Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The South Carolina Department of Social Services (DSS) initiated termination of parental rights (TPR) proceedings against M.R.C.L. (mother) and R.L. (father). Child was removed from mother and father's home in May 2007 due to allegations of physical neglect, after both parents tested positive for crack cocaine. Child, who was one year old at the time, was placed in a pre-adoptive foster home with two of her siblings. After a merits hearing, the family court ordered mother and father to complete a treatment plan, including a drug and alcohol assessment and a parental assessment, and to maintain safe and appropriate housing. Mother and father did not complete the treatment plan. The Guardian Ad Litem (GAL) testified that, in her opinion, it was in child's best interest to terminate mother and father's parental rights and allow the foster parents to adopt child. The family court terminated mother and father's parental rights, generally finding (1) mother and father willfully failed to visit the child; (2) mother and father willfully failed to support the child; and (3) termination was in the best interest of the child. Mother appealed the termination, and the Court of Appeals reversed, holding DSS failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that mother willfully failed to support or visit the child. Because the Court of Appeals found DSS failed to prove any statutory ground for TPR, it did not reach the issue whether TPR was in the best interest of the child. Upon review, the Supreme Court found the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the family court's finding that mother willfully failed to support the child. Specifically, considering all the facts and circumstances of this case, DSS showed by clear and convincing evidence that mother willfully failed to support child. The Court held the family court properly found TPR was in child's best interest. View "So. Carolina Dept. of Social Svcs. v. M.R.C.L." on Justia Law

Albert Epstein sued Coastal Timber Co., Inc. (Coastal) for damages, alleging that Coastal cut and removed standing timber that was subject to mortgages he held on property he owned. The circuit court found Mr. Epstein failed to properly secure an interest in the timber under South Carolina's Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). Epstein appealed that decision, arguing that the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment to Coastal after finding his mortgages did not constitute a lien on the standing timber cut by Coastal. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with Mr. Epstein that the UCC did not convert all standing timber to goods and thereby divest him of his interest in the timber. The Court concluded that "the proper analysis is not one of cancellation but of priority. [...] any security interest later recorded on timber to be cut under a contract of sale would be junior to any existing interests. To hold otherwise would allow a mortgagor to unilaterally void an existing lien imposed by a mortgage on the real property, which includes the timber, simply by thereafter executing a contract to sell the timber." The Court reversed the circuit court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Epstein v. Coastal Timber Co., Inc." on Justia Law

Appellant Georgetown County League of Women Voters appealed an order that dismissed its action that sought a declaration that Respondent Smith Land Company had unlawfully filled wetlands and dismissed its request for an injunction requiring Smith to restore those wetlands. Respondent owns a .332 acre lot in Pawleys Island, .19 acres of which are isolated wetlands often referred to as Carolina Bays. Before developing the lot, Respondent notified both the Army Corps of Engineers and the Department of Health and Environmental Control (DHEC) of its plans. While the Corps cautioned respondent to notify DHEC before performing the work and respondent did so, it received no response from DHEC. Respondent then filled the wetlands. The League then filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment and related equitable relief. After a hearing, the circuit court held that DHEC did not have jurisdiction over isolated wetlands, that Respondent complied with all requirements before filling the wetlands, and that the League could not maintain a private suit under the South Carolina Pollution Control Act. Finding that the circuit court erred in holding that: (1) the DHEC lacked jurisdiction to regulate the wetlands; (2) Respondent did not violate the Act; and (3) the Act does not create a private cause of action, the Supreme Court reversed the reversed the case and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Georgetown County League of Women Voters v. Smith Land Co." on Justia Law

Appellants A & A Taxi, Inc. and the South Carolina Workers' Compensation Uninsured Employers' Fund appealed a circuit court order that found Respondent Robert Pikaart was an employee of A & A Taxi, Inc. at the time he was injured in two automobile accidents and that he was entitled to certain workers' compensation benefits. Appellants contended Pikaart was an independent contractor, not an employee; therefore, the South Carolina Workers' Compensation Commission had no jurisdiction in this matter. They further argued the circuit court improperly made findings of fact that did not bear on the limited issue of jurisdiction that was before it. Because the issue on appeal concerned jurisdiction, the Supreme Court took its own view of the preponderance of the evidence. Accordingly, the Court held that the facts in this case were preponderantly in favor of a finding that Pikaart was the general manager of A & A Taxi and as such, was an employee subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission. To the extent Appellants contended the circuit court erred in making additional findings of fact that were not related to jurisdiction, the Court found the issue was not preserved for review. Consequently, the Court affirmed the circuit court's order in full. View "Pikaart v. A & A Taxi" on Justia Law

The State appealed the trial court's grant of Respondent Robert Nance's pre-trial motion to suppress the testimony of the victim in Respondent's new trial after the Supreme Court granted post-conviction relief (PCR) in "Nance v. Ozmint" (Nance II). Robert Fraley survived Respondent's attack in 1993 and testified at the first trial but died before Respondent was retried. Respondent argued that, because in "Nance II" the Supreme Court found he received ineffective assistance of counsel due to defense counsel's failure to subject the State's case to meaningful adversarial testing, he lacked the opportunity to cross-examine Mr. Fraley as required by the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Therefore, Respondent argued, the State could not read Mr. Fraley's testimony into the record as an unavailable witness under Rule 804 of the rules of evidence, because it would violate his constitutional right to confront witnesses against him. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Mr. Fraley was sworn during the first trial, and Respondent had the opportunity to cross-examine him as required by the Sixth Amendment. Accordingly, the Court found that the circuit court erred in suppressing Mr. Fraley's testimony. The Court reversed the circuit court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "South Carolina v. Nance" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to review the court of appeals' analysis and disposition of Petitioner Jamey Reid's conviction and sentence for attempted second-degree criminal sexual contact (CSC) with a minor. The single issue before the Court was whether the court of appeals erred in upholding the trial court's denial of Petitioner's directed verdict motion. Petitioner entered an Internet chat room believing he was chatting with a fourteen-year-old female. The supposed minor was, in fact, a Westminster Police Officer. Petitioner quickly turned the conversation to one of a sexual nature, as he desired a sexual encounter with the girl. Petitioner would later be indicted and tried. At the close of the State's case, Petitioner moved for a directed verdict in connection with the attempted CSC charge, arguing that the State had failed to present evidence of an overt act as required by the attempted CSC charge. Because the trial court held there was sufficient evidence presented to create a jury question, the directed verdict motion was denied. The jury convicted Petitioner on both charges, and he was sentenced. Petitioner contended the evidence, as a matter of law, was insufficient on the question of specific intent and further rose only to the level of "mere preparation," entitling him to a directed verdict of acquittal on the attempted CSC charge. Under the facts of this case, the Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeals that because a jury question was presented, the directed verdict motion was properly denied. View "South Carolina v. Reid" on Justia Law

The Town of Mount Pleasant (Town) appealed the circuit court's order reversing and dismissing Defendant Treva Roberts's municipal court conviction for driving under the influence (DUI) on the ground the arresting officer's vehicle was not equipped with a video camera pursuant to the pertinent section of the South Carolina Code. The Town argued on appeal that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction because Defendant failed to obtain a bond or pay her court-ordered fine prior to initiating her appeal. Furthermore, the Town contended that the court erred in "narrowly construing" the pertinent code to require the reversal of Defendant's DUI conviction and dismissal of the charge. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the circuit court judge erred in classifying the Town's jurisdictional challenge as one involving subject matter jurisdiction. Because Defendant timely served her notice of appeal on the municipal court, she met the procedural requirements. As such, her failure to obtain a bond or pay the court-ordered fine did not divest the circuit court of appellate jurisdiction. As to the merits, the Court found that the Town's prolonged failure to equip its patrol vehicles with video cameras defeated the intent of the state law mandating their use. Therefore, the Court concluded that the Town should not be able to avoid its statutorily created obligation to produce a videotape by repeatedly relying on the code. Because the Town failed to establish any statutory exception to excuse its noncompliance, the Court affirmed the circuit court's dismissal of Defendant's DUI charge and conviction and dismissed the charge. View "Town of Mt. Pleasant v. Roberts" on Justia Law

This case involved a dispute over the results of a town council election in Atlantic Beach, South Carolina, held on November 3, 2009. Carolyn Cole and Windy Price (Appellants) appealed the circuit court order that affirmed the Town of Atlantic Beach Municipal Election Commission's (MEC) decision to de-certify and order a new election for two Atlantic Beach Town Councilmember positions. On November 3, 2009, the Town of Atlantic Beach held an election for the two positions on town council. After the polls closed, there were 39 contested ballots. The MEC held a challenged ballot hearing, after which, 28 of the challenged ballots were accepted. These accepted ballots included those of Price and Cole. The MEC conducted two protest hearings. In pertinent part, the MEC heard testimony concerning the allegations raised in several letters of protest that contested the election of Appellants on the grounds that Appellants failed to meet the residency requirements to run as candidates. At the close of the second hearing, a majority of the Commissioners voted to grant petitions for a new election. On that same day, Appellants appealed the MEC's decision to the circuit court. The MEC did not issue a written order until January 29, 2010. That order summarily found Appellants did not meet the residency requirements of running for public office. The MEC de-certified the election results and ordered a new election. The circuit court judge heard the appeal in May 2010, and issued an order that same day affirming the decision of the MEC. Upon review, the issues before the Supreme Court pertained to whether there was sufficient evidence in the MECs record to support its decision to decertify and order new elections. Appellants argued that the Supreme Court should vacate the MEC's decision to de-certify and order a new election because the MEC failed to comply with the requirements of the South Carolina Code that delineates the procedure for contesting results of a municipal election. The Court believed that the Town's "complete disregard of the provisions of section the statute was perpetuated by a conscious decision to ignore the will of the voters, and this delay ultimately undermined the legislative purpose behind requiring the expeditious handling of election disputes." Therefore, the Court agreed with Appellants and vacated the decision of the MEC. Accordingly, the MEC's initial certification of the town council election declaring Appellants Cole and Price as winners was restored. View "Cole v. Town of Atlantic Beach Election Commission" on Justia Law

The State alleged Defendant Sammyeil Barber and three others (Blake Kimbrell, Kenneth Walker, and Marcus Kiser) conspired to rob a drug dealer, Alan Heintz. The men gathered together and discussed the plans for the robbery, procured a semi-automatic handgun and then drove to Heintz's house. Upon discovering more people than expected at the house, they left to procure a second firearm. The men returned to Heintz's house and Kimbrell waited in the car while Barber, Walker, and Kiser went inside. Heintz was dragged from his bedroom and ultimately drew a shotgun on the robbers. One of the suspects armed with a semi-automatic handgun shot and killed Heintz and shot and wounded another man who was sleeping on the couch. The three men fled the premises, stealing only $30 and leaving the second firearm behind. Kimbrell, Walker, and Kiser all implicated Barber in the planning and execution of the robbery and said he was the gunman who shot Heintz. They pled guilty and testified against Barber, each receiving 15–30 years. At Barber's trial, Kimbrell, Walker, and Kiser all testified Barber was armed with the semi-automatic handgun and had shot both victims. On appeal, Barber argued the accomplice liability charge against him was improper because it was unsupported by the evidence presented at trial. Upon review of the trial record, the Supreme Court found that the charge was properly supported by the evidence presented at trial. The Court affirmed Barber's conviction and sentence. View "Barber v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

Appellant "J. Doe" brought an action against Respondent Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (Wal-Mart) alleging various theories of negligence. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Wal-Mart. This case arose from the physical and sexual abuse of then three-year-old J. Doe (also "the victim"). "F. Doe" is the victim's guardian ad litem and great uncle. F. Doe and his wife (aunt) often kept the victim for months at a time. According to the aunt, both of the victim's parents physically abused him beginning when he was three months old. In August 1997, after arriving at her house, the aunt examined the victim and found two "wide strips" of bruising on his buttocks. She did not contact the police or the Department of Social Services (DSS) or seek medical treatment. Instead, she took two photographs of the victim's buttocks. Several days later, the aunt took the roll of film to Wal-Mart to be developed. When the aunt retrieved the photos, a photo technician informed her she had destroyed some of the photos because of a store policy requiring the destruction of photos depicting nudity. The aunt claimed the employee told her she was required to "destroy them," which the aunt believed meant the employee had destroyed the photos and the negatives. The aunt left the store with the remainder of the photos and all of the negatives, but erroneously believed the negatives depicting the victim's buttocks had been destroyed. The father pled guilty to first degree criminal sexual conduct and was sentenced to twenty-five years' imprisonment. In 2003, Appellant filed suit arguing the victim's injuries from the sexual abuse were a result of Wal-Mart's failure to report the suspected physical abuse depicted in the photos as required by the Reporter's Statute and/or Wal-Mart's negligent hiring and supervision of its employees and its violations of approximately twenty internal company policies. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the circuit court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Wal-Mart was proper because there could be no civil liability under the state Reporter's Statute and Wal-Mart owed no duty to the victim. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the lower court's decision. View "Doe v. Walmart" on Justia Law