Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant Graham Law Firm (Graham) appealed a trial court's order granting respondents' motion to set aside default judgment on the grounds that the court lacked jurisdiction based upon inadequate service of process.  In 2007 Graham filed suit against Respondents MKKM, Inc., and Mohamed Makawi, individually and doing business as International House of Pancakes, seeking payment for professional services.  Graham served both complaints on Makawi, who is MKKM's president and registered agent for service of process, by certified mail, return receipt requested, restricted delivery, at the IHOP location in Florence, South Carolina. Neither Makawi nor MKKM filed an answer to the complaint, and Graham's motions for entry of default and default judgment were granted.  Graham served a copy of the order granting default judgment by certified mail on Makawi and Makawi as registered agent of MKKM, and the return receipt was signed by Makawi.  In March 2009, counsel for respondents contacted Graham to request information about the judgment. After reconsideration, the trial court issued an order granting respondents' motion for relief from judgment. Graham appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Graham was not given sufficient opportunity for discovery and cross-examination of witnesses on the matter of authorization to accept service of process. The Court therefore reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Graham Law Firm v. Makawi" on Justia Law

Appellants Phillip Grimsley and Roger Mowers were retired and later rehired employees of the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division (SLED). As employees, they were members of the Police Officers Retirement System. As part of the rehire process, SLED required Appellants to sign a form which provided that they would take a pay cut in the amount it would cost SLED to pay "the employer portion" of retirement. According to their suit, Appellants claimed that provision was contrary to state law, which assigned the responsibility for the employer portion of the retirement to the employer. On behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, Appellants brought suit against SLED and the State, seeking a declaratory judgment and asserting causes of action for a violation of S.C. Code Ann. section 9-11-90 and for unlawful takings. The trial court dismissed the complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the South Carolina Retirement Contribution Procedures Act (Retirement Act), which Appellants challenged on appeal to the Supreme Court. Appellants additionally appealed the trial court's alternative ruling dismissing their unlawful takings claim. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with Appellants and found the trial court erred in dismissing their complaint: "Appellants have asserted a cognizable property interest rooted in state law sufficient to survive the motion to dismiss. In so finding, [the Court] also [held] the trial court erred in dismissing Appellants' unlawful takings claim." View "Grimsley v. So. Carolina Law Enforcement Div." on Justia Law

The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court was whether Respondent South Carolina Department of Health and Human Services and its agent, the South Carolina Department of Disabilities and Special Needs (DDSN), "properly ceased Mental Retardation/Related Disability services to" Appellant Jane Doe, a twenty-eight-year-old woman with undeniable cognitive and adaptive deficits. Based on a legal standard that the "onset of Mental Retardation must be before the age of eighteen (18) years according to accepted psychological doctrine[,]" the Hearing Officer concluded Doe was not mentally retarded. The Administrative Law Court (ALC) affirmed this legal determination, as well as the Hearing Officer's factual findings. Because the decision of the Hearing Officer and ALC was controlled by an error of law, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case: "DDSN could have promulgated regulations incorporating […] additional criteria as part of the definition of mental retardation. But no such steps were taken. Rather, South Carolina adopted a broad definition of mental retardation […] using language that parallels the SSI definition, and in Regulation 88-210, DDSN interpreted that definition in a manner consistent with the SSA. DDSN's interpretation of section 44-20-30 in its policy guidelines directly conflicts with Regulation 88-210 and should be disregarded." View "Doe v. South Carolina Dept. Health Human Svcs." on Justia Law

Appellant State Law Enforcement Division (SLED) appealed the circuit court order relieving Respondent Jeremy Lane Edwards from registering as a sex offender registration. In 1998, Respondent pled guilty to two counts of being a "Peeping Tom." Respondent served a probationary sentence including one hundred hours of community service. In 2004, Respondent received a pardon from the South Carolina Department of Probation, Parole, and Pardon Services (SCDPPPS). In 2009, Respondent filed petitions requesting that the circuit court issue an order mandating that he was no longer required to register as a sex offender. The Attorney General opposed the petition, and asserted that Respondent's pardon did not relieve him from the requirement that he register as a sex offender. The Attorney General argued that the amendments to the applicable statute were remedial and procedural in nature, and thus applied retroactively to Respondent's case. The circuit court disagreed, and ruled that the 2004 pardon relieved Respondent from the registration requirements of the statute, and that the 2005 and 2008 amendments did not apply retroactively. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Respondent's 2004 pardon relieved him of all consequences of his conviction. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the circuit court's order relieving Respondent of his duty to report. View "In the Matter of the Care and Treatment of Jeremy Lane Edwards" on Justia Law

Appellant Jerry Inman pled guilty to murder, first-degree burglary, first-degree criminal sexual conduct, and kidnapping of a Clemson University student. The judge sentenced Appellant to death for murder and two consecutive thirty-year sentences for first-degree burglary and first-degree criminal sexual conduct. On appeal, Appellant challenged the judge's acceptance of his guilty plea because he maintained it was conditional and that he was entitled to be sentenced by a jury despite his plea of guilty. Furthermore, Appellant contended the trial court erred in (1) refusing to recuse the Solicitor's Office from any further involvement in the case; (2) declining defense counsel's request to question the Solicitor on the issue of prosecutorial misconduct; and (3) declining to grant a mistrial despite a finding of prosecutorial misconduct. Finding that Appellant entered a valid guilty plea that was not conditioned on the preservation or outcome of the jury sentencing issue, the Supreme Court affirmed Appellant's convictions. Moreover, even if Appellant properly preserved this issue, the Court concluded Appellant abandoned it on appeal. As to the propriety of the sentencing proceedings, the Court concluded the judge did not abuse his discretion in denying Appellant's requests to recuse the Solicitor's office as advocates and to question members of the office. Although Court found the Solicitor committed prosecutorial misconduct in his treatment of Appellant's expert witness, the Court concluded that Appellant was not sufficiently prejudiced to warrant the grant of a mistrial. View "South Carolina v. Inman" on Justia Law

Petitioner Kevin Odems appealed the Court of Appeals' decision that affirmed his 2005 convictions for first degree burglary, grand larceny, criminal conspiracy, and malicious injury. The State's case against Petitioner consisted solely of circumstantial evidence. Petitioner argued on appeal the Supreme Court that the State failed to present substantial circumstantial evidence of his involvement in any of the crimes charged, and thus the circuit court should have directed a verdict on all four counts. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court agreed and reversed. View "South Carolina v. Odems" on Justia Law

This case returned to the South Carolina Supreme Court from the United States Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of "AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion." The underlying action originally came to the Court on appeal of the trial court's denial of Appellant Century BMW's motion to compel arbitration. The Court affirmed the trial court's denial of the motion to compel. Following that decision, Appellant filed a petition for rehearing, contending the Supreme Court's opinion was inconsistent with the federal Supreme Court's decision in "Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. Animalfeeds International Corp." which found that the federal Arbitration Act preempted South Carolina law. The South Carolina Court emphasized that its opinion was based on state law grounds, and admonished Appellant for "attempting to reframe the issues and miscast [the Court's] holding as disingenuous to the opinion and a holding [it] never made." Thereafter, Appellant petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. The South Carolina Court's opinion was vacated by the federal Supreme Court and remanded for consideration in light of its decision in "AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion." Respondents Heather Herron and several others "individually and for the benefit of all car buyers who paid 'administrative fees'" argued that the matter of preemption was not preserved in the South Carolina proceedings. The South Carolina Court agreed and therefore adhered to its initial opinion. View "Herron v. Century BMW" on Justia Law

Appellant Willard Farr owned seven gaming machines seized from a Union business. The magistrate issued an order to destroy the machines, and Appellant timely sought a post-seizure hearing in an attempt to block their destruction. Following the hearing, the magistrate affirmed the order, and Appellant appealed to the circuit court. Appellant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence presented before the magistrate concerning the State's witness and her inability to identify which of the offending machines she played. Finding that Appellant misunderstood the burden of proof at the post-seizure hearing (which rested solely on the owner to show why the machines should not have been forfeited and destroyed), the Supreme Court affirmed the magistrate's and circuit court's decisions. View "Union County Sheriff's Office v. Henderson" on Justia Law

The property which was the subject of this appeal was owned by Appellant Peggy McMaster and located in the City of Columbia in the immediate vicinity of the University of South Carolina. Pursuant to the Ordinance, only one "family" may occupy a single dwelling unit. At the time this dispute arose, the property was occupied by four unrelated individuals—Appellant Gray McGurn and three other young women, all of whom were undergraduate students at the University of South Carolina. After receiving a neighborhood complaint, the City's Zoning Administrator conducted an investigation and determined the occupants violated the Ordinance. McMaster appealed the violation notice to the City's Board of Zoning Appeals arguing the Ordinance was not violated and in the alternative, the Ordinance was unconstitutional. Following a hearing, the Board affirmed the zoning violation. Appellants appealed the Board's decision to the circuit court. The circuit court found the Ordinance's definition of "family" did not violate the Due Process Clause of the South Carolina Constitution. Following its review, the Supreme Court found the Ordinance was a valid exercise of the City's broad police power and that there was a rational relationship between the City's decision to limit the number of unrelated individuals who may live together as a single housekeeping unit and the legitimate governmental interests of controlling the undesirable qualities associated with "mass student congestion." View "McMaster v. Columbia Board of Zoning" on Justia Law

Petitioner All Things Possible, Inc. (ATP) sold an undeveloped lot to Respondents Michael and Marsha Moseley. The lot was burdened by an underground, surface-water drainage easement running diagonally across the entire length of the property, essentially cutting the lot in half. ATP, through its agents, was aware of the Moseleys' desire to build a home on the lot. According to the Moseleys, they "absolutely" relied upon the falsified plat in purchasing the lot, together with assurances from ATP related to the Moseleys' ability to build on the lot. As noted by the court of appeals, the Moseleys were induced to purchase the lot without obtaining an independent survey of the property. Conversely, the real estate contract contained standard provisions, including the right of the Moseleys to conduct a title examination and procure a survey of the lot. After purchasing the lot, the Moseleys learned of the easement and the resulting inability to build a home suited to their needs. The Moseleys sued ATP alleging multiple causes of action, including fraud. The matter was tried nonjury solely on the fraud claim. The trial court found that fraud had been established by clear and convincing evidence and awarded actual and punitive damages against ATP. The judgment against ATP was affirmed. On appeal, ATP argued that there was no clear and convincing evidence that it engaged in fraud. Furthermore, ATP argued that the alleged misrepresentation was discoverable in the chain of title, and therefore, the Moseleys' claim should have failed as a matter of law. The Supreme Court disagreed: "constructive notice is 'inapplicable especially 'where the very representations relied on induced the hearer to refrain [from] an examination of the records.'" The Court affirmed the appellate court's decision. View "Moseley v. All Things Possible" on Justia Law