified Personal Residence Trust (QPRT), for which he was trustee, and placed in it a Florida condominium (Florida condo) that he owned. Under the terms of the QPRT, Father could sell the Florida condo, but use of the proceeds was limited to the purchase of a replacement home to be placed in the trust, or the purchase of a separate annuity for the benefit of the trust. The trust document named Sons as co-successor trustees of the QPRT. The terms of the QPRT also provided that if Father died within eight years after its formation, the trust assets were to automatically transfer to the R-trust, of which Sons were beneficiaries. If Father was still living eight years after the formation of the QPRT, the trust assets were to be distributed equally among Sons. Father married Frances Eldridge (Wife) in 2001. Acting as trustee of the QPRT trust, Father sold the Florida condo and used the sales proceeds to buy a Hilton Head home. Instead of titling the Hilton Head home in the name of the QPRT trust, as required under the terms of the trust, he titled it in the name of the R-Trust. In 2003, Father transferred the Hilton Head home from the R-trust to himself and Wife, individually, as joint tenants with the right of survivorship. Father died in 2006, and under the right of survivorship, Wife's sole interest in the Hilton Head home became fully vested. Subsequently, she transferred title in the home to herself as trustee of the Frances Ulmer Eldridge Revocable Trust, of which Wife's children are the beneficiaries at her death. Bill and Tom, as trustees of the R-trust, filed suit against Wife and her trust, claiming that the Hilton Head home was held in either a constructive or a resulting trust for the benefit of the R-trust, and requesting the court to transfer the Hilton Head home to the R-Trust. After a bench trial, the master-in-equity issued judgment in favor of Wife. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the Sons did not have an adequate legal remedy to cure Father's breach of trust. The law of the case was that a resulting trust arose over the Hilton Head home for the benefit of the R-Trust. Because the Sons filed a claim against Wife and her trust just over a year after Father's death, the Court held that laches could not apply to bar the Sons' claim. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded with direction that Respondents execute all documents necessary to re-transfer the Hilton Head home to the R-Trust. View "Eldridge v. Eldridge" on Justia Law