Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Respondent Municipal Court Judge Sheryl Polk McKinney's sister, who was the Clerk of the Town of Varnville, was arrested and charged with embezzlement of public funds, forgery, and misconduct in office.  Respondent's sister was accused of issuing checks in Respondent's name, forging respondent's name to the checks and converting the money for her personal use over an eight year period. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that by her misconduct, Respondent violated multiple Canons of the Code of Judicial Conduct (Rule 501, SCACR). The Court found Respondent’s misconduct warranted a suspension from judicial duties.  Respondent was suspended for thirty days.  View "In the Matter of Municipal Court Judge Sheryl Polk McKinney" on Justia Law

Appellant Matthew Kundinger received a default judgment against Louis and Linda Frazer (the Frazers) before the Frazers closed a refinance mortgage with Matrix Financial Services Corporation (Matrix).  In Matrix's foreclosure action, the master-in-equity granted Matrix equitable subrogation, giving the refinance mortgage priority over Appellant's judgment lien. Appellant counterclaimed, alleging his judgment had priority over Matrix's mortgage because it had been recorded first.  Matrix, attempting to gain the primary priority position, then sought to have the refinance mortgage equitably subrogated to the rights of its January 2001 mortgage.  The master-in-equity granted Matrix's request, and Appellant appealed that order. Upon review of the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court found that a lender that refinances its own debt is not entitled to equitable subrogation.  The Court reversed the lower court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Matrix Financial Services Corp. v. Frazer" on Justia Law

Petitioner Brian DiMarco sought a writ of certiorari to review the court of appeals' decision that affirmed, as modified, a family court's contempt order against him.  Petitioner was subject to a court order to make monthly child support payments to Cheryl DiMarco (Mother).  According to Petitioner, he had made child support payments for over ten years before Mother filed for an increase in 2006.  The family court instead decreased the support order and ordered the payments be made through the court beginning on April 1, 2008.  Petitioner asserts he timely attempted to make the first payment to the court, but the court lacked record of the order and could not accept the payment. In May 2008, the clerk of the family court filed a Rule to Show Cause because Petitioner was behind on his child support payments. The hearing was scheduled for June 25, 2008. On June 23, 2008, Petitioner paid the arrearage, bringing his child support account to a zero balance. On the morning of June 25, Petitioner did not appear on time for the Rule to Show Cause hearing. The judge issued a warrant for Petitioner's arrest.  No testimony was taken on whether or not Petitioner had failed to pay child support.  Shortly thereafter, Petitioner arrived at the courthouse.  During the hearing, everyone who spoke noted Petitioner did not owe any outstanding child support at that time. During his argument, Mother's attorney stated, "I think the court needs to very much impress upon him taking the law into his own hands and not showing up, not being here on time it's just, just it's driving everyone nuts." From the bench the judge held Petitioner in civil contempt, suspended confinement and a levied a fine. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals because the sanction ordered by the family court violated Petitioner's rights under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The court of appeals said "the family court's contempt sanction has elements of both civil and criminal contempt."  The civil element of the sanction, the court found, was that the incarceration would not be imposed unless Petitioner failed to pay the $250.00 to the court.  The criminal element was that if Petitioner failed to pay the $250.00, he would be incarcerated for a definite period of time.  To remedy the family court's unclear sanction, the court of appeals modified the order and held Petitioner must pay the $250.00 in court costs, and if he failed to do so by the deadline established, then he would be incarcerated for twelve months.  In doing so, the court of appeals crafted a sanction that violated Petitioner's Sixth Amendment rights. View "DiMarco v. DiMarco" on Justia Law

Petitioner Glenda Barron began working for Respondent Labor Finders of South Carolina in Respondent's Charleston office around 1990.  During petitioner's employment, Respondent planned to open a second office location in the Charleston area and informed Petitioner she would be promoted to regional sales manager for both Charleston locations.  In 2004, petitioner signed an agreement acknowledging her status as an at-will employee and setting her compensation as "straight commission" of 3% of customer payments deposited and posted by both Charleston offices each week, to be paid within ninety days of the invoice date. The second Charleston office opened in September 2004 and began earning income that November.  In January of the following year, Petitioner became concerned that respondent had not paid her the full amount of commissions she had earned. The supervisor contacted respondent's owner, who acknowledged that, due to an oversight, he forgot to pay Petitioner the commissions from the new Charleston location.  Petitioner never filed a written complaint with the Department of Labor, Licensing, and Regulation, as outlined by the Payment of Wages Act (Act). Respondent terminated Petitioner's employment the next day, stating it was forced to downsize in light of recent budget cuts.  Eight or nine days later, Respondent issued Petitioner a check in excess of the amount she was owed for commissions. Petitioner sued, alleging violations of the Act, breach of contract, breach of contract accompanied by a fraudulent act, and wrongful termination in violation of public policy.  The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Respondent as to all causes of action. Petitioner appealed the entry of summary judgment as to her wrongful termination claim.  The Court of Appeals affirmed. Petitioner argued on appeal that the Court of Appeals erred in holding she could not maintain a wrongful termination claim under the public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine.  While the Supreme Court agreed the Court of Appeals erred in its analysis, the Court nonetheless affirmed the decision: "[a]lthough we agree. . . that there is no statutory remedy within the Act that would preclude an employee from maintaining a wrongful termination action, we nevertheless decline to address whether the public policy exception applies when an employee is terminated in retaliation for filing a wage complaint with the Department of Labor.  We find the Court of Appeals properly affirmed the circuit court's grant of summary judgment because there is simply no evidence the Act was ever implicated."  Petitioner never filed a complaint with the Department of Labor as required by the Act, nor did she ever indicate to respondent she had filed or intended to file a complaint.  "Thus, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to petitioner, there is no genuine issue of material fact whether petitioner was terminated in retaliation for availing herself of the protections of the Act." View "Barron v. Labor Finders" on Justia Law

Appellant Bon Secours-St. Francis Xavier Hospital (the Hospital) was a defendant at trial in the underlying civil case.  On the morning of the trial, Appellants removed the case to federal court for the second time on the same grounds as the initial removal.  The federal district court judge again remanded the case to state court.  The state trial judge, imposed severe sanctions against the Appellants for the delay created by the second removal.  Appellants argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that they should not have been sanctioned for the second removal because it was done in good faith. The Supreme Court agreed with both [the trial judge's] version of the facts and his conclusion that the second removal was not based on good grounds and was interposed solely for delay: "[w]hile Rule 11 is evaluated by a subjective standard, the rule still may be violated with a filing that is so patently without merit that no reasonable attorney could have a good faith belief in its propriety.  We find such is the case here." The Court affirmed the lower court's imposition of sanctions. View "Bon Secours-St. Francis Xavier Hospital v. Wieters" on Justia Law

Carolina Chloride, Inc. sued Richland County alleging the County incorrectly advised it of the legal zoning classification of its property and that it lost a potential sale of the property due to the zoning issue.  The trial judge directed a verdict for the County on all of Carolina Chloride's claims.  The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded as to the claims for negligence and negligent misrepresentation but upheld the directed verdict as to Carolina Chloride's remaining claims. On appeal, the County argued the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the directed verdict in its favor on Carolina Chloride's claims for negligence and negligent misrepresentation. Upon review of the trial record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court concluded that "[a]lthough it is certainly unfortunate that a mistake occurred in this case, Carolina Chloride had no legal right to rely solely upon the representations of County personnel and should have consulted the official record to determine the legal zoning classification of its property.  Carolina Chloride's owner and its broker are both experienced in business matters, but it appears that neither [the Company] nor his broker personally inspected the County's official records prior to making a sizable investment in developing the property."  The Court reversed the appellate court's decision with respect to the directed verdict as to the negligence and negligent misrepresentation claims. The Court affirmed the appellate court on all other matters. View "Carolina Chloride v. Richland County" on Justia Law

Appellant Charleston County School District (School District) appealed a circuit court's order that granted a Rule 12(b)(6) SCRCP motion to dismiss its complaint that alleged the unconstitutionality of Act. No. 189 of 2005 (Act 189), as well as its decision to dismiss the Governor as a party to this action. South Carolina adopted a charter school law in 1996, called the South Carolina Charter Schools Act.  The General Assembly amended the Charter Schools Act once in 2002 and again in 2006.  In the Charter Schools Act, the General Assembly provided rules governing all aspects of the organization, approval, and operation of charter schools in South Carolina, as well as the obligations of each sponsoring school district. The School District filed a complaint against Speaker of the House Robert Harrell, President of the Senate Andre Bauer, Governor Mark Sanford, and the State of South Carolina seeking a declaratory judgment that Act 189 was unconstitutional.  The complaint alleged that Act 189 was special legislation in violation of the South Carolina Constitution because the subject of charter schools was already comprehensively addressed by the Charter Schools Act and Act 189 only applied to Charleston County's charter schools without any reasonable basis for doing so. Though the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's dismissal of the Governor, the Court found that the School District's complaint sufficiently states a cause of action that Act 189 is unconstitutional.   The Court remanded the case back to the district court for further proceedings. View "Charleston County School District v. Harrell" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted the State's petition for a writ of certiorari to review a circuit court's order granting post-conviction relief (PCR) to Defendant Kelle Holden as to her guilty plea.  The State contended the circuit court judge erred in finding plea counsel ineffective for failing to adequately (1) discuss the charges with Holden, and (2) explaining to Defendant that she was pleading guilty without a sentence recommendation from the State. In 2005 Defendant was arrested and indicted for numerous charges stemming from her participation, along with several other co-defendants, in a series of car break-ins that occurred in Greenville County over a six-month period.  Following her arrest, Holden cooperated with law enforcement and gave a statement regarding her involvement. In 2006, Defendant pled guilty to multiple drug, larceny and theft charges. The plea judge sentenced Defendant to several concurrent sentences for each of the charges against her. Defendant appealed her guilty plea and sentences to the Court of Appeals.  She voluntarily chose to withdraw her appeal.  After the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal, Defendant filed a timely application for PCR in which she alleged that ineffective assistance of plea counsel rendered her guilty plea involuntary. When asked about the plea proceeding, Defendant acknowledged the judge had questioned her regarding her decision to plead guilty and had discussed the maximum sentences for each of the charges.  Defendant also recalled the solicitor's statement that there was no sentence recommendation.  At the conclusion of her cross-examination testimony, Defendant admitted she would not have filed the PCR application had she received less than a three-year sentence. The judge concluded that plea counsel "misadvised [Holden] about the sentence she would receive if she accepted the State's plea offer and entered a guilty plea."  The Supreme Court's review of the plea proceeding revealed that Defendant was clearly aware of the elements of the charged offenses, the State's evidence as to the charges, and the potential sentences. The Court found no probative evidence to support the PCR judge's finding that Holden received ineffective assistance of counsel with respect to her guilty plea. The Court reversed the PCR judge's decision and reinstated Defendant's guilty plea. View "Holden v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

After Appellant Donald Brandt produced a fraudulent document in a civil proceeding, a circuit court held Appellant in civil and criminal contempt.  In turn, the court dismissed Appellant's legal malpractice action with prejudice and ordered him to serve six months in jail and pay the defendants' attorneys' fees. In 1998, Appellant sued Elizabeth Gooding and her law firm Gooding & Gooding, P.A. for legal malpractice based on Gooding's representation of him in a real estate transaction.  During the course of discovery, Appellant presented to his attorney a document which appeared to have been sent the lender in the transaction to Appellant on September 18, 1995.  Appellant also provided the letter to his malpractice expert.  The letter was then introduced in the expert's deposition and used by him to opine that Gooding had committed malpractice. The document, if authentic, would have imputed knowledge to Gooding of a conflict of interest related to the representation of Appellant in the real estate transaction.  Gooding, however, claimed the document was fraudulent.  As a result, Gooding requested a hearing to determine whether the document was authentic.  Additionally, Gooding requested the court hold Appellant in contempt and award costs if such authenticity could not be established. Subsequently, based on the fraudulent document, the State indicted Appellant for forgery.  After a jury found Appellant guilty of the indicted offense, the trial judge sentenced Brandt to ten years' imprisonment, suspended upon the service of four years, followed by five years' probation and payment of restitution. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Appellant contended that the trial judge erred in failing to dismiss the forgery indictment and in failing to grant his motion for a directed verdict on the ground that Double Jeopardy barred the forgery prosecution.  Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the State presented sufficient evidence to support a forgery conviction.  Because the forged document did not involve a dollar amount and the State did not present evidence of a definitive dollar amount, the Court held that the trial judge erred in sentencing Appellant for felony forgery. The Court remanded the case back to the circuit court for resentencing. View "South Carolina v. Brandt" on Justia Law

Appellant Abel Jacobs appealed a circuit court's decision holding that a sentence for burglary in the first degree cannot be suspended under the language of South Carolina Code section 24-21-410.  In January 2010, Appellant pled guilty to a variety of criminal charges, including a charge for first degree burglary.  At the plea hearing, defense counsel asked the circuit judge to suspend the minimum fifteen year sentence for first degree burglary in lieu of placing Appellant under probation.  Defense counsel opined that state courts have routinely suspended sentences for first degree burglary, and the State has never appealed those sentences.  The circuit judge deferred sentencing Appellant for the first degree burglary conviction at the plea hearing, and requested the parties submit memoranda in support of their positions regarding the suspension issue.  The circuit judge subsequently issued an order finding that a sentence for the conviction of first degree burglary is not suspendable under section 24-21-410 of the South Carolina Code.  At the sentencing hearing, the circuit judge sentenced Appellant to fifteen years imprisonment for first degree burglary, along with  concurrent sentences for remaining charges, crediting Appellant for time served prior to his guilty plea. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that section 24-21-410 of the South Carolina code does not give courts the authority to suspend sentences for crimes punishable by death or life imprisonment, and this includes crimes that include lesser sentences than death or life imprisonment.  Therefore, the Court affirmed the circuit court's order. View "South Carolina v. Jacobs" on Justia Law