Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant Sean Taylor appealed an order which terminated his parental rights to his six-year-old daughter on three grounds: willful failure to visit, willful failure to support, and because the child had been in foster care for fifteen out of the previous twenty-two months.  Following a review of the record, the Supreme Court held that Respondent Charleston County Department of Social Services (DSS) did not meet its burden with respect to the first two grounds, and that the child's placement in foster care for at least fifteen of the last twenty-two months was not a sufficient ground for termination of Appellant's rights under the facts of this case. Accordingly, the Court reversed the family court's decision and directed DSS to implement a plan to reunify Appellant with his daughter, or to place the child with her grandparents until reunification could be achieved. View "Charleston County DSS v. Marccuci" on Justia Law

Respondent Atlantic Coast Builders & Contractors, LLC brought an action against Petitioner Laura Lewis for negligent misrepresentation, unjust enrichment, and breach of contract.  In 2003, Petitioner, acting through a leasing agent, entered into a commercial lease whereby Respondent would lease from Petitioner property located in Beaufort County.  Although Petitioner represented in the lease that the property could lawfully be used for a building and construction office, the property was zoned "rural," meaning virtually all commercial uses were prohibited. Respondent occupied the property and made numerous alterations to it. A few months later, a Beaufort County zoning official served Respondent with notice and warning of two violations for Respondent's failure to obtain a certificate of zoning compliance before occupying the premises and its failure to obtain a sign permit before erecting a sign.  Respondent vacated the property, relocated its business, and ceased making rental payments. Respondent then instituted this action. Petitioner denied the allegations and made a counterclaim for breach of contract.  The master in equity entered judgment in favor of Respondent. The Court of Appeals affirmed, finding the master properly granted judgment in favor of Respondent. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Petitioner did not appeal all grounds on which the master's judgment was based.  Namely, she did not challenge the determination that Respondent was entitled to recover based on unjust enrichment.  Accordingly, the Court affirmed the master-in-equity's and appellate court's decisions in favor of Respondent. View "Atlantic Coast Builders & Contractors v. Lewis" on Justia Law

Petitioner Jason Dickey appealed a court of appeals' decision that affirmed his conviction of voluntary manslaughter.  Petitioner worked as a security guard at an apartment building when on the night of April 29, 2004, an intoxicated water balloon toss among residents turned into a heated argument. The prank so angered visitor Joshua Boot that he threatened to physically assault the person who splashed him. Boot began banging on neighbors' doors, which prompted his resident-host to go to the security desk to ask Petitioner to evict her guest.  Petitioner testified he pulled the gun to discourage Boot and another guest from attacking him. Petitioner testified he saw Boot reach under his shirt as he came towards him, and Petitioner feared he was reaching for a weapon. Without warning, Petitioner fired three shots striking Boot. Subsequently, a Richland County grand jury indicted Petitioner for murder. Petitioner's counsel twice moved for a directed verdict of acquittal on the ground that Petitioner was acting in self-defense when he shot Boot. The circuit judge denied both motions. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the State failed to disprove the elements of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt.  Even viewing the facts in a light most favorable to the State, the evidence established that Petitioner shot and killed Boot in self-defense.  Therefore, the Court reversed the court of appeals and overturned Petitioner's conviction. View "South Carolina v. Dickey" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court accepted the certified question from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina on whether the South Carolina Solid Waste Policy and Management Act, (SWPMA) preempted Horry County Ordinance 02-09 entitled "An Ordinance Regulating the County-Wide Collection and Disposal of Solid Waste Generated within Horry County and for the Prohibition of the Disposal of Solid Waste Materials in any Manner Except as Set Forth Herein; and Providing Penalties for Violation Thereof."  Plaintiffs Sandlands C&D, LLC (Sandlands) and Express Disposal Service, LLC (EDS) are related, privately-owned South Carolina companies.  Sandlands owned and operated a landfill in Marion County, approximately two miles across the Horry County border, and EDS hauls waste originating in South Carolina and North Carolina to Sandlands' landfill.  DHEC granted Sandlands a permit to accept construction and demolition (C & D) waste at the Marion County site.  Prior to the passage of Horry County Ordinance 02-09, Sandlands received C & D waste originating in Horry County and hauled by EDS, accounting for a large portion of the waste processed at its landfill. Upon review of the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court responded in the negative: the county ordinance was not preempted by the SWPMA. View "Sandlands C&D v. County of Horry" on Justia Law

Appellant Thomas Jennings was convicted of two counts of committing a lewd act upon a minor and was sentenced to fifty-five months' imprisonment for the first charge and fifteen years, suspended upon the service of fifty months and three years' probation for the second charge, with the sentences to run consecutively.  Appellant appealed his convictions, arguing the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce the written reports of a forensic interviewer.  Appellant admitted he developed a friendly relationship with the victims and that he had engaged in incidental physical contact with them from time to time.  He vehemently denied, however, touching any of them inappropriately. The forensic interviewer interviewed each of the children.  The State called her as its first witness and asked her to briefly summarize what each of the victims told her during the interviews.  Appellant objected, and the trial court sustained the objection.  The State then moved to admit the forensic interviewer's written reports into evidence.  Over Appellant's objection, the trial court allowed the written reports into evidence. Upon review, the Supreme Court found portions of the written reports constituted inadmissible hearsay as they were out-of-court statements offered to prove that appellant did in fact inappropriately touch the children in the way that they claimed. The Court also found the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce this evidence, which was not harmless: "[the] trial hinged on the children's credibility, and the written reports were cumulative to the children's testimony." Accordingly, the Court reversed appellant's convictions and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "South Carolina v. Jennings" on Justia Law

Before the Supreme Court was whether an action for separate maintenance and support could be pursued when the parties were still living together. Eileen (Wife) and Clifford (Husband) Theisen were married in 1980. At the time of this action, the parties owned three properties: the marital home, which was in Wife's name, and two rental properties, both of which were in Husband's name. Wife had filed for divorce on two previous occasions, at least one of which was premised on the fault ground of physical cruelty. Wife filed this action for separate maintenance alleging Husband "has engaged and continue[ed] to engage in a course of conduct making it unreasonable and unfair to require [Wife] to continue to live with him." Husband counterclaimed for equitable distribution of the marital assets and debts as well as attorney's fees. Husband further made motions to dismiss Wife's complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Both of Husband's motions were premised on the fact that Husband and Wife were not living separate and apart. He also moved to cancel the lis pendens placed on his rental properties. The court found it "ha[d] the jurisdiction to order separate support and maintenance, [but it did] not have the authority to do so when the parties [were] living together." Accordingly, the court dismissed her complaint. The Supreme Court affirmed the family court because Wife failed to allege that she and Husband were living separate and apart at the time of filing. Furthermore, because Wife's lis pendens and claim for attorney's fees hinged on the validity of her complaint, the Court found no error in the family court's denial of that relief. View "Theisen v. Theisen" on Justia Law

Thomas Skinner received an award of benefits from the Workers' Compensation Commission for asbestosis under the scheduled loss provisions of Section 42-9-30 of the South Carolina Code.  Westinghouse Electric Corporation, Skinner's former employer, appealed that decision, arguing Skinner could not recover for a scheduled loss and must proceed under the "general disability" statutes found in Sections 42-9-10 and 42-9-20 of the South Carolina Code. Westinghouse's arguments on appeal concerned the impact of section 42-11-60 on Skinner's right to recover for his pulmonary disease.  In particular, it argued Skinner could only recover for total or partial disability under sections 42-9-10 and 42-9-20, respectively.  The Supreme Court agreed with Westinghouse and reversed the special referee's affirmation of Skinner's award based upon the clear language of section 42-11-60: "[i]n that section, the General Assembly specified that recovery for a pulmonary disease such as Skinner's hinges upon a showing of lost wages under section 42-9-10 and 42-9-20.  Because our resolution of this issue is dispositive of the appeal, it is not necessary for us to address the remaining issues raised by the parties." View "Skinner v. Westinghouse Electric Corp." on Justia Law

In 2004, Sherry Ray formed CFRE, a single-member limited liability company with herself as the sole member. CFRE conducts no business and was formed solely for estate planning and asset protection purposes. To that end, Ray declined to have CFRE taxed as a corporation and, in 2006, deeded the title in her home to it. Because there was a conveyance by deed of the property, the Greenville County Assessor automatically commenced a reassessment of the property for the 2007 tax year. Accordingly, the property was subjected to the default property tax ratio of six percent until CFRE could prove entitlement to the lower ratio under section 12-43-220. When CFRE sought the four percent ratio, the Assessor denied it eligibility. CFRE, LLC appealed the decision of the Administrative Law Court (ALC) that held that real estate owned by the company was not entitled to the residential tax ratio. Furthermore, CFRE argued the ALC erred in not sanctioning the Assessor for failing to respond to discovery requests from CFRE. While the Supreme Court held the ALC did not abuse its discretion in not sanctioning the Assessor, the Court reversed the ALC's conclusion regarding CFRE's entitlement to the legal residence tax ratio and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "CFRE v. Greenville County Assesor" on Justia Law

This case invoked the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction. Plaintiff Board of Trustees of the School District of Fairfield County (Board), Defendants State of South Carolina and the Legislative Delegation of Fairfield County (collectively, the State), and Defendant-Intervenors House of Representatives and the Senate (collectively, the General Assembly), jointly petitioned the Court to determine the constitutionality of Act 308 of the South Carolina Acts of 2010 (Act 308). The Board raised two challenges to the constitutionality of Act 308: (1) the Board asserted the General Assembly did not override the Governor’s veto of Act 308 in accordance with Article IV, section 21 of the South Carolina Constitution; (2) the Board asserted Act 308 is impermissible special legislation in violation of Article III, section 34 of the South Carolina Constitution. Upon review, the Supreme Court found the General Assembly did not override the Governor's veto of Act 308 in accordance with the State constitution. The Court entered judgment in favor of the Board. View "Fairfield School District v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

Appellant Foreign Academic & Cultural Exchange Services, Inc. (FACES) instituted this action against Respondent Daniela Tripon for breach of contract, breach of the duty of loyalty, and injunctive relief. FACES recruits teachers from outside the United States and places them with schools within the state pursuant to the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Program. Respondent, a Romanian citizen, contracted with FACES to participate in its program, and entered the United States on a J-1 visa. Pursuant to the "foreign residency requirement" of the J-1 visa, respondent was required to return to her home country and remain there for at least two years following departure from the United States. After Respondent had taught for two years, she and FACES entered into a revised agreement for the term of an additional school year. The new contract also increased respondent's salary and contained an acknowledgement that respondent would return home for two years after the contract expired. Shortly after executing the new contract, respondent married a former FACES teacher, and was granted a waiver of the J-1 foreign residency requirement, allowing her to remain in the United States. Subsequently, Respondent accepted a full-time position with another school district and received an H-1B visa allowing her to remain in the United States after the expiration of her J-1 visa. Following respondent's failure to return to Romania as contracted, FACES instituted this action. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Respondent as to all of FACES' claims. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's order granting summary judgment, finding there were material questions of fact whether respondent breached the revised contract by not returning to her home country and accepting another job, whether FACES suffered any actual as opposed to liquidated damages, and whether respondent breached the duty of loyalty implied in every employment contract. View "Foreign Academic & Cultural Exchange Services, Inc. v. Tripon" on Justia Law